Conclusions

Under what conditions would the democracies in Northeast Asia seek to join the nuclear weapons club? Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are threshold nuclear powers by virtue of their robust civilian nuclear-energy programmes. All three once pursued nuclear weapons and all face nuclear-armed adversaries. Fitzpatrick's latest book analyses these past nuclear pursuits and current proliferation drivers. It considers how long it would take each to build a nuclear weapon if such a fateful decision were made but does not predict such a scenario. Unlike when each previously went down a nuclear path, democracy and a free press now prevail as barriers to building bombs in the basement. Reliance on US defence commitments is a better security alternative – as long as such guarantees remain credible. But extended deterrence is not a barrier to proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. Nuclear hedging by its Northeast Asian partners will challenge Washington's nuclear diplomacy.

During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. 1Section:ChooseTop of page1 <<BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Missile defense: The present administration is requesting more than $10 billion this year for development and deployment of a missile defense system. Many scientists say the system, given current and foreseeable technology, cannot be effective. What proof of effectiveness should be required before the system is fully deployed? Given the low-tech nature of terrorist attacks and the limited missile capabilities of North Korea and other hostile nations, does missile defense continue to be a wise investment? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1Bush <<Kerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryOur policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, a weapons system that would defend the United States homeland against nuclear attack, including ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available. Early in my administration, I called for the examination of the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.The FY 2005 Defense Appropriations Act provides $10 billion that I requested for systems to defend against the threat from ballistic missiles. Later this year, the first components of America’s missile defense system will become operational, and we are on schedule for the next stages of the project. My administration will develop and deploy the technologies necessary to protect our people, fulfilling a pledge I made to the American people more than four years ago.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry <<2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryA missile defense that works is a wise investment, but one that pours money into defenses at the expense of other immediate national security needs is not. And that’s what this administration has done. Missile defense should be one element of a comprehensive national security strategy. But a single-minded focus on this technology and the threat it is designed to meet ignores the very real danger of terrorism and our greatest danger—terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.John Edwards and I will be committed to developing a missile defense system that works, is fully tested, and geared to the threats we face. But I will refocus our efforts on preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and dramatically accelerating the security of nuclear weapons and material in Russia and around the world. We will not sit by, falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system, while these threats continue to fester.2Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2 <<BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Climate change: Virtually all reputable research in recent years has reinforced the scientific conclusion that global warming is a real and growing crisis caused, at least in part, by the burning of fossil fuels. Do you accept that scientific consensus? Under what circumstances would you regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2Bush <<Kerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryGlobal climate change is a serious long-term issue. In 2001, I asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to provide the most up-to-date information about the science of climate change. The academy found that considerable uncertainty remains about the effect of natural fluctuations on climate and the future effects climate change will have on our environment.My administration is now well along in implementing a comprehensive climate change strategy to advance the science, expand the use of transformational energy and carbon sequestration technologies, and mitigate the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and in partnership with other nations. I created the new US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) to refocus the federal government’s climate research programs, for which my 2005 budget seeks nearly $2 billion to fund research across the federal government. The NAS endorsed the CCSP strategic plan, noting that it “articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious, and is broad in scope.”I also committed the nation to a goal of reducing American greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the next 10 years, which would prevent more than 500 million tons of carbon emissions through 2012. To help achieve this goal, I created the Climate Vision program in 2003 to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions by energy-intensive industrial sectors. Participants in the Climate Vision program account for between 40 and 45% of US greenhouse gas emissions. I have strongly supported over $4 billion in tax incentives for renewable and energy-efficient technologies, including wind and solar energy and hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles. Also, in April 2003, my administration raised the fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs [sport utility vehicles] for the first time since 1996, saving 3.6 billion gallons of gasoline. And in my 2003 State of the Union [address], I announced a $1.7 billion hydrogen fuel initiative to accelerate research that could lead to hydrogen-powered, no-emission vehicles within a generation.Additionally, my administration is participating in robust international partnerships to promote clean, renewable, commercially available fusion energy and to construct the $1 billion FutureGen project, which will test the latest technologies to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, and sequester greenhouse gas emissions from coal. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry <<3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryI recognize the risk of climate change, and I have outlined a balanced set of programs that will have impact both in the near term and over the long term. My plan will also provide balanced support for technology that can increase the efficiency and cut greenhouse emissions in transportation systems, buildings, and industry that are attractive to consumers and US producers. Our programs will encourage the use of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable electric generation that produce little or no net greenhouse gases. I will expand the production tax credit for wind and biomass energy to cover the full array of renewable energy sources and increase Department of Energy (DOE) research into renewable energy sources and their applications. And I will propose an aggressive program of research, standards, and incentives to accelerate electric generation from renewable energy. Clean coal technology can play a critical role, given technology to cut carbon dioxide emissions.My plan would encourage energy efficiency with programs such as updated fuel efficiency standards, new tax incentives for automakers to build the new, more efficient automobiles of the future, and tax incentives for families to purchase more energy-efficient cars, trucks, and SUVs.3Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3 <<BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Science investment: There is concern in the science and economic communities that the US is losing its world leadership in the sciences, which they say bodes ill for future economic growth and global competitive-ness. To address that concern, should the US increase funding for basic science, and should the administration fully fund the 2001 bill, signed by the president, to double NSF’s budget? How would you reinvigorate science education for US-born students? What is the role of foreign scientists and students in the US scientific enterprise? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3Bush <<Kerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryIncluding my FY 2005 budget request, total federal R&D investment during the first term will have increased 44% to a record $132 billion in 2005. My FY 2005 budget request commits 13.5% of total discretionary outlays to R&D, the highest level in 37 years. In the context of the overall economy, federal R&D spending in the FY 2005 budget is the greatest share of GDP [gross domestic product] in over 10 years. Funding for basic research, the fuel for future technology development, is at an all-time high of $26.8 billion in FY 2005, a 26% increase over FY 2001. Funding for NSF during the four years of my administration has increased 30% over FY 2001 to $5.7 billion in FY 2005. NSF’s broad support for basic research, particularly at US academic institutions, provides not only a central source for discovery in many fields but also encourages and supports development of the next generation of scientists and engineers. Moreover, in fulfilling its mission, NSF has used its funding efficiently and effectively.As for the American scientific enterprise, it is important in this information and technological age that our students receive a first-rate science education, just as they receive quality instruction in reading, writing, and math. The federal government has no control over local curricula, and it is not my job to tell states and local boards of education what they should teach in the classroom. Nevertheless, the No Child Left Behind Act, one of my proudest legislative achievements this term, is improving our schools and, consequently, the teaching of science. NCLB requires, for the first time, assessments in science to give us better information about how our students are performing and how to improve instruction in science. I have also proposed creating the Presidential Math and Science Scholars Fund to provide $100 million in grants to low-income students who study math or science. This will ensure that America’s graduates have the training they need to compete for the best jobs of the 21st century.I also value the contributions that foreign scientists and students make to our nation’s scientific enterprise, while recognizing the importance of safeguarding our security. We will continue to welcome international students and scientists while implementing balanced measures to end abuses of the student visa system. My administration has already achieved several notable successes in reducing delays now being experienced by some visa seekers. We have increased security while speeding up the clearance process; approximately 1000 back-logged applications have already been cleared out.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry <<4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryFor three years, the Bush administration has squandered America’s leadership in the world, putting politics before science and doing nothing to create jobs while our workers fall further behind. The administration has proposed cuts for scientific research and grossly distorted and politicized science on issues from mercury pollution to stem-cell research. This approach not only limits the research that our scientists are doing today, it undermines important discoveries of tomorrow and threatens America’s critical edge in innovation. I will reverse this course by restoring America’s scientific leadership, helping find new cures, moderating healthcare costs, and developing new technologies that will create good jobs. I will boost support for the physical sciences and engineering by increasing research investments in agencies such as NSF, the National Institutes of Health, DOE, NIST, and NASA. This funding will help with the broad areas of science and technology that will provide the foundations for economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.4Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4 <<BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Nuclear weapons: Does the US need to develop a new class of nuclear weapons to deal with the changing threats of the 21st century? Is there any circumstance in which you would support the resumption of nuclear testing? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4Bush <<Kerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryThe Nuclear Posture Review, released by my administration in January 2002, noted that the nation’s nuclear infrastructure had atrophied since the end of the cold war and that the evolving security environment requires a flexible and responsive weapons complex infrastructure. To that end, my FY 2005 budget reflects an increase over the 2004 enacted level in the weapons activities account, which encompasses the stockpile stewardship programs. There is no current need for testing due to the sophistication of computer modeling and other new technologies, but we must maintain the capability to test in case such testing becomes necessary in the future to ensure the safety and reliability of our defensive arsenal. We have not identified any need for developing new nuclear weapons. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry <<5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryNo, and a Kerry–Edwards administration will stop this administration’s program to develop a new class of nuclear weapons. This is a weapon we don’t need, and it undermines our ability to persuade other nations to forego development of these weapons.5Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5 Nuclear There is serious concern many that could or a nuclear in a US Do you the US is doing to and control of nuclear weapons and material both in the US and BushSection:ChooseTop of administration in has more to and control nuclear weapons and material than US weapons and are and both the Department of Defense and are to make more My administration has increased funding to weapons and material in the Union and has by years the schedule the administration for security in We are with Russia to end the production of and to weapons for of weapons. the my administration the to or and material We have already weapons material from several our in its for nuclear weapons. To against we the international in a global effort to account and of sources that could be used in such We activities in over 40 on this as well as with international the Energy the the and the of Defense we have dramatically our ability to that could be a threat to us and to our friends and my administration the billion initiative to support and nuclear safety in the This of the international is to a more of nation’s highest must be preventing from to nuclear weapons and the material to make We must in a global partnership with other nations to prevent the spread of these weapons. the Bush administration’s have in the have the we need to advance our security. September they have not nearly to and on the while the nuclear from and North Korea have Our security requires an immediate change of I have proposed a comprehensive strategy to of weapons and including an of programs to all nuclear weapons and within the and at research in the within four production of new material for nuclear weapons by a global on production of new of nuclear weapons and by development of the new generation of nuclear accelerating in US and nuclear and reducing of in nuclear weapons programs in hostile including by with North Korea to ensure the and of its nuclear weapons program and a global effort to prevent from the necessary to build nuclear weapons. international efforts to by and and as well as improving the security a presidential to prevent nuclear terrorism who will focus on a effort to all nuclear weapons and around the world and prevent a nuclear terrorist of Energy than of and have not in a comprehensive US energy policy. years into the future, what do you the US energy should How would you the US in that BushSection:ChooseTop of and energy is critical to America’s and homeland security. We will be more and more we are on foreign sources of energy. The of a comprehensive and balanced national energy policy has been one of my During my first in I proposed a national energy policy that would our energy production and systems, reduce our on foreign promote efficiency and increase domestic production from all of energy including renewable energy and continue to our economy and create new jobs. We will continue to with on the energy to the administration has nearly all of the more than in the comprehensive national energy policy that not as increasing reliability R&D to help prevent and the to its of million to provide energy security in case of of have proposed an program of research, and standards that would increase the efficiency of energy use and use of new energy sources that can ensure a and while reducing the risk of climate change. The program would be supported in by a billion energy security and from federal and gas the in by I have to around the and a of that can meet US needs both in the term and for in the Given the long time required to over energy investments such as of and trucks, industrial and we must a broad set of new technologies as as possible we have any of US energy use in the near term, many of the most control systems, and other technologies to improve the energy of buildings, and industrial that the US to reduce its on from the and I will set for fuels such as I will support research and incentives that will dramatically increase use of from wind and other renewable And I will encourage development of technology and nuclear generation with high standards for stewardship and of Nuclear recent by that nuclear is the best energy source to meet the US while protecting the renewable energy can be deployed on a Do you increasing the use of nuclear If what would you do with the BushSection:ChooseTop of support the further development of nuclear technologies as a clean, and to meet this nation’s future energy Nuclear for of our This which no pollution or greenhouse gas can play an expanding role in our energy future while the we with energy national energy policy several to encourage increased use of nuclear and to the that through the Nuclear my administration is with industry to the for an of a new US nuclear within the next years. through the the United States is with around the to develop a next generation of more and more nuclear that can also produce hydrogen and my administration has made a to the nuclear and the of a long-term at We are ahead with the of a to the Nuclear at the end of this administration is also committed to and in new technologies that will change the we generate I committed the United States to the international fusion energy as in is a important to test the of nuclear fusion as a source of and the of a nearly source of energy the that long-term of Nuclear can play an role in energy while reducing the risk of climate key such as nuclear nuclear and security must be John Edwards and I will ensure safety and science We George Bush’s plan to over the of a Kerry–Edwards administration will on science. John Edwards and I do not support as a nuclear and will that nuclear and transportation only on the of science and that to and the John Edwards and I will George Bush and to from a for an NAS study to is the as to long-term and or some other technology. an international to scientific for nuclear and nuclear from terrorist John Edwards and I will improve and security at nuclear In we will nuclear to to improve including measures to reduce to the an of National National Nuclear the national weapons continue to be with security spending and What would you to improve at the Does the current plan of the to the risk of the in the of the war on BushSection:ChooseTop of national are doing to deal with the threats of the 21st are a in our efforts to improve homeland are the source of technological and are helping the war on With their at the highest level in years, National National and National are also on the edge of defense research, protecting the nation’s infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and developing a that the of a nuclear This is we billion on weapons research and production in FY 2004 and I for billion for We must and security My administration has made effort to improve the the weapons do and one of efforts is that in all areas of central to the war on we can use our more and focus on his or of national play a critical role in our nuclear weapons stockpile and that our nation’s nuclear weapons are and The national also have an important role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass and in science for our nation’s have a of our nation’s but this record has been by and security at the has been John Edwards and I are committed to and and restoring the at these critical national of is being to the long-term of to the and Many scientists the will money from science How do you the importance of science exploration What is the funding between the BushSection:ChooseTop of I announced my for the future of America’s space exploration this will the of both and science will as to the and other vehicles continue to their and of to we have systems on and around a system and one on its to the for cannot be by the most or the most We need to and and for And only are of to the by space we our on the we are developing a new exploration to our This will be by and its first no than will to the as as and no than and use it as a for the We will with to the and for future will with the goal of and there for of Edwards and I will continue America’s long tradition of leadership in and space exploration as of a program to broad for this will not to programs such as the Bush administration’s Program that from in the with no or will in new programs to set by scientific in and other Our administration will on the of the scientific to the most for research and the most for these the of or are most to the 2004 American of

Reducing the risks of nuclear war to humanity

South Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa’s representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying “no”, but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa’s opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology – something that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states’ denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order – something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.

In his article, Matthew Fuhrmann challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation.1 The literature on nuclear proliferation focuses on the demand side and explains decisions to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of security threats, hegemonic ambitions, national identity, or related factors.2 The role of civilian technical nuclear cooperation is generally discounted as a motivating factor in the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. Fuhrmann argues that there is a causal connection between peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation and that civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will initiate nuclear weapons programs. The implications of the notion that civilian nuclear technology promotes nuclear proliferation are disturbing, because they lead to the conclusion that the central bargain of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—namely, access to civilian nuclear technology in return for the renunciation of nuclear weapons—is not viable and that instead the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) might be a vector for the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The central thesis of Fuhrmann’s article seems implausible. Nuclear proliferation is exceedingly rare. One hundred eighty-nine states are members of the NPT, including ave nuclear states. There are only four states that are not members of the NPT and that have nuclear weapons. Of the four, the last one to make the decision to go nuclear and that received civilian nuclear assistance started its nuclear program in 1972. North Korea went nuclear in the absence of civilian nuclear assistance.3 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Correspondence: Nuclear Cooperation and Proliferation

54 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXIV, No.4, Summer 2011 India, Pakistan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty M. Yousuf Saeed* In its Final Document adopted in May 2010, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference urged India and Pakistan to subscribe to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and to put all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards “promptly and without conditions.”1 This was not the first time that members of international community asked the two South Asian states to sign the treaty. Similar appeals were made by the U.N. Security Council in 1998 and by the NPT Review Conference in 2000.2 Both countries have remained unresponsive. This article reviews the origin and evolution of India and Pakistan’s attitudes toward the NPT. It discusses the reasons they offer for staying out of the treaty, describes the similarities and differences in their policies and the changes that these policies have undergone over a period of time. It suggests that both countries should be admitted into the treaty as nuclear weapon states (NWS), the status assigned to the first five nuclear powers. India and Pakistan: Initial response The idea of an international non-proliferation treaty, when first mooted in 1961, was supported by both India and Pakistan. The Irish resolution on the “Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” to which the legislative origin of the NPT is traced,3 was presented to the U.N. *M. Yousuf Saeed is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of History and Sociology at Claflin University in Orangeburg, South Carolina. He received his Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of South Carolina. His research interests include international relations of south and southwest Asia, and nuclear proliferation. 1 United Nations, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, 16. www.un.org. 2 U.N. Security Council resolution 1172, June 6, 1998; 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, May 24, 2000. 3 Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Arms Control (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1969), 61. 55 General Assembly that year and was favored by the two countries when put to vote on December 4.4 The central paragraph of the resolution, which contained language similar to what was later used in Articles I and II of the NPT,5 asked for the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons....6 In addition, both India and Pakistan supported other resolutions, moved around this time in the U.N. General Assembly that recommended cessation of all nuclear tests.7 India and the NPT Indian policy regarding non-proliferation underwent a change after the Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964.8 Defending its nuclear detonation, the Chinese government claimed that the 1963 Moscow partial test ban treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, was an attempt “to consolidate the nuclear monopoly held by the three nuclear powers and tie the hands and feet of all peace loving countries.” China, it further stated, supported “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons” and believed that partial suspension, or complete prohibition, of nuclear testing, or destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could not be the first step toward complete disarmament. Rather, in Chinese view, an international summit conference had to be convened which “as the first step” should conclude an agreement under which the nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon threshold states “undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them 4 Resolution 1665 (XVI) was unanimously approved. Documents on Disarmament 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962), 694. 5 Article I of NPT requires NWS not to transfer nuclear weapons...

Nuclear diplomacy is one of the key mechanisms of global security. However, it can also be perceived as an instrument of geopolitical competition among nuclear-armed states. This paper examines its dual nature, exploring how international agreements and institutions contribute to global security while also analyzing how major powers use nuclear capabilities as a means of competition. By assessing the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the paper examines both the successes and limitations of diplomatic efforts in preventing nuclear proliferation. Special emphasis is placed on the dynamics of relations between leading nuclear powers and their approach toward regional actors that have acquired nuclear weapons after 1968. The paper concludes that the future of nuclear diplomacy remains uncertain precisely because of its dual nature.

Journal Article Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries and The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Get access Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries. Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz (Eds.). Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1976. (Distributed in UK by John Wiley, Chichester.) 348 pp. £9.80.The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. By William Epstein. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 341 pp. £10.50. Lawrence Freedman Lawrence Freedman 1Chatham House Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 4, October 1977, Pages 642–643, https://doi.org/10.2307/2616240 Published: 01 October 1977

This article surveys China's policy towards nuclear non-proliferation regime and contests view that China has now completed transition from a challenger to an upholder of global non-proliferation regime. It argues that the learning curve hypothesis and bureaucratic politics and profit motives arguments provide only a partial explanation of China's shifting but ambiguous and contradictory policy towards non-proliferation. China has cleverly played the proliferation card by exploiting loopholes in nonproliferation regime and contradictions in major power relationships so as to serve its national security interests. The article examines factors that have led Beijing to disregard non-proliferation regime in past and might make it continue to do so in future. It also analyses changing Asian security environment and its impact on China's nonproliferation commitments in future. Introduction The global nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime is an outgrowth of steps taken during second half of twentieth century to halt horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The NNP regime consists of several components. These are Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957; 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere, outer space, or under water; 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was extended indefinitely in 1995; London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at halting proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems; 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement (a successor to Cold War era's COCOM) covering conventional weapons and dual-use exports; and Zangger Committee which covers nuclear-related exports. T he 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to come into force, further constrains all states from conducting nuclear tests. In addition, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) in Latin America, South Pacific, and Africa have further strengthened regime. In 1995, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, and in 1997 five Central Asian states issued Tashkent statement proposing a NWFZ for Central Asia. The overall record of NNP regime has been a mixture of success and failure. On positive side, five decades of international efforts at curbing spread of nuclear weapons have created a political and normative climate in which no state can easily declare its nuclear intentions. The unsuitability of nuclear weapons to most military situations also renders them useless. Moreover, a number of nuclearcapable states -- notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan -- have in recent years agreed to abandon strive for, or dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities. In this sense, regime has been fairly successful. On negative side, campaign for nuclear disarmament appears to be failing just when success seemed at hand. Since mid1980s, regime has been undermined by emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology and delivery systems, as well as by an increase in number of threshold or new nuclear weapons states (NWSs).. Apart from five declared NWSs (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China), and two new self-declared NWSs (India and Pakistan), several other nations (Israel, Japan, North Korea, and Iran) are widely believed to have made significant progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. The changes in international system and global nuclear balance of power since end of Cold War have thrown up new challenges and opportunities for NNP regime. …

The slogans of the "walkers for peace " in the Uniled Slates of America anti in Western Europe (and also in South Africa) against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology as well as the growing probability of a nuclear war in the light of president Reagan's rearmament plan, arc born of the numerous failures of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The ever- increasing danger that goes along with nuclear proliferation in the sense of weapon production and the handling of radioactive waste urges us to look more seriously than ever at nuclear technology. The article deals with some of the efforts to control the proliferation process as well as efforts to limit or reduce nuclear arms. Some essential factors that negatively influence the discussions are pointed out and finally it is concluded that because of the sin-induced brokenness of man’s heart, control over nuclear arms proliferation has just partial success. The abolition of weapon production and total disarm­ ament are ideals that will, in this era that precedes the second coming of Christ, not be fulfilled. Thus, the nuclear arms race will inevitably continue.

The environment is very important in the aspects of peace because when we destroy our resources and our resources become scarce, we fight over that.I am working to make sure we don't only protect the environment, we also improve governance.

ABSTRACTSouth Africa had active nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapon program prior to its 1991 accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Similarly, it terminated its chemical weapons program prior to its 1995 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Only the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program was subjected to international verification—albeit ex post facto—following a 1993 decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference to verify the correctness and completeness of South Africa's declarations under its NPT safeguards agreement. During the 1980s, South Africa also developed and purportedly used biological weapons, violating its obligations under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which it had ratified in 1975. This article draws lessons from the verification of the dismantlement of these programs and makes recommendations for future verification work to confirm the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

A growing awareness of the devastating impact of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on international peace and security inspired multilateral efforts in the 20th century to alleviate the threat posed by these weapons. These efforts culminated in the adoption the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997). This complex of WMD disarmament regimes, which was expanded by the recent adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, provides legal frameworks for reducing, and eventually eliminating, all WMD stockpiles. The disarmament literature tends to place a focus on political, technical, scientific and military aspects surrounding the implementation of disarmament regimes, while largely neglecting their legal architecture and the wider role of international law in the field of disarmament. However, developments in recent years, including the ad hoc chemical disarmament of Syria, the Marshall Islands lawsuit brought against the nuclear weapons states at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the adoption of the new treaty on nuclear weapons, have accorded increased attention to international legal aspects surrounding disarmament. In the context of these movements, this thesis intends to make a two-fold contribution. First, it addresses gaps in the disarmament literature by offering a comprehensive up-to-date analysis of the international law on disarmament, including of recent legal debates. As a second contribution, it will provide a novel evaluation of the legal effectiveness of disarmament regimes by identifying criteria which are considered crucial for successful disarmament and applying them to the respective WMD regimes. Through this dual examination of legal and practical aspects surrounding disarmament, this thesis aims to offer useful insights and support to both international legal scholars and disarmament practitioners in the appropriate interpretation, implementation and strengthening of disarmament regimes.

of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The arst is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a facade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program.1 That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats. This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others. The second broad challenge is arst-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems.2 The third challenge— the focus of this article—is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in Proliferation Rings

This bibliography reviews the scholarly literature on the meaning, causes, and consequences of nuclear proliferation. Specifically, the bibliography focuses on “horizontal” nuclear weapons proliferation, which can be defined as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states and other political entities that did not previously have them. Overshadowed by the superpower nuclear arms race during the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become a major field of interdisciplinary international relations (IR) research since the 1990s. Much nuclear proliferation research has revolved around the empirical puzzle of why so many states that could build nuclear weapons have refrained from doing so. Despite proliferation’s surprisingly slow pace, however, the number of de facto nuclear-weapon states has gradually grown larger over time, and a slow pace in the past does not guarantee a slow pace in the future. On the other side of the coin, proliferation reversal, also known as nuclear renunciation, is also possible. In addition to studying the causes of nuclear proliferation, scholars have also investigated the effects of nuclear proliferation on numerous dimensions of policy and politics. But the literature on the consequences of proliferation remains much thinner than the literature on its causes.