Does Ownership Structure Influence Firm Value? Evidence from India

EUGENE FAMA and Michael Jensen's treatment of the "Separation of Ownership and Control" is both insightful and informative. It deepens our understanding of corporate control, and the analysis of residual claimants usefully extends the economics of internal organization to include partnerships, mutuals, nonprofits, and the like. The basic argument is this: specialized governance structures arise in response to the efficiency needs of each type of organization. This is an important argument and one with which I broadly concur. They couple this, however, with a strong suggestion that these structures have reached a high degree of refinement-on which account there is not now, if indeed there ever has been, an organization control problem with which scholars and others are legitimately concerned. On this point I have grave doubts. My discussion of the paper addresses three issues: What is the relation, if any, of the hierarchical organization of the firm to economic performance? What relation, if any, does residual claimant status have to the composition and character of the board of directors? And is there now or has there ever been a corporate control problem? I deal with each of these issues in order.

This study implies that diffuse ownership structure negatively affects firm performance. Our study based on empirical evidence found that the ownership structure (the outsider and the insider i.e. managerial ownership) favorably increase the firm performance. Our sample data was based on 200 Malaysian companies listed on the Malaysian stock exchange Bursa Malaysia. We used Tobin’s Q and accounting rate of return for firm performance measurement and compared it with important ownership structure and managerial ownership structure. Our results indicate that both ownership structures have a positive relationship with firm performance.

The study aims to investigate the moderating role of accounting conservatism in the relation between ownership structure and firm performance of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms. The sample of the study consisted of 215 firms from six GCC countries during the period 2013–2015. Ownership structure was determined through three dimensions: ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership. As for performance, it was measured by two variables: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q. The study used A panel regression and concluded that accounting conservatism plays a positive role in reducing the negative impact of ownership concentration on firm performance and consolidate the positive role of managerial and institutional ownerships in firm performance. The increase of accounting conservatism in the financial reports of GCC firms reduced asymmetrical information and the intensity of agency problems, besides providing credibility to investors in financial reports.

PurposeTaking hints from the lacunas in the field of ownership structure and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of the firms in India, especially when the moderating effect of certain corporate governance mechanism comes into play, this study aims to attempt to fulfill the gap by exploring the ownership structure of the firm (i.e. foreign ownership, institutional ownership and government ownership) and the CSR performance of the firm, when moderated by board independence of the firm. In an additional analysis, the study explores the non-linear effect of foreign ownership structure on the CSR performance in the Indian context.Design/methodology/approachThe study incorporates a strongly balanced panel data set of 280 non-financial National Stock Exchange 500 listed firms for the study period of 2013–2019. The study uses both static and Arellano–Bond dynamic panel model under generalized method of moments (GMMs) framework to establish the relationship between the studied variables.FindingsThe study acknowledges a positive impact of the foreign investors in the CSR performance of Indian firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board. The study further finds a contrarian role of government ownership in Indian context among the sampled firms. The study also in its extended analysis finds a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership (FO) and the CSR performance, which shows that FO positively impacts the CSR performance until a threshold level of 34% after which the curve starts declining.Practical implicationsOne of the major implications this study provides for the corporate policymakers is that the firms with a string penchant for philanthropic activities such as CSR should be concerned with attracting more foreign investors in their shareholding. Also, a higher proportion of independent directors on the board boost the engagement of the firm in CSR works.Originality/valueThe moderating effect of board independence in the ownership structure–CSR relationship attempted by this study is a rare attempt in a developing economy, such as India, and offers a fresh dimension to the study. Also, the non-linearity relationship between FO and the CSR performance and the threshold level providing the twofold effect of the variables is an innovative research attempt, especially in regard to a developing country like India.

The aims of this study was to obtain empirical evidence of how ownership structure ie institutional and managerial ownership affect firm performance. The study also examine the moderating role of tax avoidance on the effect of institutional and managerial ownerships on firm performance. A model was developed and tested using sample of 58 manufactured companies from 2012 to 2014, which is listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange. Data were collected and analyzed using least square regression and moderated regression analisys. The result showed that institutional ownership and managerial oenrrship affect firm performance. This study also showed that tax avoidance moderates the effect of both institutional and managerial ownership on firm performance.Keywords: Institutional Ownership, managerial ownership, tax avoidance, firm performance

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) are the activities of firms that are not only considered for economic profit but also include the social welfare returns. To find the key drivers that affect the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm performance, we investigated the moderating effects of CEO power and ownership structure. Ownership structure is classified into two parts: managerial ownership and ownership concentration. We selected a sample of firms from eight manufacturing sectors of the Pakistani economy for the analysis. We collected data from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), and companies’ annual reports over the period 2008 to 2017. We employed the Fixed Effects model and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) to investigate the association between CSR and firm performance. The empirical analysis of this study highlights the following conclusions: First, CSR has a significant positive association with firm performance. Second, the relationship between CSR and firm performance shows the same results with the interaction of CEO power. Thirdly, interaction of the managerial ownership with CSR has a significant positive relationship with firm performance. Fourth, the interaction of the ownership concentration with CSR has a positive effect on firm performance.

The aim of this comparative study between the French and American markets, characterized by a different ownership structure is to examine the relationship between managerial ownership, the board of directors, the equity-based compensation and corporate performance. Regardless of the selected sample, we found on the one hand, a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance and on the other hand, in the case of managerial entrenchment board of directors is a substitute for managerial ownership to solve the agency problem. In addition, stock-based compensation is non-linear function with managerial ownership, contrary to previous studies that assume a monotonous or non-significant relationship. The hypothesis of endogeneity is valid only in the American case. This result leads us to believe that the U.S. CEO has a preference to hold a large percentage of shares of firms that generate a good performance to neutralize capital market monitoring. Our study is exclusive in terms of the effect of managerial ownership on corporate performance in terms of comparison between two markets, characterized by a difference in ownership structure. We determine the impact of equity compensation on the one hand, the managerial ownership where all the studies assume either a monotone or neutral relationship between these two variables and on the other hand, the effect of board in the alignment or managerial entrenchment cases.

Purpose : The study was carried out to produce empirical evidence to examine the relationship among corporate governance (CG) parameters, ownership structure, and corporate performance.Methodology : CG parameters included board size, CEO duality, board meetings attended, board busyness, and audit committee size and its independence. The ownership of the structure was determined by insider, foreign, and institutional ownership. A sample of 500 NSE-listed firms was selected for the study. Data analysis was conducted using STATA 17 and SPSS 25. Before conducting the regression analysis, the study undertook a series of diagnostic tests to ensure the reliability, robustness, and validity of both the dataset and the econometric models employed.Findings : The findings indicated that CG variables and ownership structure had a positive impact on firm performance. To elaborate, CEO duality ; board meetings attended ; board busyness ; audit committee size ; and insider, foreign, and institutional ownership were found to have a positive impact on performance. However, neither board size nor audit committee independence established any influence.Practical Implications : Companies may adapt their governance structures and diversity initiatives to enhance their competitive advantage and long-term sustainability. This study emphasized the importance of enhancing corporate governance (CG) and strengthening laws to achieve better firm performance in emerging markets. Additionally, the interests of insiders, as well as those of foreign and institutional investors, must be aligned with the company to support long-term wealth creation.Originality : Instead of utilizing the standard system found in the literature, we relied on a single-measure structure that incorporated a variety of CG parameters and ownership.

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Kuwait

This research investigates the effect of corporate governance through ownership structures; ownership concentration, managerial ownership and government ownership on firm performance. A multiple regression analysis was employed on sample data collected over ten years from 2001-2010 from 80 South African companies to test the magnitude of their influence to company performance as measured by return on assets (ROA). This study found a positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration, government ownership and firm performance. Results also showed a negative relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. To this account, the research concludes that managerial ownership is a single factor that significantly weighs down company performance. In validating the significance of the performance determinance model, evidence shows that companies that maintain the recommended King Report shareholding structure have an average to above average performance. Hence, corporate governance is a critical catalyst for company performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board structure on performance in VC-backed firms. Using 106 French VC-backed firms, our methodology in this paper is to estimate four equations. A regression analysis is then used to study the impact of ownership structure and board structure on performance and also to analyze whether ownership structure (ownership concentration, director ownership, venture capital ownership and employee ownership) and board variables (size, outside directors, COE-chairman duality, proportion of VC directors, proportion of employee directors and board meeting frequency) are significant determinants of VC-backed firm performance. Results indicate a strong positive relation between ownership concentration and performance and between director ownership and performance measured by ROE. And strong negative relation between ownership concentration and performance and between director ownership and performance measured by ROA. No strong relation was found between venture-capital ownership, employee ownership and firm performance. Results show also a strong negative relation between board size and performance measured by ROE and positive relation between board size and performance measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and MVA. The proportion of independent outside directors on the board was positively associated with ROE and negatively associated with ROA. The presence of a dual leadership structure is negatively associated with ROE and positively associated with ROA. No strong relation was found between the proportion of venture-capital in board, the presence of employee in board, or board meeting frequency and firm performance.

Highly concentrated ownership structure is a common feature in most developing countries including Malaysia. Such feature contributed to a significant decline in many performance indicators during the Asian financial crisis 1997/98. The main purpose of this paper is to explore developments in ownership structure and firm performance of Malaysian listed companies and their impact on firm performance. A quantitative approach was adopted to collect secondary data from annual reports of 369 listed Malaysia companies that are exist over the period of 2003 to 2013. In this study ownership structure has been measured using three indicators; the government ownership, local nominee and foreign nominee. While return on asset (ROA) and earnings per share (EPS) were the two criteria used to measure firm performance. The results of the study revealed that there are not much changes in the ownership structure and firm performance in Malaysia over the period of 2002 to 2013. It can be concluded economic development of the country does not much influence the ownership structure of listed companies in Malaysia..

<h1>Abstract</h1><p>This study aims to offer a comprehensive description of the relevant literature that related to the association between the ownership structures namely, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership and firm performance. Ownership structure is among the corporate governance primary mechanisms. Ownership structure has been a target of many analysts and scholars alike for few decades but there is a lack of prior studies that examined these relationships in the developing countries. Additionally, there is few studies were trying to examine these factors together with firm performance in the developed countries but there is a rare research to test this association in the developing countries. So, the main objective of this study is to bridge this gap and try to enrich existing literature review. As we know, the ownership is to play a significant role to enhance performance through offer encouragement both in public and foreign investors to invest without concern on future risk. Moreover, it provides investors’ confidence to continue for achieving their target. Finally, this study offers many future recommendations as explained.</p>

This paper applies a more robust methodology in industry-adjustment on measuring firm performance as related to ownership structure. We consider insider ownership, institutional ownership, and blockholder ownership. Even after controlling for the endogeneity of insider ownership, we still find positive effect of insider ownership on firm performance, which is conflicting with results found by other recent studies. We find a non-linearity in the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance, but our results do not support a relationship as neat as the inverse U-shape effect found by earlier studies. Our results indicate that the effects of the insider and square of insider on performance are positive, yet the effect of the cubic of insider ownership on firm performance is negative. As no other study based on U.S. data used the cubic of insider ownership and document its effect, our finding is new. We find strong negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm performance, and our results indicate that institutional investors are efficient monitors whose existence helps improving firm value and protecting outside minority shareholders.

This thesis investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of 2,120 publicly traded European companies. The question of whether this relation should be positive or negative has been the subject of a wide-ranging discussion and was addressed by many researchers. Of particular interest have been management, family, and employee owners. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature, and empirical studies on European companies are scarce. Utilising data from the European Federation of Employee Share Ownership (EFES) and the Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database, this relation is analysed using multiple linear regression with continuous and categorical predictors. The results show that firms having a management owner concentration up to strategic levels report a significantly higher Tobin’s Q than firms having a no or no significant management concentration. The same effect holds true for family owners and employee owners. Measuring the ownership structure as the fraction of shares of the largest shareholder does not yield a significant effect and highlights the value of management, family, and employee owners. Keywords: Ownership concentration; family ownership; management ownership; employee ownership; firm performance.