Cross-border regulatory spillovers and macroprudential policy coordination

Incorporating Financial Stability in Inflation Targeting Frameworks

The financial crisis and its aftermath have raised numerous questions about the appropriate role of financial stability considerations in the conduct of monetary policy. This paper develops a simple example of the possible connections between financial stability and monetary policy. We find that even without an explicit financial stability goal for monetary policy, financial stability considerations arise naturally in the context of standard models of optimal monetary policy if the potential magnitude of financial stability shocks is affected by the stance of policy. In this case, similar to the classic analysis of Brainard (1967), policymakers may seek to reduce the variance of output by scaling back the level of policy accommodation provided today in response to an aggregate demand shock relative to the level that would otherwise be provided. However, the policy implications of this possible connection between monetary policy and financial stability are complex even in the simple example considered here. In particular, financial stability considerations may also increase the relative benefits of following a commitment policy relative to a discretionary strategy.

Monetary and macroprudential policy with foreign currency loans

The Evolution of Monetary Rules with Financial Stability Considerations

<ns3:p>This paper reviews literature on the empirical relationship between vulnerabilities in the financial system and the macroeconomy, and how monetary policy affects that connection. Financial vulnerabilities build up over time, with both risk appetite and risk taking rising during economic expansions. To some extent, financial crises are predictable and have severe real economic consequences when they occur. Empirically it is difficult to link monetary policy to financial vulnerabilities, in part because financial cycles have long durations, making it difficult to separate effects of changes in monetary policy from other business cycle effects.</ns3:p>

Financial Stability Considerations in the Conduct of Monetary Policy

Beyond the Horizon of Banking Regulation: What to Expect from Basel IV?

The global financial crisis was characterized by heightened financial risk in the USA, which spread to the rest of the world, including emerging economies. This paper constructs a core–periphery model with a global banking network and financial frictions. Due to a common-lender effect, when global banks lend to an emerging economy, heightened financial risk in the center depresses cross-border lending to the emerging economy, reducing real activities and exacerbating monetary policy trade-offs. As financial markets become more integrated, exchange rate flexibility becomes less welfare enhancing and active capital account policy becomes more welfare enhancing.

Adding Fuel to the Fire Sales: Banks, Capital Regulation, and Systemic Risk

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

The thesis is composed of three chapters which analyze the monetary and macro-prudential policy using a New Keynesian DSGE model with the banking sector. The first chapter evaluates the effectiveness of time-varying macro-prudential tools and their interaction with monetary policy using the model framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011) which emphasizes the role of bank capital and endogenous leverage constraint due to the moral hazard problem. We consider the following three types of countercyclical macro-prudential tools: (i) capital requirements (CAR), (ii) deposit-based reserve requirements (DBRR), and (iii) asset-based reserve requirements (ABRR). The main findings are as follows. First, all three types of macro-prudential policy tools reacting to the financial condition (credit to output gap) are effective to mitigate the fluctuation of credit and business cycle by weakening the pro-cyclicality of banks' net worth and the counter-cyclicality of the endogenous leverage and external finance premium. Second, the effectiveness of each instrument differs by the source of shocks to the economy. In response to a TFP shock, the counter-cyclical CAR is the most effective to mitigate the fluctuation of credit and output and the ABRR is relatively more effective in response to capital quality shocks (credit supply shock). Third, all types of macro-prudential tools are welfare improving in combination with monetary policy, but the use of macro-prudential policy is relevant in response to the credit supply shock (financial shock). Finally, when the economy is hit by a financial shock, a relatively direct tool like asset-based reserve requirement (ABRR) can be the most welfare-improving and the relationship between monetary and macro-prudential policy can be complementary each other. The second chapter examines the role of banks' endogenous reserves and capital and the usefulness of financial condition (credit aggregates and external finance premium) as an indicator for setting up a relevant monetary policy rule. For the task, I construct an extended version of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) model which is characterized by banks' loan production function with inputs (collaterals, monitoring works and bank capital buffer) under the households' deposit in advance (DIA) constraint. Main findings are as follows. First, banks' endogenous reserves can mitigate the variation of external finance premium by substituting costly monitoring works for lending. However, the effect of endogenous reserves on output and credits depends on types of shocks (credit-demand vs credit-supply shock), which reflects the role of external finance premium (EFP) as a banking attenuator (pro-cyclical EFP) or financial accelerator (counter-cyclical EFP) respectively. Second, the effect of banks' endogenous reserves can be limited when banks can adjust their capital flexibly compared to when banks' keep their capital to asset ratio (leverage) stable. Third, considering the role of money and the frictions on the credit-supply side, monetary policy reacting actively to the financial condition is welfare improving. These results imply that quantitative easing (QE) policy during the crisis was effective but the effectiveness of QE can be limited when banks can lower their leverage in a pro-cyclical manner. And monetary policy should pay more attention to the financial condition and prevailing interest rates as well as inflation and output gap in the presence of substantive financial frictions on the credit supply side in particular when the banking shocks dominate the economy. In the last chapter (co-authored with Professor Jagjit S. Chadha), we investigate the question facing many emerging economies: the extent to which a workhorse advanced economy model can yield important insights for monetary policy-making. We note that the standard sticky-price, monopolistically competitive model does not allow analysis of money and credit dynamics and led to a concentration of research on simple interest rate reaction functions. However, time-varying financial frictions tend to act as a tax on intermediation activities and so can vary output in a significant manner. In this chapter, we consider the implications of financial frictions for baseline monetary policy using a model calibrated on Indian data and find that a simple interest rate reaction function may not be welfare maximizing when banking shocks are dominant in the economy.

Global Banking, Trade, and the International Transmission of the Great Recession

This paper builds a general equilibrium model that incorporates banks, financial frictions, default and a capital requirements. Ex-ante heterogeneous households decide how much to save or borrow for the sake of consumption (consumer credit) or the provision of housing services(mortgages). These choices are subject to borrowing limits, which depend on the value of real estate assets (for mortgages) or labour income (for consumer loans). The model includes final goods producers who must borrow in order to finance working capital/labour requirements (business credit borrowing) and intermediate good producers subject to nominal rigidities. Saving and borrowing are intermediated by a bank facing different capital requirements for each credit category. Any shock that has an impact on bank capital (for instance, a default shock) directly affects the bank’s income, the cost of external finance and, eventually, interest rates on loans. Changes in interest rates have second-round effects on labour and consumption through the borrowing limits. Simulations of the model suggest that the business cycle properties of credit and credit quality for each credit category are consistent with what is observed in the data.

Cyclical Implications of Minimum Capital Requirements

Security of investors' reserve remains the significant worry of bank controllers. It is in this regard the capital sufficiency becomes significant and imperative. Capital adequacy is an origination that results from reworking the banks' current capital structure to rebuild the banking industry against the widespread establishment. This research's objective was to assess the effect of capital adequacy ratio requirements on the Bank of Kenya Commercial Bank's loan demand. The study adopted the Capital Buffer Theory. The study reviewed related literature to capital adequacy ratio requirements on the efficiency in the Bank. This study adopted an exploratory research design. The sample population of interest in this study consisted of all 23-bank employees of KCB, Referral Branch. The study adopted a census survey. The following research questions guided the interview. How effective would be capital adequacy ratio requirements on loan demand of Kenya Commercial Bank? The study used interview guides in the collection of data. Qualitative analysis was used to analyze the perception data collected from the key informants. Joint subjects were determined, and qualitative data, organizing, and discussing based on the main objective were done. These were presented using grouped data collected in the form of discussion. From the interviewed respondents, it was found that there might be significant impacts of capital adequacy ratio requirements on loan demand of KCB. The elasticity of loan rate due to capital adequacy ratio requirement might affect loan demand, implying that there would be a change in loan demand for every percentage change in the loan rate. The study recommends that bank regulators be keen on the banks' capital adequacy ratio by laying down financial regulations on liquidity since financial regulation aims to enable banks to improve liquidity and solvency. Stricter regulation may be suitable for bank stability, but not for bank efficiency; restricting banks may lower bank efficiency and increase the probability of a banking crisis. There is a need for capital supplementation to keep up with Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) since stricter capital adequacy, robust supervision, and market discipline power promotes technical efficiency. Keywords: Loan, Demand, Ratio, Capital, Bank DOI: 10.7176/RJFA/12-6-06 Publication date: March 31 st 2021