Defence Planning and Force Generation

This article explains why the EU in recent years has gained an upper hand in Allied defence planning. The development is surprising in light of reforms undertaken by NATO in the mid-1990s and also the 1998-99 US ambition to reinforce NATO's defence planning process with the Defence Capabilities Initiative. The article argues that a number of European governments, notably including the British and French, has been motivated to seek change because NATO's defence planning process has proved difficult to adapt to new low-intensity threats and also because governments seek to control the political development of the EU itself. The article illustrates how these concerns are directly visible in the current EU design for military planning and offers an assessment of future NATO-EU relations.

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the process of ensuring effective management of defense resources. The paper highlights the factors that affect the overall effectiveness of defense resource management. The main ones include the following: the perfection of the mechanism of both defense and budget planning, the sufficiency of the entire resource potential of the country, which concerns the provision of defense needs for a specified period of time; the level of military security of the state, the state of development of the country's scientific and technical potential and the professional level of specialists involved in the management of defense resources at various levels. The importance of conducting defense planning is substantiated, which includes outlining priorities and directions for the development of defense forces. The tasks aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the medium term are considered in detail. Among them, the following should be highlighted: strengthening the defense capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; development and integration of the country's defense capabilities through rational planning and effective use of available resources and international assistance; development of territorial defense as an integrated system, improvement of the control system and comprehensive support; increasing the level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other defense forces, including their transfer to a professional basis and equipping with the latest weapons systems; ensuring the gradual rearmament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other defense forces with modern air defense complexes; development of missile weapons of certain classes and types as the main means of deterring the enemy; introduction of automated systems for commanding troops and weapons, modern communication technologies, telecommunications, information protection, intelligence and logistics, digital transformation in the military sphere, the defense sphere and military construction; deployment of a secure information exchange network between defense force management bodies, which meets the requirements for the protection and supply of modern missile weapons to destroy important enemy objects at long distances. The importance of defense planning has been confirmed by the experience of advanced countries in the world, in particular countries that are members of NATO.

The increasing prominence of scenarios of non-nuclear war in NATO's defence planning has made the proper status of chemical warfare weapons increasingly difficult to assess. The perplexities largely stem from the relationship between chemical weapons and the nuclear threshold, and what that may mean for overall deterrence. Alone among the NATO members, France and the United States have retained chemical weapons in their arsenals. Both are now poised to modernize and expand their chemical forces. The American administration wishes to proceed with this at once, and has cited undisclosed evidence of increasing Soviet chemical warfare capabilities in justification. It has also argued that modernization and expansion would strengthen the West's negotiating position in the continuing Geneva talks on chemical warfare disarmament. At the end of 1985, the US Congress made its funding of the administration's programme conditional upon a formal expression of support from NATO. In May 1986 NATO defence ministers duly adopted a 'force goal' to this end, but made it clear that, in doing so, they were not assenting to any deployment of the new weapons to Europe. These developments have brought the issue of planning and preparedness for chemical warfare into unprecedented political visibility in Western Europe. Public opinion has not viewed the issue with equanimity. Like the neutron bomb, this subject has great potential for divisiveness. In political terms it is unsurprising, therefore, that a note of genuine conviction can be heard in the voices of West European leaders extolling the virtues of negotiated chemical warfare (CW) disarmament; and West European delegations to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where CW has been under discussion since 1968, are now negotiating with an evident will to succeed. Some of the problems confronting CW disarmament are explored in the pages which follow. The starting point is an analysis of the present CW arms control regime1 and of the CW policies that have so far flowed from it.

The article examines the concept of «national security» within the categorical framework of public administration, highlighting the absence of a universally accepted definition of «national security» and its role in public administration. It is emphasized that studying the concept of «national security» in the context of public administration is crucial for understanding and interpreting the «state policy of national security» strategy. This is also essential for ensuring that public security agencies meet security requirements and effectively address both current and potential threats to the formation and functioning of Ukrainian society. It is noted that, in the 21st century, global challenges and changes in the world order have led to increased attention on the concept of «national security». This concept is now viewed as a domain of public relations focused on preventing both real and potential threats to the state's national interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. It is noted that the conceptualization of the phenomenon known as «national security» within the public administration system can be characterized as a domain of public relations aimed at ensuring the foundational conditions for the functioning of individuals and society, while also protecting national values and interests from various threats. It is determined that the concept of «national security» has the following semantic dimensions: first, as a state of society that reflects the protection of the state's vital interests; second, as a political, legal, and organizational mechanism of public administration; third, as the state and level of protection afforded to individuals; and fourth, as the protection of fundamental national interests, which include: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, democratic constitutional order, and sustainable economic development. For future research, it is proposed to focus on the relationship between national security and globalization processes, particularly exploring how globalization impacts the national interests of states.

The strategic defense bulletin ofUkrainewithin the framework of strategic objective No. 2 provides for the introduction of defense planning in the defense forces on the basis of opportunities in accordance with Euro-Atlantic principles. The goal of introducing defense planning on the basis of capabilities in the defense forces can be: adaptation of the existing planning system to the new system; the definition of the defense development strategy for the long term, as well as its harmonization with the existing risks, opportunities and resources; development of the capabilities of the defense forces.The organization of the introduction of a new planning system in the defense forces is proposed to be carried out by the heads of the central control body of the component of the defense forces. General coordination of measures to implement a new planning system in the defense forces is assigned to the structural subdivision of the central government. The main collegial body for the implementation of the new planning system is the Commission, which is appointed by the order of the head of the management body, its powers are defined in the Commission Regulation, which is approved by the order of the head of the central management body.Activities to implement the new planning system can be carried out in the following stages: organizational-preparatory, main, final.The purpose of the organizational and preparatory phase can be: the formation of working bodies, the definition of their place and role in implementing activities to implement a new planning system.During the main stage of implementation of the new planning system creation of working groups; the definition of those responsible for the implementation of the new planning system in structural units; conducting an audit (verification, analysis) of the planning system in the management bodies; determination of the order of improvement of the planning system; determination of the procedure for attracting specialists from other ministries and departments of Ukraine during the implementation phase; the definition of the training of officials; development (clarification) of guidance documents; organization and staff arrangements; definition of the control system.The final stage of implementation of the new planning system may include:summarizing the results of the implementation of the new planning system;registration of the results of the implementation of the new planning system and their public discussion;organization of coordination with interested central government bodies of proposals for the improvement of the new planning system;presenting the necessary documents to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine regarding the introduction of a new planning system;development of proposals for drafting the necessary legislative and other regulatory and legal acts.

International Legal Review of the Relationship between International Tax Law and National Tax Sovereignty: Theoretical Foundation and Development Practices

Carbon markets devolve governance to external institutions and displace power from sovereign states. Major producers in these markets, notably China, have expressed concern about the adverse implications for national interests and sovereignty associated with selling off the rights to emit carbon emissions abroad. This article suggests that such concern has shaped the discursive context in which emission trading schemes have gained popularity in the country. Our discourse analysis shows that notions of market power are made manifest as a powerful storyline. In the Chinese language, “power,” “sovereignty,” and “rights” all use the same character. The storyline captures all these expressions and allows for a positive view about active engagement in carbon trading as a way to protect development rights and redeem carbon sovereignty. Thus, the contested policy of emissions trading becomes embedded in the more appealing narrative of national development and made politically attractive, despite unfavorable realities against it.

Defense planning is a particularly important topic, which implies an analysis of the international situation, a realistic assessment of its own national security system, whichinvolves medium- and long-term decisions. The allocation of resources should follow the defense policy established following a strategic analysis process, after the strategic objectivesand level of ambition have been established. The construction of military capabilities is complex, is carried out over time and requires the allocation of financial resources and apredictable and coherent human resource policy. Discontinuous reforms, or the alteration of decisions with opportunistic, conjuncture solutions, adversely affect future programs andproduce waste of financial and material resources, as well as social convulsions in human resources. The structure of forces on which the state's defense capacity is built must beincreasingly professional to have a timely and effective responsiveness, and the resilience capacity for national defense should be based on the mental and armed resilience of thepopulation in the case of temporary occupation of the national territory. Membership of NATO and the European Union increases resilience through the commitments of the two organizationsto support the restoration of Romania's territorial integrity in the event of military aggression. The increasingly technologically evolved human society requires a rethinking of thenational mobilization system, both in terms of human resources and in terms of the involvement of the resources of the national economy. Maintaining the functioning of critical infrastructure,operationalizing industrial facilities and maintaining the capacity to provide the material and financial resources needed for the war effort are particularly important, and the workforce inthese areas cannot be made available to complement military structures. Law enforcement and civil emergency forces will be engaged in the specific missions of each of them but may formbases of resistance in the case of national occupation. Participation in NATO and EU force structures must be in line with the force structure designed for national needs, renegotiated,realistically, in the medium and long term, with sustainable promises corresponding to common standards. Allocating a 2% defense budget is not the single and sufficient solution to achievinga credible and sustainable defense capability. Difficult, socially and politically impact corrective measures are needed, but any delay will produce increasing imbalances.Keywords: Defense planning, national defense, NATO, Romania, European Union

Abstract. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of NATO policy within the context of the russian-Ukrainian war. The North Atlantic Alliance consistently demonstrates its commitment as a reliable guarantor of peace, security, and stability for its member countries. The foundation of NATO’s accomplishments lies in its dependable and effective institutional structure, well-regulated political consultation mechanisms geared towards consensus-building, and the aspiration to constantly maintain and improve the balance of transatlantic interests. The russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a critical reassessment of NATO’s role and its development prospects, primarily regarding the imperative of strengthening the Alliance’s defensive potential, the expansion of its operational scope, and the refinement of its security missions. The new Strategic Concept outlined NATO’s priorities, core objectives, and approaches. It also identified the main threats to Euro-Atlantic security and proposed countermeasures for the next decade. The Alliance reacted to the kremlin’s aggressive intentions by activating its defence plans and deploying additional military formations on NATO’s eastern flank, backed by significant air and naval potential. Moreover, the Alliance enhances the reliability of nuclear forces, strengthens the operational capabilities of conventional armed forces and anti-missile defence assets, and reinforces the resilience of member countries for collective defence. An analysis of Ukraine’s relations with NATO amidst the large-scale russian aggression underscores that the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people could facilitate a quick accession of Ukraine to the Alliance following the end of the war. An invitation to Ukraine at the 2023 Vilnius Summit opens prospects for establishing long-term sustainable peace in Europe. Keywords: NATO, russian aggression, Strategic Concept, NATO expansion, Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

ARMED FORCES TODAY

: The changing environment, internal and external, has a profound influence on the coarse and events especially of a young nation striving to maintain her survival in the face of various challenges to her national unity, prosperity, and well being. Malaysia had successfully fought the communists and was able to destroy its militant threat. However the challenges to her national security has not diminished because the diversification in her culture, traditions, and religious of her multi-ethnic communities in themselves pose a greater threat to the nation. Events occurring in the neighbouring states could also influence Malaysia's security and well being as the close proximity and the relationship existed between the states and the people would have an impact of actions and reactions on both sides. World order and events do cause realignment in policies and a review of inter-state relationship when national interests are in conflict. However government policies derived from accepted national purpose, values, and interests in the main will determine the unity, prosperity, well being, and the survivability of the nation as long as the internal order is being effectively controlled and all challenges are being tackled successfully. As a consequence Malaysia would continue to address these challenges to her national security so that her national sovereignty and integrity are being upheld. (sdw)

The threat which shaped Western European and US defence planning, force structures and military-technological developments for nearly half a century is no more. It is not just a question of the potential adversary's ideological commitment, cohesion or competence, but also of contiguity. The demise, first of the Warsaw Pact and then of the very Soviet Union, and the development of democratic states friendly to the West in the zone between Germany and the Russian Republic, have made direct military confrontation with the inheritor of most of the Soviet Union's military machine pretty well impossible, except, perhaps, at sea or in space. The intention has disappeared and, more important for defence and security planners, so has the capability. The Crimean War of I853-6 makes an interesting comparison with present circumstances. The only way Britain and France could get at Russia was via the Baltic and the Black Sea. Their war devolved primarily into a limited operation to capture the port of Sevastopol. Now Russia, which still has most of the former USSR's war-making capacity, is even more difficult to get at, as Sevastopol and the Crimea are in Ukraine. More pertinently, it is even more difficult for Russia to get out. Defence planning and the allocation of resources to defence have therefore changed fundamentally. Priorities now have more in common with those of the Age of Reason than with those of the Cold War, or than with strategic planning in the late nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, and especially from I945 to about I989, European nations measured

<p>The fundamental tasks that the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty laid in the foundation of its functions are collective defence and the preservation of peace and security. It demands joint, well-planned and organized actions of all member countries aimed at repealing external military aggression or armed attack with an appropriate package of forces and means (diplomatic, political and military).</p> <p>The well-organized rebuff of an armed attack on a NATO member state or the implementation of measures to maintain peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond requires clear and coordinated action by both government officials and armed forces of member-countries and partners.</p> <p>The Allianceʼs ability to carry out common tasks lies in the light of effective defence planning, interaction and coordination at all levels of governance in political and military spheres, as well as standardization.</p> <p>The Alliance actively relies on partnership and cooperation in every area of its activities.</p> <p>The partnership acquires different forms and content. Some countries participate in the “Partnership for Peace Program” (PfP), which is based on an agreed Framework Document and Individual or Special Partnership Programs. Cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiatives and the other Partners across the globe (Contact Countries Initiatives) are based on agreed work programs and plans. All practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation (partnership) programs with NATO differ based on the national interests, ambitions and priorities of the Partner-countries themselves. The only thing they have in common is the issue of standardization, namely the achievement of an appropriate level of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality, depending on the military-political ambitions in the field of cooperation of a particular Partner nation with NATO.</p> <p>The process of gaining full membership of Ukraine in NATO, among other things, involves the implementation of Alliance standards in all areas of the Defense Department, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian State as a whole. When we talk about the implementation of NATO standards, we mean the transformation of Ukraine's security and defense sector to the best world principles, procedures and practices. It is not only about reforming the Armed Forces, the defense industry, the intelligence community and special services of Ukraine, but also about effective civil democratic control and parliamentary oversight over the defense forces, ensuring transparency in decision making proceses at all levels, improving the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption bodies, introducing effective operational planning process focused on needed operational capabilities, etc.</p>

Asian Interests in the Arctic:Risks and Gains for Russia Katarzyna Zysk (bio) In recent years, the Arctic has become a key area of interest for Russian domestic and foreign policymakers. Russia’s renewed attention to the region and its readiness to spend enormous resources on development there have been driven by several closely interconnected factors. These include both the will to seize opportunities, primarily economic ones, as the Arctic opens up and the need to secure Russian sovereign rights in the region. Another factor has been the surge of interest in Arctic matters expressed by countries around the world, including by Asian states. This trend has fueled Moscow’s determination to defend the Russian position against the perceived threat of being pushed out of the region by foreign actors eager to develop their own activities. For some time, Russia has been reluctant to accept increased influence in the region by non-Arctic actors that could potentially challenge Russia’s status and interests. This coolness to newcomers applies to the Arctic Council’s new Asian observers—China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore—as well as to outside states and organizations in general. Although Russia intends to strengthen cooperation in the future, such cooperation is to occur on one condition: it must not challenge Russia’s sovereign rights in the Arctic, including offshore areas. This essay analyses Russia’s attitudes toward Asian interests in the Arctic. First, it examines Russia’s key Arctic interests and policies and the challenges to their implementation. Next, it sheds light on Moscow’s views on the admission of the five Asian states as observers in the Arctic Council, as well as on the motivations behind their policies toward the region. Finally, the essay analyses Russia’s views on the actual and potential risks and gains as it seeks to balance mutually beneficial cooperation with the need to preserve its own influence, rights, and interests in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic Interests: New Opportunities, New Uncertainty Russian policy fundaments, the resulting Arctic strategy, and the plan for its implementation all draw on the country’s relatively high-tempo socioeconomic and security development program and ambitions for the [End Page 30] energy sector, strategic minerals and metals mining, maritime shipping, and fisheries.1 One of Russia’s key strategic goals is the transformation of the Arctic into the “foremost strategic base for natural resources” by 2020. The expansion of the energy sector, which is monopolized by the national oil companies Gazprom, Rosneft, and more recently Zarubezhneft, has been moving forward, although dogged by delays. Some plans, including one to develop the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea, were canceled after the U.S. shale gas revolution altered the geopolitics of energy. Another fundamental Russian goal in the Arctic is development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a major shipping artery to challenge traditional trade lanes between Europe and Asia. The use of the route for both transit and destinational shipping has risen systematically since 2009, and the government has high expectations for the future.2 However, the development of the NSR depends on the scope of economic development in the Arctic, even as many Arctic development projects depend on the availability of the NSR. To make Arctic shipping easier and safer, Russia has embarked on a large-scale plan to revitalize the passage through legislative and economic means as well as the use of security and military assets. Plans include construction of a new generation of icebreakers, modernization of search-and-rescue services, management of communications, development of navigation and surveillance systems, and development of a comprehensive dual-use coastal infrastructure that would serve Russian military and civilian purposes alike. As the Arctic becomes more accessible and the number of states and organizations active in it grows sharply, the region is seen by many in Russia as increasingly vulnerable. As a result, the Russian government has been strengthening security and defense forces in the Arctic, primarily [End Page 31] the Federal Security Service and its border guard branch, as well as the Northern Fleet, the air force, and early warning units. By the end of 2014, Russia intends to establish the Northern Fleet–Unified...

This chapter discusses how the notion of ‘environmental security’ reflects both our fundamental concerns security and the changing context of security in the post-Cold War world. It examines the changing context of security in which environmental factors have a major role to play. The post-Cold War period is defined by changed priorities, and it has become commonplace to reconsider the concept of security in this context. It is, however, rather less common to consider the environmental dimensions of security. Thus environmental change presents security concerns which are qualitatively different from traditional security threats, and may even represent the basis for a broad shift in social values. Furthermore, global issues such as environmental change dislocate conventional points of reference in state security and national interest. The idea of environmental security necessarily reflects a ‘critical’ approach to the concept of security because of the diffuse characteristics of the source of insecurity which environmental change implies.