Coursebook-Based ISIS’ Propaganda: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Arabic History Texts in ISIS’ School Environments

<p><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> <p>The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) was declared in Syria in 2014 and then spread to Indonesia. ISIS in Indonesia then spread the understanding of violence and terrorism so then with that understanding ISIS in Indonesia committed many acts of terrorism against the government and the people of Indonesia. This research aims to find out the cause of the birth of terrorism groups, related to the terrorism movement in Indonesia and the movement of groups affiliated with ISIS in Indonesia from 2014-2018 since ISIS was declared in Syria in 2014, both those who committed acts of terrorism and only supported ISIS. This method of research is Kualitatif the method of providing more directed to descriptive. Qualitative research in this paper research takes two methods, namely document analysis taken from written material and the results of the discussion by making a conversation with various parties who know information related to the ISIS terrorism movement from 2014-2018. ISIS groups in Indonesia carried out acts of terror throughout 2014-2018 as many as 48 acts of terrorism. 22 acts of terror were committed against members and police stations because they were considered as enemies. In addition, the attack was aimed at houses of worship in the form of blasting churches and attacking public places and facilities with an explosion in Thamrin and the Malay bus station. This research serves as material for researchers who examine the terrorism movement of the ISIS group in Indonesia, researchers in the social field who study the ISIS social movement and its impact in Indonesia as well as researchers in the field of Islamic studies and Islamic thought which examines various kinds of Islamic thought. This research reveals new facts related to the ISIS organization in Indonesia, the ISIS organization movement in Indonesia and the acts of terrorism committed. changes in terrorist organizations and new patterns related to terrorist attacks and targets by ISIS Indonesia .  </p> <p><em><strong>Source</strong>: </em></p> <p><a href="https://ejournal.cyberdakwah.com/index.php/Islam-Universalia/article/view/137">https://ejournal.cyberdakwah.com/index.php/Islam-Universalia/issue/view/4</a></p>

In the past, women in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were known to serve as homemakers (i.e., wives, mothers). However, in recent times there has been a shift in their roles, as more women are starting to emerge on the front lines as suicide bombers, recruiters, or a part of ISIS's official women police brigade. This article investigates this phenomenon by performing a thematic analysis on open-source material, namely research reports, media reports, and propaganda material produced by ISIS. In doing so, it presents the evolution of the roles of women in ISIS from past to present and highlights key reasons that motivate women to join ISIS, which include ideology, alienation, romance, peer influence, and a sense of security. Implications for research on women in terrorism have also been identified.

PurposeThe existing literature on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has thus far focused on the group’s contemporary or previous financing activities. However, there has not been an analysis of the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to change moving forward now that it has come under international scrutiny. The purpose of this paper is to assess the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to evolve in the future and to also suggest methods for combating its financing activities.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is theoretical in nature. By assessing the existing literature on terrorist financing, it is apparent that terrorist organizations alter their funding sources and methods after coming under intense international scrutiny. Therefore, two hypotheses are put forth for the future of ISIS’ funding activities: the group will become more effective at building social support among its local population, thereby consolidating is funding sources and methods within Syria and Iraq; and the group will increasingly branch out, searching for sources from a transnational network, as its base in Syria and Iraq begins to deteriorate.FindingsCommunity support is essential for sustaining a terrorist network. As a result, it is likely that ISIS will increasingly seek funding from a transnational network as its base of support in Iraq and Syria begins to deteriorate. There is also a distinct third possibility that the group will be able to consolidate its base while also moving abroad for financial support. This third option presents the most complicated outcome for the international community in its fight against ISIS.Originality/valueThis study fills a gap in the literature on terrorist financing, particularly with regards to ISIS, to assist the international community in its fight against the group both now and moving into the future.

Since the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became prominent after the release of beheading videos of its prisoners, many have been confused over how to describe this development in relation to the way the Internet is exploited by violent extremists. While the element of surprise and horror lingered on the minds of many observers, a more pressing question facing the law enforcement is: how does ISIS attract foreign fighters using such videos and online propaganda? As countries around the globe grapple with the security threat posed by their nationals travelling to join ISIS, the need to be au fait with the appeal of ISIS and its ability to use the Internet to recruit new members and sympathisers becomes even more apparent. This chapter uses a behavioural sciences lens to explicate how individual and organisational motivational factors may contribute to the overall appeal of joining ISIS.

<p><em>The Post-Cold War turning to globalizations era, evokes a variety of issues, particularly, identity and religion. Some scholars had stated strongly the relations between religion and identity. Some, not all, religious actors demonstrate terrorism trait and performed symbol which was identically close with Islam. One of the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism was Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS was known as terrorist bringing Islamic doctrine that has mission to jihad (holy struggle). Islam was not different with other religions, it promote peace and harmony in the world. On the contrary, ISIS spread fear and intimidation. ISIS not only did terror in Iraq, Syria, or the Middle East countries but also in other countries such as countries in Europe, Asia, and America. This article attempted to answer how ISIS construct their transnational identity through digital media, Youtube. The method was using qualitative approach and data collection technique was literature study. The result of this paper described a process of building up ISIS identity cross national border and explained how could ISIS convince and recruit member beyond the state in case their movement in digital media, Youtube. </em></p><p>Key words: Identitas, ISIS, Youtube</p><p><strong> </strong></p>

The political environment of Iraq in the period from 2011-2014 experienced a great degree of turbulence. Many Sunni tribes in the Anbar, Ramadi and Salahadin regions organized a daily protest against the central government, accusing it of being sectarian. Gradually, these protests become more popular, and the Baghdad government became fearful that it would spread into the other regions of Iraq. In order to control the protests, the government used force, and many were killed. Simultaneously, in Syria, and especially during 2013-2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more land and more people, and to take advantage of the Iraqi people's dissatisfaction with their government, ISIS crossed the border between Iraq and Syria in June 2014. Mosul as the second most heavily populated city was seized by ISIS and the Iraqi army could not fight back, which meant that the Iraqi army retreated from most of the Sunni areas. Even Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, and the city where the central government operates, was threatened. While the Iraqi army was unable to fight against ISIS, the Shia religious supreme leader Al-Sistani called for self-defence and to stand against ISIS. Sistani’s call became a cornerstone for the creation of the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) with the aim of the fighting against ISIS. In this article, we assess the PMF from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly on violence, considering Ariel Ahram's model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.

The media plays a crucial role in contemporary conflicts because an image war is occurring alongside the military confrontation. The Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) sets a prime example for the usage of image as part of its fighting strategy, using various platforms to communicate its narrative. This study evaluates ISIS’s image front by analyzing its messages promoted through various online communication platforms: audio statements made by ISIS leaders, official videos, Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines, Islamic chants ( nasheeds), and Amaq news reports. The findings indicate that ISIS uses messages strategically in an attempt to create and maintain its image as a powerful organization. The three main themes are power projection, violence, and Islamic religious messages (while different emphases are placed on various platforms). Most messages target Muslims, while others (usually threats) target the organization’s various enemies. It appears that ISIS invests considerable resources and efforts into promoting its narrative as part of the image war—projecting its power, based on religious arguments, on one hand, and demonizing and threatening its enemies on the other, using repeated themes, descriptions, metaphors, and visual images (videos, pictures, and infographics). The study’s analysis indicates that ISIS puts a lot of emphasis on the media/image aspects of its battle, and uses all of the tools in its tool box in an attempt to succeed in the image war, a central front in contemporary conflicts.

This article aims to understand how discourses about Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are supported and/or rejected by radical Islamic groups. Data were collected from two Islamic news website: Voa-Islam and Arrahmah. Both websites are categorised as radical Islamic sites. By using the discursive psychology approach, it was found that when ISIS is viewed as a group that actualised the establishment of an Islamic State, it is praised and supported. However, when ISIS is deemed to have killed other fellow Muslims, it is opposed and its movement is considered to be ‘out of Islamic corridors'. Practical implications of these findings are identified and discussed.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted many foreign fighters from all over the world. ISIS has disseminated voluminous propaganda in painting itself as the defender of Islam. The core of ISIS messages is designed to have a global religious appeal. At the same time, ISIS has incorporated local issues and grievances into its propaganda message. The analysis of Georgia's experiences with foreign fighters reveals that ISIS has exploited local issues to attract recruits, demonstrating that, even though foreign fighter recruitment seems global, it inevitably draws on local roots.

The November 2015 Paris Attacks: The Impact of Foreign Fighter Returnees

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) was, and to some extent remains, a ‘nation’ built on blood and bytes. It epitomizes Anderson’s imagined community; it is an ummah with borders that ebb and flow in both the physical and virtual worlds. This chapter focuses on ISIL’s attempts to use digital media to recruit and elicit support from women, and in particular describes aspects of the group’s highly effective imagery-based campaigns. It explores two facets of the information war. Firstly, whether tensions between femininity, faith, and violence were resolved in the online identities of female ISIL supporters. Secondly, whether social media changed or choreographed the avenues for female participation in jihad. More conservative terrorist leaders advocate the total non-involvement of women in combat. In 2015, the ‘Islamic State’ was as much a digital terrain as a physical one.

This essay studies the rise, decline, and rebirth of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its transformation into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It first examines AQI’s distinctive vision and its defiance of al Qaeda central. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s anti-Shiite jihadist perspective, dramatized by AQI’s use of social media, attracted thousands of foreign fighters to Iraq. The Jordanian’s struggle against Shiite apostates and 2006 martyrdom in a US airstrike continues to dazzle young militants. Second, the essay analyzes AQI’s regeneration and metamorphosis into ISIS and its challenge to al Qaeda’s central command. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s refusal to recognize the authority of al Qaeda’s Ayman al Zawahiri and Baghdadi’s violent resistance to reconciliation measures has sparked destabilizing intrajihadist warfare. Third, the essay examines ISIS’s position as it resists attacks by Iraqi regime forces, rebel groups, Kurdish militants, and US-led coalition air strikes. The essay’s concluding observations analyze the parallels and differences between the Armed Islamic Group’s campaign in Algeria in the 1990s and ISIS’s position in Iraq and Syria in 2015.

Do targeted strikes against militant groups affect insurgent operations differently from terrorist operations? One of the reasons it is challenging for states to counter militant groups who simultaneously wage an insurgency and a terrorist campaign is that there are offsetting effects between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. As both an insurgent group and a terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses particular challenges to states. Since 2014, the United States and coalition allies have conducted thousands of targeted strikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). In this article, we examine the effects of targeted strikes against ISIL. Using a novel dataset of time-series observations from Iraq and Syria between 2015 and 2018, we examine the relationship between targeted strikes conducted under OIR and the number of insurgent and terrorist attacks conducted by ISIL. Our findings give empirical support to the theoretical argument that the same military strategy can have different effects on insurgency and terrorism.

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) which was declared by al-Baghdādī as an Islamic caliphate (dawlah khilāfah) is not necessarily welcomed by Muslim fundamentalists in Indonesia. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), two Muslims fundamentalist organization that struggle for Islamic caliphate, considers ISIS as deviant and invalid. This article aims to discuss the argument surrounding religious foundation of Islamic caliphate as believed al-Baghdādī as ISIS mastermind and the response of Indonesian fundamentalists to it. While all Islamic fundamentalism believes that establishment of Islamic caliphate is a religious obligation, they do not agree how to implement this obligation. ISIS’s al-Baghdādī is on the opinion that Islamic caliphate is to be implemented with all costs, including using violence and military campaign, Indonesian fundamentalists tend to use non-violence and dialogue as their strategy instead.

ABSTRACTThe Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s flagship English-language magazine, Dabiq, is a puzzle. The magazine is not, despite appearances, primarily designed for direct recruiting efforts or inciting violence against the West. In fact, the primary audiences of Dabiq are English-speaking second generation Muslims or converts, Western policymakers, and a third group of current or would-be members of ISIS who are not integrating with the organization itself. The third audience—those members who are failing to function within the organization—is strange to include in an English-language magazine. Why publish organizational weaknesses, in English? One possibility for this puzzle is that the fundamentalist hermeneutics of ISIS is reflected in their own media efforts. One of the assumptions that ISIS holds about their sacred texts is that each text carries a single meaning that reflects the author's original intent. There might be multiple applications of that intent, but each text can only have one intent, and therefore one meaning. Following this logic, a message meant for one person is unlikely to be of utility for another, and so this may be why ISIS exposes their weaknesses as part of the process of correcting their own members.