Dynamic Event-Based Model Predictive Control for Networked Systems with Hybrid Cyber Attacks

Smart grids (SGs) are becoming increasingly complex with the integration of communication, protection, and automation technologies. However, this digital transformation has introduced new vulnerabilities, especially false data injection attacks (FDIAs) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. FDIAs can subtly corrupt measurement data, misleading operators without triggering traditional bad data detection (BDD) methods in state estimation (SE), while DoS attacks disrupt the availability of sensor data, affecting grid observability. This paper presents a deep learning-based framework for detecting and localizing FDIAs, including under DoS conditions. A hybrid CNN, Transformer, and BiLSTM model captures spatial, global, and temporal correlations to forecast measurements and detect anomalies using a threshold-based approach. For further detection and localization, a Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) model maps forecast errors to the compromised sensor locations, effectively complementing or replacing BDD methods. Unlike conventional SE, the approach is fully data-driven and does not require knowledge of grid topology. Experimental evaluation on IEEE 14–bus and 118–bus systems demonstrates strong performance for the FDIA condition, including precision of 0.9985, recall of 0.9980, and row-wise accuracy (RACC) of 0.9670 under simultaneous FDIA and DoS conditions. Furthermore, the proposed method outperforms existing machine learning models, showcasing its potential for real-time cybersecurity and situational awareness in modern SGs.

This chapter focuses on the very serious problem of denial of service (DoS) attacks against computer systems and networks. DoS attacks are attacks designed to disrupt, overwhelm, and/or damage computing resources and data. These attacks are aimed not against confidentiality of data or integrity of systems and data, but rather against availability of systems and data. Attackers launch DoS attacks for a wide variety of reasons. The probability of success is high, due in large part to the fact that the Internet itself has not been designed for security. The cost of DoS attacks is often high—several well‐known attacks have reportedly cost organizations billions of dollars. Many types of DoS attacks have surfaced so far, including resource starvation attacks, buffer overflow attacks, and packet fragmentation attacks. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, attacks in which programs planted in multiple systems cooperate, represent an even higher level of threat. Preventing DoS attacks is difficult in the first place due to a plethora of reasons; limiting the potential for damage and disruption is often the most cost‐effective strategy. Hot sites, cold sites, use of uninterruptible power supplies (UPSs) and Redundant Array of Independent Drives (RAID) solutions, and other measures can limit the damage from DoS attacks. Using properly configured and maintained firewalls is one of the best single prevention measures. Additionally, using packet filters on systems, keeping up with patches, limiting services that run on these systems, and using other measures go a long way in helping prevent susceptibility to DoS attacks.

ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on the secure control of positive networked control systems under multi‐channel attacks characterized by a Bernoulli distribution. Specifically, the sensor‐to‐controller channel suffers from false data injection (FDI) attacks, whereas the controller‐to‐actuator channel suffers from denial of service (DoS) attacks. The objective is to design a static output feedback controller that guarantees the positivity and stochastic stability of the closed‐loop system in the presence of DoS and FDI attacks. To conserve communication resources, we employ an event‐triggered scheme to reduce the frequency of information transmission. Due to the positivity of the system, the proposed event‐triggering mechanism employs the 1‐norm form instead of the 2‐norm form, which allows that the controller parameter is determined via linear programming rather than LMI technique. Finally, two simulation examples are provided to verify the effectiveness of our methods.

This paper introduces a distributed secondary controller with a dynamic event-triggered mechanism (DETM) designed to tackle secondary control challenges in islanded microgrids (MGs) under denial of service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can disrupt communication channels, causing unexpected changes in the network topology that may prevent controllers from receiving crucial information, degrading control performance. A security architecture based on Acknowledgment signal (ACK) for attack detection and topology recovery is created. Based on this architecture, a secondary control strategy of MG under DETM is proposed, which can solve the contradiction between voltage regulation and reactive power sharing in the case of DoS attack, achieve accurate reactive power sharing, reduce the deviation between voltage amplitude and standard value, and realize frequency recovery and active power sharing. The stability of the proposed control strategy is established through the application of Lyapunov's theory. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed control strategy is verified through the utilization of an islanded MG simulation system built in MATLAB/Simulink and a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) test platform.

The cybersecurity of the smart grid is becoming a critical issue to the power systems. Mitigating potential cyberattacks on the control of the power electronic devices is an important concern in the controller design to enhance the resilience of the overall power grid. In this paper, a novel model predictive control (MPC) is proposed for the multilevel cascaded H-bridge inverters considering the false data injection (FDI) attacks. The FDI attack is a vicious attack scenario when the attack signals are injected into the sensors in the cyberphysical systems (CPS). It is shown that FDI signals can effectively penetrate the commonly used Kalman Filter (KF) based state estimation and jeopardize the control of the inverters. The k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) algorithm is employed in the proposed scheme to mitigate the FDI attacks. The proposed KNN-based MPC scheme was tested with various types of attack signals. The results show that the proposed scheme exhibits a robust performance in the face of the malicious FDI attacks.

In WSN, DoS (denial of service) attack makes shortcoming system. The packets travel over and over in the sensor network. By that, all the assets like data transmission, memory, and vitality are squandered by this attack. However, the attacker ought to optimize its attacker plan for request to boost the impact on the system performance because of the deficiency of vitality at the aggressor side. Denial of service (DoS) attack on the Internet has become a squeezing issue. By staying away from these sorts of attacks, network performance can be improved. Therefore, security is a fundamental requirement for these networks. Effective routing is necessary in order to overcome the issued faced by the crosslayer in the DOS attack of the WSN network for the purpose of good transmission. This research work mainly focuses on performance evaluation using optimization methods. To establish the efficient path in the crosslayer against DoS attack, this paper has proposed enhanced lion optimization with an efficient path routing equalization technique (LOEPRE). If any failure node occurs in the network, then the node is recognized and the transfer of the data packet is done to the other node. Retransmission of data causes overload in the network. The proposed model focuses on these issues and overcomes these issues by improving the path efficiently with robust security. It consists of three phases: the initial phase includes the route discovery in the network. In the second phase, the transfer of data is done in the high router path for security purposes. Finally, the efficient path routing equalization technique is used for minimizing the overload in the network; it provides the equalized path length in the network and is highly efficient. Hence, the proposed LOEPRE technique is used to achieve energy efficiency in wireless network for prolonged network lifetime and minimum packet latency and minimize consumption of energy. Moreover, the simulation outcome of the proposed LOEPRE method is highly robust while comparing to the existing methods EFCRS, SSPRA ELOER, EFLOR, and TSTP. It achieves better performance than existing algorithms in comparing metric connectivity ratio, end-to-end delay, overhead, throughput, and packet delivery ratio.

In the recent years, cyberattacks to smart grids are becoming more frequent. Among the many malicious activities that can be launched against smart grids, the False Data Injection (FDI) attacks have raised significant concerns from both academia and industry. FDI attacks can affect the (internal) state estimation process—critical for smart grid monitoring and control—thus being able to bypass conventional Bad Data Detection (BDD) methods. Hence, prompt detection and precise localisation of FDI attacks are becoming of paramount importance to ensure smart grids security and safety. Several papers recently started to study and analyse this topic from different perspectives and address existing challenges. Data‐driven techniques and mathematical modelling are the major ingredients of the proposed approaches. The primary objective is to provide a systematic review and insights into FDI attacks joint detection and localisation approaches considering that other surveys mainly concentrated on the detection aspects without detailed coverage of localisation aspects. For this purpose, more than 40 major research contributions were selected and inspected, while conducting a detailed analysis of the methodology and objectives in relation to the FDI attacks detection and localisation. Key findings of the identified papers were provided according to different criteria, such as employed FDI attacks localisation techniques, utilised evaluation scenarios, investigated FDI attack types, application scenarios, adopted methodologies and the use of additional data. Finally, open issues and future research directions were discussed.

The pervasiveness of information and communications technologies as well as intelligent electronic devices leads to an expanded attack surface in smart grids, making it increasingly challenging to withstand the high-profile false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper, we propose a Proactive Approach to Mitigate FDI Attacks (PAMA) in smart grids. With PAMA scheme, the critical information - power grid connections and configurations as well as the original measurement data - used for constructing FDI attacks is well protected from leakage or theft, so that FDI attacks are effectively mitigated. Specifically, we transform the state estimation and FDI detection application into a distributed one equipped with converted information from the critical information provided by the control center. In addition, the original measurement data is also protected by using a secure hybrid Paillier cryptosystem. Our PAMA scheme is proved to be secure and effective in mitigating FDI attacks on smart grids. The computational complexity and the communication overhead are evaluated on the standard IEEE 14-bus test system. Keywords <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">__</sup> Smart grids, false data injection (FDI) attack, Paillier cryptosystem, state estimation.

The adaptive control of bilateral teleoperation system under denial of service (DoS) attacks is studied in this letter. The model of bilateral teleoperation system under DoS attacks is presented. The adaptive controllers are designed to deal with the influence of data missing caused by packet dropouts and DoS attacks. Two Bernoulli distributed variables are introduced to describe the system dynamic for the case that both packet dropouts and DoS attacks are involved in the communication channels. The globally asymptotically stability criterion is proposed by using Lyapunov functional methods, which implies the dynamics of the Master and the Slave are globally asymptotically synchronized. A numerical example of two degree of freedom bilateral teleoperation system is provided to show the effectiveness of obtained results.

In this study, to enhance the system reliability under false data injection (FDI) attacks and DC-link voltage (DCLV) sensor failures, a hybrid control strategy for a DC microgrid (DCMG) based on the Lagrange extrapolation and voltage observer is proposed. Under normal conditions without FDI attacks or DCLV sensor failures, the DCMG system works in a distributed control scheme. To enhance the reliability of the system under the DCLV sensor failure or FDI attack, the DCMG system utilizes a hybrid control strategy that combines distributed control with decentralized control. The hybrid control strategy is achieved by the proposed detection algorithms for FDI attacks and DCLV sensor failures. The detection of FDI attacks is accomplished by comparing the predicted secondary controller output based on the Lagrange extrapolation with the actual one. When a power agent detects an FDI attack, its control mode is switched to decentralized control by using the proposed hybrid control strategy. The DCLV sensor failure detection algorithm to enhance system reliability against DCLV sensor failures is achieved by comparing the estimated DCLV with the measured one from the voltage observer. Upon detecting a DCLV sensor failure, the operation of the power agent is switched to the current control mode to sustain the system operation even under DCLV sensor failures. The proposed detection algorithms are simple, effective, and precise, operating without mutual interference that deteriorates the detection accuracy. Simulation and experiments are carried out under various uncertain test conditions to validate the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed control strategy.

False data injection attacks with complete stealthiness in cyber–physical systems: A self-generated approach

For target tracking in radar network, any anomaly in a part of the system can quickly spread over the network and lead to tracking failures. False data injection (FDI) attacks can damage the state estimation mechanism by modifying the radar measurements with unknown and time-varying attack variables, therefore making traditional filters inapplicable. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel consensus-based distributed state estimation (DSE) method for target tracking with FDI attacks, which is effective even when all radars are under FDI attacks. First, a real-time residual-based detector is introduced to the DSE framework, which can effectively detect FDI attacks by analyzing the statistical properties of the residual. Secondly, a simple yet effective attack parameter estimation method is proposed to provide attack parameter estimation based on a pseudo-measurement equation, which has the advantage of decoupled estimation of state and attack parameters compared with augmented state filters. Finally, for timely attack mitigation and global consistency achievement, a novel hybrid consensus method is proposed which can compensate for the estimation error caused by FDI attacks and provide estimation accuracy improvement. The simulation results show that the proposed solution is effective and superior to the traditional DSE method for target tracking in the presence of FDI attacks.

To measure the degree of basic service of wireless sensor network (WSN) with denial of service (DoS) attacks, it is necessary to evaluate survivability of WSN. This paper presents new method based on services and Markov Chain. It distinguishes services, analyzes influence of services under DoS attacks, gets the formula of survivability. Probability of states is obtained by markov chain, then the quantitve survivability is getted in different states. Simulations prove that DoS attacks obviously decrease the survivability of WSN, but adding node energy and improving node density in certain range can reduce the influence of DoS attacks.

Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a powerful attack which prevents the system from providing services to its legitimate users. Several approaches exist to filter network-level attacks, but application-level attacks are harder to detect at the firewall. Filtering at application level can be computationally expensive and difficult to scale, while still creating bogus positives that block legitimate users. In this paper, authors show application layer DoS attack for SIP server using some open source DoS attack tools and also suggest a mechanism that can protect a given SIP server from application-level DoS attacks especially the attacks targeting the resources including CPU, sockets, memory of the victim server. In this paper author’s attempt to illustrate application layer distributed denial of Service (DDoS) attack on SIP Server such as SIP flooding attack, real time transport (RTP) flooding attack using open source DDoS attack tools. We propose a new DDoS defence mechanism that protects SIP servers from application-level DDoS attacks based on the two methodologies: IPtables and fail2ban detection. The attack flow detection mechanism detects attach flows based on the symptom or stress at the server, since it is getting more difficult to identify bad flows only based on the incoming traffic patterns. A popular software known as Wireshark which is a network protocol analyzer is used to capture the packets during DoS attack from the victim server Ethernet interface to detect the attacking host IP address and analysis the types of attack. We evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme via experiment

In ad-hoc and wireless networks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks has always been problematic during data routing. DoS attacks disrupt the data routing and avert the generated data to reach the destination or the sink nodes. In tunnel attack, which is one of the type of DoS attacks, the intruder attracts all the traffic towards itself and prevent it from forwarding further to the neighboring nodes. Researchers have presented multiple solutions to cater the problem and minimize or avoid the tunnel attacks, but they all have their shortcomings. The main reason behind all the drawbacks is that those solutions have not been confirmed using formal methods. The formal methods can be utilized to authenticate whether or not the solutions are immune to DoS attacks. In our previous researches, it has been revealed that by employing formal methods, our newly developed protocol RAEED can detect and avoid many DoS attacks. In this research paper, it has been proved using model checker that RAEED can efficiently avoid both simple and intelligent tunnel attacks. Moreover, the results of formal methods have been confirmed with the help of computer simulations as well as practical implementation on MicaZ motes. In future we aim to employ formal methods to verify more wireless communication issues in multiple protocols.