Considerations Based on Behavioral Psychology and Cognitive Science

Cognitive Mapping and the Origin of Language and Mind

Theopsych: A Psychological Science Primer for Theologians

Previous articleNext article No AccessNew Biological BooksOrigins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Merlin Donald Harry J. JerisonHarry J. Jerison Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 67, Number 4Dec., 1992 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/417877 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 34Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1992 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Merlin Donald Précis of Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 737–748.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032647Michael A. Arbib From cooperative computation to man/machine symbiosis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 748–749.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032659Derek Bickerton Putting cognitive carts before linguistic horses, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 749–750.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032660C. Loring Brace “Pop science” versus understanding the emergence of the modern mind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 750–751.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032672Bruce Bridgeman, Margarita Azmitia Mimetic culture and modern sports: A synthesis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 751–752.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032684Philip G. Chase Archaeology and the cognitive sciences in the study of human evolution, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 752–753.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032696Andy Clark Symbolic invention: The missing (computational) link?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 753–754.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032702Thomas L. Clarke A natural history of the mind: A guide for cognitive science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 754–755.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032714Alan Costall The place of cognition in human evolution, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 755–755.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032726Vilmos Csányi Human evolution: Emergence of the group-self, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 755–756.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032738Jeffrey Cynx, Stephen J. Clark Ethological foxes and cognitive hedgehogs, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 756–757.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003274XJ. B. Deregowski What about pictures?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 757–758.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032751R. I. M. Dunbar The modern mind: Its missing parts?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 758–759.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032763Jerome A. Feldman From mimesis to synthesis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 759–759.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032775James H. Fetzer Evolution needs a modern theory of the mind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 759–760.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032787Liane M. Gabora Cultural transitions occur when mind parasites learn new tricks, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 760–761.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032799K. J. Gilhooly Working memory and its extensions, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 761–762.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032805John Halverson Mythos and logos, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 762–762.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032817P. J. Hampson From mimetic to mythic culture: Stimulus equivalence effects and prelinguistic cognition, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 763–763.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032829Harry J. Jerison The evolved mind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 763–764.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032830Leonard D. Katz The gradual evolution of enhanced control by plans: A view from below, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 764–765.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032842Aarre Laakso Language equals mimesis plus speech, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 765–766.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032854Rudi Lutz Lessons from evolution for artificial intelligence?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 766–766.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032866Alexander Marshack Correct data base: Wrong model?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 767–768.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032878Robert W. Mitchell, H. Lyn Miles Apes have mimetic culture, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 768–768.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003288XH. C. Plotkin Hunting memes, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 768–769.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032891Jocelyn Penny Small Memory, text and the Greek Revolution, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 769–770.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032908Evan Thompson Language, thought and consciousness in the modern mind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 770–771.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003291XMichael Tomasello It's imitation, not mimesis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 771–772.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032921Jacques Vauclair, Joël Fagot Can a Saussurian ape be endowed with episodic memory only?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 772–773.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032933Christopher Wills Stages versus continuity, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 773–773.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032945Thomas Wynn Archaeological evidence for mimetic mind and culture, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 774–774.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032957Jiajie Zhang External representation: An issue for cognition, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 774–775.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032969Merlin Donald On the evolution of representational capacities, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no.44 (Feb 2010): 775–791.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032970

Learning motivated by electrical stimulation of the brain.

Focuses on open science practices in suicide research. Specifically, the authors use examples from their own and others' work to demonstrate the opportunities for future-proofing research by implementing open science practices, and they discuss some of the challenges and their potential solutions. They cover implementing open science practices in new, ongoing, and concluded studies, and discuss practices in order of being 'low' to 'high' threshold to implement (based on Kathawalla et al., 2021). Space constraints preclude an extensive presentation of all open science practices although they briefly describe the strategies of providing preprints, sharing study materials and codes, preregistration of studies and registered reports, and sharing research data. To highlight the open science work of as many researchers as possible, examples are provided in Electronic Supplementary Material 1 (ESM 1) rather than in the text. The authors ask for readers' help in adding to these examples via their 'living' reading list (https://osf.io/v6y3t/).

The term `complexity' is often found in the behavioural and cognitive sciences. This paper compares the common-sense usage of the world with attempts by information theorists to provide a formal definition. The concepts of randomness, predictability, organization and complexity are reviewed and we advocate that a distinction be made between traditional `algorithmic' and a more biologically relevant `organizational' complexity. We develop the formal properties of the latter with reference to hierarchies of explanation. The utility of both measures of complexity is discussed and examples of practical application given. We discuss relationships between complexity of environment, cognition, behaviour and brain, outline a possible metacognitive function for perception of complexity, and consider the implications for evolutionary psychology of the special nature of social complexity.

One perspective of a design process in the engineering design community is that it is largely a process marked and defined by a series of decisions. The fundamental assumption in most developed design decision support methodologies is that decision makers make rational choices; that is, choices that maximize the payoff for the predicted outcome. Decisions that do not maximize the predicted payoff are termed as mistakes or irrational choices and discarded. However, research in behavioral economics, psychology, and cognitive science has studied the human mind and suggested the notion of “bounded rationality” to explain decision errors. Bounded rationality refers to the intrinsic inability of human beings to accurately choose “rational” options prescribed by decision models such as expected utility. This paper extends the notion of bounded rationality within engineering design. Specifically, this paper studies the design of complex systems that require interaction among several different subsystems contributing to the overall product design. For convergent decentralized design problems, rational designers converge to equilibrium solutions that lie at the intersection of their individual rational reaction sets. These equilibrium solutions are usually not Pareto optimal and due to the dynamics of the designers’ interaction in collaborative design, it is rarely possible for them to converge to Pareto optimal solutions. However, when models for bounded rationality are introduced into individual designer behavior, it is seen that the converged solutions can improve the resulting solution. Bounded rational decisions within decentralized design are modeled, and the effects of propagating such decisions within a design process are studied.

Removing the stigma of medication for opioid use disorder

In a case study of the growth of cognitive science, we analyzed the activities of the Cognitive Science Society with a particular emphasis on the multidisciplinary nature of the field. Analyses of departmental affiliations, training back‐grounds, research methodology, and paper citations suggest that the journal Cognitive Science and the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society are dominated by cognitive psychology and computer science, rather than being an equal division among the constituent disciplines of cognitive science. However, at many levels, a growing percentage of work was found to involve a conjunction of multiple disciplines, such that approximately 30–50% of recent work in the Cognitive Science Society is multidisciplinary. In a questionnaire study of cognitive scientists involved in collaborative research, multidisciplinarity was found to shape the research process and affect the factors associated with successful research.

The rational actor model is a basic organizing principle in economic theory. As I shall explain below, biologists generally employ the same model in understanding the behavior of organisms, albeit with different connotations (Grafen 1999; Gintis 2004). By contrast, psychologists generally reject this model altogether. This theoretical discrepancy must be squarely faced if fruitful collaboration between psychologists and biologists is to emerge, especially in areas where behavior is concerned, including behavioral game theory, animal behavior, gene-culture coevolution, and neuroeconomics. I argue here that the rational actor model is justified by basic evolutionary theory and should be conserved in transdisciplinary research, though it is better expressed as the beliefs, preferences, and constraints model, as the term “rational” is laden with irrelevant and misleading connotations. To document the rejection of the rational actor model in standard psychological theory, note that cognitive psychology generally defines the brain as an “information-processing organ,” but in fact the brain is a decision-making mechanism, information processing simply being a necessary element thereof. For instance, a widely used text of graduatelevel readings in psychology (Sternberg and Wagner 1999) devotes the ninth of 11 chapters to “Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making,” offering two papers, the first of which shows that human subjects generally fail simple logical inference tasks, and the second shows that human subjects are irrationally swayed by the way a problem is verbally “framed” by the experimenter. A leading undergraduate text (Goldstein 2005) placed “Reasoning and Decision Making” the last of 12 chapters. This includes one paragraph describing the rational actor model, followed by many pages purporting to explain why it is wrong. Behavioral psychology generally avoids positing internal states, of which preferences and beliefs, and even constraints, are examples. Not surprisingly, when the rational actor model is mentioned, it is summarily rejected (Kahneman et al. 1982; Herrnstein et al 1997). Not surprisingly, in a leading behavioral psychology text (Mazur 2002), choice is covered in the last of 14 chapters and is limited to a review of the literature on choice between concurrent reinforcement schedules and the capacity to defer gratification. Summing up a quarter century of psychological research in 1995, Paul Slovic asserted, accurately I believe, that “it is now generally recognized among psychologists that utility maximization provides only limited insight into the processes by which decisions are made” (Slovic 1995: 365). “People are not logical,” psychologists are fond of saying, “they are psychological.” Economics and biology aside, the behavioral sciences have generally spurned the rational actor model. Sociology and anthropology, in addition to cognitive, behavioral, and social psychology, broadly reject this model. Yet, the evolutionary argument for the rational actor model is strong. The fitness of an organism depends on how effectively it makes decisions in an uncertain and varying environment. Effective decision making is a function of the organism’s state of knowledge, which consists of the information supplied by the sensory inputs that monitor the organism’s internal states and its external environment. The fact that the brain is an organ adapted for fitness-maximizing decision making follows from basic biological principles. The brain is a costly organ that evolved because it enhanced the fitness of its carriers, and hence is structured to make on balance fitness-enhancing decisions in the face of the various constellations of sensory inputs it commonly faces. For every such constellation, each decision taken by the organism generates a probability distribution over fitness outcomes, the expected value of which is the fitness value associated with that decision. Since fitness is a scalar variable, for each constellation of sensory inputs, each possible action the organism might take has a specific fitness value, and organisms whose decision mechanisms are optimized for this environment will choose the available action

Psychological capital (PsyCap) is an individual's psychological capacity that can be measured, improved, and managed for performance improvement. Hope, self-efficacy, optimism, and resilience are among the psychological resources that make up the higher-order construct. It has been connected to a variety of positive work attitudes, behaviors, and other outcomes. The concept of well-being is intricately joined with that of living life to the fullest potential. The decades of extensive research on mental illness and dysfunctional behavior in psychology and other behavioral science have generally failed to contribute to a better understanding of the role that human qualities, flourishing, and optimal performance. Similarly, the study of work stress, conflict, dysfunctional attitudes, and other negative constructs that have preoccupied organizational behavior and human resource management scholars and practitioners has also not necessarily shed more light on the traits of outstanding workers or the dynamic mechanisms that support greatness in the workplace. This realization motivated positive psychologists and positive organizational behavior scholars to launch new and exciting streams of research that focus on positivity in its own right, rather than simply extrapolating existing mainstream research. It is expected that the positive influences of PsyCap will reduce costs and mitigate negative influences in an organization or workplace. The concept of well-being is a complex thought on optimal performance in one's life. It is having two visual aspects, the hedonic approach and the eudaimonic approach. The present conceptual review paper has been drafted to have an understanding of positivity, particularly PsyCap which can promote well-being, both at and beyond the workplace.

Cognitive informatics in image semantics description, identification and automatic pattern understanding

Previous articleNext article No AccessMagic and Witchcraft: An Interpretation from Dissonance TheoryTheodore Rosenthal, and Bernard J. SiegelTheodore Rosenthal Search for more articles by this author , and Bernard J. Siegel Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 15, Number 2Summer, 1959 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/soutjanth.15.2.3628803 Views: 10Total views on this site Citations: 32Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in the Southwestern Journal of Anthropology (1945-1972), which is continued by the Journal of Anthropological Research (1973-present). PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Thi An Tran From Dichotomy to Multipolarity: A Case Study of the Four Ladyship Saints Worshipping Practices in Vietnam, (Oct 2021): 167–187.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5055-0_10Patrick Kwaku Ofori, David Tod, David Lavallee An exploratory investigation of superstitious behaviours, coping, control strategies, and personal control in Ghanaian and British student-athletes, International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 16, no.11 (Feb 2016): 3–19.https://doi.org/10.1080/1612197X.2016.1142460Richard Sosis, W. Penn Handwerker Psalms and Coping with Uncertainty: Religious Israeli Women's Responses to the 2006 Lebanon War, American Anthropologist 113, no.11 (Feb 2011): 40–55.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2010.01305.xJules J. Wanderer, George Rivera, Jr. Black magic beliefs and white magic practices: The common structure of intimacy, tradition, and power, The Social Science Journal 23, no.44 (Dec 2019): 419–430.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(86)80016-7Nicholas P. Spanos Hypnotic behavior: A social-psychological interpretation of amnesia, analgesia, and “trance logic”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 449–467.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046537John O. Beahrs The “special-process” controversy: What is at issue?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 467–468.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046549Patricia G. Bowers Understanding reports of nonvolition, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 469–470.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046562Nathan Brody Cognitively induced analgesia and semantic dissociation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 470–470.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046574William E. Edmonston Hypnosis and social suggestibility, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 470–471.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046586Frederick J. Evans Hypnosis and behavioral compliance: Is the cup half-empty or half-full?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 471–473.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046598Kenneth R. Graham Explaining “virtuoso” hypnotic performance: Social psychology or experiential skill?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 473–474.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046604John F. Kihlstrom Strong inferences about hypnosis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 474–475.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046616Irving Kirsch Role playing versus response expectancy as explanations of hypnotic behavior, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 475–476.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046628Peter L. N. Naish Hypnosis: Towards a rational explanation of irrational behaviour, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 476–477.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0004663XMartin T. Orne, David F. Dinges, Emily Carota Orne Hypnotic experience: A cognitive social-psychological reality, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 477–478.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046641Campbell Perry, Jean-Roch Laurence Social and psychological influences on hypnotic behavior, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 478–479.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046653Robert Rosenthal Nonsignificant relationships as scientific evidence, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 479–481.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046665Ted L. Rosenthal Hypnotic phenomena: Who really sees the emperor's new clothes?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 481–481.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046677John Sabini, Debra A. Kossman What grandma thinks about hypnosis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 481–482.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046689Richard St. Jean Hypnosis: Artichoke or onion?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 482–482.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046690Peter W. Sheehan Theories of hypnosis – useful or necessary paths to truth?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 483–483.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046707David Spiegel Painstaking reminders of forgotten trance logic, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 484–485.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046719Dennis C. Turk, Thomas E. Rudy Hypnotic behavior dissected or … pulling the wings off butterflies, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 485–485.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046720Geoffrey Underwood Using simulations to disprove hypnosis amnesia? Forget it, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 485–486.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046732Graham F. Wagstaff State versus nonstate paradigms of hypnosis: A real or a false dichotomy?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 486–487.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046744Edwin A. Weinstein Attentional capacities have neurological basis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 487–488.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00046756Nicholas P. Spanos More on the social psychology of hypnotic responding, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, no.33 (Feb 2010): 489–502.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0004677XThomas Frank Lazar Indigenous Curing Patterns in a Samoan Migrant Community, Oceania 55, no.44 (Feb 2015): 288–302.https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1834-4461.1985.tb02094.xTED L. 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The interaction of robotics with behavioral and cognitive sciences has always been tight. As often described in the literature, the living has inspired the construction of many robots. Yet, in this article, we focus on the reverse phenomenon: building robots can impact importantly the way we conceptualize behavior and cognition in animals and humans. This article presents a series of paradigmatic examples spanning from the modelling of insect navigation, the experimentation of the role of morphology to control locomotion, the development of foundational representations of the body and of the self/other distinction, the self-organization of language in robot societies, and the use of robots as therapeutic tools for children with developmental disorders. Through these examples, I review the way robots can be used as operational models confronting specific theories to reality, or can be used as proof of concepts, or as conceptual exploration tools generating new hypotheses, or used as experimental set ups to uncover particular behavioral properties in animals or humans, or even used as therapeutic tools. Finally, I discuss the fact that in spite of its role in the formation of many fundamental theories in behavioral and cognitive sciences, the use of robots is far from being accepted as a standard tool and contributions are often forgotten, leading to regular rediscoveries and slowing down cumulative progress. The article concludes by highlighting the high priority of further historical and epistemological work.

Burnout is common among physicians; it severely alters their health and has a negative impact on functioning of healthcare systems. Hypertension, increased cortisol levels, maladaptive behaviors with negative social consequences, and suboptimal quality of care have been associated with healthcare providers' burnout. As the number of patients with cancers, psychiatric and neurodegenerative disorders will rise, we need new solutions to maintain physicians' health and, therefore, quality of care. Coping strategies before the COVID-19 pandemic seem ineffective in scaling all the deficits of the global healthcare systems. Examples of new initiatives include new collaborative projects, such as COH-FIT (The Collaborative Outcomes study on Health and Functioning during Infection Times - https://www.coh-fit.com), which aims to collect global data and understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on physical and mental health in order to identify various coping strategies for patients and healthcare workers during infection times, or MEMO (Minimizing Error, Maximizing Outcome), funded by the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Others: i) Rome Foundation GastroPsych undertake efforts dedicated to the science and practice of psychogastroenterology, a burgeoning field with roots in behavioral intervention, cognitive science and experimental psychology focused on fostering the professional growth and collaboration of those engaged in medical practices, or ii) World Gastroenterology Organisation (WGO), Train The Trainers (TTT) program including a new topic of the impact of burnout on career longevity in order to foster strategies for staying healthy and increasing career satisfaction. There is a need for continuous development of digital technologies (e.g. training simulators, telemedicine, robots and artificial intelligence). Their implementation into medical practice is inevitable. Now more than ever, there is a need for a new spirit in healthcare. Together with others in the field, we believe this article is a desperate call for maximizing the use of novel technologies supported by collaborative interactions among healthcare providers and medical professionals of diverse medical fields.