Electoral Reform

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.

This study investigates the impact of electoral system reforms on political representation and accountability in Indonesia’s legislative elections from 1999 to 2024. Following democratization after the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia implemented major institutional changes, including the shift from a closed-list to an open-list proportional representation system, the introduction of electoral thresholds, and the enforcement of a 30 percent gender quota. Using a mixed-methods approach that combines longitudinal electoral data with qualitative evidence from interviews and document analysis, the study examines three dimensions: proportionality and party system dynamics, gender representation, and legislative accountability. The findings indicate that electoral reforms have improved vote–seat proportionality and reduced excessive party fragmentation, contributing to greater electoral stability. Women’s representation in parliament has increased over time, although persistent structural and cultural barriers continue to constrain substantive gender equality. In addition, indicators of accountability such as legislative attendance, constituency engagement, and public trust show moderate improvement, suggesting that open-list competition encourages more responsive behavior among legislators. However, accountability remains largely personalized rather than institutionalized, relying on individual visibility instead of collective performance. Overall, Indonesia’s electoral reforms have supported gradual democratic consolidation, while remaining constrained by clientelism and weak institutional accountability.

Previous studies had no consensus on whether a ‘mandate-divide’ exists between district and party-list legislators under the mixed-member system. I argued that previous studies ignored the role of the party. This article aims to explore the legislative consequences of the 2005 electoral reform and the role of parties in Taiwan. I analyzed the roll-call votes, considering abstention and absence as potential defection, along with interviews. The data cover from the fifth to eighth Legislative Yuan, two periods each before and after the electoral reform. The findings show that district legislators tended to defect from the party line than list proportional representation (PR) members in pre- and post-reform periods. However, district legislators only tended to be absent from the voting than list PR members after the electoral reform. Mandate-divide was present throughout the period, but differences were more salient before the reform. Besides, evidence stressing the influence of parties was revealed in the interviews. Party leaders enforce various punishments to enforce party discipline. The role of party became more important after the electoral reform. District legislators have higher absence rate after the electoral reform because they need to engage more in constituency service or avoid expressing their position on controversial issues. The ruling party tends to sanction the absence when they have majority in parliament.

The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of why African electoral systems should be reformed and how to do so in order to improve the quality of representation, participation, and government effectiveness.We attempt to offer a generic framework, a menu, so to speak, whereby African political parties and policy makers can reflect on the current state of play vis-à-vis their electoral systems and then decide whether a comprehensive or partial electoral reform agenda is needed.The paper also delineates the various institutions and stakeholders that should be involved in the electoral system reform process.This is a call to improve the reform process instead of entrusting it with a limited range of state-sponsored institutions, which often create more problems than those they contrive to solve.The paper is divided into four sections: a) a synoptic exposé of electoral reforms; b) the various types of electoral reforms and the factors which militate against them; c) lessons from the African experience with electoral system reforms; and d) an analysis of the main stakeholders required to steer a comprehensive electoral system reform agenda.

Two approacheshave been used in the literature to describe the nature and theprocess of unanimous constitutional choices in parliamentarydemocracies. The first approach suggests that unanimity in constitutionaldecisions derives from political compromises (Nohlen 1984, 1986;Shugart 1992). The second approach is based on the idea thatunanimity results from constitutional decision making from behinda veil of ignorance or uncertainty (Brennan and Buchanan 1985;Buchanan and Congleton 1998). In this study we argue that neitherof these two descriptions (compromise and veil of ignorance)is appropriate in defining the process of constitutional decisionmaking concerning electoral reforms. It is rather a mixture ofinterests' identification of the former (compromise) and uncertaintyconditions of the latter (veil of ignorance) which leads towardunanimous agreement in decisions regarding the design of a newsystem of representation. The case of Italian electoral reformand the results of an electoral simulation exercise with datafrom the 1996 election for the Italian Chamber of Deputies confirmour hypothesis. Our findings have some implications for the typeof assembly to be formed in cases of electoral system's reform.

Most accounts of electoral reforms focus on successfully implemented reforms to explain how electoral context shapes the incentives of political parties, paying scant attention to the cases where governments fail to implement their preferred system. This article takes a step back in the electoral reform process and examines when and why governing parties initiate electoral reforms. In doing so, it focuses on how the electoral context can affect the electoral bases of the incumbents and their main competitor. This novel account expects that governments initiate electoral reforms depending on whether small or new parties draw votes from their own vote base or from that of their main competitor. Using an original dataset of electoral reform attempts from 32 parliamentary democracies between 1945 and 2015, this article shows that ruling parties are more likely to initiate a restrictive reform when small parties draw votes from their electoral base, but a permissive one when small parties draw more votes from their main competitor.

It is commonly believed that a norm of consensus-based election reform exists in New Zealand. However, this belief has yet to be tested with systematic study of changes to the democratic rules of the game. This article empirically analyzes the extent to which partisan and restrictive election rules have been proposed and enacted since passage of the Electoral Act 1956. Using a novel matrix of election lawmaking, a wealth of primary textual sources, and interviews with key actors, the data show clear evidence that election reforms are routinely partisan and have occasionally curtailed democratic participation. An analysis of election lawmaking by political party reveals that Labour is responsible for most partisan election reforms, whereas National has passed most demobilising enactments. These trends extend to proposed members’ bills and across multiple governments. The findings highlight the need for scholars to take seriously the importance of a broader array of election reforms beyond the electoral system, including voter and registration administration, franchise rules, ballot initiatives, electoral governance, and campaign finance. It also underscores the need for systematic study of election reforms in a wider variety of countries.

The seminal work of Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (1994), limits the definition of electoral reforms to those affecting electoral formulas, district magnitudes, assembly size, or electoral thresholds. Following this definition, studies on electoral reform have put political parties and their motivations at centre stage. Expanding the definition of electoral reform, however, requires a move beyond parties to explore the multiple possible sources of change. This article examines the most common reforms ofrecent years, electoral gender quota policies, and points to at least four explanations for the adoption of gender quota laws. Based on extensive data from gender quota campaigns, the article suggests that the literature on this topic would benefit from efforts to broaden the analytical focus to include the role of agency, group interests, anddiscursive struggles, and to call attention to the possibility of causal diversity by revealing different routes to electoral reform.

Despite pressure for reform and the concomitant benefits of more inclusive and participatory electoral systems, major electoral reform in Canada rarely takes place through legislative or public deliberative processes. As a result, citizens demanding electoral reform have turned to other venues to pursue their claims for democratic change. This article considers such venue shifting efforts through the use of the courts to pursue electoral reform in Canada. Using precedent tracing and content analysis approaches, it considers all the final judicial decisions citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on democratic rights in Figueroa v. Canada. It finds that courts were willing to intervene in some cases involving technical aspects of the exercise of democratic rights, but tend not to entertain more major systemic based reforms. As such, the article concludes that such pursuits for democratic reform through judicialization are likely to fail.

The most distinctive Australian contribution to institutional design is the construction of electoral systems. This paper locates the work of E. J. Nanson 1850-1936; Professor of Mathematics, University of Melbourne, 1875-1922 in its intellectual context. After setting out the puzzle of the frequent discoveries and disappearances of axiomatic social choice, and its awkward relationship with electoral reform, the paper explores Nanson's arguments in both social choice and electoral reform. The first were good; the second disappointingly weak. Nanson's failure to influence Australian institutional design at the foundation of the Commonwealth and the subsequent adoption of Nanson's recommendations for Senate elections are analysed.

This article delineates the three waves of development in the study of electoral reform: the systematic description and consequences of electoral systems; the analysis of major reform and its political consequences; and a more comprehensive approach to the study of electoral reform. It seeks to achieve two goals. The first is to shift attention away from the political consequences of electoral change and toward what takes place before the passage of reform. Beyond delineating what electoral reform is, the authors ask: Why does it occur? Who initiates the electoral reform? When, and where, does it succeed or fail to pass the necessary obstacles? How should we study it? They therefore want to analyse the determinants of electoral reform. Their second goal is to elaborate an agenda for future research in electoral change, and they do so by discussing both the reconceptualisation and the methodology of electoral reform research.

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

Significance After three successive electoral cycles (2006, 2011 and 2018) of decreasing legitimacy, one of the most sensitive issues on the new government’s agenda is electoral reform. Impacts The electoral reform debate may also strain the government’s relations with civil society actors whose support it needs in other domains. International partners will likely encourage electoral reforms but urge respect of the 2023 deadline for the next elections. Having senators and governors elected by popular vote could reduce corruption risks without greatly complicating the electoral format.

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 5, No. 4 SymposiumElection Commissions and Electoral Reform: An OverviewChristopher S. ElmendorfChristopher S. ElmendorfSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:26 Oct 2006https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.5.425AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byWhat Explains the Organization of Electoral Management Bodies in the U. S. States?The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association, Vol. 69, No. 2The relationship between political parties and their regulators9 November 2015 | Party Politics, Vol. 23, No. 6Second-Best Deliberative Democracy and Election Law Yasmin Dawood12 December 2013 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4Fixing failures of U.K. electoral managementElectoral Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of Electoral Politics Alistair McMillan18 June 2012 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2The Importance of Policy Instruments for Managing Principal-Agent Relationships in the Administration of Elections: The Case of Performance Benchmarking in the UKSSRN Electronic JournalJudges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for Institutional ChangeSSRN Electronic JournalDemocracy and Electoral ProcessesSSRN Electronic JournalWho Should Run Elections in the United States?Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 Volume 5Issue 4Dec 2006 InformationCopyright 2006, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Christopher S. Elmendorf.Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Dec 2006.425-446.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.5.425Published in Volume: 5 Issue 4: October 26, 2006PDF download

Toward Better Governance in China takes a fresh look at the latest efforts made by Chinese leaders to promote governance-based reform. It asserts that the improvement of governance has now become one of the breakthrough points of the much anticipated political reform. Although the Chinese government continues to play down expectations about political reform, many small-scale reform experiments have been quietly undertaken by Chinese leaders at various levels in recent years, including the new round of administrative reform centered on the creation of 'super ministries,' the enlargement of inner-party democracy within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the strengthening of local legislative bodies, and judicial reform designed to promote judicial independence and rule of law. This strategy calls for strengthening governing capacity and changing government functions. One of the advantages in placing the improvement of governance first is that it is less risky than embarking upon a full-scaled electoral reform. Electoral democracy is undoubtedly an important element in a functional democracy. But equally important is the effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and openness of the governing process. Better governance implies greater transparency, open deliberation and participation, and less adversarial political confrontation and conflict. If constructed properly, China may become the sort of democratic administration or administrative democracy that Robert Dahl discussed in 1947. Clearly, political reform of this kind does not follow the conventional wisdom of a democratic transition which places heavy emphasis on electoral reform or the precedence of the electoral reform to the government reform. This book is intended to shed some new light on the ongoing debate about the direction of China's political development.