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Previous articleNext article FreeDiscussionPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreThe authors started by thanking both discussants. They agreed with Robert Hall’s assessment that the paper contains two distinct parts but slightly disagreed on their characterization. They viewed the first part as proposing a mechanism for the propagation of a financial crisis and its effect on interest rates. The second part proposes a mechanism for the endogenous persistence of financial crises. The authors clarified that their paper focuses on persistence, whereas both discussants mostly focused on propagation. The authors argued that they opted for a simple yet quantitatively realistic propagation mechanism based on liquidity constraints. Their emphasis is on a novel persistence mechanism and its ability to explain a decrease in riskless interest rates over an extended period of time. Their persistence mechanism relies solely on agents not knowing the true distribution of shocks and estimating it over time.Gregory Mankiw spoke next and asked the authors why they focused specifically on the recent financial crisis instead of taking a more general approach. He suggested that they could study other related episodes, including the Great Depression and the Great Moderation. Several participants proposed alternative approaches to validate the authors’ mechanism. Gita Gopinath suggested looking at disasters in emerging markets. Valerie Ramey recommended investigating the response of land prices to earthquakes. Emmanuel Farhi proposed studying a broader class of assets and analyzing whether their behavior is consistent with the prediction of the authors’ theory. He suggested looking into the cross-section of stocks and exchange rates during and following the Great Recession. The authors were sympathetic to these suggestions. They explained that they could not extend their analysis to the Great Depression due to data limitations.Mankiw pointed out that real rates have decreased over time since the Great Depression, whereas the authors’ persistence mechanism would predict a recovery following the initial decrease. The authors confirmed that their mechanism would indeed predict such a recovery but noted that real rates are affected by other factors outside the scope of their analysis. Robert Gordon followed up on the issue and questioned the existence of a secular decline in real interest rates. He argued that inspecting the series for real rates from the 1980s onward is misleading, referring to a plot displayed by Hall during his discussion. Gordon noted that the 1980s were times of tight monetary policy and easy fiscal policy, which led to high real interest rates. He added that real interest rates were actually low in the 1960s due to surprise inflation during the Vietnam War and in the 1970s due to an oil supply shock. Gordon suggested that notion of a secular decline in real interest rates may become obsolete over the next 5 years.Andrea Eisfeldt followed up on the question of rare disasters and referred to the work of Tyler Muir (“Financial Crises and Risk Premia,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 2 [2017]: 765–809). Using a large cross-section of countries and a long time series, Muir documents that bond spreads respond to bank net worth shocks but not to wars or other events affecting consumption growth or the capital stock. Eisfeldt noted that this finding suggests that the response of bond spreads to leverage shocks may be muted. On the other hand, she raised the possibility that shocks to the collateral value of banks could have a sizable effect. The authors were very receptive to Eisfeldt’s suggestion. They added that the response of spreads to an increase in perceived tail risk is quite modest in their model. The reason for this small response is that firms deleverage when credit risk increases. Eisfeldt noted that a friction to deleveraging would be required to obtain a larger effect.The rest of the discussion focused on the nature of belief formation in the authors’ model. Michael Woodford was very sympathetic to the idea that observing unusual events affects agents’ beliefs about the probability of tail risk. He viewed the authors’ evidence on options prices as compelling in this respect. Woodford was more skeptical, though, that the authors’ simple model of learning could capture important features of the belief formation process. He emphasized that the size of the data set that agents use to form their expectations plays a critical role. Woodford noted that if this data set expands over time, agents will infer the true distribution of shocks asymptotically, so surprises about this distribution eventually disappear. He concluded that the window must be of finite length for the authors’ mechanisms to be present in the long run. In Woodford’s opinion, a window of fixed length wouldn’t be particularly relevant either. As an example, he noted that prior to the Great Recession many economists assumed data prior to World War II was no longer relevant for assessing risks for the US economy, invoking policy and institutional changes. After the Great Recession, however, there was a renewed interest in the profession in the Great Depression and its policy lessons. Woodford argued that it is important to endogenize the window used for belief formation.Pierre-Olivier Weill seconded Woodford’s point and suggested that the natural next step would be a model of attention choice, where agents choose which episodes to consider when forming their beliefs. Wendy Edelberg noted that agents’ beliefs may overshoot in response to a tail event. This response is not captured in the authors’ model. She raised the possibility that this mechanism could decrease the degree of persistence in their model, as agents realize that their beliefs are incorrect. Martin Eichenbaum added that there is strong evidence of generational effects: old households put a lower weight on new observations when forming beliefs, relative to young households. Eichenbaum provided two examples: heterogeneity in inflation expectations by age and in risk taking in the financial industry between those who experienced the 2007–8 crisis and those who did not.In response to Woodford, the authors said they saw a virtue in considering a modest deviation from rational expectation and showing that it yields a substantially different response to rare events. They added that they also performed an exercise in which they discounted the weights on observations by 1% a year, which may capture the generational effect mentioned by Eichenbaum.Eichenbaum concluded the general discussion by inviting researchers to be less apologetic about deviating from rational expectations. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by NBER Macroeconomics Annual Volume 332018 Sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/700913 © 2019 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. 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