Circuit complexity and the expressive power of generalized first-order formulas

We consider various extensions of first-order logic. Informally, a logic 𝓛 is an extension of first-order logic if every sentence of first-order logic is also a sentence of 𝓛. We also require that 𝓛 is closed under conjunction and negation and has other basic properties of a logic. In Section 9.4, we list the properties that formally define the notion of an extension of first-order logic. Prior to Section 9.4, we provide various natural examples of such extensions. In Sections 9.1–9.3, we consider, respectively, second-order logic, infinitary logics, and logics with fixed-point operators. We do not provide a thorough treatment of any one of these logics. Indeed, we could easily devote an entire chapter to each. Rather, we define each logic and provide examples that demonstrate the expressive power of the logics. In particular, we show that none of these logics has compactness. In the final Section 9.4, we prove that if a proper extension of first-order logic has compactness, then the Downward Löwenhiem–Skolem theorem must fail for that logic. This is Lindstrom’s theorem. The Compactness theorem and Downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem are two crucial results for model theory. Every property of first-order logic from Chapter 4 is a consequence of these two theorems. Lindström’s theorem implies that the only extension of first-order logic possessing these properties is first-order logic itself. Second-order logic is the extension of first-order logic that allows quantification of relations. The symbols of second-order logic are the same symbols used in first-order logic. The syntax of second-order logic is defined by adding one rule to the syntax of first-order logic. The additional rule makes second-order logic far more expressive than first-order logic. Specifically, the syntax of second-order logic is defined as follows. Any atomic first-order formula is a formula of second-order logic. Moreover, we have the following four rules: (R1) If φ is a formula then so is ￢φ. (R2) If φ and ψ are formulas then so is φ ∧ ψ. (R3) If φ is a formula, then so is ∃x φ for any variable x.

We consider an extension of first-order logic by modular quantifiers of a fixed modulus $q$. Drawing on collapse results from finite model theory and techniques of finite semigroup theory, we show that if the only available numerical predicate is addition, then sentences in this logic cannot define the set of bit strings in which the number of 1's is divisible by a prime $p$ that does not divide $q$. More generally, we completely characterize the regular languages definable in this logic. The corresponding statement, with addition replaced by arbitrary numerical predicates, is equivalent to the conjectured separation of the circuit complexity class $ACC$ from $NC^1$. Thus our theorem can be viewed as proving a highly uniform version of the conjecture.

We study the expressive power in the finite of the logic Fixed-Point+Counting, the extension of first-order logic which is obtained through adding both the fixed-point constructor and the ability to count.To this end an isomorphism preserving (‘generic’) model of computation is introduced whose PTime restriction exactly corresponds to this level of expressive power, while its PSpace restriction corresponds to While+Counting. From this model we obtain a normal form which shows a rather clear separation of the relational vs. the arithmetical side of the algorithms involved.In parallel, we study the relations of Fixed-Point+Counting with the infinitary logics and the corresponding pebble games.The main result, however, involves the concept of an arithmetical invariant. By this we mean a functor taking every finite relational structure to an expansion of (an initial segment of) the standard arithmetical structure. In particular its values are linearly ordered structures. We establish the existence of a family of arithmetical invariants with the following properties:• The invariants themselves can be evaluated in polynomial time.• A class of finite relational structures is definable in Fixed-Point+Counting if and only if membership can be decided in polynomial time on the basis of the values of one of the invariants.• The invariant r classifies all finite relational structures exactly up to equivalence with respect to the logic We also give a characterization of Fixed-Point+Counting in terms of sequences of formulae in the : It corresponds exactly to the polynomial time computable families (φn)n ∈ ω in these logics.Towards a positive assessment of the expressive power of Fixed-Point+Counting, it is shown that the natural extension of fixed-point logic by Lindström quantifiers, which capture all the PTime computable properties of cardinalities of definable predicates, is strictly weaker than what we get here. This implies in particular that every extension of fixed-point logic by means of monadic Lindström quantifiers, which stays within PTime, must be strictly contained in Fixed-Point+Counting.

Concrete domains have been introduced in description logic (DL) to enable reference to concrete objects (such as numbers) and predefined predicates on these objects (such as numerical comparisons) when defining concepts. The primary research goal in this context was to find restrictions on the concrete domain such that its integration into certain DLs preserves decidability or tractability. In this article, we complement these investigations by studying the abstract expressive power of both first-order and description logics extended with concrete domains, i.e., we analyze which classes of first-order interpretations can be expressed using these logics, compared to what their counterparts without concrete domains can express. We demonstrate that, under natural conditions on the concrete domain D (which also play a role for decidability), extensions of first-order logic (FOL) or the well-known DL ALC with D share important formal characteristics with FOL, such as the compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties. Nevertheless, these conditions do not ensure that the abstract expressive power of the extensions we consider is contained in that of FOL, though in some cases it is. To be more precise, we show, on the one hand, that unary concrete domains leave the abstract expressive power within FOL if we are allowed to introduce auxiliary predicates. As a by-product, we obtain (semi-)decidability results for some fragments of FOL extended with the concrete domains considered in this article. On the other hand, we show that the ability to express equality between elements of D , another condition employed in the context of showing decidability of ALC ( D ), is sufficient to push the abstract expressive power of most first-order fragments with concrete domains beyond that of FOL. While for such concrete domains D decidability is retained for ALC ( D ), we show that the availability of equality in D causes undecidability of the two-variable fragment of FOL( D ), although the two-variable fragment of FOL is decidable.

Approximate pattern matching and transitive closure logics

First-order logic augments the expressive power of propositional logic as it links the logical assertions to properties of objects of some non-empty universe: the domain of discourse. This is achieved by allowing the propositional symbols to take arguments that range over elements of the domain of discourse. These are now called predicate symbols and are interpreted as relations on the domain. Elements of the domain of discourse are denoted by terms built up from variables, constants, and functions applied to other terms. First-order logic also expands the lexicon of propositional logic with the quantifiers “for all” and “there exists” that are interpreted consistently with their natural language meaning.This chapter is devoted to classical first-order logic. Our presentation is similar to the one conducted for propositional logic. We first define the syntax of first-order logic, followed by its semantics. Next we define a proof system for it and present the fundamental theoretical results of soundness and completeness. We also discuss the decision problems related to this logic. The remaining sections of the chapter cover variations and extensions of first-order logic, as well as first-order theories.

First-order temporal logic, the extension of first-order logic with operators dealing with time, is a powerful and expressive formalism with many potential applications. This expressive logic can be viewed as a framework in which to investigate problems specified in other logics. The monodic fragment of first-order temporal logic is a useful fragment that possesses good computational properties such as completeness and sometimes even decidability. Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for dealing with situations where the knowledge of agents in a system is involved. In this paper we present a translation from temporal logics of knowledge into the monodic fragment of first-order temporal logic. We can then use a theorem prover for monodic first-order temporal logic to prove properties of the translated formulas. This allows problems specified in temporal logics of knowledge to be verified automatically without needing a specialized theorem prover for temporal logics of knowledge. We present the translation, its correctness, and examples of its use.

The calculus of constructions as a framework for proof search with set variable instantiation

We study the expressivity and the complexity of various logics in probabilistic team semantics with the Boolean negation. In particular, we study the extension of probabilistic independence logic with the Boolean negation, and a recently introduced logic first-order theory of random variables with probabilistic independence. We give several results that compare the expressivity of these logics with the most studied logics in probabilistic team semantics setting, as well as relating their expressivity to a numerical variant of second-order logic. In addition, we introduce novel entropy atoms and show that the extension of first-order logic by entropy atoms subsumes probabilistic independence logic. Finally, we obtain some results on the complexity of model checking, validity and satisfiability of our logics.

Transitive closure logic is a known extension of first-order logic obtained by introducing a transitive closure operator. While other extensions of first-order logic with inductive definitions are a priori parametrized by a set of inductive definitions, the addition of the transitive closure operator uniformly captures all finitary inductive definitions. In this paper we present an infinitary proof system for transitive closure logic which is an infinite descent-style counterpart to the existing (explicit induction) proof system for the logic. We show that, as for similar systems for first-order logic with inductive definitions, our infinitary system is complete for the standard semantics and subsumes the explicit system. Moreover, the uniformity of the transitive closure operator allows semantically meaningful complete restrictions to be defined using simple syntactic criteria. Consequently, the restriction to regular infinitary (i.e. cyclic) proofs provides the basis for an effective system for automating inductive reasoning.

Logics for ‘generally’ were introduced as extensions of First-Order Logic (FOL) for handling assertions with vague notions (e.g., ‘generally,’ ‘most,’ and ‘several’) expressed by formulas with generalized quantifiers. Deductive systems have been developed for such logics. Here, we characterize the structure of derivations in natural deduction style for filter logic. This characterization extends the familiar one for FOL.

First-order logic (FOL) is evidently insufficient for the many applications of logic in computer science, mainly due to its inability to provide inductive definitions. Therefore, only an extension of FOL which allows finitary inductive definitions can be used as a framework for automated reasoning. The minimal logic that is suitable for this goal is Ancestral Logic (AL), which is an extension of FOL by a transitive closure operator. In order for AL to be able to serve as a reasonable (and better) substitute to the use of FOL in computer science, it is crucial to develop adequate, user-friendly proof systems for it. While the expressiveness of AL renders any effective proof system for it incomplete with respect to the standard semantics, there are useful approximations. In this paper we show that such a Gentzen-style approximation is both sound and complete with respect to a natural, computationally-meaningful Henkin-style semantics for AL.

A conservative extension of first order logic, suitable for circumscriptive inference, is introduced.

Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) are one of the central topics in theoretical computer science, in particular, in the area of artificial intelligence. Their computational complexity is due to relatively recent results from areas of mathematics, including finite-model-theory, algebra and graph homomorphisms. The main conjecture by Feder and Vardi states that any CSP over a finite relational template is either in P or is NP-complete. Further, it amounts to showing that every non NP-complete CSP can be expressed as an extension of first-order logic. A finite template is Mal'tsev, a compatible algebraic operation, which is closely related to an affine space over a finite field. The so-called Bulatov-Dalmau algorithm, a natural generalization of the Gaussian elimination on vector spaces, shows such CSPs are tractable. In this work, we prove that CSPs described over a finite template Mal'tsev are expressible in logic LFP+rnk, providing a logical proof that such CSPs are tractable.

A Simple Nominal Type Theory