Deterrence, Assurance, and Countermeasures

The US-China relationship has always been an important part of international relations, and Taiwan is a central issue in the relationship between the two countries. 2022 The visit of Nancy Patricia, the President of the US House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August has caused another tension in the Taiwan Strait. This paper will use this Pelosi's visit to Taiwan as an entry point to analyze the impact of this event on China, the US, and Taiwan from the theory of international relations realism. Finally, it will be analyzed that the US, to safeguard its influence in the Asia-Pacific region, has used the Taiwan issue to cause a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait to weaken China's national security and to achieve the result of the US becoming the controller of the Asia-Pacific region again. To ensure its national security, China has been conducting regular military exercises in the Taiwan Island region to strengthen its military power for self-help purposes. Taiwan, as a non-sovereign state, has acted as a pawn in the game between the two great powers, China and the United States. This incident has made China pay more attention to cross-strait relations and security in the Taiwan Strait, and has provided an opportunity for China to advance cross-strait reunification.

During his administration, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte adhered to the One China principle and Philippine-Taiwan interactions were kept within reasonable limits. Since President Marcos Jr. came to power, Philippine-Taiwan interactions have been enhanced and the One China principle has been relaxed. The dynamic elements that led to the President Marcos Jr. administration‟s position on Taiwan are the leader‟s personal experiences and security perceptions, Filipino workers in Taiwan, dissatisfaction with China‟s handling of the South China Sea disputes, and US involvement in regional affairs. The transformation of the Marcos Jr. government‟s position on Taiwan has complicated the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. It‟s almost certain that China would continue to keep its economic cooperation with the Philippines, improve the existing mechanism for dealing with the South China Sea issue, while firmly safeguarding the country‟s sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea issue and the Taiwan Question.

The purpose of this paper is to derive the strategic implications for the Korean Peninsula of the U.S.-China military reinforcement and military readiness surrounding the Taiwan Strait. This paper derived the following. First, the United States and China will continue to strengthen their military readiness surrounding the Taiwan Strait along with competition to increase military power. In particular, Washington is strengthening its military cooperation with allies and partners while also strengthening forward bases that can keep China in denial in the East and South China Seas. On the other hand, Beijing is satisfied with securing the Ream naval base in Cambodia amid a lack of allies and partner countries in the region. Second, based on the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States will strengthen its lattice-like security system through cooperation with allies and partner countries to block China's expansion of influence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In particular, the additional four bases on Luzon Island in the Philippines will provide strategic flexibility for U.S. forces to quickly intervene in an emergency in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Third, while Beijing continues its power competition with Washington, it will continue to threaten Taiwan, such as invading Taiwan’s ADIZ, with its superior military power compared to Taiwan. In addition, China will continue to strengthen its presence in the Taiwan Strait and strengthen its influence in the South China Sea through the forward deployment of SSBNs and other forces. China is also strengthening its maritime A2/AD capabilities, including anti-ship ballistic missiles(ASBMs), which are necessary for the US military’s access and area denial within the 1st and 2nd Island Chain. Fourth, Taiwan will strengthen its relationship with the United States to deny China’s military influence, as it has a military power that is inferior to that of China and will make efforts to not only introduce necessary weapons from the United States but also strengthen its military power, such as submarines. Taiwan is also strengthening its ability to attack mainland China with its ballistic missiles. On balance, based on the lessons learned from China’s blockade of the Taiwan Strait in August 2022, Japan is strengthening its defense capabilities in the Southwest Islands to protect the Southwestern Islands, including Yonaguni Island, and to provide prompt support in the event of an emergency in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Japan is strengthening its infrastructure and capabilities, including the introduction of long-range attack weapons such as Tomahawk from the United States and the construction of an F-35B deployment base, where the United States can project/operate military power in the Taiwan Strait in case of emergency. In particular, the intensifying arms race between the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan over the Taiwan Strait, along with the recent restoration of the alliance between North Korea and Russia, has the following strategic implications for the Korean peninsula. First, recently, U.S. allies and partner countries have raised questions about whether Washington can manage two conflicts in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and the intervention of U.S. troops in Korea during the Taiwan crisis is increasing. Second, if a limited military conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, the Republic of Korea must be able to respond flexibly. Third, if an armed conflict between China and Taiwan escalates with the intervention of the U.S., Seoul must make a strategic decision to cooperate militarily with the U.S. at an appropriate level. Lastly, South Korea and the United States must also prepare for the possibility of North Korea’s military provocation to block the concentration of U.S. military forces when China threatens Taiwan with its military forces.

We propose a two-stage process to explain the relationship between the local news environment and citizen engagement. Our original content analysis of newspaper coverage in every US House district during the 2010 midterms reveals that districts with uncompetitive races and those served by large-circulation outlets see significantly less, and less substantive, coverage than hotly contested districts and those served by smaller outlets. We then merge the news data with survey data from the 2010 CCES and find that a diminished news environment depresses engagement. Citizens exposed to a lower volume of coverage are less able to evaluate their member of Congress, less likely to express opinions about the House candidates in their districts, and less likely to vote. This is true for people regardless of levels of political awareness, indicating that the deleterious consequences of a decline in local coverage are widespread, not restricted to the least attentive citizens.

More than a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, but Asia still faces serious security challenges. These include the current security environment in the Korean peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and over Kashmir, the danger of nuclear and missile proliferation, and the concern with the rising power of China and with American dominance. Indeed, some experts see Asia as a dangerous and unstable place. Alagappa disagrees, maintaining that Asia is a far more stable, predictable, and prosperous region than it was in the postindependence period. This volume also takes account of the changed security environment in Asia since September 11, 2001. Unlike many areas-studies approaches, Alagappa’s work makes a strong case for taking regional politics and security dynamics seriously from both theoretical and empirical approaches. The first part of this volume develops an analytical framework for the study of order; the salience of the different pathways to order is examined in the second part; the third investigates the management of specific security issues; and the final part discusses the nature of security order in Asia.

Renewable energy technology usage and environmental security: Public perception and governance's role in Hail, Saudi Arabia

In a straight party line vote the US House of Representatives voted on 30 July to allow John Boehner, an Ohio Republican and the House speaker, to move ahead with...

Although cross-strait relations have been the most stable in the last eight years under the pro-mainland KMT government, the pro-independence DPP scored a major victory in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections. This paper examines ways identity changes in Taiwan have influenced how Taiwanese view and deal with cross-strait relations and reactions from the mainland after the January elections. Using constructivism as the theoretical framework and survey data, we argue that Taiwan’s continued democratization has created a different social and political experience. This experience has solidified over time and created a unique Taiwanese identity. As time passes, the KMT, which has a stronger historical and social lineage with the mainland, is being weakened by Taiwan’s changing experience and identity. Nevertheless, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only essential for people on both sides of the strait, they are essential for the region and the world. Both the new DPP government and the mainland government must rethink their strategies and policies in order to construct a new framework to ensure continued peace and stability in the region.

In migrant communities, parents and children not only represent two diverse generations, but two different languages and cultures. As migrants who still carry memories of their homeland and culture close to their hearts, many are tied linguistically, culturally, and emotionally to their native country and culture. Language maintenance in migrant families assists parents and their children not only to communicate but to also understand cultural values better, which are crucial to their identity and worldview. Although research on community languages has flourished since Michael Clyne’s pioneering work on community language maintenance in the 1960s, there is limited understanding of the role of migrant families in maintaining and transmitting a community language and its influence on identity in Australia. Specific research on Rioplatense Spanish language maintenance and Argentinean identity within the Argentinean community has remained largely unexamined in the contemporary global landscape. In particular, we lack research on how and why first and second generation Argentineans maintain the Spanish language, but more specifically, Rioplatense Spanish and the consequences this has for their experience of Argentinean identity. This thesis addresses this knowledge gap for Australia and elsewhere by examining and discussing the following four themes. First, the central role of the family (as opposed to governments) in conceptualising and implementing language maintenance and identity practices. Second, the influence of familial (endogamous and exogamous unions, extended family, siblings, and language strategies) and extra-familial factors (social networks, travel, language status, and institutions) in augmenting the development and maintenance of community language literacy skills and identity. Third, how linguistic strategies and attitudes are dynamic and play a role in the process of language learning and maintenance, and last, the role and consumption of media (print, audio, audio-visual, and digital communication technologies), and technology in community language maintenance and identity. This thesis analyses the results of a two-step study, drawing upon data derived from mixed-methods research. First, a community-based survey of first and second generation Argentineans from Australia’s three largest cities — Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane — examined respondents’ use and maintenance of the Spanish language and the influence this has on their experience of Argentinean identity. Second, semi-structured interviews with first and second generation Argentineans were conducted to verify and triangulate survey findings and develop insights derived from the survey data. The analyses of the survey and interview data in this thesis provide insights into how the attitudes and actions of first generation Argentineans since the 1970s have influenced intergenerational ethnolinguistic vitality in Spanish language maintenance. This thesis illuminates our understanding by demonstrating how Argentineans in contemporary Australia maintain and transmit the Spanish language, their dialect Castellano Rioplatense [Rioplatense Spanish], and the implications this has for their experience of Argentinean identity. It also demonstrates that although the Argentinean community pertains to the broader Latin American community in Australia, they signal their uniqueness via their use of Rioplatense Spanish. The principal finding of this thesis is that despite Australia’s dominant monolingual landscape, first and second generation Argentineans continue to transmit and maintain Spanish, but more specifically, Rioplatense Spanish. Moreover, their use of Rioplatense Spanish allows them to maintain a distinct Argentinean identity in a multicultural context that otherwise publicly renders them as ‘Latin Americans.’ This thesis identifies four key elements in community language maintenance and identity. First, the family is the most salient factor in language maintenance and transmission. Second, the heterogeneity of the Argentinean community compared to other Latin American communities in Australia is reflected by their distinct use of Rioplatense Spanish, which maintains and ameliorates ethnolinguistic vitality, framing their Argentinean identity. Third, positive language attitudes within families further aids in the transference and maintenance of Rioplatense Spanish in various domains, at both micro and macro levels. Fourth, the consumption of media and digital communication technologies influences how the community language is used and experienced. This is achieved by individuals participating in diverse spaces that use and sustain not only the Spanish language, but more specifically, Rioplatense Spanish, and Argentinean identity. Hence, the use and maintenance of Spanish creates a sense of an imagined community, with individuals sensing that they mentally belong ‘here’ in Australia and ‘there’ in Argentina. The findings of this thesis have implications for promoting intergenerational language and identity within families, communities, pedagogical programming, educational and linguistic policies to facilitate language maintenance and identity opportunities.

Political observers, campaign experts, and academics alike argue bitterly over whether it is more important for a party to capture ideologically moderate swing voters or to encourage turnout among hardcore partisans. The behavioral literature in American politics suggests that voters are not informed enough, and are too partisan, to be swing voters, while the institutional literature suggests that moderate candidates tend to perform better. We speak to this debate by examining the link between the ideology of congressional candidates and the turnout of their parties’ bases in US House races, 2006–2014. Combining a regression discontinuity design in close primary races with survey and administrative data on individual voter turnout, we find that extremist nominees—as measured by the mix of campaign contributions they receive—suffer electorally, largely because theydecreasetheir party’s share of turnout in the general election, skewing the electorate towards their opponent’s party. The results help show how the behavioral and institutional literatures can be connected. For our sample of elections, turnout appears to be the dominant force in determining election outcomes, but it advantages ideologically moderate candidates because extremists appear to activate the opposing party’s base more than their own.

Since the end of the Cold war, many tensions in the international society appear to be eased. In order to sustain it’s economic development, China have to keep stable relationship with international community and such intention also affects China’s positions and practices on confidence building measures (CBMs). Besides, to ease the concerns of other countries about “China threat”, China has been enthusiastically concluding many CBMs agreements with other countries and group of countries by advocating new security concept and cooperative patterns. However, the measures which China took still think inside the box of national strategies. The features of China’s CBMs can be summarized as follow: 1) setting up political statement, 2) enhancing informal patterns, 3) developing bilateral and multilateral relationship simultaneously, 4) advancing step by step. To maintain its best interests, China’s CBMs establishment with Russia, central Asia countries, India, USA and Japan is based on four dimensions: 1. military strategy: to ease the concerns of other countries about China threat. 2. economic strategy: to protect primary economic interests, and to create a suitable economic development environment. 3. security strategy: to constrain the rise of separationism. 4. energy strategy: to assure the security of supply line and supply. With the rapidly rising of China’s national power, the strengths of economy and military power have gradually tilted to in favor of China. It’s important to put efforts on how to establish CBMs between both sides under the prerequisite of security across the Taiwan Strait. However, there still exist differences on the issues of definition of “one China,” perception of sovereignty, and perception of threat between Taiwan and the Mainland. Close cross-strait contacts on all aspects over the years have produced structural changes in cross-strait relations, and this has given opportunities for both sides to achieve peace. Based on the research findings, I suggest that, how to establish CBMs between both sides through “enhancing political will”, “indentifying responsible institution”, “establishing research units and databases”, “adopting defense strategies” and “obtaining support from the US” by the Taiwan government should be the priority in the current stage. In the meanwhile, the planning of establishing thinking tank and the effects caused by military imbalance of cross-strait should be put into evaluation by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan.

In the presidential system of government in the United States, the President’s party has on more than one occasion been reduced to a minority in the federal legislature. The US President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives—the leader of the majority party—had often found themselves clashing on matters of policy, legislation, and executive action. This essay makes a careful selection of five House Speakers in the post-1945 period, all belonging to the ‘other party’, and explores their relations with the Presidents of their times. Out of these, only Newt Gingrich succeeded in dividing the government as never before, demonstrating that the House Speaker had the capacity to stall government altogether, something even a ‘Leader of the Opposition’ in a parliamentary system can never do.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the causes and possible consequences of the fourth security crisis in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. House Speaker N. Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022 marked a point of no return in US - China relations. Beijing did not succumb to provocation and deliberately did not allow the diplomatic crisis to turn into a military-political phase. China clearly understands the potential risks of a military, political and economic escalation of the conflict with Washington, while external forces would inevitably be involved into it. At the same time, the Chinese leadership has demonstrated its readiness to give a commensurate response to the crises in all spheres of modern international relations.

After post-Mao reforms, China has achieved a phenomenal growth record. Its real GDP increases with an average of 9% every year. Behind this achievement is China's ”advantage combinations”-including cheap labor force, various preferential policies, foreign investments & technology, catching-up managerial staff, heavy investments in infrastructures, and increasingly expanding domestic markets-all tempting businessmen around the world who come to invest China. Such economic base then empowers China, enabling the regime to employ economic leverage for its unification agenda. Such strategy imperils Taiwan's political autonomy and also leaves the island in a dilemma of ”economic prosperity” and ”national security.” In this paper, we argue against that thesis, claiming that there is no direct incompatibility between Taiwan's economic interests and political dignity. Even given the asymmetric economic interdependence, China's economic leverage may not work that effectively as been wished. On the contrary, Taiwan is able to make best use of its ”unexploited market power,” such as deploying its investments in China's strategic sectors and/or alternating compromises and confrontations for better deals with China. In this way, China has to bear much heavier costs when using force against Taiwan. The tension of military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait is thus alleviated and Taiwan's status in this asymmetric interdependence is improved.

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