Cognitive Networked Redemption Operational Conception and Devising (CNROCD)

This article analyzed North Korea's rapidly changing cyber capabilities and presented countermeasures against future threats from a military perspective. Previous studies had limitations in staying in past data with North Korea experts, so this study differentiated them based on specific latest cases. North Korea is focusing on selecting cyber warfare talents and increasing manpower, strengthening education and training systems, and upgrading cyber attack patterns and technologies, focusing on excluding background components in accordance with domestic and foreign environmental changes such as the signing of the New Treaty between North Korea and Russia, promoting local development 20×10 policies, and developing artificial intelligence (AI) technology. In particular, North Korea laid the foundation for the remarkable development of cyber warfare capabilities based on the New Treaty. In addition, cyber attacks are expanding into the social infrastructure sector to support the economic policies directly managed by Kim Jong-un. It is expected that AI technology will be applied more to North Korea's destructive cyber attacks in the future. In conclusion, Republic of Korea (ROK) should strengthen ROK-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and develop its capabilities to fully respond to all-round cyber threats, including North Korea's cyber threats, by applying cutting-edge AI technology to cyber warfare in earnest from the perspective of total power.

The ever-evolving capabilities of cyber attackers force security\nadministrators to focus on the early identification of emerging threats.\nTargeted cyber attacks usually consist of several phases, from initial\nreconnaissance of the network environment to final impact on objectives. This\npaper investigates the identification of multi-step cyber threat scenarios\nusing kill chain and attack graphs. Kill chain and attack graphs are threat\nmodeling concepts that enable determining weak security defense points. We\npropose a novel kill chain attack graph that merges kill chain and attack\ngraphs together. This approach determines possible chains of attacker's actions\nand their materialization within the protected network. The graph generation\nuses a categorization of threats according to violated security properties. The\ngraph allows determining the kill chain phase the administrator should focus on\nand applicable countermeasures to mitigate possible cyber threats. We\nimplemented the proposed approach for a predefined range of cyber threats,\nespecially vulnerability exploitation and network threats. The approach was\nvalidated on a real-world use case. Publicly available implementation contains\na proof-of-concept kill chain attack graph generator.\n

Defining cyber risk

The dependence on cyberspace has considerably increased over time, as such, people look at risk associated with cyber technology. This chapter focuses on the cyber risk issue. The authors aim to describe the global state of the art and point out the potential negative consequences of this type of systemic risk. Cyber risk increasingly affects both public and private institutions. Some of the risks that entities face are the following: computer security breaches, cyber theft, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage. Developed nations but also emerging markets suffer from cyber risk. It is therefore important to examine the different security regulation implemented across different markets. Moreover, cyber risk is a concern for all economic sectors. In particular, it is a crucial issue in banking sector because of the negative effects of cyber attacks, among others, the financial losses and the reputational risk. However, the awareness is increasing and cyber insurance is growing.

The increasing digitalization of our society has brought about numerous benefits, enabling seamless communication, convenient transactions, and efficient operations. However, with this growing reliance on interconnected systems and information technology, the risk of cyber-attacks has also surged. Cyber threats, such as data breaches, ransomware, and sophisticated malware, have become more prevalent, threatening the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical data and services. Organizations across industries face the daunting challenge of defending against a wide array of cyber-attacks that continue to evolve in complexity and stealth. In response to this ever-changing cyber threat landscape, Cyber Security Risk Management (CSRM) and attack detection have become critical components of any comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The ability to identify and mitigate cyber risks and swiftly detect malicious activities is paramount for safeguarding sensitive information, preserving business continuity, and maintaining the trust of customers and stakeholders. A novel approach to Cyber Security Risk Management through an Attack Detection Model that utilizes Semi-Supervised Learning Auto-Encoders in conjunction with Probabilistic Bayesian Networks. The study compares the performance of Multi Connect Variational Auto-Encoder (MC-VAE), Probabilistic Bayesian Networks (PBN), and a combined model of MC-VAE and PBN. The study employs the NUSW-NB15_GT dataset for training and evaluation purposes. Notably, the Semi-Supervised Learning with Probabilistic Bayesian Networks (SSL-PBN) model demonstrates exceptional results, achieving a precision rate of 94% and a recall rate of 90%. The F1 score of 0.9191 highlights the SSL-PBN model's efficacy in achieving a balanced trade-off between precision and recall, critical for minimizing false positives and false negatives...

General Background: Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI), formed from the merger of Bank BRI Syariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri, and Bank BNI Syariah, plays a strategic role in the Indonesian sharia banking sector. Specific Background: Recently, BSI experienced a cyber attack causing financial losses and reputational challenges over an unpredictable period. Knowledge Gap: Limited research exists examining the resilience and health level of sharia banks during cyber disruptions using structured financial assessment methods. Aim: This study analyzes BSI’s health level before and during a cyber attack using the CAMEL method. Methods: A comparative descriptive approach with quantitative analysis was employed, using secondary monthly financial reports from April and May 2023, followed by descriptive statistics, normality tests, and paired sample t-tests. Results: The findings indicate no significant difference in BSI’s health level before and during the cyber attack. Novelty: This study provides empirical evidence on the stability of sharia bank health metrics during cyber threats. Implications: The results inform bank management and regulators about the resilience of financial and operational health indicators under cyber risk conditions. Highlights: Comparative analysis of BSI health before and during a cyber attack. No significant change detected using CAMEL metrics. Provides evidence on sharia bank resilience during cyber disruptions. Keywords: BSI, CAMEL, Sharia Bank Health, Cyber Attack, Financial Resilience

Cyber-attacks have become a very serious issue in Europe, targeting essential services such as national health systems, banks, electoral campaigns or mobile services. There is certainly no one single solution to the need to improve cybersecurity, but a wide range of collective and far-reaching technical and legal measures may make it as hard as is possible for those who want to attack the security of infrastructures, services and products. This article aims to aid our understanding of cybersecurity, cyber threats, cyber-attacks and cyber defence from both legal and technological perspectives. It discusses the most recent EU cybersecurity legislative movements and considers whether current legal and technical measures, including the newly adopted EU Cybersecurity Act 2019, have provided efficient solutions to respond to radically changed cyber threats and attacks, in particular in critical services in the EU. It offers insights into the scope and limitations of technical measures in achieving the highest possible level of cybersecurity due to the unpredictable nature of certain cyber-attacks.

<p>The high reliance on nuclear weapons on computers has outstretched the susceptibilities of the cyberwar against them. While other countries are not discounting the cyber threat against its nuclear weapons, India has officially maintained the position that the present systems and technologies that it is employing, ensures safe handling of its nuclear assets against all cyber-attacks. However, there are certain loopholes in the present C2 structures, which need to be examined and addressed. The cyber threats against the nuclear C2 structures can cause a delay in India’s response time, in a situation of retaliation. In such a scenario, it would be difficult to absorb the extent of the first strike of the enemy, and cyber warfare may result in a catastrophic impact on the communication systems. A cyber-attack can also be the cause of technical failures in the civil nuclear program, which may lead to uncontrolled leakage of radiation. This article explores various possibilities of cyber warfare against India’s nuclear weapon systems, which can be a serious threat to its critical infrastructure.</p>

Background: Cyber security has turned out to be one of the main challenges of recent years. As the variety of system and application vulnerabilities has increased dramatically in recent years, cyber attackers have managed to penetrate the networks and infrastructures of larger numbers of companies, thus increasing the latter’s exposure to cyber threats. To mitigate this exposure, it is crucial for CISOs to have sufficient training and skills to help them identify how well security controls are managed and whether these controls offer the company sufficient protection against cyber threats, as expected. However, recent literature shows a lack of clarity regarding the manner in which the CISOs’ role and the companies’ investment in their skills should change in view of these developments. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the CISOs’ level of cyber security-related preparation to mitigate cyber threats (and specifically, the companies’ attitudes toward investing in such preparation) and the recent evolution of cyber threats. Methods: The study data are based on the following public resources: (1) recent scientific literature; (2) cyber threat-related opinion news articles; and (3) OWASP’s reported list of vulnerabilities. Data analysis was performed using various text mining methods and tools. Results: The study’s findings show that although the implementation of cyber defense tools has gained more serious attention in recent years, CISOs still lack sufficient support from management and sufficient knowledge and skills to mitigate current and new cyber threats. Conclusions: The research outcomes may allow practitioners to examine whether the companies’ level of cyber security controls matches the CISOs’ skills, and whether a comprehensive security education program is required. The present article discusses these findings and their implications.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the cyber landscape in Belarus, with a focus on the Belarus government's use of cyber activities from an offensive and defensive context, the emergence of opposition cyber activities, and the broader implications for cybersecurity and legal compliance. In the course of the research, researchers try to assess Belarus as a source of cyber-threats, both domestically and to neighbouring states (especially those supporting Ukraine). The first section of the paper outlines the Belarusian government's engagement in cybercrimes against its citizens, especially under President Lukashenko's regime, highlighting extensive online surveillance, repression, and the escalation of these activities following the 2020 presidential elections. In this political context, Belarus is also examined as a country initiating and/or contributing to Information Warfare activities, which are mainly directed at western countries. The second section of the paper delves into Belarus's cybersecurity legal framework, examining various national strategies and concepts, the absence of a formal cybersecurity strategy, and the focus on 'information security' as part of national security. The third section presents case studies of cyber activities in Belarus, contrasting government-backed hacking efforts with those of opposition groups like the Belarus Cyber Partisans. It explores the Partisans' attacks on state infrastructure and information leaks as a form of protest against the government, and the pro-government hackers' disinformation / information campaigns website defacements, and data breaches, particularly targeting Ukraine. This section highlights the evolving nature of cyber conflict in Belarus, where both government and opposition forces use cyber tools for political ends, reflecting broader geopolitical tensions in the region. This part of the report compares the Belarusian pro-government hacktivist and Cyber Partisans groups, their activities and manifestations within the country (inside), as well as the cyber threats they pose to foreign countries. The article attempts to answer the question of what kind of threat Belarus as a country poses in the context of cybersecurity, hybrid-cyber threats. This country is often included in Russian hybrid-cyber threats strategies, Belarus entities also work with Russian and sometimes Chinese groups in undertaking cyber activities against other countries.

Protection of resources like system, network and information from cyber threat is called cyber security. To understand cyber security, understanding of cyber-attack, cyber-crime and cyber terrorism is must. Cyber-attack is kind of sophisticated battle with good and bad computer and internet users. Cyberattack is an attack with mala fide intentions. Theft of data, money and other resources are common reasons behind these attacks. These attacks hamper working of all the important sectors of the world like education, research, health, safety, defense and entertainment. All organization including various countries’ Governments now are worried about these attacks and various steps are taken to prevent these attacks. Cyber security is a continuous process as the attackers and hackers are updating their techniques rapidly. Continuous updating of technology, education of people about these threats, and being aware and alert are the best ways of protection from cyber attacks.

Additive Manufacturing (AM) offers revolutionary design capabilities but introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities due to its digital integration. While existing research focuses on cyber threats, a significant gap exists in addressing physical and cyber risks. The current research focuses on cyber threats, but more attention needs to be paid to addressing physical and cyber risks. This paper proposes a new risk assessment framework that considers both physical and cyber threats quantitatively and qualitatively and helps safeguard the AM supply chain. The framework identifies, analyses, and prioritises potential threats based on their characteristics. It also considers the trustworthiness of data and the frequency of reported threats to estimate the likelihood of each threat. The risks are then prioritised based on a combined impact-likelihood score. The framework has been validated on the standard benchmark MITRE CVEs dataset and has proven effective in identifying critical vulnerabilities. This approach empowers manufacturers to proactively deal with security concerns and navigate the complexities of the rapidly evolving AM landscape.

The increasing number of cyber attacks has become a global problem for companies, public institutions, even for governments and for each particular user. Cyber crime causes damage of about 750 billion EUR every year in Europe alone. Thus, ICT security is nowadays a major concern, increasing the demand for specialists in this domain. Currently, universities do not produce enough graduates with strong network security skills able to defend against complex cyber attacks. Recently new EU approved ERASMUS+ project (DECAMP) addresses innovatively this educational aspect. DECAMP brings together within a framework of an international partnership 6 EU universities and 3 associated partners. The project is set up to create 6 online courses with integrated heterogeneous virtual hands-on lab environments covering ICT Security issues of various application areas. Each partner creates a course corresponding to its expertise. These courses can be accessed by all the students, professors and researchers of the universities within the DECAMP consortium as well as from other EU universities. The core of the DECAMP project is an online distributed virtual campus. The paper describes the procedure developed for controlling a secure access of various type of users to the platform of eLearning course materials. The solution complies on one hand with all the differences of enrollment procedures installed at each particular EU university to verify the type of user (student, teacher, researcher, etc) requiring access to the institution's resources. On the other hand the developed mechanism allows the users to obtain a single sign on (SSO) account which support their accesses to all distributed modules of the platform, placed at the corresponding universities which create and maintain them. A prototype system that has been deployed for testing the proposed solutions is also presented.

Current simulations supporting the Net-Centric Test battlespace do not accurately represent the impact of cyber threats and information operations. When cyber threats are considered, they are typically limited to a small number of isolated physical devices. To further limit consideration, insufficient attention is paid to cyber attacks launched on the basis of passive threats like the eavesdroppers or the coordinated threats. Further, the test technologies are typically limited to incorporation of threats that can be realized physically, which limits both the scale and sophistication of representing such attacks; a Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) paradigm for modeling of threats is missing. Lastly, for threats such as jamming, wormhole attacks, large-scale Denial of Service attacks, use of physical threats is expensive, since specialized equipment and manpower is required to realize these threats. The net consequence of these deficiencies is to leave a major gap in the DoD test infrastructure with respect to our ability to realistically test the vulnerabilities and resiliency of Blue Force communication architectures to sophisticated cyber attacks, particularly in networks that include both current force & Future Force communication infrastructure. In this paper, we present StealthNet, a Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) framework that provides a real-time, hardware-in-the-loop capability for simulation of cyber threats to the entire net-centric infrastructure. It also provides the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the threats in disrupting Blue Force communications via key performance indicators, i.e. bandwidth, reliability, delay and quality of service metrics. The StealthNet framework provides models for accurate cyber threat simulation at all layers of the networking stack to include passive, active, coordinated and adaptive attacks on networks with hundreds to thousands of wired and wireless components. The LVC technology can stimulate physical Networked-System Under Test (NSUT) with simulated cyber threats that span all the protocol stack layers for real-time testing. Additionally, the framework enables composability with existing Test and Evaluation (T&E) architecture and tools (TENA, SBE environments, etc) to facilitate transition to other T&E programs.

In the last few years, we could see that a lot of world organizations are contested by different ways, which we are called as cyber threats or cyber risks. Many of organizations are well secured, but the most of them admitted that they are not able to successfully prevent these attacks and they tried to find other ways to mitigate the risk. This paper describes a possible approach to modeling the impact of selected cyber threats in the field of providing cyber-risk insurance. It compares predefined organizational parameters in relation to cyber threats scenarios. The main results include modeling the impact of selected cyber threats on the organization’s parameters. Based on these results, it is possible to quantify possible financial impacts and, on the basis of this, to propose an optimal amount of insurance cover.