Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning

General proof theory studies how proofs are structured and how they relate to each other, and not primarily what can be proved in particular formal systems. It has been developed within the framework of Gentzen-style proof theory, as well as in categorial proof theory. As Dag Prawitz's monograph "Natural Deduction" (1965) paved the way for this development (he also proposed the term "General Proof Theory"), it is most appropriate to use this topic to celebrate 50 years of this work. The conference took place 27-29 November, 2015 in Tübingen at the Department of Philosophy. The proceedings collect abstracts, slides and papers of the presentations given, as well as contributions from two speakers who were unable to attend.

Reprint of: A more general general proof theory

According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with “Truth” in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, and proposed that it should be replaced by the anti-realist (and intuitionistic) notion of assertability-condition. Taken together with normalization results obtained by Dag Prawitz, Dummett’s work truly opened up the anti-realist challenge at the level of proof-theoretical semantics.2 There has been since numerous rejoinders from partisans of classical logic, which were at times met with by attempts at watering down the anti-realist challenge, e.g., by arguing that anti-realism does not necessarily entail the adoption of intuitionistic logic. Only a few anti-realists, such as Crispin Wright and Neil Tennant, tried to look instead in the other direction, towards a more radical version of anti-realism which would entail deeper revisions of classical logic than those recommended by intuitionists.3 In this paper, which is largely programmatic, we shall also argue in favour of a radical anti-realism which would be a genuine alternative to the traditional anti-realism of Dummett and Prawitz. The debate about anti-realism has by now more or less run out of breath and we wish to provide it with a new lease on life, by taking into account the profound changes that took place in proof theory during the intervening years. We have in mind in particular the considerable development within Gentzen-style proof theory of non-classical, substructural logics other than intuitionistic logic, which seriously opens up the possibility that anti-realism, when properly understood, might end up justifying another logic, and the development of closer links between proof theory and computational complexity theory that has renewed interest in a radical form of anti-realism, namely strict finitism.KeywordsClassical LogicIntuitionistic LogicLinear LogicNatural DeductionProof TheoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

We consider Dag Prawitz’s theory of grounds and suggest a formal apparatus for it. On its basis we show that the account faces a decidability issue similar to one that is often associated with BHK semantics, and propose different readings of the issue that involve different consequences.

The idea of an ‘inversion principle’, and the name itself, originated in the work of Paul Lorenzen in the 1950s, as a method to generate new admissible rules within a certain syntactic context. Some fifteen years later, the idea was taken up by Dag Prawitz to devise a strategy of normalization for natural deduction calculi (this being an analogue of Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem for sequent calculi). Later, Prawitz used the inversion principle again, attributing it with a semantic role. Still working in natural deduction calculi, he formulated a general type of schematic introduction rules to be matched – thanks to the idea supporting the inversion principle – by a corresponding general schematic Elimination rule. This was an attempt to provide a solution to the problem suggested by the often quoted note of Gentzen. According to Gentzen ‘it should be possible to display the elimination rules as unique functions of the corresponding introduction rules on the basis of certain requirements’. Many people have since worked on this topic, which can be appropriately seen as the birthplace of what are now referred to as “general elimination rules”, recently studied thoroughly by Sara Negri and Jan von Plato. In this study, we retrace the main threads of this chapter of proof-theoretical investigation, using Lorenzen's original framework as a general guide.

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Godel on deduction”, which examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Godel and general proof theory. When writing that other paper, the authors were not acquainted with a system of natural deduction that Godel presented with the help of Gentzen’s sequents, which amounts to Jaśkowski’s natural deduction system of 1934, and which may be found in Godel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave in 1939 at the University of Notre Dame. Here one finds a presentation of this system of Godel accompanied by a brief reexamination in the light of the notes of some points concerning his interest in sequents made in the preceding paper. This is preceded by a brief summary of Godel’s Notre Dame course, and is followed by comments concerning Godel’s natural deduction system.

The topics of structural proof theory and logic programming have influenced each other for more than three decades. Proof theory has contributed the notion of sequent calculus, linear logic, and higher-order quantification. Logic programming has introduced new normal forms of proofs and forced the examination of logic-based approaches to the treatment of bindings. As a result, proof theory has responded by developing an approach to proof search based on focused proof systems in which introduction rules are organized into two alternating phases of rule application. Since the logic programming community can generate many examples and many design goals (e.g., modularity of specifications and higher-order programming), the close connections with proof theory have helped to keep proof theory relevant to the general topic of computational logic.

Several formal systems, such as resolution and minimal model semantics, provide a framework for logic programming. In this article, we will survey the use ofstructural proof theoryas an alternative foundation. Researchers have been using this foundation for the past 35 years to elevate logic programming from its roots in first-order classical logic into higher-order versions of intuitionistic and linear logic. These more expressive logic programming languages allow for capturing stateful computations and rich forms of abstractions, including higher-order programming, modularity, and abstract data types. Term-level bindings are another kind of abstraction, and these are given an elegant and direct treatment within both proof theory and these extended logic programming languages. Logic programming has also inspired new results in proof theory, such as those involving polarity and focused proofs. These recent results provide a high-level means for presenting the differences between forward-chaining and backward-chaining style inferences. Anchoring logic programming in proof theory has also helped identify its connections and differences with functional programming, deductive databases, and model checking.

Computability is one of the fundamental notions of mathematics and computer science, trying to capture the effective content of mathematics and its applications. Computability Theory explores the frontiers and limits of effectiveness and algorithmic methods. It has its origins in Godel's Incompleteness Theorems and the formalization of computability by Turing and others, which later led to the emergence of computer science as we know it today. Computability Theory is strongly connected to other areas of mathematics and theoretical computer science. The core of this theory is the analysis of relative computability and the induced degrees of unsolvability; its applications are mainly to Kolmogorov complexity and randomness as well as mathematical logic, analysis and algebra. Current research in computability theory stresses these applications and focuses on algorithmic randomness, computable analysis, computable model theory, and reverse mathematics (proof theory). Recent advances in these research directions have revealed some deep interactions not only among these areas but also with the core parts of computability theory. The goal of this Dagstuhl Seminar is to bring together researchers from all parts of computability theory and related areas in order to discuss advances in the individual areas and the interactions among those.

The third Tübingen conference on proof-theoretic semantics took place in the Alte Aula of the University of Tübingen from the 27th to the 30th of March 2019. These proceedings contain all abstracts, the slides of most presentations and also a number of full papers, including a transcript of the talk by Per Martin-Löf.

Mathematical logic and computer science have driven the design of a growing number of logics and related formalisms such as set theories and type theories. In response to this population explosion, logical frameworks have been developed as formal meta-languages in which to represent, structure, relate and reason about logics.Research on logical frameworks has diverged into separate communities, often with conflicting backgrounds and philosophies. In particular, two of the most important logical frameworks are the framework of institutions, from the area of model theory based on category theory, and the Edinburgh Logical Framework LF, from the area of proof theory based on dependent type theory. Even though their ultimate motivations overlap – for example in applications to software verification – they have fundamentally different perspectives on logic.In the current paper, we design a logical framework that integrates the frameworks of institutions and LF in a way that combines their complementary advantages while retaining the elegance of each of them. In particular, our framework takes a balanced approach between model theory and proof theory, and permits the representation of logics in a way that comprises all major ingredients of a logic: syntax, models, satisfaction, judgments and proofs. This provides a theoretical basis for the systematic study of logics in a comprehensive logical framework. Our framework has been applied to obtain a large library of structured and machine-verified encodings of logics and logic translations.

Given a logic presented in a sequent calculus, a natural question is that of equivalence of proofs: to determine whether two given proofs are equated by any denotational semantics, ie any categorical interpretation of the logic compatible with its cut-elimination procedure. This notion can usually be captured syntactically by a set of rule permutations. Very generally, proofnets can be defined as combinatorial objects which provide canonical representatives of equivalence classes of proofs. In particular, the existence of proof nets for a logic provides a solution to the equivalence problem of this logic. In certain fragments of linear logic, it is possible to give a notion of proofnet with good computational properties, making it a suitable representation of proofs for studying the cut-elimination procedure, among other things. It has recently been proved that there cannot be such a notion of proofnets for the multiplicative (with units) fragment of linear logic, due to the equivalence problem for this logic being Pspace-complete. We investigate the multiplicative-additive (without unit) fragment of linear logic and show it is closely related to binary decision trees: we build a representation of proofs based on binary decision trees, reducing proof equivalence to decision tree equivalence, and give a converse encoding of binary decision trees as proofs. We get as our main result that the complexity of the proof equivalence problem of the studied fragment is Logspace-complete.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1502.01993

Apologies. The purpose of the following talk is to give an overview of the present state of aims, methods and results in Pure Proof Theory. Shortage of time forces me to concentrate on my very personal views. This entails that I will emphasize the work which I know best, i.e., work that has been done in the triangle Stanford, Munich and Münster. I am of course well aware that there are as important results coming from outside this triangle and I apologize for not displaying these results as well.Moreover the audience should be aware that in some points I have to oversimplify matters. Those who complain about that are invited to consult the original papers.1.1. General. Proof theory startedwithHilbert's Programme which aimed at a finitistic consistency proof for mathematics.By Gödel's Theorems, however, we know that we can neither formalize all mathematics nor even prove the consistency of formalized fragments by finitistic means. Inspite of this fact I want to give some reasons why I consider proof theory in the style of Gentzen's work still as an important and exciting field of Mathematical Logic. I will not go into applications of Gentzen's cut-elimination technique to computer science problems—this may be considered as applied proof theory—but want to concentrate on metamathematical problems and results. In this sense I am talking about Pure Proof Theory.Mathematicians are interested in structures. There is only one way to find the theorems of a structure. Start with an axiom system for the structure and deduce the theorems logically. These axiom systems are the objects of proof-theoretical research. Studying axiom systems there is a series of more or less obvious questions.

Cut-free proofs in Herbelin’s sequent calculus are in 1-1 correspondence with normal natural deduction proofs. For this reason Herbelin’s sequent calculus has been considered a privileged middle-point between L-systems and natural deduction. However, this bijection does not extend to proofs containing cuts and Herbelin observed that his cutelimination procedure is not isomorphic to β-reduction.In this paper we equip Herbelin’s system with rewrite rules which, at the same time: (1) complete in a sense the cut elimination procedure firstly proposed by Herbelin; and (2) perform the intuitionistic “fragment” of the tq-protocol - a cut-elimination procedure for classical logic defined by Danos, Joinet and Schellinx. Moreover we identify the subcalculus of our system which is isomorphic to natural deduction, the isomorphism being with respect not only to proofs but also to normalisation.Our results show, for the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logic, how to embed natural deduction in the much wider world of sequent calculus and what a particular cut-elimination procedure normalisation is.KeywordsClassical LogicIntuitionistic LogicReduction RuleNatural DeductionSequent CalculusThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Logic is not only of foundational importance in mathematics, it is also playing a big role in software engineering and formal verification. Its different roles influence its teaching, which has to take into consideration the recent developments in category theory and proof theory. We show that teaching set theory from a categorical viewpoint, in contrast with Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, helps develop proper skills that are essential in mathematics and software engineering. The use of a proof assistant provides students with another perspective on both subjects: basic category theory and proof theory.