Conceptual Framework for Understanding Security Requirements: A Preliminary Study on Stuxnet

With the development of software technology, software security is receiving more and more attention. Security requirement is a key stage in the process of software development. In the present research, we propose a method to elicit security requirements; that is developed based on safety knowledge base. In the method, we perform analysis based on the asset, threat and Common Criteria security function components. Then, we summarize the relationship of the three. Based on this, we establish a safety knowledge base. Starting from the functional requirements of the application system, the system assets will be analyzed and matched automatically based on the established safety knowledge base, and finally we elicit the security requirements. The approach is very effective for the purpose of security requirement analysis, and elicits security requirements easily and efficiently. It will be very helpful for security software development.KeywordsSecurity RequirementsAssetThreatSecurity Functional ComponentCommon Criteria

Given the wide distribution of software and its current growth, security is inevitable, and software systems have become more complex. To avoid the complexity and protect valuable assets of software systems, researchers, and practitioners in the fields of security requirement engineering (SRE) and security assurance advise incorporating security requirements early in software development life cycle (SDLC). Nowadays, security requirements specification and identification are an active research area for ensuring the effectiveness of software systems. However, security requirement identification is a challenging task due to sheer numbers of threats and attacks to a software system. Previous researchers have identified different SRE techniques, each looking at the same problem from a different perspective. Therefore, a literature review conducted on SRE techniques. We compared and analyzed different SRE techniques to find the most suitable SRE techniques for researchers and practitioners. Selected SRE techniques compared based on various parameters, such as different attributes, requirement elicitation, requirement analysis, project size, and integration of standards. The literature also indicates that among SRE approaches, security quality requirements engineering (SQAURE), secure tropos, security requirements engineering process (SREP), and comprehensive lightweight application security process (CLASP) are the most used SRE approaches that focus on activities such as threats, security requirements identification, and security objectives identification. Unfortunately, several SRE approaches fail to explicitly integrate the security standard and security assurance perspective. Three questions developed for this study: Question 1 is based on comparison of existing SRE approaches, Question 2 is based on SRE with security requirements elicitation and analysis, and Question 3 highlights the incorporation of security requirements assurance by SRE approaches implicitly or explicitly. The researcher must work with the developer to easily adopt SRE approaches to elicit and ensure security requirements for the software system.

Security requirements play a vital role in the software development process to gain secured software. The security levels of each software system can be varied depending on multiple factors, such as information processing or storing in the software system, business criticality of the software system, or features and functions of the system. However, the understanding of these factors has not been done early and has little or no involvement from the business users (end-users or system owners), who have the best understanding of how the system should be used in their business and the business impacts. As a result, the system design is done without awareness of these factors. Most of the time designing the system to address security concerns is done late in the development lifecycle, which causes extra money, effort, and time from the development team. In this paper, we propose a framework to help elicit the security requirements from business users based on the survey questions. The framework recommends a set of security requirements and implementation methods that are suitable for the business operations of the system. Two web applications with 12 business users for each application were selected to experiment with the effectiveness of the framework. The framework's suggested results were tested for conformity against a set of security recommendations from four security experts. We found that the security requirements and recommendations from the framework have an average 89% conformity for the WFMS system and a 93% conformity for the ASMS system with the expert recommendations.

This talk will cover two topics, namely, modeling and design of Moving Target Defense (MTD), and DIFT games for modeling Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). We will first present a game-theoretic approach to characterizing the trade-off between resource efficiency and defense effectiveness in decoy- and randomization-based MTD. We will then address the game formulation for APTs. APTs are mounted by intelligent and resourceful adversaries who gain access to a targeted system and gather information over an extended period of time. APTs consist of multiple stages, including initial system compromise, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration, each of which involves strategic interaction between the APT and the targeted system. While this interaction can be viewed as a game, the stealthiness, adaptiveness, and unpredictability of APTs imply that the information structure of the game and the strategies of the APT are not readily available. Our approach to modeling APTs is based on the insight that the persistent nature of APTs creates information flows in the system that can be monitored. One monitoring mechanism is Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT), which taints and tracks malicious information flows through a system and inspects the flows at designated traps. Since tainting all flows in the system will incur significant memory and storage overhead, efficient tagging policies are needed to maximize the probability of detecting the APT while minimizing resource costs. In this work, we develop a multi-stage stochastic game framework for modeling the interaction between an APT and a DIFT, as well as designing an efficient DIFT-based defense. Our model is grounded on APT data gathered using the Refinable Attack Investigation (RAIN) flow-tracking framework. We present the current state of our formulation, insights that it provides on designing effective defenses against APTs, and directions for future work.

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) has become one of the most complicated and intractable cyber attack over the last decade. As APT attacks are conducted through series of actions that comprise social engineering, phishing, command and control servers, and remote desktop control, conventional anti-virus mechanisms become insufficient because they were designed to cope with traditional stand-alone malware attacks. Furthermore, data transmission from the compromised network to the APT actors is usually well disguised and embedded in normal transmission, exacerbating the detection of APT attacks to the point that even major anti-virus firms are not sure about the ratio of discovered APT attacks against real attacks. To make things worse, APT actors tend to be well-organized and potentially government-funded groups of hackers and professionals who are capable of developing and maintaining malware specifically made for their own purposes and interpret the stolen data. While most efforts in defending against APT attacks focus on related technologies, this research argues the importance of constructing a holistic understanding by analyzing the behaviors and changes of ATP attacks and actors. This research aims to understand the evolution of technologies and malware on the one hand and the behavioral changes of attacking groups. By doing so, this research is expected to contribute to constructing a clearer roadmap of APT attacks and actors that cyber security providers can use as reference.

Due the evolution of technology, a new class of sophisticated threats, called Advanced persistent threats (APTs), has arisen and became a pressing problem specially for the industrial security sector. APTs ignited a fire of information warfare where they form cyber-attacks with a high-risk for very critical and secured infrastructures. They targeted a specific companies and governments. The most significant feature of APTs is their ability for bypass high-profile of security systems and steal or tamper information for doing negative impacts on physical objects. Stuxnet virus is an example of APTs that has a specific target and has an ability to destroy its physical infrastructures. It did not need Internet for spreading. It revealed in 2010 and targeted Iran’s nuclear program by exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows Operating System. In the recent years, a number of different APTs have emerged which increased researchers’ attention to analyze them in order to find solutions to protect against existing and future APTs. In this paper, we examine the majority of existing reports and research papers of Stuxnet and APTs to give an overview of characteristics, features, and operations of each of them. We cover Duqu, Flame, Shamoon and Triton as recent variances of Stuxnet. In addition, we highlight the differences and similarities between Stuxnet and these APTs to help in predicting future attacks and encourage the researchers to find solutions to protect against them.

Detecting mobile advanced persistent threats based on large-scale DNS logs

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) employ sophisticated and covert tactics to infiltrate target systems, leading to increased vulnerability and an elevated risk of exposure. Consequently, it is essential for us to proactively create an extensive and clearly outlined attack chain for APTs in order to effectively combat these threats. Unlike traditional malware or application threats, APTs can sidestep cyber security efforts and cause severe damage to organizations or even state security. Nonetheless, earlier methods struggle to accurately track APTs and may face a dependency explosion issue, as identifying the intricate and complex unknown malicious activities within APTs proves to be challenging. In this paper, we propose and build an approach, T-trace, which constructs the events provenance graphs by analyzing the correlations among logs. The approach precisely finds the log communities with tensor decomposition and calculates significance scores to extract the events. The APTs can be inferred by discovering the event communities and constructing the provenance graph with log correlation. In the experiment, we used DARPA data sets and launched four current practical APTs. Compared with current approaches, the results show that T-trace can efficiently reduce time cost by 90% and achieve a 92% accuracy rate in constructing the provenance graph, which can be practically applied in APTs provenance.

Cyber security has become a matter of a global interest, and several attacks target industrial companies and governmental organizations. The advanced persistent threats (APTs) have emerged as a new and complex version of multi-stage attacks (MSAs), targeting selected companies and organizations. Current APT detection systems focus on raising the detection alerts rather than predicting APTs. Forecasting the APT stages not only reveals the APT life cycle in its early stages but also helps to understand the attacker’s strategies and aims. This paper proposes a novel intrusion detection system for APT detection and prediction. This system undergoes two main phases; the first one achieves the attack scenario reconstruction. This phase has a correlation framework to link the elementary alerts that belong to the same APT campaign. The correlation is based on matching the attributes of the elementary alerts that are generated over a configurable time window. The second phase of the proposed system is the attack decoding. This phase utilizes the hidden Markov model (HMM) to determine the most likely sequence of APT stages for a given sequence of correlated alerts. Moreover, a prediction algorithm is developed to predict the next step of the APT campaign after computing the probability of each APT stage to be the next step of the attacker. The proposed approach estimates the sequence of APT stages with a prediction accuracy of at least 91.80%. In addition, it predicts the next step of the APT campaign with an accuracy of 66.50%, 92.70%, and 100% based on two, three, and four correlated alerts, respectively.

The early attainment of requirements in a software development process allows us to improve the quality of the product. Although many methods through which to elicit requirements exist, few of them are specifically designed for security requirements. This paper describes a method - M-BPSec - which permits the elicitation of security requirements which form part of a business process description carried out with a UML 2.0 Activity Diagram. MBPSec is made up of stages, actors, tools and artifacts which, when applied in a coordinated manner, allow us to specify security requirements in business processes and to obtain class and use cases from this specification.

Detection of advanced persistent threat using machine-learning correlation analysis

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) consist of multiple attack stages between entry and exit points of the attack. In each stage of the attack, the adversary gathers more privileges, resources, and information about the system and uses this information to gain access to the targeted data of the next stage to reach the final goal. APTs are not only persistent but also stealthy and hence difficult to detect. The persistent nature of APTs, however, creates information flows in the system that can be monitored. One monitoring mechanism is Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT), which taints and tracks malicious information flows through a system and inspects the flows at designated traps. Since tainting all flows in the system will incur prohibitive resource costs, efficient tagging policies are needed to decide which flows to tag in order to maximize the probability of APT detection while minimizing resource overhead. At present such an analytical model for DIFT for multi-stage APT detection does not exist. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework modeling real-time detection of multi-stage APTs via DIFT. We formulate a two-player (APT vs DIFT) nonzero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information to obtain an optimal tagging policy. Our game model consists of a sequence of stages, where each stage of the game corresponds to a stage in the attack. At each stage, the goal of the APT is to reach a particular destination, corresponding to a targeted resource or privilege, while the goal of the defender is to detect the APT. We first derive an efficient algorithm to find locally optimal strategies for both players. We then characterize the best responses of both players and present algorithms to find the best responses. Finally, we validate our results on a real-world attack data set obtained using the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) framework for a ScreenGrab attack.

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are cyberattacking that use covert strategies to target specific groups. As a result of the rapid growth of computing technology and the widespread connectivity of devices, there has been a boom in data transfer across networks. Because APTs' attack tactics are always changing, it can be difficult to detect them. This has led cybersecurity experts to develop creative solutions. We found gaps in the research on APT detection by doing a systematic literature review (SLR) covering the years 2012 to 2022 and finding 75 studies related to computer, mobile, and Internet of Things technologies. The most sophisticated cyberattack, known as an advanced persistent threat, involves malevolent individuals breaking into a network without authorization and staying hidden for an extended period. Advancement persistent threat attacks and organizational threats are becoming more frequent. Machine learning is one technique used to detect attacks by sophisticated persistent threats. The need for improved detection methods is highlighted by our findings, and we offer suggestions to guide the creation of early APT detection models and progress in cybersecurity. We propose a conceptual model known as Cyber Guardian that uses Random Forest classifier and attention techniques to create a self-translation machine through an encoder-decoder framework. These advanced attention algorithms are intended to improve the machine's capacity to examine and decipher intricate patterns found in HTTP requests, enhancing APT detection capabilities, and providing cybersecurity experts with cutting-edge instruments to proactively detect and neutralize new threats in real-time. This all-encompassing strategy is a major advancement in the ongoing fight against Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and emphasizes how crucial it is for the cybersecurity community to continuously innovate and collaborate in order to remain ahead of changing cyberthreats.

In recent years, extensive research has been conducted in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack defence. However, most existing defence solutions can only identify and temporarily disrupt cyber attacks, seeking to deny the threat from the intranet, it’s difficult to defence against APT attacks. Attributing the APT organization is an excellent complement to the existing defence solutions, which not only can expose the attacker’s true identity, but also provide evidence to bring the attacker to justice. However, research on attributing APT Organization is still few, poses complex tasks because APT attacks are highly targeted, stealthy, persistent and organized. To answer thie question, we propose a Particle Swarm Optimization Multiclass Support Vector Machine (PSO-MSVM) approach to identify the organization behind complex APT attacks automatically. Firstly, we have collected a large amount of data on the traces of APT attack tools executed in the sandbox, and selected data closely related to APT organizations to construct the feature set. Secondly, based on the strategy of keeping the personal best (pbest) and global best (gbest) particles in the particle swarm algorithm away from the adaptation values generated by the misclassification information as they move, the particle positions are updated frequently to eventually obtain the optimal parameters (i.e., penalty parameter ( <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${C}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ) and sigma parameter ( <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\sigma $ </tex-math></inline-formula> )) for MSVM, thus enabling the MSVM technique to accurately identify APT organizations. The results obtained from the PSO-MSVM approach showed the superiority of this technique in three different measures of accuracy, precision and F1,compared with other six classical methods.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) pose significant cybersecurity challenges due to their multi-stage complexity. Knowledge graphs (KGs) effectively model APT attack processes through node-link architectures; however, the scarcity of high-quality, annotated datasets limits research progress. The primary challenge lies in balancing annotation cost and quality, particularly due to the lack of quality assessment methods for graph annotation data. This study addresses these issues by extending existing APT ontology definitions and developing a dynamic, trustworthy annotation framework for APT knowledge graphs. The framework introduces a self-verification mechanism utilizing large language model (LLM) annotation consistency and establishes a comprehensive graph data metric system for problem localization in annotated data. This metric system, based on structural properties, logical consistency, and APT attack chain characteristics, comprehensively evaluates annotation quality across representation, syntax semantics, and topological structure. Experimental results show that this framework significantly reduces annotation costs while maintaining quality. Using this framework, we constructed LAPTKG, a reliable dataset containing over 10,000 entities and relations. Baseline evaluations show substantial improvements in entity and relation extraction performance after metric correction, validating the framework’s effectiveness in reliable APT knowledge graph dataset construction.