DIPLOMACY'S FUNCTION IN GUARANTEEING NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY

This study examines the transformation of Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations from a foundation rooted in historical and cultural affinity into a multidimensional strategic alliance shaped by energy cooperation, defense collaboration, and economic integration. Beginning with energy diplomacy in the 1990s and the implementation of landmark projects such as the BTC and TANAP pipelines, bilateral relations evolved through Azerbaijan's substantial investments in Türkiye. The analysis also highlights the intensification of military cooperation, particularly after the Second Karabakh War, culminating in the signing of the 2021 Shusha Declaration. This agreement institutionalized collaboration across military, economic, political, and technological domains.the two states have established a comprehensive alliance that enhances regional security, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy. The research underscores the role of these interconnected sectors in elevating Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations to a robust model of bilateral cooperation in the South Caucasus and the greater Eurasian region.

Energy is critical for assuring quality of life and underpins the attainment of the internationally agreed United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development. Countries from the Central Asia region, specifically Kazakhstan, will by 2050 need to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels from over 80% to around 50% in order for them to achieve significant negative carbon emissions thus abide by agreed international limits. However, Kazakhstan lacks the capacity to undertake such a transition alone. International support from major nations and organisations would play a vital role in energy transition of Kazakhstan. By using policy documents on renewable energy projects and databases on auction-based energy projects over the last ten years, this article aims to analyse the existing international cooperation in sustainable energy between Kazakhstan and China, as well as with United Nations. The article argues that China and the United Nations play unique and critical roles in supporting sustainable energy security in Kazakhstan. The former as a “helper” of energy transition and exporter of technologies, techniques and capital to Kazakhstan provides support through business know-how and, most importantly, investments. The latter brings together international partners for capacity building through policy support and consulting of government. Both are essential in forming an equitable sustainable energy paradigm through iENERGY model (interconnectivity, interplay, intelligent) to achieve the respective climate and energy targets. A further deepening of ties through iENERGY model could serve as an international standard and example of cooperation in energy transition and it could bring long-term prosperity in sustainable economic growth, political stability, and energy security for Central Asian region and China.

张 弛 【摘要】本文探讨中国能源安全的海外风险并提出对策建议。中国能源安全的主要矛盾是供应安全，关键在于以可承受的价格获得充足的能源供应，可进一步分解为两个要素：一是以合适的价格购买到能源；二是充足、不间断的能源进口。相应地，中国能源安全的海外风险突出表现在国际油价攀升和进口运输安全两方面。在维护能源安全的对策上，现实主义和新自由主义的能源安全观各有长处和不足，应立足中国国情进行扬弃，具体要做好三方面工作，即能源外交、军力发展和战略石油储备。 This article discusses the overseas risks to China’s energy security and provides suggestions for how to safeguard China’s energy security. The key to China’s energy security is supply security. This means obtaining enough and continued energy supply at affordable prices which can be divided into two factors: one is purchasing energy at reasonable prices; the other is having uninterrupted energy import. Accordingly, the major overseas challenges to China’s energy security are the surging international oil prices and the problem of safeguarding energy imports. There are both merits and shortcomings to the energy security concept of realism and that of neo-liberalism. Suggestions for how to secure China’s energy supply should be based on China’s conditions as well as a critique of the two theoretical perspectives and should include three aspects: energy diplomacy, military development and strategic oil reserves.

China's energy security is of interest to outsiders for three principal reasons. First, China's growing demand for oil has an immediate as well as long-term economic impact on the rest of the world. China is already becoming a major force in world energy markets. As is well known, China's oil imports have grown markedly in the past decade or so. This raises the question of how much oil China (and India) will need to import twenty years from now and of how quickly the world's oil reserves will be depleted if China's economic growth and its need for imported oil continue. A mere fourteen years ago China was self-sufficient in oil; today, with imports of nearly 3 million bar­rels per day (mbd), it is the world's third largest importer of crude oil after the United States (nearly 14 mbd) and Japan (over 5 mbd).2 If China's rapid economic growth continues, China will need to import 60–80 per cent of its total domestic oil consumption by 2020, anywhere from 6 to 11 million barrels per day.3 China's increasing need for foreign oil has also been blamed for rises in oil prices and volatility in the global oil spot market .4

Indonesia faces significant challenges in meeting its growing energy demand while seeking clean, sustainable, and safe energy sources. Nuclear energy is emerging as a potential alternative, supported by the country's substantial uranium reserves. However, nuclear energy development in Indonesia faces various obstacles, including public concerns regarding safety, nuclear non-proliferation issues, and high construction costs. This research aims to analyze the role of Indonesia's energy diplomacy in promoting nuclear energy to the public and internal stakeholders as a solution to improve national energy security. Qualitative research methods were used to evaluate Indonesia's internal diplomatic and promotional efforts, including document analysis and content analysis. The study examined Indonesia's bilateral and multilateral cooperation strategies, as well as its participation in international forums such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while focusing on domestic education and socialization efforts. A key focus was identifying challenges, opportunities, and best practices in nuclear energy diplomacy and internal promotional campaigns. The research findings highlighted the importance of comprehensive public education, strengthening international cooperation, and implementing strict safety standards in nuclear energy development. Strategic measures identified include strengthening diplomatic capacity, improving transparency and communication with domestic stakeholders, and developing national nuclear technology and regulation capacity. The research concludes that by addressing these challenges through effective energy diplomacy and structured internal promotion, Indonesia can improve its public acceptance and nuclear energy development prospects. This has the potential to ensure the safe, responsible, and sustainable utilization of nuclear energy to meet the country's long-term energy needs and contribute to global efforts in climate change mitigation

This chapter examines the changes in Qatar’s energy sector that began prior to the blockade, when the key decision to lift a moratorium on new gas exploration in the North Field was taken, and accelerated in December 2018 with the Qatari withdrawal from OPEC and its decision to prioritize the further expansion of its natural gas reserves. The chapter places energy within the context of the blockade, and analyzes why Qatari policymakers ringfenced the Dolphin pipeline to the UAE and Oman from the rupture in political and economic relations, a move that reinforced the post-blockade effort to portray Qatar as a reliable, rule-of-law partner and responsible member of the international community. The chapter ends with a section that explores how Qatari ‘energy diplomacy’ has evolved since 2017 as Qatar Petroleum entered into a plethora of joint ventures with international partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Banten Sultanate was a pre-Indonesian Islamic kingdom from the 16th to early 19th centuries. Banten developed as a kingdom based on trade, its main commodity being pepper. In the 17th century, pepper became a spice with high value, so Banten used it as a diplomatic tool apart from being a trade commodity. As the destination of many foreign traders, it encouraged Banten to communicate with several kingdoms. Through historical research methods and a literature review, this article attempts to see diplomacy as one of the political activities of pre-Indonesian kingdoms. As a result, it can be seen that the Banten Sultanate carried out its diplomatic activities with several kingdoms, for example, Mecca (Ottoman), the Netherlands, England, Denmark, and France. This activity can be known from Banten's correspondence with the foreign kingdom and is supported by the chronicle narrative as colonial historiography. In this activity, the sultan of Banten often included several gifts, one of which was a large amount of pepper. Therefore, letters and other manuscripts can show Banten's position in diplomacy with other kingdoms, and pepper has an important role.

It is a truism that Northeast Asian states could benefit very much if they were to cooperate in the energy security realm. However, to many, especially economists, their behaviour to this common sense solution has been bewildering: there has been simply no progress towards this end and it still remains a puzzle, even to many energy specialists. This article attempts to answer a simple question: Why do the Northeast Asian states, namely China, Japan, Korea, and Russia, not cooperate? For its analysis, the author of the article relies on content analysis of recently released official governmental long-term energy policy and strategy documents of these states, and notes that cooperation for energy security reasons at the regional level is conspicuously absent, which possibly implies a lack of desire and willingness to do so amongst themselves. The article, however, deliberately omits from its study Korea, simply because no such long-term energy policy exists today. It attributes the major cause to the strong propensity by energy specialists to interchangeably use the concepts of ‘energy cooperation’ and ‘energy security’ in their analysis.

Energy security, as an essential dimension of national security, is deeply intertwined with economic, social, and geopolitical dynamics and represents one of the most pressing challenges facing the Western Balkan region at both national and supranational levels. At the national level, energy security is strongly connected to political stability and economic resilience, while at the supranational level, it is tied to the region's ongoing process of European integration. The Western Balkans face a complex and interdependent set of challenges in achieving energy security and sustainability, situated within the broader context of the European Union's Green Deal and the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans. This paper examines the evolving relationship between energy security, environmental sustainability, and regional cooperation, noting how certain structural and institutional limitations within the Western Balkan countries may slow the pace of the green transition. The study identifies key vulnerabilities in national energy systems while assessing the degree of alignment with EU climate objectives and the 2050 carbon neutrality target. The findings reveal that despite modest improvements in renewable energy integration, the Western Balkan region remains highly dependent on fossil fuels, particularly coal, and vulnerable to fluctuations in energy imports, which together hinder progress toward decarbonization and long-term stability. Strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms, alongside transparent and predictable regulatory frameworks, emerges as a prerequisite for advancing both energy security and sustainability. The paper concludes that achieving the 2050 climate neutrality objective will remain highly challenging for the Western Balkans unless regional cooperation is significantly strengthened and aligned with broader European efforts.

The global shift towards renewable energy has necessitated a strategic reevaluation of national energy policies, especially in resource-dependent economies like Nigeria. This study explores Nigeria’s approach to negotiating the energy transition through strategic alliances in the renewable energy sector. It examines how Nigeria leverages bilateral and multilateral partnerships to attract foreign direct investment, transfer green technology, and build institutional capacity for a low-carbon future. Drawing from energy transition theories and green diplomacy frameworks, the paper analyzes collaborations with international partners such as Germany, China, and the United Nations Sustainable Energy for All initiative. It also evaluates the role of public–private partnerships and policy reforms in fostering a conducive environment for renewable energy development. The findings reveal that while Nigeria uses energy as a diplomatic tool particularly in West Africa, Renewable energy is still treated as a development or technical issue, rather than a strategic domain of soft power ostensibly due to challenges such as domestic institutional fragmentation and bargaining weakness, policy inconsistency and regulatory uncertainty and weak institutional capacity and bureaucratic inefficiencies and geopolitical interests remain critical impediments. The paper concludes by recommending institutional reforms, renewable energy laws and formal training programs and sustained diplomatic engagement as pathways for effective energy transition.

2nd ASEAN International Conference on Energy and Environment (AICEE) Cambodia, Hybrid, 14-15 September 2022 Accelerating Clean Energy Transition to Enhance Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability in ASEANIntroductionASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) is an intergovernmental organisation within ASEAN structure that represents the 10 ASEAN Member States’ (AMS) interests in the energy sector. With their growing population and economic growth, AMS are expected to be a new global epicentrum of energy market in the future. This trend pushes energy security as one of the highest priorities in energy development in the region.On the other hand, the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) Phase II: 2021-2025, a regional blueprint on energy cooperation, has a theme and sub-theme in which embracing energy transition is one of the key elements to achieve regional energy security and environmental sustainability.Therefore, the concerns on energy security and sustainability call for collaborative planning and action between energy and climate change policymakers, scholars, and businesses, to find common ground and ensure success in both areas. Energy and climate experts sometimes work in their own chambers and have limited interaction with each other. To bridge the chamber and pave the way forward, the short-run target of energy security and the long-run target of sustainability should be reconciled within the framework of the energy transition. During the energy transition, a mixture of fossil fuels and renewable energy that maximizes economic growth and minimizes emissions might be preferable. The optimal road map to decarbonization and shift to low carbon energy should also be developed.To help accelerating the energy transition, improve intersectoral collaboration and connect academia with policymakers and business sector, the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Institute of Technology of Cambodia (ITC) as the academe partner held the 2nd ASEAN International Conference on Energy and Environment (AICEE) in conjunction with the ASEAN Energy Business Forum (AEBF) 2022 and the 40th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM). The 2nd AICEE was in partnership with the Kyoto University, Japan, Japan-ASEAN Science, Technology, and Innovation Platform (JASTIP), and the International Society for Sustainable Future of Human Security (SustaiN Society), and support of the National Energy Technology Center (ENTEC), Thailand. This year, the 2nd AICEE was held in collaboration with the 8th International Conference on Sustainable Future for Human Security (The 8th SustaiN).List of Theme, Topic, Key Dates, Participants, Agenda, Steering Committee, Scientific Committee, Organizing Committee, Documentation, Conference Agenda are available in the pdf.

Brazilian energy diplomacy intensified from 2003 to 2010. In this case, this intensification was related to the structure of more convergent preferences of Itamaraty—Brazil's Foreign Ministry—other related ministries, and agencies with foreign government preferences for engagement in energy security and/or integration. Co-extensive with these preferences were those of most Brazilian domestic actors on the diversification of the state's energy supplies, enhancement of access to markets or reserves, stimulus for sustainable production and use—mainly in developing states—and strengthening of strategic international partnerships—mostly with developed states—for training and the competitive insertion in the international market.

From geopolitical point of view, this thesis aims to probe into China’s energy security and energy cooperation with ASEAN, intricacies and challenges between them along the process, as well as the future trend. With 6% of its total oil consumption coming from foreign countries, China, for the first time, has become a net importer of crude oil in 1993. In 2004, it overtook Japan to become the world ' s second - largest consumer of oil while it shared 20.3% of global energy consumption and 55.2% of oil dependency, became the biggest user of oil in 2010, ahead of the U.S. Although being abundant in natural resources, such as oil, gas, coal and water supplies, ASEAN has greater demands for energy due to rapid economic growth. Therefore, energy inefficiency in the region is inevitable. Along with China and ASEAN’s enormous needs for resources, their respective strategies in energy have to be altered accordingly. Mutual trust and energy cooperation mechanism, such as strategic dialogue in economy, investment and fields of cooperation, have to be strengthened. In respect of energy security, China has to maintain stable relationship with ASEAN. Even though both sides have reached successful achievement in political and economic alliance, they, undeniably, are annoyed by other concerns like sovereignty and resource distribution issues in the South China Sea areas, which may pose threat to their diplomatic relationship and undermine future energy cooperation.

This article analyzes Japan's ambitious 2050 net-zero emissions target and its effects on energy security with a primary focus on the strategic role of hydrogen technology Japan's energy security dilemma lies in its dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power, and the challenges of transitioning to renewable energy sources. Understanding how Japan's 2050 Net-Zero Vision shapes its foreign and security policies is essential, especially as hydrogen technology plays a central role in these changes. This work posits that while Japan's hydrogen ambitions offer promise, the challenge of balancing energy security with net-zero goals is complex. The high costs of hydrogen production and ongoing reliance on fossil fuels complicate Japan's energy transition and international energy partnerships. The article employs a political economy framework to evaluate the feasibility and practicality of Japan's hydrogen-centric energy strategy, taking into account both domestic policy implications and its impact on global alliances. Why environmental and climate security is often secondary to economic security in energy discussions requires further examination. The article presents theoretical perspectives on the reduction of fossil fuel dependence, the enhancement of energy self-sufficiency, and the advancement of technologies that can mitigate long-term vulnerabilities. Hydrogen plays a pivotal role in Japan's energy and climate agenda, serving as a cornerstone for both domestic objectives and international collaboration. Furthermore, the article analyses Japan's hydrogen collaborations with ASEAN and Middle Eastern countries, along with the geopolitical and economic implications. This study identifies the opportunities and challenges in Japan's transition to new energy sources and examines the broader implications of Japan's energy security for global energy dynamics. The article maps the scope of major challenges Japan faces in balancing its net-zero targets—a critical issue for both regional and global policy—while ensuring its energy security.

The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT, signed in 1994, entered into force in 1998) occupies its objective (economically justified) place within the evolving international energy governance system, in particular within the evolving system of ‘investor-state’ investment-protection mechanisms (i.e. for international energy producing companies vs. resource-owning host states). This system has been developing since the Middle Ages, starting from the colonies (which since the beginning of the industrial revolution provided security in raw materials supply for the metropolitan states from their foreign territories), through initially territory-oriented ‘traditional’ concessions (since 1901), which were later modified to project-oriented ‘modernized’ concessions (since 1948), PSAs and risk-service contracts (since the 1960s), etc., which gave birth to different instruments of investment protection/stimulation in the domestic/national law, both in the mother countries of the energy investors and in the resource-owning sovereign host-states. The growth of international trade and investment, including in energy, in the 20th century gave birth to the development of international (first bilateral, then multilateral) instruments of trade and investment protection/stimulation. Firstly, the net of bilateral instruments was evolved (first in trade, then in investment): DTTs (since the 1920s) and BITs (since 1959). The rocketing increase in their numbers due to radical changes in the political map, mostly in Europe, in the 1990s, stimulated the development of multilateral trade and investment treaties as risk-mitigation instruments for international flows of energy trade and investments, mostly between West and East in Eurasia and primarily (at its birth) between the dissolving USSR/FSU and the enlarging EU. The ECT has become the first multilateral treaty of its kind to secure the ongoing cross-border energy flows (with an increase in the importance of its transit component) from the East to the West to be balanced for mutual benefit by the yet-to-be-developed investment flows from the West to the East. Today the Energy Charter Treaty is still the only energy-specific multilateral instrument of international law, being a culmination of the long-run development (evolution) of investment and trade protection mechanisms in international energy. It seems that within the EU the ECT has been always considered as an external energy policy instrument of the EU. Despite the generally widespread perception that it was Russia who had lost its interest in the ECT (especially after the ‘YUKOS case’ from 2004 onwards), which culminated with the withdrawal of Russia from its provisional application to the ECT in 2009 and the accompanying statement of the Russian Government that it had no intention to ratify the ECT, the EU who began to lose interest in the ECT from the time of the adoption of the EU Second Energy Package in 2003 and with the increasing objective legal conflict between the ECT and the EU Energy acquis. This conflict has resulted in an increasing number of investor-state disputes (based on ECT Art. 26) by investors from the EU member states (which are all ECT Contracting Parties) against corresponding EU governments, finally culminating with the withdrawal of Italy from the ECT (2016). So the ECT has passed through different periods of importance in Russia-EU energy relations – from high priority in the 1990s with the peak of mutual interest in 2002 (when the finalization of the draft multilateral Transit Protocol to the ECT – still not reached – had begun), to diminishing importance since then, though for different reasons for both parties, through the 2000s – despite growing interest in the ECT by other participants in the international energy community beyond Russia and the EU, which culminated in the signing of the International Energy Charter (additional and complementary to the European Energy Charter) in May 2015. With the growing importance of the international campaign against energy poverty, and a possible change in the key paradigm of international energy development (from perceived peak supply to peak demand), when the dominant trends in international energy governance will most probably be changing from access to non-renewable energy (natural) resources to access to capital, financial resources, innovations, minimization of the negative environmental impact of energy investments/development, the new role of the ECT and its expanded version on the basis of the International Energy Charter and the following instruments might again attract the practical attention of the political and business elites in both EU and Russia to this energy-specific multilateral instrument of international law, most probably, not yet – but within next political cycles.