Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis (review)

Reviewed by: Just War and Pacifism: Chinese and Christian Perspectives in Dialogue Joseph Tse-Hei Lee (bio) Edmund Ryden . Just War and Pacifism: Chinese and Christian Perspectives in Dialogue. Variétés Sinologiques, New Series, 89. Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001. 181 pp. Hardcover $12.00, ISBN 2-910969-04-5. The wars of the twentieth century and, thus far, of the twenty-first have been "total wars," exhausting huge amounts of resources, killing more civilians than soldiers, and devastating the environment. The question of how to replace violent with nonviolent means of conflict resolution has now become extremely urgent. In Just War and Pacifism, Edmund Ryden, a Jesuit scholar at the Fujen University in Taiwan and author of Philosophy of Peace in Han China (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 1998), takes yet another look at this question. Exploring the issue from philosophical and cross-cultural perspectives, Ryden adds an ethical dimension to the debate about war and peace by challenging the dehumanization of the "enemy" in contemporary political rhetoric (p. 13). He consults a wide range of disciplines on nonviolent means of conflict resolution including history, philosophy, political science, and theology. In many ways, this book presents a thorough critique of the subject within a dialectical framework of just war, pacifism, and nonviolence, and calls for greater commitment to avoid using war as an instrument of international policy (pp. 14-15). [End Page 250] While the preface lays out the book's objectives and methodology, part 1, "Just War," traces the historical development of the "Just War" theory and discusses its conceptual relevance to the contemporary world. There are at least two ways of looking at the "Just War" theory: the pursuit of justice and the avoidance of war. At the center of the debate is the question of how the theory should be used to justify the use of force in domestic and international politics. Chapter 1, "Just War: A Western Perspective," presents a critical review of the "Just War" theory in Europe by examining the writings of Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Vitoria, Suarez, Gonzalez, Gentili, and Grotius. Underlying their writings is the idea that God would approve the use of war to pursue peace and justice. When warfare is perceived as a choice between a greater and a lesser evil, these Catholic thinkers are willing to accept the use of war as a defense against the greater evil. In the West, the "Just War" theory is more than a philosophical idea. It is also an official doctrine in the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church that, as such, can only be declared active by the Pope. The last time this doctrine was used by the Pope was in late July 1995, when John Paul II called for "defensive and proportionate" intervention in Bosnia in "a just war" to defend the civilian population.1 The Pope's remark amounted to sanctioning the actions of the Croatian army prior to the U.S.-supported Croatian military action against the Serbs in Krajina in early August 1995, widely known as "Operation Storm."2 All contemporary wars are framed as a struggle between good and evil. The concept of the "Cold War" was based on the same formula, and right-wing politicians and intellectuals in the West are reluctant to abandon this formula. The current U.S. military campaign in Iraq is justified on the basis of the evil of Saddam Hussein's regime. Chapter 2, "Just War: A Chinese Perspective," explores the notion of yi zhan (just war) in ancient Chinese philosophy. There seem to be considerable parallels between early Chinese and Western philosophical texts on the nature of war, an insight that, in an imperfect world, war can be used as a self-defense against aggression. Of all the Chinese philosophical texts, Ryden focuses on the Huainanzi: On Military Strategy because this text is more restrictive about the use of force in a wartime situation. According to the Huainanzi, the sole purpose of an army is humanitarian intervention, and the army must be disbanded after the end of a military campaign. This corresponds to Machiavelli's view that an army should be prevented from establishing itself...

Throughout history, Chinese international behavior suggests that security calculations have remained and continue to be an inherent force in the minds of Chinese foreign policy decision‐makers. Since China launched its open‐door policy in 1979, the way the Chinese think and assess the field has significantly changed. Today, the once widely supported realist approach is being rejected by a growing body of Chinese experts who now view the world as increasingly interdependent in both economic and security terms. This paper shows how the Chinese perspective on security issues has diversified and significantly transformed into a more interdependent viewpoint. Despite general skepticism over whether China has learned the inevitability of state sovereignty infringement in the globalization age, Chinese analysts came to understand and believe in the necessity of the security regime and multilateralism in the post‐Cold War period. The “new security concept” exemplified the development of the mutual security in the late 1990s. Whether the Chinese design based on the new idea will be realized is unclear, given the present security structure dominated by the U.S.‐alliance system. However, the new growing paradigm of the Chinese security perspective might play an important role in the process of building multilateral security institutions and regimes in the region, and participation and influence might be China's intention as a responsible regional power

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the rise of China has been one of the most frequently discussed topics in international relations (IR) circles. Because of this rise, Anglophone IR scholars have developed an increasing interest in Chinese perspectives on international relations. At the same time, IR scholars in China are dissatisfied with being consumers of knowledge rather than knowledge producers; many Chinese scholars have suggested there should be a Chinese school (CS) of IR, and attempts have been made over the past few decades to establish it. The call for a CS can be understood as an effort by Chinese scholars to establish their own subjectivity in international studies, a pursuit of an indigenous Chinese site of agency with regards to developing IR and IR theory. To demonstrate this, the historical development of international studies in China after the founding of the People’s Republic and how it led to Chinese IR scholars calling for the establishment of a CS in the 21st century is first introduced. Subsequently, the main branches and viewpoints of the CS will be illustrated—including Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, Zhao Tingyang’s conception of the Tianxia system, the Shanghai school’s symbiosis theory, and Qin Yaqing’s relational theory of world politics—before elucidating the main criticisms they have received from the Anglophone world of IR. Critics argue that the overall development of international studies in China is very much one of Chinese scholars replicating mainstream IR and its problems. This claim suggests that the CS movement is an imitation of modern Western discourse for political service rather than a genuine development of an indigenous discourse from Chinese tradition. This article, however, refutes these critics by suggesting that the development of international studies in China does have the potential to make an important contribution to non-Western, post-Western, and global quests in IR; attempts at creating CS contain an indigenous Chinese site of agency with regards to developing IR.

This chapter examines the relationship between international and Chinese foreign policy. It looks at how a particular kind of international factor might affect Chinese foreign policy, namely, international structure. In particular, there are two kinds of structures, the existence and effects of which are at the core of international relation (IR) theory debates today: material power structures and normative structures. The predominant arguments about material power structures in IR come from neorealist theory. Neorealism's influence on IR theory has been profound. Sovereignty is an example of a normative structure with a direct impact on Chinese foreign policy because the concept is deeply internalized and institutionalized in the decision process. Human agency—the power to act according to intentions—occurs within normative structural boundaries and within the meaning these structures provide to material realities. The chapter discusses different ways in which Chinese foreign policy has been affected by the interplay of domestically generated and institutionalized identity and changing international norms.

Contesting Visions of East Asia's Regional Economic Order:A Chinese Perspective Xinquan Tu (bio) and Yue Lyu (bio) Despite being the biggest country in Asia, China only within the last century has developed a sense of itself as a regional country. Historically, China considered itself the center of the world. It was not until the early twentieth century, after Western powers overwhelmingly defeated the Qing Dynasty and forced the country to open its markets, that the Chinese people began to observe the world from the perspective of a country located in East Asia. Since the government's economic reforms and opening in the 1980s, China has become a significant destination for trade and investment and a key link in the regional production network. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy. This essay will provide a Chinese perspective on the contending U.S. and Chinese visions of the regional economic order in East Asia. The discussion is divided into four sections examining China's vision of the East Asian economic order, China's perception of the U.S. role in this order, the points of convergence and divergence between the Chinese and U.S. visions, and the impact of China's recent initiatives on the existing regional economic architecture. China's Vision of the East Asian Economic Order In the first three decades after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the relationship between China and its East Asian neighbors was difficult due to ideological differences. However, the rapid development of some of these ideological opponents became a mirror for China to reflect on its own backwardness and seclusion. Deng Xiaoping's visits to Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia in 1978 were considered a strong stimulus for his decision to reform and open up the Chinese economy. These neighbors set a good example for economic development, and China was eager to learn from and cooperate with them. China's opening was [End Page 26] also a great investment opportunity for these countries, in particular their overseas Chinese communities.1 Since then, diplomatic and economic relations between China and many East Asian countries have grown closer, and China has re-emerged as a major power in the region. However, it is not yet powerful enough to set up the regional architecture it prefers. In addition to the challenges China faces from the two incumbent powers, the United States and Japan, issues such as the South China Sea and North Korea complicate China's relations with the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) and South Korea, respectively.2 These tensions are causing China to rethink its strategy for regional integration. With no pressing need to build an East Asian community, China has chosen to lower its expectations and take a more pragmatic approach. At the same time, China has begun to look beyond East Asia and see itself not only as a regional power but also as a global actor. Beijing has attempted to establish frameworks beyond East Asia in order to bypass the constraints imposed by Japan and the United States. This has, in part, involved launching cooperative forums with other regions of the world. For example, China started the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, took the lead in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with Russia and Central Asian states in 2001, and launched the China–Latin America Forum in 2014. Recently, most attention has been paid to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013. Although the plans for this wide-ranging and ambitious initiative have not been fully disclosed, it is obvious that East Asia is only a part of China's global strategy. In East Asia, which is still very important for China in terms of trade and investment, Beijing's main approach has shifted from regionalism to bilateralism. Though the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has stalled, China signed FTAs with South Korea, ASEAN, and Australia in 2015, indicating its pragmatic approach to regional integration in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In December 2015 the State Council released [End Page 27] the first official document regarding China...

This book assesses the role of identity and Chinese face culture in Chinese foreign policy by analyzing China’s political and economic retaliation against South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system on its soil.By examining the history and military action of China, Japan, and North and South Korea, the book argues that China’s divergent responses were caused by different expectations according to whether states had a perceived identity as a friend or a rival. The author demonstrates that Chinese face culture shapes China’s reaction to others through three dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. This book shows how identity and culture have worked in the relationship between China and neighboring countries through three case studies exploring North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006, South Korea’s decision to allow the United States to deploy the THAAD around 2016, and Japan’s decision to deploy two U.S. X-band radars in 2005 and 2014.A timely analysis of the importance of identity and culture in international relations, the book will be of interest to scholars of Chinese foreign policy, Sino-South Korean relations, Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-Japanese relations, Korean Politics, Asian Politics, and International Relations.

Research Article| May 01 2000 Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization Hongying Wang Hongying Wang Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2000) 40 (3): 475–491. https://doi.org/10.2307/3021157 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Hongying Wang; Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization. Asian Survey 1 May 2000; 40 (3): 475–491. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3021157 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 2000 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

As the largest emerging power of the international regime, China actively pursues opportunities for outward economic expansion. In doing so, the Chinese leadership is in favour of using classic Confucian concepts to explain the underlying motivations and approaches of China’s economic expansion. They differ largely from the traditional western International Relations (IR) interpretation of the Chinese foreign policy. Hereby, this research explores the Confucian revival in the Chinese leadership discourses in the context of Asian values. It aims to answer the question: how are Confucian ideas utilized for creating new meaning for Chinese foreign policy. We begin by considering how Confucianism fits into the current debates on universal norms and particularly Asian norms and values, engaging with the discussions about Globalizing the study of Regionalism and IR. Secondly, we reflect on the ways in which Confucianism has evolved over time and maintained its relevance for Chinese contemporary political thought. Finally, we contextualise the Confucian references of Xi Jinping’s administration by locating them within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has come to define Xi’s presidency.

Two long-standing and fiercely debated issues remain central to contemporary studies on Chinese philosophy. The first concerns whether there was an early tradition of metaphysics, and the second concerns whether there was an early tradition of Daoism. This study engages with both issues simultaneously, since if there was a tradition of early Chinese metaphysics, then it is identifiable with Huang-Lao Daoism, and if Huang-Lao Daoism constituted an early Chinese tradition, then it is identifiable with the tradition of Chinese metaphysics. This study engages with these issues in two parts. The first part examines Western and Chinese perspectives concerning what is entailed by claims that there was or was not an early tradition of Chinese metaphysics and that there was or was not an early tradition identifiable as Huang-Lao Daoism. The second part is an analysis of contemporary Chinese scholarship that, deeply grounded in the growing collection of early Chinese excavated manuscripts, both affirms the dynamic existence of early Chinese metaphysics and the vibrant existence of an early tradition identifiable with Huang-Lao Daoism. Throughout, this study attempts to concurrently build on the work of contemporary Chinese scholars for reading certain early Chinese writings often held as Daoist, but instead of agreeing with them that Laozi’s Daodejing represents an early blossoming of metaphysics, it argues that his work is grounded in an originally non-metaphysical philosophy of the Dao that Huang-Lao Daoism transformed into a metaphysics, thereby originating the tradition of early Chinese metaphysics.

Using Kuhn and McPartland’s approach, 116 Chinese college students were recruited and asked to write as many sentences as possible beginning with “Chinese…,” “Americans…,” and “Japanese….” The population of sentences consisted of 258 adjectives, of which 96 described Chinese, 53 described Americans, and 109 described Japanese. Next, the first ten adjectives with the highest frequencies describing Chinese, Americans, and Japanese, respectively were selected for the second step of data collection in that students were asked if they would accept these adjectives describing Chinese, Americans, and Japanese. If they did, they were further asked to provide examples or illustrations to support their agreement. Based on the top 30 adjectives and the qualitative data collected at the second step, students’ perceptions of Chinese, American, and Japanese were analyzed. The results of the data analysis discovered that Chinese students are, to some extent, stereotyped toward American and Japanese, and their understanding of Chinese people is not accurate, either. The results confirm that media to certain extent are responsible for the shaping of some of the students’ stereotypes. Evidently, the results of this study suggest that the Chinese students’ stereotypes will affect their intercultural communication with Americans and Japanese. Although this study does not provide tactics on the reduction or elimination of stereotypes in the process of intercultural communication, it provides meaningful clues for future research in how stereotypes may be reduced by way of intercultural contact or training. This research has two major limitations. First, all the subjects are Chinese. Had American and Japanese samples been selected for a comparative investigation, more meaningful and insightful results could have been obtained. Second, because of the space constraints, verbs and nouns were not analyzed.

Although Chinese law imposes informed consent for medical treatments, the Chinese understanding of this requirement is very different from the European one, mostly due to the influence of Confucianism. Chinese doctors and relatives are primarily interested in protecting the patient, even from the truth; thus, patients are commonly uninformed of their medical conditions, often at the family's request. The family plays an important role in health care decisions, even substituting their decisions for the patient's. Accordingly, instead of personal informed consent, what actually exists is 'family informed consent'. From a Western perspective, these features of Chinese law and Chinese culture might seem strange, contradicting our understanding of doctor-patient relationship and even the very essence of self-determination and fundamental rights. However, we cannot forget the huge influence of cultural factors in these domains, and that 'Western' informed consent is grounded on the individualistic nature of Western culture. This article will underline the differences between the Western and the Chinese perspectives, clarifying how each of them must be understood in its own cultural environment. But, while still respecting Chinese particularities, this paper advocates that China adopt patient individual informed consent because this is the only solution compatible with human dignity and human rights.

Dedication Acknowledgements Preface Tables and Figures Abbreviations PART I Introduction Ideological Assumptions PART II: THE BASES Power: the Centrepiece Marxism: Political Legitimacy Culture: Historical Legacies Modernisation: Development Requirements PART III: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES Units of Analysis: State Levels of Analysis: Inter-state Level Interactions: Contradictions PART IV: CONCLUSION Towards an IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics Problems and Prospects Postscript Endnotes Interviews Appendices Select Bibliography Glossary Index

The 2001 “spy” plane incident was probably the most serious military incident in Sino-American relations since the 1970s, and it generated a crisis in the already brittle relationship since the new Bush administration came into office. This article attempts to revisit this incident from the Chinese perspective and provides some insight into the understanding of the Chinese foreign policy behavior and position on Sino-American relations. It presents the respective arguments concerning the responsibilities of the incident, explores the Chinese historical memory of US hegemonic behavior, and examines the Chinese perspective and attitude towards the incident and their causes through a study of the reactions of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to the incident.1

One of the striking features of today's globalizing world is the cross-border penetration of just about everything: goods, ideas, technology, culture, food, the English language and much more. For proponents of globalization, this greater interconnectedness holds great promise. In the post-Cold War era, few ideas have been more influential than the notion that the spread of liberal democracy and free markets could contribute to peace and stability. In such a world, countries would be interdependent, cooperation would increase, and state borders would matter less. Despite the great appeal these ideas hold, this is still a world defined by states and their borders. As Harvey Starr writes in his article that opens this issue, "Borders matter." States are defined by their ability to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their territory. In many cases, however, border regions are unstable because states are unable to exercise control effectively or are competing for control. In such situations, the borders may not be able to hold back human trafficking, drug running, arms smuggling, and a host of other ills. The Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a stark reminder that more easily permeable borders allow the spread not only of beneficial ideas and goods, but also of terrorists and murderous ideologies. The masterminds of those attacks are now believed to be hiding in the lawless border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Iraq, porous borders have allowed support for the insurgency to stream in from Iran and Syria. Illegal immigration across Mexico's border with the United States remains an emotional issue in U.S. politics. As this issue went to press, the avian flu continued to spread across national borders into new countries, threatening a worldwide pandemic. Even in a globalizing world, therefore, it is useful to consider the role of borders in international relations. That is the theme of this issue ofSAIS Review. The issue opens with Starr's article, which explains why borders still matter in international relations and why we should pay attention to them. Stuart Elden then examines the changing norms of state sovereignty brought by the world's understanding that what happens within a state's borders cannot be that state's exclusive concern. We then offer a trio of articles addressing Iraq. Richard Schofield describes the history of Iraq's original border demarcations with Iran and Kuwait—fateful decisions that still have security ramifications today. Robert Bateman, an Army officer recently stationed in Iraq, examines the challenges of securing that country's borders. Alexander B. Downes, surveying recent efforts to resolve ethnic conflicts, concludes that partition is the only viable solution, one that he believes should be applied to Iraq. [End Page 1] The issue then explores several conflicts along national borders and issues that arise along those borders. Cyrus Samii examines the Kashmir conflict and outlines several steps the parties could take to ease tensions. Shireen T. Hunter provides a historical perspective on the complex and intractable conflicts along border regions in the Caucasus. Matthew J. Ouimet analyzes the 60-year-old conflict between Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands. Although most of the articles in this issue deal with land borders, territorial disputes at sea and control of sea-lanes are also important in international relations. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara explore China's view of the strategic South China Sea and the implications for U.S. foreign policy. Kathleen Davis outlines the problem of cross-border trafficking of North Korean women into China. Perhaps the most striking example of the relaxation of national borders is in Europe, where members of the European Union have yielded progressively more sovereignty to the center with the aim of maximizing economic well-being. Even so, future widening and deepening of the union remain controversial, as demonstrated by last year's French and Dutch rejections of the constitutional treaty. How much further should the European Union extend its borders, and to what extent should member states pursue deeper political integration so that national borders matter less? Ioannis N. Grigoriadis analyzes...

Globalization has indeed exerted strong influence on China’s literary and cultural studies. The present essay first of all deals with the controversial issue of globalization with the author’s reconstruction of it from a Chinese perspective on the basis of his previous observations. Then it discusses cultural studies, including studies of elite culture and its products challenged by popular culture, in China. It lays particular emphasis on the currently prevailing Cultural Studies introduced from the West into China at the beginning of the 1990s. The author addresses the following issues: how Cultural Studies is introduced into the Chinese context, how it is integrated with domestic elite culture studies and literary studies, how it is institutionalized in the Chinese context, and how it is developing into the phase of carrying on equal dialogues with the Western scholarship in the age of globalization. To the author, Cultural Studies has a lot in common with literary studies, especially in the Chinese context, so these two branches of learning should not necessarily be opposed to one another. A sort of dialogue and complement rather than opposition between literary and cultural studies could be realized. Even in the age of globalization, when many of the other disciplines of the humanities are severely challenged, comparative literature, merging with cultural studies, is still flourishing as it is closely related to the debate on the issue of globalization. Although both the two disciplines are closely related to the advent of globalization and have travelled from the West to China, they have after all been “glocalized” in the Chinese context with certain Chinese characteristics. That is why they still survive the age of globalization.