Efflux-Mediated Macrolide Resistance in Clinical Streptococcus Isolates: A Comparative Molecular Study

PDG10 COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF CELECOXIB VERSUS IBUPROFEN AND NAPROXEN IN PATIENTS WITH OSTEOARTHRITIS IN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA BASED ON RESULTS FROM THE PRECISION TRIAL

α-Thalassemia (α-thal) is usually due to deletions within the α-globin gene cluster, leading to loss of function of one or both α-globin genes. α-Thalassemia is prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. There are no large-scale reports regarding the prevalence of α-thal in the Arabian populations apart from sporadic surveys in the mid-1980s on red cell indices from Saudi Arabia and a more recent study from Kuwait. Several studies were conducted in an attempt to elucidate the frequency of α-thal in the UAE. Cord blood samples were collected from 419 consecutive newborns of UAE national mothers. The study involved polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based analysis of the α-globin genes and sequencing using an ABI Genetic Analyser 3130. The findings demonstrated that 49% of the neonates had α-thal, one of the highest in the world. The incidence of α-thal, particularly the –α3.7 deletion, was extremely high. The distribution of mutations was extensive, ranging from the simple –α3.7 genotype to severe nondeletional type α-thalassemias such as the polyadenylation signal (polyA1) [αPA–1 (AATAAA>AATAAG)], polyA2 [αPA–2 (AATAAA>AATGAA)], Hb Constant Spring [Hb CS, α142 (αCSα/αCSα) TAA>CAA (α2)] and pentanucleotide deletion [α−5 nt (GAGGTGAGG>GAGG)]. The nondeletional mutations, denoted αTα or ααT, are markedly frequent in the UAE and are well characterized. The report here describes the analysis of 84 chromosomes having deletional and nondeletional types of α-thal. Of the 84 chromosomes, 47.4% had the polyA1 mutation (αPA–1α), 28.2% had the small deletion –α3.7, 11.5% had Hb CS (αCSα), and 5% were positive for the pentanucleotide deletion (α−5 ntα). These findings show that nondeletional α-thal has a significant impact on the genotype/phenotype correlation in the UAE. It is important to note that the polyA1 mutation accounted for almost 50% of all the α-thal alleles, making it one of the most common mutations in the Gulf Region.

In The Politics of Islam, Birol Baskan sets out on the ambitious task of explaining the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the governments of five Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He traces what began as a symbiotic relationship between these states and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s before chronicling a divergence of attitudes among the Gulf’s ruling elites toward the Muslim Brotherhood today, marking key events like the Iranian Revolution, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the 9/11 attacks, and the Arab Spring uprisings in the 2010s as critical junctures in this change. This comparative and chronological approach is useful, although Saudi Arabia, as Baskan highlights, emerges as an outlier. Baskan explains the unique continued relevance of Saudi religious actors by the fact that their influence predated the construction of institutions of the modern nation-state.Baskan also finds that “the level of state religiosity seems to have little impact on whether Islamism generates opposition in a country or not” (2–3, emphasis original). To this end, he investigates literature about Islamism’s oppositionality―an understudied topic and one that certainly deserves attention, particularly when writing and thinking about state-Muslim Brotherhood relations. In his view, Islamism “seeks to expand the scope of Islam beyond the specific areas explicitly covered by the Islamic law” and as a result sets out to compel the state that all rules and norms should be derived from Islamic sources (11). Meanwhile, modern states have sought to harness the political and social capital of religion, and thus, even if they try to put in place religious rules, as in many Gulf states, they often run into Islamist opposition. And yet the Muslim Brotherhood has not become oppositional in all cases; Baskan notes Bahrain and Qatar as examples.After an introduction in which he discusses Islamism as an oppositional movement and state-religion relations in the Gulf, Baskan’s book has five substantive chapters. The first of these (chapter 2) describes how the Gulf states were founded and highlights the role of religious scholars in the formation of educational and judicial systems. It is interesting that Baskan begins his analysis in the pre-independence period. In my own book tracing state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, I began after independence and indeed after the realization of oil wealth. Baskan’s longer historical lens, however, gives a sense of the extent to which Ottoman and British legacies affected state-religion relations in the Gulf, since religious figures held political capital in Saudi Arabia long before the advent of the modern Saudi state.The second substantive chapter (chapter 3) covers the period 1950–70 and shows how the regional political context in which Arab nationalism was ascendant as the oppositional political ideology and the choice of all five of the states covered to welcome members of the Muslim Brotherhood who escaped repression elsewhere in the region―namely from Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Indeed, it was during this period that all five of the states under study in the volume were aligned in their policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood, welcoming many of its members from abroad to staff nascent educational and judicial sectors.Chapter 4 examines the period between 1980 and the late 2000s, tracing how domestic reforms in education and justice, sectors in which members of the Muslim Brotherhood had once been active, changed how these four states interacted with Islamists, particularly as Islamists accrued power in both sectors. In this discussion, however, Baskan appears to conflate modernity with secularism. The Gulf states, not to mention the United States, prove that religiosity can be interwoven into modern, purportedly secular, institutions. In his words, “all the Gulf states issued man-made laws to regulate increasingly complex modern life. This does not suggest, however, that they intentionally pursued state secularization. It rather suggests that the Islamic law is insufficiently developed to regulate all, new or old, fields of human life and in fact grants rulers extensive discretion to regulate a range of them” (69–70). I find it difficult to accept the notion that religion necessarily is at odds with modernity or modernizing reforms, especially considering that Islamic law exists as a living and adaptable body rather than a strictly codified legislative text. Baskan later states that “the modern state inescapably confronts religious actors” (215)―a claim that I believe can be contested, since modernity does not always imply secularism or Westernization, as it has in many countries of the Gulf. Further, because much of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is made by humans rather than coming directly from God, it is perhaps uniquely open to reform.The fifth chapter focuses on geopolitics during the same period (1980s to the late 2000s), particularly the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the 9/11 attacks. In so doing, Baskan discusses ways in which regional events fundamentally shaped how Gulf regimes viewed Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Increasingly, Islamists came to be seen as part of a viable political opposition (except in Bahrain and Qatar) in the aftermath of the fall of Arab nationalism. It was during this period that the Gulf states developed different attitudes toward the Brotherhood, ranging from suspicion in those states in which the Brotherhood became oppositional (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE), and co-optation in states in which the Brotherhood was a potential partner (Bahrain and Qatar).The sixth chapter focuses on the Arab Spring, when state-Muslim Brotherhood relations shifted sharply in the five states under study, from a loyalist Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain and Qatar, to a tolerated Brotherhood in Kuwait, to the Muslim Brotherhood’s being designated as a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He uses statements of specific Islamist figures to tell the story of how relations change, yet not all of the figures he uses are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This approach also overlooks existing scholarship on Islamism in the Gulf as well as primary source material from the local organizations themselves. In Saudi Arabia, Baskan uses the figure of Salman al-ʿAwdah, in the UAE―Muhammad al-Siddiqi, in Kuwait―Tareq al-Suwaidan, and in Qatar―Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In my view, it would have been more effective to analyze what Muslim Brotherhood movements did and the statements which they produced in the wake of the events of the Arab Spring. Also, the use of Egyptian-born Shaykh Qaradawi to give a sense of the position of Qatari Islamists points to a larger issue about the importance of indigenous religious scholarship in the Gulf.While Baskan makes an important point about a lack of indigenous religious scholars at independence in the Gulf states, I would argue that the field has changed significantly in intervening decades, with many Bahraini, Kuwaiti, and Qatari religious figures having emerged in their own right in the past decades. Throughout the volume, Baskan, in my view, underestimates the role of Gulf-based Islamists in the field of Islamism writ large. For instance, he states “The Arab Gulf region did not produce any Islamists who made a contribution to the development of Islamism” (47). This statement dismisses the substantial scholarship produced by Gulf-based Islamists ranging from the extreme (Osama bin Laden), to the quietist Salafi strand, which has found a home in Kuwait since the 1980s, to ideologues of the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. Baskan further claims that a “home-grown” Muslim Brotherhood organization emerged only in Bahrain and Kuwait (88), denying the agency of local Islamists in other countries he studies. While the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements in the Gulf were certainly influenced by outsiders initially, the Gulf has produced its own types of Islamists and strand of Islamist ideology.All in all, Baskan’s book provides a helpful reference and overview of state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in five Gulf states, a huge undertaking to be applauded. He claims that modern states inevitably face opposition from religious actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as they try to expand control over new state institutions (especially in education and the judiciary), which once were controlled by religious actors. Nonetheless, variation exists among the Gulf states, as the Brotherhood did not become oppositional in all five states―an important finding of the book. Still, Baskan leaves some important issues unaddressed. For instance, is authoritarianism rather than modernity to blame for the attempted state takeover of arms of the state once ceded to religious figures? And while Saudi Arabia maintains a cohesive native religious class, how much independent political capital does it still retain as the state seeks to take over more areas previously under their control? At what point does coherence no longer imply political capital?Further, Baskan recognizes throughout the book that the states under study have massive financial resources, which they used to help finance state modernization, to try to buy off political discontent during the Arab Spring, and to fund the Morsi and later the Sisi governments in Egypt after the Arab Spring. However, he does not explicitly engage the academic literature linked to rentierism, which I believe may have helped to show how state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in the Gulf are qualitatively different from those elsewhere in the region. He mentions these issues tangentially in a brief conclusion, but the book would benefit from a broader assessment and recognition of how the Muslim Brotherhood operates as an oppositional movement in rentier states of the Gulf. This kind of assessment could then be tied to a more general discussion of opposition in such states. The result, in my judgment, would have been a very useful contribution to Gulf studies.To be fair, Baskan never sets out to make a contribution Gulf studies specifically, seeking instead to question the oppositional nature of Islamist movements and the degree to which opposition might be predicted in certain contexts in the region. This he largely succeeds in doing.

The World Health Organization recommends taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) as part of cost-effective interventions to prevent diet-related noncommunicable diseases. To analyse the adoption and implementation of SSBs taxation in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and its impact on obesity rates. Using a semi-structured questionnaire, we collected information on progress with implementation of SSBs taxes in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates between January 2015 and December 2023. We searched literature published in Arabic and English on the subject and used the WHO acceleration scenario modelling tool to forecast the potential impact of SSBs on overweight and obesity in the 2 countries over the same period. Both countries implemented SSBs taxation consistently between 2015 and 2023, generating additional revenue and reducing obesity rates. The acceleration scenario estimates showed that SBB taxation could reduce overweight prevalence among children and adolescents (aged 5-19 years) from 38.2% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2030 in Saudi Arabia and from 37.0% to 34.6% in United Arab Emirates, and could reduce obesity rate by approximately 12.7% in Saudi Arabia and 9.5% in United Arab Emirates in the same period. This review provides further evidence that SSBs taxes can be effective in reducing sugar consumption, thereby reducing overweight and obesity rates. However, to effectively combat obesity and overweight among children and adolescents, taxation policies must be implemented alongside other strategies, including public health campaigns to increase awareness about the health risks associated with excessive sugar consumption.

This paper determines the dynamic linkage of oil price and public expenditures in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates from 1991 to 2017. For this purpose, the study uses symmetric and asymmetric ARDL and Granger causality procedures. The results confirm the existence of asymmetric behaviour of oil price, which is a key factor that fiscal authorities used for the decision about public expenditures. Furthermore, the result reveals that the evidence of the Keynesian hypothesis is observed in United Arab Emirates. While Kuwait fits both theories at a time and also confirms Wagner's law only in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the results support the spend‐and‐revenue hypothesis in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait while fiscal neutrality in United Arab Emirates. On the basis of conclusion, the study recommends that the government should re‐invest the surplus from oil receipt into other sectors of the economy on a priority basis that will reduce the negative effects of a decline in oil price.

Based on several small collections, new taxonomic and faunistic data on spiders of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lebanon are presented. Six species are described as new to science: Dorceus saif Szűts & Zamani, sp. nov. (♂; Saudi Arabia), Loureedia melanconi Szűts & Zamani, sp. nov. (♂; Saudi Arabia) (both Eresidae), Leptopilos hajarensis Zamani & Marusik, sp. nov. (♀; UAE), Synaphosus dulcicola Zamani & Marusik, sp. nov. (♀; UAE) (both Gnaphosidae), Arctosa formosa Zamani & Marusik, sp. nov. (♂♀; UAE) (Lycosidae), and Prodidomus emiratus Zamani & Marusik, sp. nov. (♀; UAE) (Prodidomidae). In addition, the previously unknown male of Trichothyse golan (Levy, 1999) (Gnaphosidae) is illustrated and described. Finally, one new family record, 16 new generic records and 22 new species records are documented, and the previous record of Sahastata infuscata (Kulczyński, 1901) (Filistatidae) from Yemen is rejected.

ObjectiveHere we use novel methods of phylogenetic transmission graphanalysis to reconstruct the geographic spread of MERS-CoV.We compare these results to those derived from text mining andvisualization of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) DiseaseOutbreak News.IntroductionMERS-CoV was discovered in 2012 in the Middle East and humancases around the world have been carefully reported by the WHO.MERS-CoV virus is a novel betacoronavirus closely related to a virus(NeoCov) hosted by a bat, Neoromicia capensis. MERS-CoV infectshumans and camels. In 2015, MERS-CoV spread from the MiddleEast to South Korea which sustained an outbreak. Thus, it is clearthat the virus can spread among humans in areas in which camels arenot husbanded.MethodsPhylogenetic analysesWe calculated a phylogenetic tree from 100 genomic sequencesof MERS-CoV hosted by humans and camels using NeoCov as theoutgroup. In order to evaluate the relative order and significance ofgeographic places in spread of the virus, we generated a transmissiongraph (Figure 1) based on methods described in 1.The graph indicates places as nodes and transmission events asedges. Transmission direction and frequency are depicted withdirected and weighted edges. Betweenness centrality, representedby node size, measures the number of shortest paths from all nodesto others that pass through the corresponding node. Places withhigh betweenness represent key hubs for the spread of the disease.In contrast, smaller nodes at the periphery of the network are lessimportant for the spread of the disease.Web scraping and mappingDue to the journalistic style of the WHO data, it had to be structuredsuch that mapping software can ingest the data. We used Import.io tobuild the API. We provided the software a sample page, selected thedata that is pertinent, then provided a list of all URLs for the software.We used Tableau to map the information both geographically andtemporally.ResultsGeographic spread of Mers-CoV based on transmissions identifiedin phylogenetic dataMost important among the places in the MERS-CoV epidemicis Saudi Arabia as measured by the betweenness metric applied toa changes in place mapped to a phylogenetic tree. In figure 1, thecircle representing Saudi Arabia is slightly larger compared to otherlocation indicating its high importance in the epidemic. Saudi Arabiais the source of virus for Jordan, England, Qatar, South Korea, UAE,Indiana, and Egypt. The United Arab Emirates has a bidirectionalconnection with Saudi Arabia indicating the virus has spreadbetween the two countries. The United Arab Emirates also has highbetweenness. The United Arab Emirates is between Saudi Arabia andOman and Between Saudi Arabia and France. South Korea, and Qatarhave mild betweeness. South Korea is between Saudi Arabia andChina. Qatar is between Saudi Arabia and Florida. Other locations(Jordan, England, Indiana, and Egypt) have low betweenness as theyhave no outbound connections.Visualization of geographical transmissions in WHO DataCertain articles include the infected individuals’ countries oforigin. ln constrast, many reports are in a lean format that includes asingle paragraph that only summarizes the total number of cases forthat country. If we build the API in a manner that recognizes featuresin the detailed reports, we can generate a map that draws lines fromorigin to reporting country and create visualizations. However, sinceonly some of the articles contain this extra information, mapping inthis manner will miss many of the cases that are reported in the leanformat.ConclusionsOur goal is to develop methods for understanding syndromicand pathogen genetic data on the spread of diseases. Drawingparallels between the transmissions events in the WHO data and thegenetic data has shown to be challenging. Analyses of the geneticinformation can be used to imply a transmission pathway but it ishard to find epidemiological data in the public domain to corroboratethe transmission pathway. There are rare cases in the WHO data thatinclude travel history (e.g. “The patient is from Riyadh and flew to theUK”). We conclude that epidemiological data combined with geneticdata and metadata have strong potential to understand the geographicprogression of an infectious disease. However, reporting standardsneed to be improved where travel history does not impinge on privacy.A transmission graph for MERS-CoV based on viral genomes and place ofisolation metadata. The direction of transmission is represented by the arrow.The frequency of transmission is indicated by the number. The size of the nodesindicates betweenness.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship among cultural values, using the dimension of power distance (PD), and employee job satisfaction in engineering firms in United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Design/methodology/approach – A well-known leading survey design, the Value Survey Module 94 developed by Hofstede (1980), is used in measuring PD as a quantitative methodology in the form of a questionnaire survey in UAE and Saudi Arabia. Findings – Power distance index (PDI) show variation not only at country level, but also at firm level. Consultative is found to be the most preferred manager type by the employees. Employees perceiving their managers to be consultative are the least afraid of disagreement with their managers. “Work”, “co-workers” and “operating procedures” find to be the major job satisfaction facets while “opportunities for promotion” and “reward” are the least attracted to job satisfaction. Age is found positively correlated with “pay”, “work”, “opportunities for promotion” and “benefits”. “Work” and educational qualification of the employees are negatively correlated but no significant correlations appear to exist with other job satisfaction facets. No significant correlation existed between education level and PDI is found. Originality/value – This paper is one of the first studies on PD and job satisfaction in UAE and Saudi Arabia. This can provide significant insight of how the Middle East countries, UAE and Saudi Arabia, react with globalization in the recent years. Recommendations for improving the existing job satisfaction in the Middle East countries are also explored.

The world’s largest transnational population is found in India. From the Gulf to Northern America to Europe, the Indian diaspora is found on every continent and in every region. The diaspora is incredibly energetic and lively worldwide. 34 million Indians were living outside of their country of birth, according to the UN DESA population division’s “International Migration 2025 Highlights” report. According to this report, India’s sizable diaspora is dispersed over several important countries of destination, with the UAE housing the greatest number of Indian migrants at 3.5 million, the US at 2.7 million, and Saudi Arabia at 2.5 million. Australia, Canada, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Kingdom were among the other nations that hosted a significant number of Indian migrants. The largest Indian diaspora in the globe is considered to be among the most “vibrant and dynamic”. From Mauritius to the US, Indian expats are present in many nations and make substantial contributions to the social, cultural, and economic spheres. The greatest Indian diasporas are found in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. The nature and destination of the Indian diaspora are examined in this research. India places great importance on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a group of Gulf nations. Only the Arabian Sea separates India’s “immediate” vicinity from the Gulf. The GCC is made up of the following six nations: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The Ministry of External Affairs estimates that 8.9 million Indian migrants were living in the Gulf nations as of 2024. The United Nations reports that the six Gulf nations of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain are home to 56 per cent of non-resident Indians and 25 per cent of overseas Indians. With millions of Indians currently residing in the UAE, the number of Indian expatriates has increased dramatically. Indians are essential to the UAE’s economic growth, working in industries like business, healthcare, and construction. India has a sizable workforce in Saudi Arabia, especially in fields like information technology, healthcare, and construction. The infrastructure and economic development of Saudi Arabia have benefited greatly from the efforts of the Indian minority. There are 3.2 million Indians living in Bahrain, 10.3 million in Qatar, 7.8 million in Oman, and 7.3 million in Kuwait. The diaspora, which serves as a conduit between India and its host nations, has been a source of strength and influence that has an impact on the economy, trade, investment, and foreign exchange reserves. Gulf nations have been important places for Indians to work and conduct business. In actuality, Gulf employers have favoured Indian community members above others for employment due in large part to their professionalism, discipline, and dedication. They now contribute to the growth and development of the Gulf nations. Indians who work in the United Arab Emirates transfer a portion of their salary to their family back home. With increased capital flows, investments, and consumption, foreign remittances help India's economy thrive and provide many people with a substantial source of steady financial assistance. The UAE is the second-largest source of remittances to India because so many Indians work in a variety of industries, including retail, hospitality, and construction. India will be the largest recipient of remittances, with inflows likely to increase 12.4 per cent to $125 billion in 2023 or 3.4 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, according to World Bank’s latest report. The importance of the Indian diaspora on India-GCC relations is assessed in this essay. The literature on the nature and destinations of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf, the role of the diaspora in strengthening ties between India and the GCC nations, economic cooperation between the two countries, and strategic partnerships between India and the GCC nations forms the basis of this paper.

Tense relations between Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are a major cause for concern regarding stability, security and peace in the Gulf region and in the Middle East more generally. These states seek to play a major role in the Middle East and use arms as a key tool in the pursuit of this aim. To illustrate the importance given to military capability in these four states, this fact sheet provides a concise overview of trends and patterns of military expenditure and of arms imports—the main source of modern major arms for these states—in the period 1994–2018.

هدفت الدراسة إلى التطرق لموضوع دول الخليج العربي في مؤشر التنافسية العالمية الذي يصدر سنويًا من منتدى الاقتصاد العالمي خلال الفترة الممتدة من (2010 – 2018) من حيث مؤشر كفاءة الاقتصاد، وعامل كفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب. وذلك من خلال فرضية وجود تأثير لكفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب في دول الخليج العربي على كفاءة الاقتصاد في ضوء معايير مؤشر التنافسية العالمية، وقامت الدراسة بتحليل وضع كل دولة من دول الخليج العربي (المملكة العربية السعودية – الكويت – الإمارات العربية المتحدة – عمان – البحرين – قطر) من حيث المعدل العام والترتيب، واستخدمت معادلات رياضية من الدرجة الأولى ذات المتغير، وذات المتغيرين، وذات الثلاث متغيرات، للوصول إلى نتيجة وضع دول الخليج العربي بالنسبة للدول متصدرة الترتيب والدول متأخرة الترتيب سواء في محور كفاء الاقتصاد، أو في معامل كفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب. واستخدمت الدراسة معادلة رياضية لتحليل نسبة تأثير معامل كفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب في دول الخليج العربي على محور كفاءة الاقتصاد، وخرجت الدراسة بعدة نتائج مبنية على معادلات رياضية وجوانب اقتصادية فيما يخص كفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب في دول الخليج العربي، وتوصلت الدراسة إلى أن درجة تأثير كفاءة اقتصاديات التعليم العالي والتدريب على كفاءة الاقتصاد في دول الخليج العربي في ضوء معايير مؤشر التنافسية العالمية تعتبر متوسطة تميل إلى الارتفاع حيث تبلغ (11.20%) من أصل (17%)

This study examined how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pursue both international and domestic legitimacy through cooperation with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Despite not being DAC members, both countries strategically aligned their foreign aid systems with DAC norms, reflecting an exceptional case of voluntary compliance among non-member donors. Drawing on the concept of hybrid legitimacy, this study argued that their engagement with DAC serves as a dual mechanism for achieving international recognition and strengthening domestic legitimacy. The analysis revealed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have institutionalised cooperation frameworks that integrate global development norms with Islamic values, thereby transforming their aid systems into instruments of normative convergence. As DAC participants, they seek international legitimacy through normative alignment and policy coherence, while participation in the Arab–DAC Dialogue provides a platform for demonstrating performance-based legitimacy and value-driven aid. It concludes that Saudi Arabia and the UAE exemplify a multi-layered legitimacy strategy that simultaneously consolidates global credibility and domestic approval through cooperation with DAC.

Coastal management in the Persian Gulf region within the framework of the ROPME programme of action

For Islamic family law, the 21st century started with groundbreaking reforms. In January 2000, the Egyptian parliament passed Law No 1 of 2000 governing procedure in personal status cases, article 20 of which henceforth permitted women to seek judicial divorce without any fault on their husband’s part and without his consent. The Egyptian legislature’s reinterpretation of the traditional Islamic divorce procedure of ‘mukhālaᶜ’ allows the wife to dissolve her marriage against her husband’s will so long as she is willing to ransom herself by paying him financial consideration. These Egyptian reforms were quite famously termed ‘the dawning of the third millennium on shariᶜa’ (Arabi 2001). At the same time, roughly 1,300 miles to the southeast, i.e. in the small Arab Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as in Saudi Arabia, family law appeared less dynamic. Rules governing Muslim personal status remained uncodified and questions of family and succession law were guided by the individual judge’s own interpretation of the multitude of differing opinions that make up Islamic law. Hence, in the Arab Gulf, women in particular were ‘in the anomalous position of enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world and yet being subject to a law which was developed over a thousand years ago’ (Hinchcliffe 1986). In 2005, however, the idea of comprehensively codifying Islamic family law was eventually picked up by the UAE, followed by Qatar in 2006 and Bahrain in 2009. Currently, even Saudi Arabia is debating a draft code of Muslim personal status. Codification as a means for the state to shape family relations has taken root in the Arab Gulf.This chapter first explores the legal setting prior to the codification of family law in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE (part II). The focus will be laid on the influence of European notions of codification and Egyptian law – the birthplace of the majority of jurists working in the region – on the development of the legal regimes in the Arab Gulf following their independence. In addition, the family court systems and the few legislative steps already taken by the three governments in the area of family law before the comprehensive codifications were introduced will be assessed. Part III is devoted to the codification process itself; both the actors and the debates surrounding the first-time codification of family law will be explored. Finally, part IV will trace the approaches to codification and legal reform in the new family codes of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE by using selected examples from among the many new statutory rules.The two main questions that the chapter sets out to answer are as follows: First, how did the three Arab Gulf States approach family law codification approximately ninety years after the very first codification of the field in the Muslim world (ie the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917) and, second, did the three legislatures create a ‘modern family law’ in the sense that it accommodates the current socioeconomic realities of the Arab Gulf monarchies?

Purpose This research investigates the trajectory of Gulf region, focusing on the interplay between environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and key elements – digital economy, green economy (GE), green finance, green energy and green innovation. This study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how Gulf economies align their developmental pursuits with sustainability principles amidst the rapid evolution of digital technologies. Design/methodology/approach A data set of 95 listed companies from six Gulf Cooperation Council countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – from year 2016 to 2022 was compiled from reputable sources. Using fixed effect regression techniques, this study explores relationships, accounting for individual and time-specific variations. Findings This study indicates that key factors – digital economy, GE, green energy and green innovation – significantly influence ESG performance across Gulf nations underscoring the potential for strategic integration of these elements to enhance sustainable practices. However, the nonsignificant impact of green finance highlights a need for further exploration and refinement of financial mechanisms to effectively contribute to ESG goals in the Gulf region. Research limitations/implications The findings underscore the importance for Gulf policymakers to prioritize ongoing support and policy formulation fostering digitalization and green initiatives. Businesses in the region can enhance ESG performance by integrating sustainable practices, promoting long-term resilience and reputation. Investors and financial institutions can use these insights to guide investment decisions, prioritizing projects contributing to environmental sustainability and social responsibility. Originality/value Amidst the current sustainability imperative, this research holds unique value in its timely exploration of the Gulf region’s sustainable landscape, providing crucial insights into the interplay between ESG factors and digital and green initiatives.