Corporate Leverage: Insights From International Data

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate simultaneous relations between corporate governance (CG) practice and cash flow right, cash flow leverage (the divergence between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders). The two ownership measures reflect alignment and expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders. This study also examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on CG practice.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses publicly listed companies (PLCs) excluding those from the Indonesian finance sector during 2011-2013 as the samples of the study. Two-stages least squares regression models were used to test the simultaneous relations between CG practice and ownership structure variables. The study develops a CG instrument to measure CG practice based on ASEAN CG Scorecard, that comprehensively covers OECD CG principles and that can be used for panel data.FindingsCG practice has a positive influence on cash flow right and has a marginally negative impact on cash flow leverage, while cash flow right and cash flow leverage have a marginally negative impact on CG practice. Further, the existence of large MLS complements CG practice, but as the control right of the second largest shareholders becomes closer to the largest shareholder, the complement relation becomes less important. State- or foreign-controlled PLCs practice better CG than other PLCs.Research limitations/implicationsStudies on CG/ownership structure need to treat CG and ownership structure as endogenous variables in their research design. In addition, the level of rule of law in a country should be taken into account when examining the relation between CG and ownership structure. The interrelation among CG, ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance has been studied in the context of dispersed ownership structure and strong rule of law. Thus, future study needs to examine the interrelation among these four concepts in countries with high concentrated ownership and weak rule of law.Practical implicationsTo minimize the risk of expropriation, investors in the capital market need to select shares of PLCs that practice CG suitable for the ownership structure of PLCs, have high ownership by the largest shareholder and have no divergence between control and ownership right, and or have MLSs. PLCs may need to choose the level of CG mechanism in the context of their ownership structure and consider the benefits and costs implementing them.Social implicationsThe study supports the “one size does not fit all” perspective on CG and, thus, it supports the recently enacted financial service authority (FSA) rule requiring PLCs to follow the “comply or explain” rule on the CG code for PLCs. The FSA needs to enforce the compliance of PLCs with CG rules and encourage PLCs to implement CG in substance, not just in form. To strengthen the positive impact of good CG practice in attracting investments in capital market, the regulator needs to improve investor protection rules and ensure strong rule of law.Originality/valueThe study is the first to examine the simultaneous relation between CG practice and both cash flow right and cash flow leverage of the largest shareholder. It is also the first that investigates the impact of MLS on CG practice. It explores the complement and substitution relation between the two concepts in reducing agency costs. In term of research design, the study develops a CG instrument that is based on OECD CG principles, that can be used for panel data and that uses public information.

Numerous empirical studies in the finance field have tested many theories for firms’ capital structure. The pecking order theory and the trade-off theory of capital structure is among the most influential theories of firms’ capital structure. The trade-off theory predicts optimal capital structure, while the pecking order theory does not predict an optimal capital structure. According to pecking order theory, the order of financial sources used is the source of internal funds from profits, short-term securities, debt, preferred stock and common stock last. The main objective of this study is to econometrically test whether the listed companies in Indonesian Stock Exchange follow the pecking order theory or the trade-off theory. Samples in this study are public companies listed during 2009-2010. The research questions are tested by running regression models. The empirical result of this study shows that the pecking order theory is not supported, while the trade-off theory is supported. This suggests that the capital structure of listed companies in Indonesian Stock Exchange is financed based on optimal capital structure, not by the order financial resources.

<p><em>Capital structure is a vital component of any business entity. The success and or failure of many business enterprises arise from their capital structures. Many financial institutions adopt different approaches regarding their capital structure arrangement. Some depend entirely on debt financing, others depend more on equity financing and others still mix the two approaches. The question has been which capital structure is the best for financial institutions?  For those firms which prefer mixing the two approaches, what would be the best portion for the two approaches? This paper critically reviews the capital structure theories, which include Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller theorem, Trade-off theory of capital structure and taxes, Pecking order theory, The market timing theory and Agency cost theory. This paper suggests that any financial institution should carefully analyze its operations before making its capital structure decision</em></p>

Purpose: Corporate governance and capital structure are seen as significant factors in improving corporate performance. Although many studies have examined the association among corporate governance and capital structure through company performance, this type of research remains still scarce in the Malaysian context. The purpose of this research is to advance a conceptual framework that observes the effect of corporate governance and capital structure on the performance of public firms in Malaysia.
 Design/Methodology/Approach: The research used secondary data using annual reports of companies registered on Bursa Malaysia from the period 2013 to 2016. The data was captured from Thomson Reuters Data Stream Version 5.1 available at the Sultanah Bahiyah Library of Universiti Utara Malaysia.
 Implications/Originality/Value: This research proposes to enhance the role of corporate governance and capital structure, and to redefine corporate governance policy and capital structure to enhance corporate performance. Finally, it is hoped that this research will increase the performance of the company, and benefit the financial report users, investors, creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in public companies in Malaysia.

This study examines the impact of corporate governance determinants on the capital structure of manufacturing firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Using a purposive sampling of 15 manufacturing firms, we collect secondary data for 14 years. We employ a system generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to address endogeneity issues. Apart from firms using more short-term debt financing than long-term debt, we report a significant positive relationship between managerial and institutional ownership and capital structure. There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between ownership concentration on both the short- and long-term debt ratios. Regarding company financial management, the study offers several recommendations and practical implications. Our findings have implications for improved management performance and corporate governance policies that lead to value-relevant capital structure decisions. The study also provides empirical support for the idea that firms might benefit from reduced agency costs and lower cost of capital if they implement appropriate corporate governance mechanisms. We provide support for the agency and pecking order theories. Future research could consider broader corporate governance variables and optimal capital structure.

This study conducted empirical tests on contemporary finance theories for corporate cash holdings, such as trade-off, pecking order, and agency theory. There is ongoing debate on the possibility of excess cash savings by domestic firms, including chaebols in the Korean capital markets. Thus, it may be worthy to identify any financial characteristics based on each aforementioned theory as an extension of previous studies on similar subjects. Two primary hypotheses were postulated and tested, and the following empirical results were obtained. First, principal component analysis (PCA) provides evidence that nine out of the twenty explanatory variables showed a significant influence on the level of corporate cash holdings, such as cash conversion cycle in trade-off theory and leverage in pecking order theory. Second, the chaebol firms that decreased cash holdings after global financial turmoil may be affected by financial factors that include investment opportunities and foreign ownership according to the PCA. The results may reinforce the outcomes derived from previous research on corporate cash holdings. Based on the robust results, large firms in advanced or emerging capital markets could approach the optimal level of the cash reserves. 요 약

Purpose – This study aims to measure the extent of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting and investigate the impact of competition, corporate governance and ownership structure on risk reporting practices in annual reports of Egyptian companies. Design/methodology/approach – A number of theoretical perspectives including proprietary cost, agency theory, stakeholder theory, political cost, signalling theory and legitimacy theory are used to derive research hypotheses and identify the potential determinants of risk reporting practices in the annual reports of Egyptian companies. The annual reports of 105 listed companies for 2007 were examined to measure the extent of risk reporting and examine potential determinants of risk reporting. An unweighted disclosure index, based on Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) 25, has been used to measure the level of mandatory risk reporting while content analysis – sentence approach – is used in coding voluntary risk reporting. Multiple regression analysis is used in evaluating the relationships between competition, corporate governance, ownership structure and risk reporting. Findings – The results indicate a low level of compliance with mandatory risk reporting requirements. A low extent of voluntary risk reporting with a tendency to report more backward-looking and qualitative risk disclosure compared to forward-looking and quantitative risk disclosure is indicated. Agency theory and proprietary cost provide explanations for the variation of risk reporting in corporate annual reports. It is suggested that competition, role duality, board size, ownership concentration and auditor type are key determinants of risk reporting practices in Egypt. Research limitations/implications – The scoring and classification process suffers from inherent judgment limitations and subjectivity, which cannot be entirely eradicated. The study applies a cross-sectional approach and examines risk reporting practice and its determinants at one point in time. However, longitudinal research may provide a better understanding of risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The use of only one proxy of competition is one of the limitations of this study. Practical implications – The findings regarding mandatory disclosure level and nature of voluntary risk disclosure should be on concern to regulatory authorities and standard-setters. Originality/value – The study aims to contribute to risk reporting research through addressing not only mandatory but also voluntary risk reporting in emerging economies in general and Egypt in particular. In addition, examining the impact of competition on risk reporting is a main contribution of this study.

This article studies the influence of corporate governance and ownership structure on capital structure of Tunisian insurance enterprises. Then, we utilize a sample composed of 22 Tunisian insurance enterprises during the period of study from 2000 to 2019. From the empirical results, we show that the improvement in governance did not affect the financing policy. The indicator which measures the size of the board of directors is negatively associated with the indicator which measures leverage ratio and the growth of independent members has more influence on the debt policy. The ROE-dividend payout rate differential has a negative nexus with the capital structure but is not influential enough. In fact, the self-financing policies adopted slightly affect the leverage ratio. Finally, the ownership structure characterized by the managerial shareholders and the institutional investors can be considered as a determining factor of the capital structure. In Tunisian insurance companies, the ownership structure influences the capital structure more than corporate governance.KeywordsGovernanceBoard of directorsLeverage ratioManagerial ownershipInsurance companiesJEL ClassificationsG22G52I1

Past literature attempts to resolve the issue of the motivation behind managers' choice of a given capital structure. Despite several decades of intensive research, there is still no consensus about which theory dominates capital structure decisions. The present study empirically investigates the relative importance of two prominent theories of capital structure- the trade-off and the pecking order theories by exploring the conditions under which each theory can explain the financing choices of firms. These conditions are defined along two dimensions: (i) a firm's degree of information asymmetry, and (ii) its observed leverage relative to target leverage. The results show that, in the short-run, pecking order theory has more explanatory power in explaining the financing choices of firms. The target leverage theory assumes limited importance: Over-leveraged firms, when faced with low adverse information, are more inclined to adapt to the trade-off policies. In the presence of high information asymmetry, however, firms appear to be more concerned about adverse selection costs and make financing decisions that are more consistent with the pecking order theory. An analysis of the market reaction to seasoned equity issuances during announcement periods reveals that firms with high information asymmetry are penalized more than firms with low information asymmetry. This may explain the contradiction when over-leveraged firms continue to issue debt. However, the situation is reversed in the long run. Firms' long term financing goals appear to follow the leverage re-balancing theory. An analysis of financial activities over a five-year period, subsequent to security issuance decisions when they appear to be inconsistent with trade-off theory, reveals that firms follow an active policy of moving closer to the target leverage. In sum, the notion of target capital structure appears to exist. In the short-term, the management's financing decisions are consistent with the modified version of the pecking order theory, leading to tactical deviations from the optimal capital structure. However, long-term analysis indicates that the pecking order effect is largely transitory in nature and firms actively pursue strategic reversals towards an optimal capital structure.

The purpose of this study is to empirically test the determination of the existing capital structure in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. Various capital structure theories (trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency theory, and free cash flow theory) are reviewed in order to formulate testable hypotheses about the determinants of capital structure in manufacturing firms. The research was carried out on a sample of 896 financial statements using panel data procedures. The results show that Tangibility and liquidity have a significant negative effect on leverage. Profitability and company age have no effect on leverage, while company size has a significant negative effect. This study has laid some groundwork for further investigation into the determinants of capital structure in Indonesian firms, which could be the basis for a more detailed evaluation. Furthermore, empirical findings should assist corporate executives in making the best capital structure decisions. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that uses the most recent data to investigate the determinants of capital structure of manufacturing firms in Indonesia. Furthermore, this study appears to confirm that the same factors influence capital structure decisions in developing countries as they do in developed economies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the capital structure of family firms in a context of crisis. Specifically, it aims to discover whether and how the determinants of their capital structure have a different impact on firms’ leverage before and during the recent global financial crisis. Considering the pecking order theory (POT), trade-off theory (TOT), and agency theory (AT), this study analyzes 1,502 Italian medium family firms comparing the pre-crisis (2005-2007) and crisis (2008-2010) periods. This research shows that that current liquidity, asset structure, and agency costs are the most important variables in influencing medium family firms' leverage, in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Moreover, during the crisis, agency costs increase and have a negative influence on the short-term leverage highlighting that crisis contingencies influence the agency-based effects on family firm's leverage. Furthermore, our findings highlight that a more exhaustive understanding of family firms’ capital structure can be achieved through the combined use of different theories.

Pesquisas sobre estrutura de capital das empresas são consideradas dentre as mais relevantes na área de finanças. Diversas abordagens teóricas têm sido discutidas e testadas na literatura financeira. Este estudo buscou analisar o nível de endividamento das maiores empresas brasileiras, à luz das duas principais teorias que versam sobre o assunto, a teoria de Pecking Order e a teoria de trade-off, testando seus determinantes. A teoria do Pecking Order sugere a existência de uma hierarquia no uso de fontes de recursos, enquanto a teoria de trade-off considera a existência de uma estrutura meta de capital que seria perseguida pela empresa. O estudo é uma adaptação do artigo de Gaud et al. (2005), cujo trabalho serviu como base e principal referência para a escolha das principais variáveis e dos testes econométricos realizados. Tal como Gaud et al. (2005), desenvolvemos as análises estatísticas utilizando a metodologia de Panel Data, que considera os dados da amostra em corte transversal e longitudinal. Além de testes estáticos, foram feitos testes dinâmicos, com o objetivo de analisar o processo de ajuste da estrutura de capital ao longo do tempo, em direção a um suposto nível-alvo ótimo. Os resultados demonstraram relação negativa entre o nível de endividamento das empresas e o grau de tangibilidade dos ativos e a rentabilidade, bem como relação positiva do endividamento com o risco. Demonstraram ainda que empresas de capital estrangeiro são mais endividadas que empresas nacionais. De um modo geral, os resultados sugerem que a teoria de Pecking Order é mais consistente do que a teoria de trade-off para explicar a estrutura de capital das companhias abertas brasileiras. Em especial, destacamos a relação negativa entre endividamento e rentabilidade, confirmando vários outros resultados de pesquisa obtidos na realidade brasileira. A análise dinâmica demonstrou baixa velocidade do processo de ajuste da estrutura de capital em direção ao nível-alvo, sugerindo a existência de elevados custos de transação e confirmando o comportamento de Pecking Order dos administradores.

Testing Trade-Off Theory After U.S. Housing Bubble in 2008

External independent audit is an important component of strong corporate governance. The choice of independent external auditor is determined by several different factors. Besides all firmspecific factors, corporate governance might be a determinant of external auditor choice. The relation between auditor choice and corporate governance varies in accordance with the “substitution or complementary effect”. Firms may prefer to demand less effective and low quality audit and substitute the quality of audit services by a strong corporate governance structure. Alternatively, firms may demand a high quality audit in order to complement and support firms’ corporate governance structure. Therefore it is important to understand how a strong corporate governance structure is associated with auditor choice to reveal the effect of each corporate governance mechanisms on Big-4 and industry-specialist auditor choice. The main aim of this study is to investigate the association between corporate governance and auditor choice by using a sample of 805 firm-year observations from Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) between the years 2005-2009. Overall findings show that, firms’ auditor choice in terms of Big-4 and audit firm industry specialization is affected by the firm-level corporate governance mechanisms of firms, particularly, board of directors’ composition and ownership structure

Purpose The cost of equity (COE) and corporate governance structure are the most critical factors affecting competition among publicly held companies. Accordingly, the present paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the COE in the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. Design/methodology/approach Our statistical sample includes 34 companies listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2017. Board structure (i.e. board size, board independence, CEO tenure, board meetings frequency and CEO duality) and ownership structure (managerial ownership, institutional ownership and state ownership) are considered proxies for corporate governance structure. Besides, the authors employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model to measure the COE as our dependent variable. Multiple regression analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis are also used to estimate the research models. Findings Our results suggest that corporate governance structure plays a significant role in reducing COE during the ISIS era. Furthermore, the authors find that corporate governance can be an alternative to COE reduction in Iraq’s absence of national security. Our findings also indicate that board size, board meeting frequency, managerial ownership and institutional ownership are negatively associated with COE. Research limitations/implications Although this study has been thoroughly considered and cautiously planned, the specific period chosen to conduct the research (i.e. the ISIS era) could be a significant limitation since financial disclosure of listed companies may have been of lower quality during this period. However, to relatively alleviate this limitation and maintain the authenticity of the findings, the authors exclude low-quality financial statements, particularly non-audited financial reports, from the statistical sample. Furthermore, practitioners of emerging markets that are suffering from a weak external corporate governance combination can use the findings of this paper as a guideline to compensate the existing market deficiencies by improving internal corporate governance for observing further cash sources with lower cost. The findings also propose to international agencies that the business environment in Iraq is heavily affected by the ISIS phenomenon and needs financial aid to recover from its side effects. Furthermore, macroeconomists may use this paper to make more decisive macroeconomic indicators predictions. Originality/value This paper is among the pioneer investigations and elaborates on how the agency conflict is resolved effectively. The board and managerial characteristics and different forms of ownership might be applicable to provide cheaper funds for companies listed in emerging markets suffering from weak external corporate governance combinations.