Complex language, complex thought?

This study investigated Theory of Mind (ToM) development in children with hearing loss, comparing children with mild-to-moderate hearing loss (MHL, n = 26), severe-to-profound hearing loss (SHL, n = 31), and typical hearing (TH, n = 53), aiming to explore the differences between the three groups and potential factor related to the ToM development in children with hearing loss. Participants completed the ToM scale and language assessments. One-way ANOVA and Bonferroni post-hoc tests were used to analyze group differences, while Pearson's correlation examined relationships between ToM, language, and background variables. Results revealed that both MHL and SHL groups showed delays in overall ToM skills compared to TH peers, with the SHL group exhibiting more substantial delays. The MHL group demonstrated delays only in hidden emotion understanding, while the SHL group showed delays from knowledge access through false belief and hidden emotion tasks. Language comprehension was significantly correlated with ToM skills in both hearing loss groups. Aided audibility was associated with false belief understanding in the MHL group. The study highlights the impact of hearing loss severity on ToM development and emphasizes the crucial role of language comprehension in ToM skills. Findings suggest the need for tailored interventions addressing language and communication challenges to support ToM development in children with hearing loss.

In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children’s conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind (ToM) ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age (M = 65.45, SD = 11.45, 36 girls) judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did not involve knowledge change. Children’s learning judgments in familiar contexts improved with age and correlated with their ToM understanding. However, the correlation was no longer significant once age was held constant. Another sample of 72 children aged between 40 and 90 months (M = 66.87, SD = 11.83, 31 girls) participated in study 2, where children were asked to judge whether the story protagonists intended to learn and whether they eventually learned. The results suggested that children over-attributed learning intention to discovery and implicit learning. Stories with conflict between the learning intention and outcome appeared to be most challenging for children. Children’s intention judgment was correlated with their ToM understanding, and ToM marginally predicted intention judgment when the effect of age was accounted for. The implication of the findings for school readiness was discussed. Training studies and longitudinal designs in the future are warranted to better understand the relation between ToM development and children’s learning understanding.

This study examines the link between language abilities and Theory of Mind (ToM) development in individuals with Williams Syndrome (WS) and Down Syndrome (DS). We compared the results of 16 participants with WS, aged 6.3 to 27.2 years (Mean = 15.9 years, SD = 6.8 years), to those of 16 participants with DS, aged 10.7 to 23.9 years (Mean = 16.8 years, SD = 3.6 years). Using the French version of the ToM test-Revised (ToM test-R), we assessed three levels of ToM development: prerequisites, first-order beliefs, and second-order beliefs. Language abilities were evaluated using the Isadyle French language assessment battery, focusing on word comprehension, word production, syntax comprehension and production, and emotional lexicon. The results showed that the WS group performed significantly better in overall ToM skills in the ToM test-R compared to the DS group. Moreover, language skills were significantly associated with ToM development in the WS group, but not in the DS group. These findings underscore the importance of language development, particularly syntax and emotional understanding, in ToM acquisition. Through the application of a cross-syndrome approach, this study provides insights into how each syndrome impacts ToM development and the role of language in this process.

Theory of mind (ToM) involves understanding others’ thoughts and feelings and is related to language abilities. Individuals with communication disorders are at risk of ToM difficulties; however, little is known about speech-language pathologists’ (SLPs’) knowledge, perceptions, and educational preparation related to ToM.U.S.SLPs ( N = 95) completed an online survey in which they described their understanding of ToM and answered questions about their educational preparation related to ToM. A thematic analysis of SLPs’ definitions of ToM revealed nine themes represented in participants’ responses including perspective-taking and interpersonal and intrapersonal cognitive and affective ToM. Most SLPs’ definitions included more than one code indicating a multifaceted understanding of ToM; however, most SLPs reported little formal education related to ToM. Although language ability plays a critical role in the development of ToM and SLPs are language specialists, these results suggest that SLPs receive little formal education on these topics. Clinical implications are discussed.

This longitudinal study investigates theory of mind (ToM) development in middle childhood and its demographic and linguistic predictors. In this study, 194 Italian primary school children (Mage = 9.4 years; 47% girls; 28% with one or both Italian parents) were assessed four times over 2 years using a multi-modal ToM battery. Results confirmed longitudinal measurement invariance of the ToM battery. Latent growth modeling showed ToM growth from Time 1 to Time 3, followed by a plateau. Analyses revealed significant inter-individual variability at Time 1 but no variance in the rate of development. Higher verbal ability and having siblings predicted higher initial ToM, while non-native speakers began lower but showed greater gains. Findings extend existing accounts on ToM development.

Longitudinal tracking of 107 three- to-thirteen-year-olds in a cross-sequential design showed a 6-step theory of mind (ToM) sequence identified by a few past cross-sectional studies validly depicted longitudinal ToM development from early to middle childhood for typically developing (TD) children and those with ToM delays owing to deafness or autism. Substantively, all groups showed ToM progress throughout middle childhood. Atypical development was more extended and began and ended at lower levels than for TD children. Yet most children in all groups progressed over the study's mean 1.5years. Findings help resolve theoretical debates about ToM development for children with and without delay and gain strength and weight via their applicability to three disparate groups varying in ToM timing and sequencing.

Children's and adults’ neural bases of verbal and nonverbal ‘theory of mind’

Executive functions and theory of mind development in preschoolers: Insights from NIRS data

Various arguments are reviewed about the claim that language development is critically connected to the development of theory of mind. The different theories of how language could help in this process of development are explored. A brief account is provided of the controversy over the capacities of infants to read others' false beliefs. Then the empirical literature on the steps in theory of mind development is summarized, considering studies on both typically developing and various language-delayed children. Suggestions are made for intervention by speech language pathologists to enhance the child's access to understanding the minds of others.

The Theory of Mind deficit due to cognitive-affective disintegration is a poorly understood cognitive consequence of cortical and subcortical disruption in right temporal lobe epilepsy. Following Marr's trilevel approach, we used the material-specific processing model to understand the Theory of Mind deficit in drug-resistant epilepsy (N = 30). We examined pre- and post-surgery changes in first-order (somatic-affective, non-verbal component) and second-order Theory of Mind (cognitive-verbal component) in three groups formed using: (i) seizure side (right versus left), (ii) right temporal epilepsy (right temporal lobe epilepsy versus non-right temporal lobe epilepsy), and (iii) right temporal lobe epilepsy with amygdalohippocampectomy (right temporal lobe epilepsy versus left temporal lobe epilepsy amygdalohippocampectomy versus non-amygdalohippocampectomy). We observed a marked deficit in the first-order Theory of Mind in the right temporal lobe amygdalohippocampectomy group; we mapped this deficit to decline in the non-verbal component of Theory of Mind (somatic-affective component). Preliminary results support using a material-specific processing model to understand the Theory of Mind deficits in right temporal lobe epilepsy amygdalohippocampectomy. Malleability of verbal processing in presence of deterioration of non-verbal processing might have clinical relevance for post-surgery recovery in right temporal lobe epilepsy amygdalohippocampectomy. Documenting the material-specific nature of deficits (verbal versus non-verbal) in non-western, linguistically, and socioeconomically diverse country enables us to understand the problem of heterogeneity in post-surgery cognitive consequences in the right amygdalohippocampectomy.

Children with autism are thought to have a deficit in theory of mind. It is now widely regarded that theory of mind development has a strong relationship with language ability. In particular, current research has focused upon the syntactic aspects of language as a means of relating communicative competence and what is considered the culmination of theory of mind, the false belief task. This current study was an exploratory examination into the ability of 3 children with autism on the false belief task and 3 tasks considered precursors to false belief ability. Further language examinations sought to investigate how language ability may relate to their performance on these tasks. It was hypothesized that the ability to understand false belief tasks was not purely dependent upon linguistic formulation, but also utterance conceptualization. Language competencies at the Conceptualizer and Formulator levels of Levelt's model of speaking were assessed. The results challenge the current beliefs concerning the theory of mind deficit in individuals with autism and provide possible avenues for future research.

Sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) is considered as a cognitive-emotional style. Theory of mind (ToM) skills form the basis of human cognition and social behavior. The aim of this study is to contribute to SCT literature by examining the relationship between SCT and cognitive and affective ToM in school-age children with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Fifty school-age children with ADHD (43 boys and seven girls) and 40 typically developing children (34 boys and six girls) were assessed using Parent-rated Barkley Child Attention Scale and Child Behavior Checklist/6-18, cognitive (first- and second-order ToM) and affective ToM (Reading Mind in the Eyes Test and Unexpected Outcomes Test (UOT)) tests. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to determine the variables that may predict SCT levels in children with ADHD. Attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder-inattention (Exp(B) = .334, p = .027), internalization (Exp(B) = .305, p = .006), and UOT scores (Exp(B) = .933, p = .015) significantly predicted SCT severity in children with ADHD. SCT severity was significantly associated with impaired cognitive ToM skills as measured by second-order ToM (Exp(B) = 1.933, p = .045). Our findings may indicate that affective ToM developing with age, and impaired cognitive ToM skills are associated with increasing SCT severity.

The current study aimed to investigate differences in theory of mind between left-behind children and non-left-behind children in rural China and to examine the potential protective role of general reasoning ability in left-behind children’s theory of mind. Participants included 213 children aged 7.10–13.67 years (111 boys and 102 girls, M = 10.51 years, SD = 1.33), 101 of whom were left behind in rural areas by one or both migrating parents for at least 6 months. The Strange Stories task, a second-order false belief task, and a faux pas task were used to measure children’s theory of mind, and Sessions B and C in Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices were used to test children’s general reasoning ability. The results showed that left-behind children scored lower on both the faux pas task and Strange Stories task. Additionally, on second-order false belief understanding, left-behind boys performed worse than non-left-behind boys, while left-behind girls scored higher than non-left behind girls. Moreover, children’s general reasoning ability moderated the relationship between parental migrant status and children’s faux pas understanding: For children with high levels of general reasoning ability, left-behind children performed similarly to non-left-behind children, while for children with low levels of general reasoning ability, left-behind children scored lower than non-left-behind children, indicating that general reasoning ability buffered the negative effect of being left behind on children’s theory of mind development. The implications of these findings for training directed at left-behind children are discussed.

We examined deaf and hearing children's progression of steps in theory of mind (ToM) development including their understanding of social pretending. Ninety-three children (33 deaf; 60 hearing) aged 3-13 years were tested on a set of six closely matched ToM tasks. Results showed that deaf children were delayed substantially behind hearing children in understanding pretending, false belief (FB) and other ToM concepts, in line with their delayed uptake of social pretend (SP) play. By using a scaling methodology, we confirmed previous evidence of a consistent five-step developmental progression for both groups. Moreover, by including social pretence understanding, both deaf and hearing children's ToM sequences were shown to extend reliably to six sequential developmental steps. Finally and focally, even though both groups' sequences were six steps long, the placement of pretence relative to other ToM milestones varied with hearing status. Deaf children understood social pretending at an earlier step in the ToM sequence than hearing children, albeit at a later chronological age. Theoretically, the findings are relevant to questions about how universal developmental progressions come together along with culturally distinctive inputs and biological factors (such as hearing loss) to set the pace for ToM development.

In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural language use, we conducted an experiment. It was based on a strategic game of imperfect information, in which it was beneficial for participants to have a good mental model of their opponent, and more specifically, to use second-order Theory of Mind. It was also beneficial for them to be aware of pragmatic inferences and of the possibility to choose between logical and pragmatic language use. We found that most participants did not seem to acquire these complex skills during the experiment when being exposed to the game for a number of different trials. Nevertheless, some participants did make use of advanced cognitive skills such as second-order Theory of Mind and appropriate choices between logical and pragmatic language use from the beginning. Thus, the results differ markedly from previous research.