Conspiracy, Complicity, Critique

Henrik Ibsen and Conspiracy Thinking: The Case of <i>Peer Gynt</i>

Paradoxes of white moral experience

A survey of 1,010 randomly selected adults asked about media use and belief in three conspiracy theories about the attacks of September 11, 2001. “Paranoid style” and “cultural sociology” theories are outlined, and empirical support is found for both. Patterns vary somewhat by conspiracy theory, but members of less powerful groups (racial minorities, lower social class, women, younger ages) are more likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, as are those with low levels of media involvement and consumers of less legitimate media (blogs and grocery store tabloids). Consumers of legitimate media (daily newspapers and network TV news) are less likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, although these relationships are not significant after controlling for social structural variables. Beliefs in all three conspiracies are aligned with mainstream political party divisions, evidence that conspiracy thinking is now a normal part of mainstream political conflict in the United States.

This chapter argues that labeling a point of view as a “conspiracy theory” is a form of panic (“conspiracy panic”) used to discipline thought. “Conspiracy theory” reinforces the “regime of truth,” Foucault’s reference to social mechanisms that discipline thought. The chapter lays out a framework for assessing the truth value of conspiracy theories as, like other social science theories, propositions about social attitudes and behavior, rejecting a priori classification of conspiracy theories as pathological thinking. The framework differentiates how we should regard three kinds of grand (or “world”) conspiracy theories that rarely hold up because they reduce complex, large-scale events to simple explanations of elite manipulation; petty conspiracy theories, that collectively may have significance, e.g., in the way cumulative corruption erodes trust in government; and operational conspiracy theories, that are often plausible and significant and are worthy of serious investigation by historians and social scientists. Like voting, diplomatic negotiations, conflict resolution, propaganda, war-making, legislating, etc., operational conspiracies are ways of doing politics. Most conspiracy theories for and against Trump are operational ones, and they need to be sorted into those that are nativist and fit the “paranoid style” and those that are plausible based motivation, logic, and evidence.

Reviewed by: Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography Bruce Kuklick David S. Brown , Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual BiographyChicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. xxiv+291 pp. Notes, Bibliographic Essay, Sources, Students of Richard Hofstadter, Index. $27.50. In the mid-twentieth century Richard Hofstadter was one the finest historians of the United States. Uncommitted to work in primary sources, he was perhaps not at the level of Perry Miller, Vann Woodward, and Edmund Morgan. But Hofstadter had a greater range and wider influence than these men, and the combination of intellectual and political history that he wrote was unique, as was the penetration of his intellect and his appealing sensibility. Hofstadter was born in Buffalo, New York, the son of a Lutheran mother and a father who was a secular Jew. The son went to the local University of Buffalo. While not as impoverished as this biography is inclined to make him, Dick Hofstadter "married up" after he fell in love with Felice Swados, the daughter of a Buffalo Jewish doctor who was also a student at the University. Swados introduced Hofstadter to the Marxist intellectual left of the 1930s, although he was himself a successful and intelligent student leader. In the years after their graduation, the couple had a tempestuous start to their marriage, but over the next several years they built a life in New York City. Felice became the medical columnist for Time; Dick productively completed a doctoral degree in history at Columbia University. They both continued their radical activities. In the late 1930s he was briefly a member of the American Communist Party, although Dick quickly resigned because of the authoritarian nature of the organization. Even then, however, he was more removed and skeptical than Felice, with more of an historian's impartiality and sense of the tragic. Felice's unambiguous commitments moved him, but Dick was, literally, only half-inclined to the Jewish left. Swados died of cancer in 1945, after they had moved to Washington, D.C., where Hofstadter was teaching at the University of Maryland. But a year later the devastated young man obtained a position at Columbia. At the same time he met and married Beatrice Kevitt, another capable woman with literary and editorial talent. In 1948 Hofstadter published what I still think is his masterwork, The American Political Tradition. A series of sharp portraits of leading politicians, [End Page 574] the book owed much to Hofstadter's leftist background. It was indebted to Marxist analyses, or at least to those of the sort promulgated by the great historian, Charles Beard, who saw economics as central to the study of national life. But Hofstadter did not see a clash between capitalists and their opponents in the United States. He viewed the entire tradition of American politicians as committed to a certain kind of exploitative social system, although his book did not quite have the edge suggested by this last phrase. Hofstadter became known as a "consensus" historian who had a monolithic sense of the American experience, although this monolith was not benign as was that of other practitioners of consensus. In the 1950s Hofstadter, now a prominent Columbia faculty member, moved away from some of the economic preconceptions of The American Political Tradition. Instead, in his two other important books, The Age of Reform (1955) and The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965), he brought to bear on the American experience a group of concepts that he took from his study of the social sciences. Overall, these two books undermined his previous materialist interpretation of politics. Instead, Hofstadter found that irrational fears, psychological maladjustments, and concerns about status might motivate leaders and movements more than a rational appraisal of self-interest. In retrospect, this 1950s social science does not appear very enlightening, and so Hofstadter's absorption of it is not to be praised. On the other side, so many of his fellow historians attacked him for his interdisciplinary bent that his generous outreach looks more than daring. Hofstadter's own personal politics shifted, too. He became a staunch if critical defender of the social democratic liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and its impulses in the 1950s and 1960s. In...

The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, <i>by Richard Hofstadter</i>

This chapter explores the place of toy guns in the dream lives of American boys. What few mainstream pundits seem willing to discuss is the role, in America’s gun violence, of the radically deregulated capitalism championed for decades by neoliberal economists and conservative ideologues. What Ayn Rand would call the virtuous selfishness of winner-take-all capitalism insists on profit maximization at any cost. It is the reason why the gun industry spends millions in lobbying, campaign contributions, and issue ads to thwart gun control. The paranoid style in American politics is also part of the psychotic equation of gun culture. It is no coincidence that America leads the industrialized world in gun violence, and American children are eleven times more likely than children in other developed countries to die in a gun accident.

This text offers an overview of conspiracism in the United States from the 1950s to the present. Even if contemporary conspiracy mongering extends certain practices and attitudes that were already well-known at the time of Richard Hofstadter’s classic study of the “paranoid style in American politics” (1964) and Robert Goldberg’s more recent study of “the culture of conspiracy in modern America” (2001, 2010), it also introduces new techniques by savvy strategists, such as Donald Trump and Tucker Carlson, who exploit the economic vulnerability of many and the status loss anxiety of many others to destabilize the faculty of judgment of American citizens, increase polarization and suspicion between opposing camps, and weaken confidence in public institutions and democracy. This new conspiracism, we claim, serves to console the most vulnerable and turn the attention of the American public away from a forty-year social trend (conspiracy or not) which would be a neoliberal globalization that deepens inequalities and advances most often with total impunity to advance the interests of powerful deciders and loyalists—the first being to retain power and their control over narratives of power. The paper concludes with some recommendations for combatting this highly cynical and corrosive new conspiracism.

When misinformation is rampant, “fake news” is rising, and conspiracy theories are widespread, social scientists have a vested interest in understanding who is most susceptible to these false narratives and why. Recent research suggests Christians are especially susceptible to belief in conspiracy theories in the United States, but scholars have yet to ascertain the role of religiopolitical identities and epistomological approaches, specifically Christian nationalism and biblical literalism, in generalized conspiracy thinking. Because Christian nationalists sense that the nation is under cultural threat and biblical literalism provides an alternative (often anti‐elite) source of information, we predict that both will amplify conspiracy thinking. We find that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism independently predict conspiracy thinking, but that the effect of Christian nationalism increases with literalism. Our results point to the contingent effects of Christian nationalism and the need for the religious variables in understanding conspiracy thinking.

EthosVolume 1, Issue 2 p. 153-174 Free Access Cult and Context: The Paranoid Ethos in Melanesia Theodore Schwartz, Theodore Schwartz Theodore Schwartz is an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology, at the University of California, San Diego.Search for more papers by this author Theodore Schwartz, Theodore Schwartz Theodore Schwartz is an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology, at the University of California, San Diego.Search for more papers by this author First published: Summer 1973 https://doi.org/10.1525/eth.1973.1.2.02a00020Citations: 25 AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Bellow, Saul. 1961. Herzog. Fawcett. Belshaw, Cyril. 1950. The Significance of Modern Cults in Melanesian Development. Australian Outlook 4. Benedict, Ruth. 1934. Patterns of Culture. Houghton Mifflin. Cohn, Norman. 1957. The Pursuit of the Millenium. London. Cohn, Norman. 1961. The Pursuit of the Millennium. Harper and Row. Devereux, George. 1956. “ Normal and Abnormal: The Key Problem of Psychiatric Anthropology.” In: The Anthropological Society of Washington. Some Uses of Anthropology: Theoretical and Applied. Wash., D.C. Devereux, George. 1970. “ Normal et anormal.” (An expansion of the above article.) In: Essais d'éthnopsychiatrie générale. Gallimard. Durkheim, Emile. 1938. The Rules of Sociological Method.. Firth, Raymond. 1955. The Fate of the Soul: An Interpretation of Some Primitive Concepts. Cambridge University Press. Fortune, Reo. 1932. Sorcerers of Dobu. The Social Anthropology of the Dobu Islanders of the Western Pacific. Dutton. Fortune, Reo. 1935. Manus Religion: An Ethnological Study of the Manus Natives of the Admiralty Islands. University of Nebraska Press. Guiart, Jean. 1951. Forerunners of Melanesian Nationalism. Oceania 22. Hallowell, A. Irving.1955. Culture and Experience. University of Pennsylvania Press. Hitson, Hazel, and D. Funkenstein. 1959. Family Patterns and Para-noidal Personality Structure in Boston and Burma. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 5. Hofstadter, Richard. 1965. The Paranoid Style in American Politics. Knopf. Lanternari, Vittorio. 1963. The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults. Knopf. Lawrence, Peter. 1964. Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea. University of Manchester Press. Lawrence, Peter, and Mervyn Meggitt. 1965. Gods, Ghosts, and Men in Melanesia. Oxford University Press. Lerner, Max. 1970. Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Paranoia. Los Angeles Times.. McClelland, David P. 1961. The Achieving Society. Van Nostrand. Mead, Margaret. 1930. Growing Up in New Guinea. Morrow. Mead, Margaret. 1938. The Mountain Arapesh: An Importing Culture. Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History 36. Sahlins, Marshall. 1968. Tribesmen. Prentice-Hall. Schwartz, Lola. 1969. The Hierarchy of Resort in Curative Practices: The Admiralty Islands, Melanesia. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 10. Schwartz, Theodore. 1962. The Paliau Movement in the Admiralty Islands, 1946–1954. Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History 49. Schwartz, Theodore. 1963. Systems of Areal Integration: Some Considerations Based on the Admiralty Islands of Northern Melanesia. Anthropological Forum 1. Schwartz, Theodore. 1968. Beyond Cybernetics: Constructs, Expectations, and Goals in Human Adaptation. Paper presented at Wenner-Gren Foundation Symposium, Burg Wartenstein. Schwartz, Theodore. 1972. Distributive Models of Culture in Relation to Societal Scale. Paper presented at Wenner-Gren Foundation Symposium, Burg Wartenstein. Souter, Gavin. 1963. New Guinea: The Last Unknown. Angus and Robertson. Spiro, Melford E. 1967. Burmese Supernaturalism. Prentice-Hall. Swanson, David W., Philip J. Bohnert and Jackson A. Smith. 1970. The Paranoid. Little, Brown and Company. Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1956. Revitalization Movements. American Anthropologist 58. Wallis, Wilson. 1943. Messiahs: Their Role in Civilizations. American Council on Public Affairs. Whiting, John W. M. 1941. Becoming a Kwoma. New Haven. Worsley, Peter. 1968. The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of “Cargo Cults” in Melanesia. Schocken Books. Citing Literature Volume1, Issue2Summer 1973Pages 153-174 ReferencesRelatedInformation

This dissertation consists of one review chapter (Chapter 2) and four empirical chapters (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6). Jointly these chapters emphasize the importance of categorizing conspiracy theories as either ingroup (i.e., the suspected conspiracy is located within a valued community, e.g., own government or own political party) versus outgroup (i.e., the suspected conspiracy is located outside a valued community, e.g., a foreign government or an opposing political party). Specifically, the thesis is designed to examine the different psychological antecedents and social consequences of ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs are commonly treated as a homogeneous phenomenon. Accumulating research suggests, however, that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of conspiracy theories, as such different conceptualizations have different psychological effects. Chapter 2 proposes at least three facets that are important. Besides the distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories (1), also matters (2) whether the conspiracy theory is directly relevant for perceivers’ core values, and (3) how much power or status the perceived conspirators have. We describe this organizational framework in terms of the acronym “GIST” (Groups, Ideology, and Status - Typology). In Chapter 2, we also discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization. The following four chapters zoom in empirically on the first (“Groups”) facet. Chapter 3 examines how a variety of social crisis situations influences outgroup conspiracy beliefs, as well as the underlying cognitive mechanisms linking existential threats to outgroup conspiracy beliefs, within a Chinese context. Chapter 4 reveals how ingroup victimhood orientation inherited from history, and the conspiracy beliefs about the historical perpetrator group, jointly affect current collective action tendencies. The chapter specifically comprises a series of studies examining the influence of victim consciousness on conspiracy theories and collective action among Chinese participants. Chapter 5 explores the complex relationships of two different forms of ingroup identification – collective narcissism and collective self-esteem – with both ingroup and outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Previous research has established that collective narcissism and non-narcissistic positive ingroup identification (such as collective self-esteem) are associated differently with conspiracy beliefs. We propose that these specific relationships are different for ingroup and outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Chapter 5 reports three cross-sectional surveys conducted in China and the United States to explore the intricate relationships between these variables, along with their underlying mechanisms and cross-cultural consistency. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the contrary effects of embracing ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories on system-justifying belief, as well as the underlying psychological mechanisms. By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories, Chapter 6 seeks to explain a paradox in conspiracy theory research: Namely, that conspiracy beliefs are associated with both derogation and justification of the social system. To conclude, this dissertation sought to investigate how outgroup conspiracy beliefs emerge in crisis situations and influence intergroup dynamics. Moreover, the dissertation delineates how outgroup conspiracy beliefs differ from ingroup conspiracy beliefs in terms of psychological antecedents and social consequences. The findings are consistent with a key goal of our proposed GIST model, which is to highlight the complexity of different conspiracy beliefs, avoid overgeneralization of research findings, and provide direction to the domains in which ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theories may originate and persist. Taken together, this dissertation attempts to provide an organizational framework to help researchers design future studies that are more mindful of the types of conspiracy theories under investigation.

T O CONSPIRE MEANS literally to breathe together. And usually it's about bad breath. The word conspiracy tends to be used pejoratively to designate a subversive kinship of others, an imagined community based on exclusion more than on affection. Conspiracy theory is a conspiracy against conspiracy; it does not oppose conspiratorial world view as such but doubly affirms it. Because conspiratorial thinking, whether based on facts or on fictions, produces vicious circles of analogy and paranoiac overdetermination, conspiracy theory can become a cause of violence, not merely its effect. How, then, can one produce a critical reflection on conspiracy that will not turn into a conspiracy theory? If conspiracy can be fictional, can fiction conspire to undo it? The terms of conspiracy and of narrative overlap: in both cases one speaks about plots and plotting. Although we might all be complicit in desire for a plot, in what Roland Barthes called the passion for making sense, ideally our plots exist in plural, not in singular. In contrast, conspiracy theory that will be discussed here relates everything to a single subterranean Plot, promising a comfortingly totalizing allegory that leaves nothing to chance. In this case narrative passion turns into paranoiac obsession. For a paranoiac-conspirator other is seen as anothermore or less successful-paranoiac. The whole world appears as a kind of global village or new international of double agents and conspirators, a secret society of those who are not with us but against

As conspiracy theories around COVID-19 pose a big global challenge to public health and well-being, this study seeks to identify how and when people are likely to activate conspiratorial thinking and believe in conspiracy theories about the coronavirus. Based on a U.S. national two-wave survey (W1: N = 1,119; W2: N = 543), this study found partial support for direct effects of uncertainty on conspiratorial thinking and support for indirect effects through threat perception. We also found some evidence of direct effects of uncertainty on conspiracy beliefs and indirect effects through threat perception and serially mediated through threat perception and negative emotions. Findings suggest that effects – either direct or indirect – of uncertainty on conspiratorial thinking/conspiracy beliefs are moderated by perceived relevance to COVID-19, personal experience of the disease, and social media use. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Recent theorizing suggests that people gravitate toward conspiracy theories during difficult times because such beliefs promise to alleviate threats to psychological motives. Surprisingly, however, previous research has largely failed to find beneficial intrapersonal effects of endorsing an event conspiracy theory for outcomes like well-being. The current research provides correlational evidence for a link between well-being and an event conspiracy belief by teasing apart this relation from (1) the influence of experiencing turmoil that nudges people toward believing the event conspiracy theory in the first place and (2) conspiracist ideation-the general tendency to engage in conspiratorial thinking. Across two studies we find that, when statistically accounting for the degree of economic turmoil recently experienced and conspiracist ideation, greater belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories concurrently predicts less stress and longitudinally predicts greater contentment. However, the relation between COVID-19 conspiracy belief and contentment diminishes in size over time. These findings suggest that despite their numerous negative consequences, event conspiracy beliefs are associated with at least temporary intrapersonal benefits.

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N=275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N=300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N= 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.