Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises

State Ownership in the Russian Economy: Its Magnitude, Structure and Governance Problems

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to defining the nature, types, and role of formal and informal insurance market institutions. Methodology of research. The methodological basis of the work has become a systematic approach to the study of the formation and functioning of formal and informal insurance market institutions; as well as a dialectical method of cognition and grouping to determine the types of formal and informal institutions that have formed and ensure the development of insurance relationships. Methods of induction and deduction have been used to generalize the essence and role of insurance market institutions under the provisions of economic theory and insurance business. The differences between formal and informal insurance market institutions have been established by a comparative method. To make theoretical generalizations, to form conclusions from the study, an abstract reasoning method has been used. Findings. The article presents the results of empirical analysis of formal and informal institutions, under the influence of which the insurance market has been formed and is currently functioning. Formal insurance market institutions are clearly defined, regulated by public protection mechanisms, and mandatory for all economic entities involved in the insurance process. Informal insurance market institutions are unwritten and undocumented norms and rules that shape the behaviour of economic entities of the insurance market regarding the creation, purchase and sale, and consumption of insurance services. Both formal and informal insurance market institutions should be divided into basic and specific ones, taking into account the peculiarities of the insurance market and the specifics of insurance relationships. Originality. Given the peculiarities of the insurance business, formal and informal insurance market institutions are clearly distinguished, with their subsequent division into basic and specific ones. Practical value. The results of the study can serve as a basis for further research in this area and will be useful for insurers, supervisory authorities, and other participants in the insurance market in terms of improving the quality of insurance services, identifying areas of the insurance market, and efficiency of its participants, which will increase confidence in the insurance market. Key words: institution, formal institution, informal institution, insurance market, basic insurance market institution, specific insurance market institution.

This paper investigates whether and to what extent corporate governance mechanisms affect the efficiency of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) operating in transition economies. Furthermore, it examines the relationship between corporate governance practice and its impact on both wholly state run SOEs and majority state run SOEs. We employed a unique dataset of corporate governance ratings (related to quality of transparency, quality of board, and quality of strategic planning, implementation and control) of commercial Lithuanian SOEs relating to the period following the introduction of the corporate governance reforms in the years 2012-2013. In order to investigate our research hypotheses, we set-up a two stage empirical research strategy that combined a non-parametric efficiency estimator (i.e., Data Envelopment Analysis) with a bootstrapped truncated regression. We built two aggregate indexes of corporate governance ratings to represent one dimension of corporate governance quality. We then ran a battery of regressions using both the aggregated and the single corporate governance indexes as independent variables. First, the paper finds that the wholly state ownership model of SOEs is positively correlated to efficiency (i.e., wholly SOEs are more efficient than majority SOEs). Moreover, overall corporate governance practices are efficiency-enhancing; more specifically, board quality and strategic planning seem to be effective internal governance mechanisms in promoting overall organizational efficiency. Interestingly, we uncovered that there exists a relationship between concentration of ownership and corporate governance practices, but this mitigated efficiency enhancement in wholly state run SOEs compared to majority state run SOEs. This effect was driven by the lower quality of the board. Overall, our findings illustrate that corporate governance reforms have enhanced efficiency, but wholly SOEs require a better implementation in order to achieve full efficiency gains.

This paper investigates whether and to what extent corporate governance mechanisms affect the efficiency of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) operating in transition economies. Furthermore, it examines the relationship between corporate governance practice and its impact on both wholly state run SOEs and majority state run SOEs. We employed a unique dataset of corporate governance ratings (related to quality of transparency, quality of board, and quality of strategic planning, implementation and control) of commercial Lithuanian SOEs relating to the period following the introduction of the corporate governance reforms in the years 2012-2013. In order to investigate our research hypotheses, we set up a two-stage empirical research strategy that combined a non-parametric efficiency estimator (i.e., Data Envelopment Analysis) with a bootstrapped truncated regression. We built two aggregate indexes of corporate governance ratings to represent one dimension of corporate governance quality. We then ran a battery of regressions using both the aggregated and the single corporate governance indexes as independent variables. First, the paper finds that the wholly state ownership model of SOEs is positively correlated to efficiency (i.e., wholly SOEs are more efficient than majority SOEs). Moreover, overall corporate governance practices are efficiency-enhancing; more specifically, board quality and strategic planning seem to be effective internal governance mechanisms in promoting overall organizational efficiency. Interestingly, we uncovered that there exists a relationship between concentration of ownership and corporate governance practices, but this mitigated efficiency enhancement in wholly state run SOEs compared to majority state run SOEs. This effect was driven by the lower quality of the board. Overall, our findings illustrate that corporate governance reforms have enhanced efficiency, but wholly SOEs require a better implementation in order to achieve full efficiency gains.

The informal institutions construct has not been well understood in prior research. We contribute to the informal institutions literature by developing a generalized two-by-two conceptualization of institutions that juxtapose the dimension of behavioral uncertainty versus environmental uncertainty and the dimension of informal institutions versus formal institutions. In particular, we theorize informal institutions based on the extent to which they reduce behavioral uncertainty or environmental uncertainty, as well as their alignment with the formal institutional environment with respect to the two types of uncertainty. Leveraging this fourfold typology, we shed new light on the importance of informal institutional conditions in theories of firms’ absorptive capacity and performance. Using a cross-country meta-analytical approach, we find that a firm’s absorptive capacity is more positively related to performance outcomes in countries with informal institutions that reduce behavioral uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, the misalignment between informal and formal institutions with respect to behavioral uncertainty and environmental uncertainty weakens the relationship between absorptive capacity and performance outcomes. Overall, by re-emphasizing the fundamental role of informal institutions in reducing behavioral and environmental uncertainties, our typology offers a fine-grained perspective to conceptualize informal institutions and constitutes an opportunity to advance theory in informal institutions and international business.

The increasing gap between the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe(CE and EE) with regard to both their economic and political performance cannot be explained by their different starting conditions after the breakdown of the Soviet Union alone. Rather, it is due to cultural and historical circumstances that shape the particular tradition and societal environment. Indeed, the experience of transition has led to a growing awareness of the role of informal institutions in the process of institutional change in institutional and evolutionary economics. Although a lot of work has been done on this problem, we still do not have a satisfying explanation of the role that informal constraints of human behavior play in institutional change. When institutional and evolutionary economics the idea of historical and cultural dependency is applied to the problem of CE and EE transition, it is often overlooked that the European nations did never only develop according to the tracks determined by a cultural heritage. This is not to say, however, that the idea of historical and cultural path dependency has to be rejected. For whenever formal institutions are taken over from abroad, in the course of their implementation they mingle with the soil of the prevailing informal constraints of human behavior and thought, which are determined by the legacies of the past. This phenomenon can be described as a transplantation of institutions. The decisive issue then is, how the informal institutional settiings in the different countries interacted with the imported formal settings. The often made assumption that informal institutions react inertly to changes in the formal institutional settings must be modified. If seen as a tranplantation of institutional arrangements, the reaction rate of informal institutions depends on their compatibility with imported formal institutions. Central thesis of this treatise is that the ‘reaction rate’ of informal institutions depends on their compatibility with imported formal institutions. The transition process in CE and EE can tell us much about the relation between path dependence and politically implemented institutional change. During the 20th century the countries of CE and EE twice went through rapid institutional change. For centuries they had acculturated to Western Europe, but as a result of the October Revolution Eastern patterns were imposed upon them. Since the german unification at October 3, 1990 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990 they have returned to Europe, by establishing democracy and capitalism. In our opinion, to understand the difference in performance between the transition countries, it is necessary to interpret both transitions as processes of institutional transplantation and ask how the informal institutional settings in the different countries interacted with the imported formal institutions. The paper is organized in six sections. After the introduction, the second section will give an dverview of hoa institutional economists deal with the problems mentioned above and indicate how a cultural theory of economics could contribute to their solution. In section three we sill specify a theoretical approach that tries to explain the mutual relations between formal and informal institutions. This general theoretical framework is purely structural in the sense that it does not include historical and cultural factors. These factors are included into our analysis in section four, where we apply our framework to the transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe. In section five we wiöö briefly outline some conclusions for economic policy-making. We will finish our paper with a short outlook on the political and theoretical problems before us.

Despite concerted efforts, achieving the goal of universal food security remains challenging. Food security interventions occur at different levels of systemic depth. Some interventions target visible supply-side gaps, while others focus on deeper systemic problems in the food system. Here, we used a leverage points perspective to ask how multiple types of more superficial (shallow) and more fundamental (deep) interventions in the food system interact. Focusing on a case study in southwestern Ethiopia, we examined (1) recent changes in formal and informal institutions related to food security; (2) the effects of formal and informal institutions on the food system at different levels of systemic depth (i.e., on parameters, feedbacks, design, and intent); and (3) issues of institutional interplay between formal and informal institutions. We surveyed 150 rural households and analyzed key policy documents. Both formal and informal institutions were perceived to improve food security. However, at the intent level, formal institutions primarily aimed to enhance food supply, while informal institutions additionally sought to build trust among farmers. At the design level, formal interventions targeted information flow through a newly created agricultural extension system, while informal institutions facilitated labor sharing and communication. In terms of institutional interplay, new formal institutions had partly undermined pre-existing informal institutions. We conclude that both visible supply-side gaps and deeper drivers of food insecurity should be targeted through food security interventions. Interventions need to be cognizant of potentially unexpected ways of institutional interplay, especially between formal and informal institutions.

Our social order is shaped by institutions, which makes them important. Governmental players adhere to the formal or informal regulations that institutions set out. Any political system has informal institutions, albeit it can be challenging to understand how they relate to formal ones. An extensive examination of the many definitions of institutions is presented in this paper. Many instances from many subfields are given, which in turn emphasize how universal the key issues facing political actors in various substantive situations are. Afterwards, it is clarified what the ramifications of considering institutions in this way are and how they contribute to these strategic problems by resolving or generating them (consciously or not). Understanding how institutions function necessitates looking at their historical background. Three specific obstacles that arise when attempting to understand and justify the beginnings of institutions are identified; these issues indicate some of the domains in which our understanding of institutions is limited. This paper aims to highlight the common challenges encountered when attempting to comprehend the formation and operation of institutions, offering valid reasons for researchers in related fields to collaborate more to improve our understanding of institutions. Generally speaking, it is untrue to say that there is a boundary between absolutely "formal" and fully "informal" institutions. This paper reveals that this unexpected claim is an invitation for academics to consider several issues. Firstly, to distinguish formal and informal institutions from one another, definitions of each are required. Second, discussing the connection between formal and informal institutions is crucial. By doing this, disparities between various forms of informal institutions and their ranges of complexity are distinguished. Third, it is critical to comprehend how formal and informal institutions affect the sort of regime (autocracy vs. democracy) and vice versa. The subject of how informal institutions are generated, created, and maintained is also discussed in this context. This paper concludes with a discussion of methodological perspectives on formal and informal institutions. It considers the use of typologies that encompass formal institutions and are frequently employed in the study of governance systems for this reason. The discovery by certain researchers that informal structures have a significant and frequently surprising impact on the functioning of formal institutions serves as the foundation for subsequent discussions.

The article examines the legal status of supervisory boards in joint-stock companies with 50 percent or more of their shares owned directly or indirectly by the State. The author analyzes the main tasks and highlights the peculiarities of corporate governance in state-owned companies, and identifies the specifics of the supervisory board’s independence in the public sector, which consists in the interaction of the supervisory board not only with the executive body, but also with the shareholder represented by the relevant management body. The author analyzes the legislative norms governing the activities of supervisory boards in public joint-stock companies and the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises. The author highlights the specifics of legal regulation of the supervisory board of a joint-stock company with 50 percent or more of its shares owned directly or indirectly by the State, namely, special requirements for the minimum number of independent directors, impossibility of establishing additional grounds for early termination of powers of the supervisory board members, mandatory formation of committees, impossibility of delegating the functions of the supervisory board to the general meeting, etc. The author analyzes the question of the authority of the meetings of the supervisory board of state-owned companies in the event that the majority of independent directors are absent in the supervisory board. Researched the legal consequences of non-compliance with the legal requirement for a majority of independent directors on the supervisory board and concludes that there are no legal consequences, and the supervisory board will be competent in this case and will be able to perform its duties in full within its competence. It is determined that the absence of legal consequences in such a situation constitutes a shortcoming in the legal regulation of the status of the supervisory board. At the same time, the author concludes that the lack of responsibility of the management body for violation of the terms of competitive selection of independent members of the supervisory board and the provision of the management body with the opportunity to perform the functions of the supervisory board for the period of martial law also constitute shortcomings in legal regulation.

Purpose As one of China’s informal institutions, red culture serves a soft constraint function in economic and social development. However, the question of its impact on corporate governance remains unresolved. This study aims to examine the association between Chinese red culture and corporate governance level. Design/methodology/approach Hypotheses were tested using multiple linear regression models based on hand-collected data on red culture and a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2020. Findings Red culture, as a carrier of specific cultural values, significantly promotes corporate governance level. In addition, red culture promotes the level of corporate governance through two channels by improving the quality of internal control and shaping a culture of corporate collaboration. Moreover, in companies with strong market power and for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with military experience, the positive impact of red culture on corporate governance is more significant. Originality/value This study examines the impact of red culture on the level of corporate governance in enterprises using a unique red culture dataset collected manually. It not only contributes to the existing body of research on informal institutions and corporate governance, but it also provides empirical evidence of the impact of red culture on corporate governance level. Furthermore, the findings are socially oriented, which facilitates the effective integration of corporate and social governance by underscoring the soft constraint function of red culture.

Withdrawal from rural homesteads (WRH) in China is mainly conducted under the guidance of government and follows the principle of farmers’ voluntary participation, in which both formal and informal institutions play essential roles. However, few studies have systematically analyzed the institutional factors in WRH. By introducing both formal and informal institutions into the analysis framework, the aim of this study was to explore the impacts of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ behavior to WRH, and the interaction between formal and informal institution in different villages. Based on survey data from farmers in Jinzhai, China, this study adopted a binary probit model and factor analysis. (1) The study revealed that farmers’ cognition of homesteads property rights and their trust in village cadres are the key formal institutional factors affecting farmers’ behavior to WRH, and farmers’ social networks, reciprocal norms, and trust in villagers are the key informal institutional factors affecting farmers’ WRH; (2) Both formal and informal institutions promote farmers’ WRH, and informal institutions play a more important role. However, there is no interaction between formal and informal institutions in the whole sample. (3) Furthermore, the effect of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ WRH have the heterogeneity of village location: there is a complementary relationship between formal and informal institutions in farmers’ WRH for villages with a medium proximity to the county seat, and a substitution relationship for villages far away from the county seat. Finally, this study discusses the implications of these findings on the new round of WRH policy.

Colombian SOEs: A Review Against the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises

The past decade has witnessed a revival in interest in the relationship between rule of law and economic development. Disenchantment with the universal model that emerged from the Washington Consensus era led to a shift in focus to a more pluralist approach in which policy prescriptions became tailored to each country’s socio-political context. The authors suggest that the pendulum may have swung to the other extreme, and that the newly ascendant pluralist approach may overemphasize pluralism at the expense of core rule of law principles. This paper examines the rule of law building efforts pursued by the BRIC countries to shed light on their strikingly different processes of economic transition. The authors argue that formal, informal, and transitional institutions have played distinct roles in these divergent economic development narratives. While informal and transitional institutions have facilitated growth during initial and intermediate phases of development, a degree of formalization across some institutions is critical to support the long-term development of a market economy. The authors set out the core tenets approach, an exploratory concept that emphasizes a malleable set of fundamental rule of law principles which exist alongside transition institutions to build trust in formal institutions as an economy advances.

Why does the diffusion of environmental management standards differ across countries? The role of formal and informal institutions in the adoption of ISO 14001

To Friends Everything, to Strangers the Law? An Experiment on Contract Enforcement and Group Identity