Copyright

Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement

ONS and Intellectual Property

Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard

Copy

Objective: The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of AI breakthroughs on copyright and challenges faced by intellectual property legal protection systems. Specifically, the study aims to analyze the implications of AI-generated works in the context of copyright law in Indonesia. Method: The research employs a normative legal approach, utilizing secondary data sources including books, legal journals, research findings, and statutory regulatory documents. The study focuses on relevant legal frameworks, such as Law No. 28 of 2014 governing copyright in Indonesia. The analysis is based on existing literature and legal documents to understand the current state of AI-generated works and their eligibility for copyright protection. Result: The research findings reveal that according to Law Number 28 of 2014 in Indonesia, AI-generated works do not meet the originality standards required for copyright protection. However, users of AI-generated works are still bound by the terms and conditions set by the AI platform, which can limit their rights to the work. The impact of AI developments on copyright law includes challenges related to determining creators and copyright holders, redefining the concept of originality, increased instances of copyright infringement, issues concerning moral and personality rights, and collaborations involving both humans and AI. Additionally, challenges related to database protection and patent protection in the context of AI are also highlighted. Conclusion: In conclusion, the advancement of AI technology introduces complexities in intellectual property law. The existing legal frameworks, such as copyright laws, need further adaptation and clarification to effectively regulate AI-generated works in the digital era. Addressing issues related to originality, creatorship, and collaborative works involving AI requires careful consideration and legal adjustments. Additionally, challenges related to database and patent protection in the realm of AI need to be addressed to ensure comprehensive intellectual property protection in the face of evolving technologies. Legal adaptation and clarification are crucial to navigating the intricate intersection of AI and intellectual property law.

<i>Google v. Oracle</i> Amicus Merits Stage Brief: Vindicating IP’s Channeling Principle and Restoring Jurisdictional Balance to Software Copyright Protection

The Copyright/Patent Boundary

This book deals comprehensively with the major treaties and conventions covering the law of international copyright and neighbouring rights. It explains the complex legal, economic and political background to the treaties and their contents, and how they inter-relate. There is also practical commercial discussion of how copyright and neighbouring rights are treated in international trade measures such as GATT, WTO, NAFTA, and bilateral and unilateral treaties, with a section devoted to how unilateral trade measures are applied by the USA in particular. There is also some discussion of how international copyright law and neighbouring rights may develop in the future. The book is intended to be a definitive account of the law of international copyright and neighbouring rights, but it is also intended to be accessible to non-specialist practitioners. It is fully cross-referenced to a forthcoming companion volume, European Copyright Law and Policy (expected to publish in 2008), offering readers a comprehensive approach to the subject. The author has been consulted on copyright policy on numerous occasions by various governmental and non-governmental organisations within and outside the EC, and therefore is ideally placed to give an inside view on how policy is formed.

In his argument for the protection of literary properties, Southey here quite explicitly draws upon the previous century’s legal analogies between literary and landed property put forward by literary aesthetes such as Edward Young and William Duff, as well as prominent legal figures such as William Blackstone and Francis Hargrave. The work of the latter group represented a forceful public challenge to the eighteenth century’s more multifaceted Renaissance and neo-Classical conceptions of the author as either a ‘craftsman’ or ‘inspired’ and both equally dependent on religious and spiritual muses. Imitation as a valuable compositional technique and the importance of tradition began to give way under this discourse to the myth and privilege of raw literary originality. The late eighteenthand nineteenth-century departure from the former style of compositional practice thus pointedly diminished the element of craftsmanship in favour of the inspired individual, but more significantly it also modified the source of this inspiration. As contemporary legal-literary theorists have repeatedly noted, this had broader implications not only for aesthetic definitions of authorship but also for the development of English copyright law and the legal classification of an author’s relationship with their work. Martha Woodmansee convincingly argues that ‘inspiration came to be regarded as emanating not from outside or above, but from within the writer himself . . . the inspired work was made peculiarly and distinctively the property . . . of the writer’ (427). Southey’s confident assertion of his legal rights over his own work emphatically derives from this notion of the inspired individual and further relies on copyright law’s absorption of the same idea in its definition of authorship. Southey’s comments are also notably made within the context of the long and heated debate over literary properties and copyright law which dominated the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This debate eventually culminated in the revised Copyright Act of 1842 and the dramatic extension of authors’

The dominant explanatory/justificatory framework informing scholarly commentary on copyright law, policy and theory today – certainly in the US – is law and economics. From this perspective, copyright law exists to underpin markets in certain categories of ‘information good’ (copyright works). These markets in turn function to ensure that the private costs and benefits of information production and consumption line up (more or less) with the social costs and benefits of these activities, ie that ‘free-riding’ on the efforts of information producers is (more or less) curtailed. A widely held view is that this tradition of what might be called ‘copyright-law-and-economics’ is now deeply divided – between adherents to what Glynn Lunney has called ‘copyright’s incentives-access paradigm’ on the one hand, and proponents of what Mark Lemley has called the ‘full value’ or ‘absolute protection’ paradigm on the other. Absolute protection theorists tend towards the view that all uses of copyright works should be capable of being controlled (and so priced) by the right-owner; incentives-access theorists distinguish between uses the control of which would affect the information producer’s incentives ex ante, and those that would not, and recommend that copyright protection should extend to the former category only. This paper examines the features that are said to distinguish the two paradigms from each other, focusing especially on the approach each recommends to copyright’s scope (ie the issue of what uses of copyright works properly constitute copyright infringements). Particular attention is paid to the efforts of critical economists of intellectual property law such as Lemley and Brett Frischmann to retrieve and advance versions of the incentives-access paradigm with a view to counteracting the disadvantages for society they believe are associated with the absolute protection paradigm. Ultimately, however, I conclude that too much has been made of the distinction, and that the debate over which paradigm should have priority in determining the contours of copyright policy distracts attention from a more fundamental issue – the hegemony of economic analysis generally in organising the conceptual and normative universe of legal scholars working in this area. Thus while sympathetic to the impulse underlying the efforts of Lemley and Frischmann – a concern to resist the seemingly relentless expansion of copyright towards the horizon of absolute right-holder control of all uses of copyright material – I argue that their lingering adherence to the presuppositions of economic analysis has stymied their well-meaning efforts to account for the social value of ‘information’ in terms distinct from the merely economic measure of price. My overall aim here is to suggest that, because of its presuppositions, economic analysis – in whatever paradigm it may be packaged – offers at best a blinkered perspective on both copyright law and the field of social life that copyright law affects. I conclude by proposing Jurgen Habermas’s social theory as an alternative framework in relation to which critics of copyright expansionism might fruitfully orient themselves in the future.

The global fashion industry produces a huge variety of creative goods to market. The fashion industry profits by developing creative content as in the music, film, video game, and book industries. However, unlike those industries, the fashion industry’s principal creative production lies outside the domain of intellectual property law. Fashion has not been historically protected by copyright law due to differences in the legal treatment of the fine arts, like literature, music, and art, which are accorded copyright protection, and crafts, which are generally not accorded such protection. Although fashion is meant to be functional (i.e., it must fit the human body and keep it warm and dry), it is also artistic and creative. Most would agree that fashion is rarely a fine art because it also fulfills a utilitarian function, but this should not necessarily preclude designers from being able to protect their investment in truly innovative designs, as artists and musicians are able to do. The law has traditionally treated each field of IP as an instance of discrete and mutually exclusive protection. Patents protect innovation in terms of functional design, while copyrights protect artistic expression. Finally, trademarks protect goodwill and reputation. These firm divisions between patentable and copyrightable subject matter have left the creative designers of utilitarian objects such as clothing without protection. The growth of the fashion industry has spawned an increased public awareness about fashionable designer products. In light of the popularity of certain designers or specific designs, design piracy has increased exponentially. Design piracy is the copying of a designer’s original designs, thereby enjoying the benefit of his/her artistic work at no expense. Copyists can thus free ride on the efforts of designers, thereby discouraging future investments in creative fashion design. Design piracy is not new; however, while it once took several years for a fashion to descend the price line into low-priced production, this progression is now nearly immediate. Technological advances have made it possible for design pirates to obtain another creator’s designs and manufacture duplicates overnight. Because of the pervasiveness of design piracy, the practice of copying is now considered commonplace in the fashion industry. Accordingly, the original designers of iconic fashion pieces stand to lose substantial amounts of revenue after expending the capital necessary to create them. This study compares Korea and the United States to understand the implications of Korea’s fashion design protections. This paper describes the research on fashion design protection practices in both countries, analyzes the present situation state of fashion design protection in these countries, and compares their legal principles related to fashion design protection. To this end, a literature review is presented that draws on relevant studies and national statistical data on both countries. First, the research on Korea and U.S. fashion design piracy can be summarized as follows. For fashion design in Korea, previous studies focus on the current status of counterfeit fashion goods, intellectual property protection in the fashion market and the protection of applied arts including fashion design. However, these studies have some limitations; many lack specific, concrete discussion on the current status of intellectual property and protection methods, instead providing general, comprehensive discussions. In contrast, studies in the U.S. context focus on the present situation of counterfeit goods in the fashion market, the nature of the fashion market, the essential features of design piracy and the legal protection of fashion design under the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. The breadth of studies on U.S. design piracy studies is much wider compared to those on Korea. In particular, as bills regarding the protection of design under copyright law such as DPPA or IDPPA are submitted to Congress, studies on the protection of design under legal laws are actively conducted. Fashion design protection in Korea versus the United States and the relevant legal principles can be summarized as follows. There are similarities and differences in the protection of fashion design across both countries. First, both countries are similar in terms of fashion design protection under patent law. Both countries provide some protection for fashion design under copyright law. Fashion design still lacks the criteria that have been established for literary works, but criteria are being developed to facilitate the protection of fashion design under copyright law. The most significant difference between the two countries regarding the protection of fashion design lies in the political efforts undertaken to protect fashion design. Unlike Korea, the United States has continued to enforce a separate law for the practical protection of fashion design to address two problems: first, the screening process generally takes a long time, which hinders the protection of fashion, and second, it is difficult to protect the middle area of design rights.

Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions brings together leading copyright scholars and the field&amp;apos;s foremost authorities to consider the critical role of copyright law in shaping the complex social, economic, and political interaction critical for cultural productivity and human flourishing. The book addresses defining issues facing copyright law today, including justifications for copyright law&amp;apos;s limitations and exceptions (L&amp;amp;Es), the role of authors in copyright, users&amp;apos; rights, fair use politics and reform, the three-step test in European copyright law, the idea/expression principle with respect to functional works, limits on the use of L&amp;amp;Es in scientific innovation, and L&amp;amp;Es as a tool for economic development in international copyright law. The book also presents case studies on the historical development of the concept of &amp;apos;neighboring rights&amp;apos; and on Harvard Law School&amp;apos;s pioneering model of global copyright education, made possible by the exercise of L&amp;amp;Es across national borders.

This chapter comments on D McClean's Piracy and Authorship in Contemporary Art and the Artistic Commonwealth (Copyright & Piracy, eds Bently et al, CUP, 2010, ch 16). In that chapter, McClean considers the norms of authorship and infringement in the culture of high art. He suggests that this culture – even in its postmodern variants – is shaped by a predominant concern with unique artefacts and obeys norms that differ significantly from those underpinning copyright law. He explains that, as a result, artists are obliged to employ mechanisms outside copyright law to secure their interests and that copyright infringement proceedings involving high artists sometimes fail to recognise the conventions of the artistic commonwealth. In response to McClean, it is argued here that, while copyright law has certainly adopted a model that generally identifies intangible essence rather than material artefact as its object of regulation, this model is far from complete. Copyright continues to display features capable of securing interests in material cultural forms and, to some extent, remains open to alternative norms (particularly to norms deriving from the cultural practices that it regulates). However, the law's aesthetic neutrality, it is argued, present a much more significant impediment to the recognition of the autonomy of the artistic commonwealth in copyright law.

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the potential impacts that differences between UK and US copyright laws for sound recordings have on musicians. It also highlights the needs for continued standardisation of international copyright laws (particularly those for sound recordings), copyright law education for creators, and a need for musicians to re‐think future artistic and managerial decisions.Design/methodology/approachIn this critical analysis of current academic literature and legislation, significant differences between the domestic copyright laws of the UK and USA have been identified. The impacts of these differences on musicians are discussed and conclusions drawn.FindingsFindings suggest that there are several significant differences between the UK and US copyright laws for sound recordings, which do impact on musicians in both countries. However, determining the degree of impact is dependent on several contributing factors: the nationality of the musician; the level of success of the musician; the creative roles adopted by the musician; and the ambition of the musician.Research limitations/implicationsResearch scope was limited to the domestic copyright laws of the UK and USA only; and, specifically, the copyright laws for sound recordings. Findings were generalised for all musicians, regardless of type or genre.Originality/valueThis paper is one of the first to investigate the impact of differences in domestic copyright laws on musicians, and identifies several strategy issues that must be considered by musicians when making future artistic and managerial decisions.

This edited volume of fifteen essays on the subject of “transatlantic women” signals an ongoing and welcome set of developments in the still relatively new field of transatlantic studies. It adds to the field in two significant ways, both by helping to define the field's theoretical parameters and by contributing important examples of how transatlanticism can be productively applied to new areas of study in the future. On the whole, the strength of this volume resides in the particular essays as stand-alone examples of the places the field might go, and not as much in the volume's theoretical armature, though careful thought has gone into considering how to draw connections among the fifteen diverse essays.As Brigitte Bailey, one of the three editors of the volume, points out in her useful introductory essay, the field of transatlantic studies has come into its own over the past two decades. Bailey highlights two of the founding texts in this field: Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993) and Paul Giles's Virtual Americas: Transnational Fictions and the Transatlantic Imagination (2002). Bailey contends that these works, among others from this early period of the formation of the field, “question the national frameworks of literary scholarship and make a compelling case for reading nineteenth-century literature in the international contexts in which it was written, contexts that include empire, capitalism, the slave trade, migration, cultural hybridity, international print culture, and the comparative elaboration of national imaginaries” (xiv). The field of transatlantic studies has continued to mature over the past two decades, giving rise to international conferences, an anthology, journals, and numerous specialized monographs and collected volumes. (For a review of four of the most recent scholarly monographs in transatlantic studies, see Joseph Rezek, “What We Need from Transatlantic Studies,” American Literary History 26.4 [2014]: 791–803. Web. For another recent account of the state of the field, see Jennifer Phegley, “The Nineteenth-Century Periodical Press and the Emergence of Transatlantic Studies,” American Periodicals 25.1 [2015]: 62–67. Web.)So what is unique about this particular collection of essays among the many recent contributions to the field? Why women writers? Why Great Britain? Why the nineteenth century? Most important, why these specific limiting factors all at once? Are these factors, taken together, simply a convenient way of narrowing down a topic to a suitable length for an academic book, or is there some logical coherence that emerges from this synthesis? According to Bailey, this book fills a gap since there has been no other “volume that pulls together research on a range of nineteenth-century American women writers working in multiple genres as figures engaged in the transatlantic world” (xv). Indeed, this volume casts an especially wide net in terms of time period, covering the whole nineteenth century, and disciplinary approaches (though most of the essayists are from English departments, there is a real variety in subfields). If the field were new and still in the process of being defined, the broad sweep of its subjects could be taken as a shortcoming, but, in fact, as the essays line up, the strength of this volume is its “diversity of approaches” (xvi). Rather than occupying themselves with a debate about the relevance of transatlanticism as a theoretical approach to literary texts, Bailey, her coeditors Beth L. Lueck and Lucinda L. Damon-Bach, and the contributors to this volume seldom concern themselves with justification of the method. However, there remains a question of boundaries (women writers, American, engaged with the idea of Great Britain, nineteenth century). For example, Bailey's illuminating chapter on Margaret Fuller's New-York Tribune dispatches ends with a fascinating coda about Fuller's visit to Lyon, but then seems to shut down abruptly, leaving us wanting to know about Fuller's writings from France and Italy, which are unfortunately outside the purview of this volume. The opposite question might also be worth considering: why is this collection not more narrowly focused? A few of the most interesting essays look at the decade before and after Margaret Fuller's record-setting steamship voyage from Boston to Liverpool in 1846, clearly a moment of historical change worth a more concerted look as a nodal point for transatlantic studies.One could easily imagine a volume more rigorously organized around a particular constellation of ideas as well. The book is divided into two collections of essays: the first is called “Tourism, Celebrity, and Reform: Nineteenth-Century American Women Writers and Transatlantic Travel,” which includes essays about Frances Osgood, Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Margaret Fuller, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Fanny Fern, Harriet Jacobs, and Ellen Craft, all in the antebellum period, and many of them in some way exploring racial identity and abolitionism. The final essay in this first section stands out as an anomaly in terms of period and subject covered. It is about the Women's Rest Tour Association, founded in Boston in 1891, and the way it encouraged and constructed European travel for a broad range of American women starting in the 1890s. Nonetheless, for the most part, the first section has a coherent focus: the relationship between public and private identities and how transatlantic American women writers in the nineteenth century managed these identities in historically specific ways. Damon-Bach's essay about Catherine Maria Sedgwick's 1839 tour of England and the book she wrote about it, Letters from Abroad to Kindred at Home (1841), summarizes one of the more important contributions of Transatlantic Women: “The transatlantic conversation for women writers is, in part, about the relationship between a woman's home life and her authority to write” (43). This same constellation of issues is also elaborated in Sarah Klotz's essay about Frances Osgood (“A Flight from Home: Negotiations of Gender and Nationality in Frances Osgood's Early Career”); this chapter centers on a close reading of Osgood's book of poetry, A Wreath of Flowers from New England (1838). Bailey's essay on Margaret Fuller (“Margaret Fuller's New York Tribune Dispatches from Great Britain: Modern Geography and the Print Culture of Reform”) most fully develops this historically particular range of identity positions, in this case as adopted by Fuller at the moment when she becomes a “transatlantic foreign correspondent” (49). Bailey writes of Fuller's work as a correspondent: “I would like to suggest ways of reading these texts more analytically by following the lead of Fuller's frequent conjunctions of the geography and the print culture of British modernity” (51).The second section, “Authorship, Influence, and Reception: Nineteenth-Century American Women Writers and Transatlantic Print Culture,” seems less focused and more of a catchall than the first. It includes chapters on two significant transatlantic literary correspondences (between Stowe and George Eliot and between Sarah Orne Jewett and Mrs. Humphry Ward). Both of these chapters contribute significantly to our understanding of all four of these writers and how they reacted to the changes brought on by a globalizing print culture. Particularly of interest is the discussion of the ways the passage of the American Copyright Bill in 1891 affected Ward's sense of herself as a transatlantic author (Silvey 281). This also connects to Sharon Estes's chapter on Susan Warner's Wide, Wide World (1850) as an “English bestseller” and its implication in legal shifts in copyright law in 1851–54 (214). Estes describes the transatlantic nature of Warner's best seller in terms of both its audience (it was a huge seller on both sides of the Atlantic) and its message (it illustrates “the potential for the creation of transatlantic reading audiences that self-consciously saw religious reading as going beyond nationality” [209]). However, as a whole, the second section is less coherent than the first. Chapters on the influence of geological thinking on Emily Dickinson or the influence of Milton's Comus or Brontë's Jane Eyre on American writers seem less sharply engaged with the principle concerns of transatlantic studies. They are, in fact, more along the lines of pre-transatlantic influence studies.Taken together, as a single work of scholarship, this volume's most important contribution may be that it serves as a corrective to the long-standing practice of reading certain forms of nineteenth-century women's writing as nonliterary or marginal forms. In her chapter on Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Damon-Bach counters Mary Suzanne Schriber's argument in her groundbreaking work Writing Home: American Women Abroad, 1830–1920 (1997): “According to Schriber, only by the end of the century did women's travel writing evolve into ‘high art,’ as in the works of Edith Wharton” (41). Transatlantic Women refocuses our attention on the literariness, in all its richness and complexity, of the writers in the century before Wharton, and in so doing recasts our understanding of Wharton's prehistory. From the point of view of transatlantic studies, Wharton's prehistory is something different from that posited in Schriber's timeline (a timeline reflective of a pre-transatlantic scholarly moment); from within transatlantic studies, as it is delineated in Transatlantic Women, we can see Wharton's work within a continuum rather than as a break with the past.