- Research Article
- 10.1086/596002
Comment
- May 01, 2009
- NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics
- Paolo Pesenti
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This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country world with sticky prices under pricing to market. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target consumer price inflation, the output gap, and the currency misalignment. The paper derives the loss function of a cooperative monetary policymaker and the optimal targeting rules. The model is a modified version of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (JME, 2002). The key change is that we allow pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of currency misalignments. JEL: E52, F31, F41
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Optimal exchange rate flexibility with large labor unions
Optimal exchange rate flexibility with large labor unions
Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with inflation and output persistence
Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with inflation and output persistence
Optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates
Optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates
A New Dilemma: Capital Controls and Monetary Policy in Sudden-Stop Economies
A New Dilemma: Capital Controls and Monetary Policy in Sudden-Stop Economies
Introduction: Recent Developments in Monetary Macroeconomics
IntroductionRecent Developments in Monetary Macroeconomics David Altig The contents of this volume hardly require explanation beyond its title: "Recent Developments in Monetary Macroeconomics." Our intent for the conference was to collect a set of papers reflecting the cutting edge of applied monetary macroeconomics. As befitting such an ambitious-sounding goal, the contributions are wide ranging. For purposes of this brief introduction, however, we might organize the papers as answers to three questions. (1) What is the "optimal" Taylor rule? (2) Are "New Keynesian" or "New Neoclassical Synthesis" models the final word on the monetary transmission mechanism? (3) Is there a role for money in the conduct of monetary policy? What is the "Optimal" Taylor Rule The inclusion of the Taylor rule issue is almost a prerequisite for any collection of papers purporting to survey recent developments in monetary macroeconomics. In policy discussions, the Taylor rule is ubiquitous, and it is currently the choice among alternative specifications of central bank behavior. More precisely, perhaps, the general form of the Taylor rule is the choice, as it has come to represent the general class of equations that relate the federal funds rate to some measure of an output gap and inflation rate. There is substantially less unanimity about whether output gaps and inflation rates should be past, present, or (expected) future values, whether past values of the funds rate need to be included, and what are the appropriate magnitudes of the responses to each of these measures. Marc Giannoni and Michael Woodford offer the natural approach to addressing the dispute: find the representation that is optimal within the framework being employed for policy analysis. The model in question here is essentially a derivative of the "New Neoclassical Synthesis" class of models that are currently the workhorses of most monetary policy analyses among academic and central bank staffs alike. Their approach to discovering the optimal policy within this structure has the flavor of [End Page 1039] the "Ramsey problem" familiar from optimal tax policy, although with the strong requirement that the derived policy rule be "robustly optimal": it must support the optimal equilibrium no matter what the distribution of disturbances the model policymakers face. Giannoni and Woodford offer two essential lessons. First, whether optimal policy incorporates forecasts of future price-level growth or output gaps depend critically on the dynamics of the inflation rate. If the adjustment of the price-level to shocks is inertial, then optimal policy necessarily depends on forecasts of future inflation. Second, the response of the funds rate to its own past is inertial. In fact, it is super-inertial, meaning that (all else equal), the contemporaneous funds rate responds more than one-for-one with the lagged value of the funds rate (and lagged changes in the rate). The proposition that monetary authorities ought to aggressively respond to lagged values of the funds rate also arises in the papers by Jess Benhabib, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, and Martín Uribe, and George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja. In the latter case, the authors consolidate and expand on their well-known work on learning dynamics. A central contribution of the work presented in this article is the notion that convergence to a unique rational expectations equilibrium under learning, as well as the stability of that equilibrium, serves as basis for the choice (or rejection) of an optimal policy formulation. An apparent lesson from Evans and Honkapohja's analysis is that the learnability criterion prescribes a policy rule that differs in some important ways from the conventional wisdom coming from analyses that invoke the Taylor rule in a pure rational expectations environment. In particular, they conclude that the optimal policy rule in the environment they consider requires the monetary authority to respond directly to private-sector expectations. The environment they consider is essentially the same as in Giannoni and Woodford, with the exception of the central bank's assumed loss function: Giannoni and Woodford assume a preference for interest rate smoothing, Evans and Honkapohja do not. In his comments, John Duffy points out that the introduction of interest-smoothing motive yields an optimal policy rule under learning that is much closer to the conventional view. In particular, it does not require...
Read moreRobustly optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with housing
We analytically characterize optimal monetary policy for an augmented New Keynesian model with a housing sector. With rational private sector expectations about housing prices and inflation, optimal monetary policy can be characterized by a standard ‘target criterion’ that refers to inflation and the output gap, without making reference to housing prices. When the policymaker is concerned with potential departures of private sector expectations from rational ones and seeks a policy that is robust against such possible departures, then the optimal target criterion must also depend on housing prices. For empirically realistic cases, the central bank should then ‘lean against’ housing prices, i.e., following unexpected housing price increases (decreases), policy should adopt a stance that is projected to undershoot (overshoot) its normal targets for inflation and the output gap. Robustly optimal policy does not require that the central bank distinguishes between ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-fundamental’ movements in housing prices.
Read moreOptimal monetary policy in a small open economy with staggered wage and price contracts
Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with staggered wage and price contracts
Financial Shocks and Optimal Policy
Financial Shocks and Optimal Policy
Optimal Interest Rate Policy in a Small Open Economy
Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Optimal monetary policy reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of floating.
Read moreOptimal Monetary Policy and Term Structure in a Continuous-Time DSGE Model
Optimal Monetary Policy and Term Structure in a Continuous-Time DSGE Model
Leaning Against Housing Prices As Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy
Leaning Against Housing Prices As Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy
Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations
Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations
A Defense of Moderation in Monetary Policy
This paper examines the implications of uncertainty about the effects of monetary policy for optimal monetary policy with an application to the current situation. Using a stylized macroeconomic model, I derive optimal policies under uncertainty for both conventional and unconventional monetary policies. According to an estimated version of this model, the U.S. economy is currently suffering from a large and persistent adverse demand shock. Optimal monetary policy absent uncertainty would quickly restore real GDP close to its potential level and allow the inflation rate to rise temporarily above the longer-run target. By contrast, the optimal policy under uncertainty is more muted in its response. As a result, output and inflation return to target levels only gradually. This analysis highlights three important insights for monetary policy under uncertainty. First, even in the presence of considerable uncertainty about the effects of monetary policy, the optimal policy nevertheless responds strongly to shocks: uncertainty does not imply inaction. Second, one cannot simply look at point forecasts and judge whether policy is optimal. Indeed, once one recognizes uncertainty, some moderation in monetary policy may well be optimal. Third, in the context of multiple policy instruments, the optimal strategy is to rely on the instrument associated with the least uncertainty and use alternative, more uncertain instruments only when the least uncertain instrument is employed to its fullest extent possible.
Read moreRobust optimal monetary policy in a forward‐looking model with parameter and shock uncertainty
This paper characterizes a robust optimal policy rule in a simple forward‐looking model, when the policymaker faces uncertainty about model parameters and shock processes. We show that the robust optimal policy rule is likely to involve a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. Thus parameter uncertainty alone does not necessarily justify a small response of monetary policy to perturbations. However, uncertainty may amplify the degree of ‘super‐inertia’ required by optimal monetary policy. We finally discuss the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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