Electoral Systems in Context

Electoral systems do not simply reflect voter preferences, social cleavages, or the political party configuration of a given society. All electoral systems shape and reshape these features. The choice of one electoral system or another involves a decision about what goals decision-makers wish to foster. The present article enumerates six possible goals of electoral systems and then explains how various systems foster or derogate from these goals. In all cases of electoral-system choice, there are tradeoffs. A system may fulfill one objective but make it difficult to attain another. Clarity of objective and attention to the details of system choice are, therefore, necessary.

The relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations is analysed in this article. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed-list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, it is demonstrated here that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying this study draws on work on ‘the personal vote’ that suggests that the incentives to amass resources – and perhaps even to do so illegally – increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, it is shown that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold – the estimates here are that this is as low as fifteen – corruption is greater under open lists than closed lists. Only at small district magnitudes (below fifteen) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. These results hold for alternative measures of corruption, for different sets of countries analysed, for different measures of district magnitude and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, and of the number of parties.Using an objective measure of corruption in public works contracting, corroborating evidence is also presented from Italian electoral districts. In Italy's open-list environment in the period prior to 1994, larger districts were more susceptible to corruption than smaller ones.

This article considers the impact of ethnic dynamics and electoral systems in the December 2023 elections in the Iraqi province of Kirkuk, where long-standing tensions between Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations were the main influences in the political landscape. The adoption of an ‘open list’ electoral system and the rise of independent candidates from various ethnic groups marked a key turning point. The effects of these changes both increased voter participation and resulted in a fragmented outcome that required coalition-building. The study suggests that reforms in institutions and civic education have facilitated inter-ethnic cooperation and created more effective governance in Kirkuk. The article concludes by suggesting that the historic power struggle between different groups in Kirkuk could gradually develop into a more effective political process that encourages collaboration.

ABSTRACTA classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.

In some political and science circles (including Poland) there are articulated views on the crucial role of electoral systems in the process of political competition. Therefore they express the opinion about prevalence of certain electoral arrangements in terms of the implementation of certain political preferences. Often hopes for the reform of the political system are associated with the changes of the electoral systems. In the Great Britain (the United Kingdom) and other English-speaking countries citizens have formed community associations whose aim is the change from the majority to the proportional electoral system. In the effect we have more proportional election result and extension of real electoral bid to a larger number of political parties. On the other hand, in Poland, we have seen the opposite trend. Proponents of single-mandate constituencies depreciate the system of proportional representation. They express the belief in the positive effects of the majority system in the parliamentary elections. Radicals endorse the idea that only those electoral solutions are synonymous with electoral democracy and they are a way to reduce the pathologies of political life. In terms of these issues there have arisen many misconceptions and political myths. The main purpose of this article is to pay attention to trends in the areas of electoral reforms in the world. The author tries to answer the following research questions: 1) What electoral systems were popular in the world in individual periods from the 19th to the 21st centuries? 2) What tendencies appear in changes of electoral systems in the recent years? 3) What is the being of popularity phenomenon of mixed-member electoral systems? In the recent years the most popular electoral systems are: proportional representation with open lists and majority rules in single member-districts.

ABSTRACTThis article presents an overview of a project designed to simulate the distribution of seats in the European Parliament after the first direct elections in 1978. First, the data base and some basic assumptions are described which pertain to electoral systems, voter behavior, and realignments in party systems. Some illustrative results of simulation runs are summarized which proceed from voter preferences as expressed in the most recent national general elections in the nine member countries of the European Community. These findings are analyzed for individual parties and parliamentary fractions as well as with the chances for forming majority coalitions in mind. Finally, the effects of some likely shifts in voting patterns are considered assuming that current national electoral systems will be applied in 1978.

Free party lists provide voters with greater freedom of choice than other electoral systems, allowing them to select candidates within and between parties. Given that free party lists are cognitively highly demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts to discriminate between candidates. This study uses multilevel linear regression models to analyze the effect of candidates' gender and ballot position on preference voting in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Our results show that both candidates' gender and ballot position have a significant effect on their preference voting share and provide evidence on how they interact in intraparty competition. Candidates' ballot position has an inverse J‐shaped effect on their preference vote share. This effect varies with candidates' gender in both countries but works in different directions. Our findings have important implications for electoral system design, outlining the potential consequences of alphabetical and party‐ordered lists for candidates' chances and for electoral gender quotas' effectiveness under intraparty preference voting procedures.

Elections are widely recognized as the keystone of representative democracy. In the Central and Eastern European context, there are two key aspects of elections that are worthy of consideration: electoral systems (the rules and regulations associated with the casting of votes and the conversion of votes into seats), and voting behaviour (the decision whether or not to vote and the choice(s) made at the polls). Electoral systems allow citizens to express their political preferences; in addition, they influence the development of party systems and the composition of government. In this chapter we shall see that there was an initial shift towards list-based forms of proportional representation across the countries of the region, followed by a greater degree of institutional stability. The chapter will also consider the ways in which elections allow citizens to interact with government: whether they vote or not (turnout), and what election outcomes reveal about voter preferences. In other words, this will be the chapter in which we discuss ‘conventional’ participation.

A variety of electoral systems for single-winner, multicandidate elections are evaluated according to their tendency to (a) select the Condorcet candidate-the candidate who could beat each of the others in a two-way race-if one exists, and (b) select a candidate with high social (average) utility. The proportion of Condorcet candidates selected and a measure of social-utility efficiency under either random society or spatial model assumptions are estimated for seven electoral systems using Monte Carlo techniques. For the spatial model simulations, the candidates and voters are generated from multivariate normal distributions. Numbers of candidates and voters are varied, along with the number of spatial dimensions, the correlation structure, and the relative dispersion of candidates to voters. The Borda, Black, and Coombs methods perform well on both criteria, in sharp contrast to the performance of the plurality method. Approval voting, plurality with runoff, and the Hare system (preferential voting) provide mixed, but generally intermediate results. Finally, the results of the spatial model simulations suggest a multicandidate equilibrium for winningoriented candidates (under plurality, runoff, and Hare) that is not convergent to the median.

Objective: The objective of this study is to investigate the role of ethnopolitics and kinship solidarity in determining the victory of candidate pairs in the 2020 Pacitan Regency Election, with the aim of understanding the influence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as a political patron on voter preferences and political networks. Theoretical Framework: This research is underpinned by concepts of kinship solidarity, ethnopolitics, and political patronage. These frameworks provide a solid basis for analyzing informal political networks and social ties and their influence on local democracy and voter behavior. Method: The methodology adopted for this research comprises a qualitative approach utilizing a phenomenological lens. Data collection involved in-depth interviews, observations, and document analysis. This multi-method strategy enabled an exploration of the dynamics between kinship solidarity, group solidarity, and political preferences among voters. Result and Discussion: The results revealed that kinship solidarity serves as a social-emotional and informal political network, effectively mobilizing electoral support. SBY's personality strengthens these ties, creating legitimacy beyond traditional program-based campaign strategies. Ideologically driven group solidarity and shared interests also play a crucial role in mobilizing societal elements with collective values. However, risks associated with kinship-dominated politics, such as nepotism and favoritism, were identified as potential threats to meritocracy and local democratic integrity. These findings are contextualized within the theoretical framework, emphasizing the dual impact of such networks on voter behavior and democratic processes. Research Implications: This research highlights practical and theoretical implications, offering insights for designing effective, context-sensitive political campaigns. It also underscores the need for balancing kinship-based networks with merit-based practices to enhance local democratic integrity. These findings are particularly relevant to the fields of political science and public administration. Originality: This study contributes to the literature by providing an in-depth understanding of the integration of social networks and political preferences in Sustainable Cities, particularly in terms of political patronage and access to sustainable resources and voter preferences. This study highlights the strategic role of ethnopolitics in shaping local democracy, offering a new perspective on strengthening democratic practices through community-oriented strategies.

Migrant candidates tend to win fewer preference votes compared to native candidates across electoral systems. We focus on two general explanations for the observed migrant–native vote gap: (1) disproportionate amounts of electorally valuable resources and (2) an electoral penalty whereby migrant candidates who hold similar resources as native candidates are treated differently by the voters. Three types of resources are included as independent variables: personal, social, and contextual. We analyse candidate survey data from the 2017 Finnish municipal elections and apply the twofold Kitagawa–Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method. The results show that group differences in the distribution of political capital, length of residence, and size of the municipality are associated with the vote gap, as well as the inability of migrant candidates to capitalise on campaign support from people in their immediate social environment.

The article examines the electoral consequences of pronouns in parliamentary speech, one of the tools legislators use for reelection purposes. I use data from Estonia (2011–2023), whose electoral system relies on open-list proportional representation in districts while keeping an option to be elected via closed-party lists. The results suggest that self-referential and we-referential speech align differently with the incentives provided by the electoral system but also highlight variation based on MPs' gender and leadership status. The findings enhance our understanding of personal and party representation and the gendered perceptions of personalised behaviour.

How have openly lesbian and gay politicians feared in German and Finnish politics from the 1980s to the present day? The article follows anecdotally the careers of individual lesbian and gay political actors in two countries with either a mixed system of constituency voting and list voting, or an open list with multi-member districts by using newspaper and journal articles as its sources. The findings of the article challenge pervious understandings about the natural connection between lesbian and gay politicians, movements and voters, as well as the most advantageous timing and ways for coming out. Whereas in both countries politician’s known homosexuality has transformed from a devastating problem to a potential benefit, the article also highlights the decisive role of gender in building successful political careers as an openly homosexual politician in high-level politics, and suggests to the enduringly gendered and sexualized constructedness of politics.

Many accounts of democratisation in Africa from the early 1990s were infused with revived Afro-optimism at the outbreak of competitive elections in country after country on the continent. As noted by Huntington (1991:174) multiparty elections mean the demise of dictatorships and in many states the first years of the 1990s were heralded as the beginning of ac omplete political renewal (Ayittey 1992; Hyden and Bratton 1992; Joseph 1992). However, soon thereafter disputed elections in key states such as Kenya and Ghana in 1992, aborted processes in Togo and Cameroon, Zambia’s disappointing second elections in 1996, and breakdowns of the democratisation process in countries including Nigeria (1993), Angola (1992), and Gambia (1994) led to ah ost of pessimistic predictions: ac ontinuation of disorder and destructive politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999), no change at all (Akinrinade 1998), political closure (Joseph 1998), semi-authoritarianism (Carothers 1997), or ar eturn to ‘big man’, neopatrimonial, clientelist, informalised and disordered politics of the continent (Ake 1996; Bratton 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Mbembe 1995; Villalon 1998). 1 While an umber of states have become either electoral or fully liberal democracies, many countries in Africa are still run by electoral authoritarian regimes. This article analyses the role of opposition parties’ behaviour in institutionalising democratic elections in electoral autocracies, and the effects of opposition choices on transformation of electoral authoritarian regimes to democracies. Specifically, the choices of opposition parties either to contest or boycott elections, and either accept or reject the outcome of the polls, are addressed in the analysis. The question is what type of opposition behaviour increases the likelihood of electoral autocracies becoming democracies and increasing participation, competition, and legitimacy? Political parties’ behaviour varies in important ways and that variation is taken as given in this article. One could legitimately also ask why opposition parties chose to act differently depending for example on the structural cleavages they represent (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), incentives of electoral systems they face (Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1984), the preferences of voters they seek to catch (Downs 1957), or because they are office-, voter-, or policy-seeking parties (Strom 1990). Seeking to explain the behaviour of opposition parties in Africa’s emerging democracies would be an interesting subject, but the focus on the con

Baden-Württemberg's previous mixed electoral system, which gave voters a single vote with three functions, has changed the electorate's voting behaviour in non-obvious ways compared to the German federal electoral system. The results of a unique social experiment – the two-level (Bundestag-Landtag) electoral systems in the Federal Republic of Germany – show that voting in single-member districts does not necessarily reduce party system fragmentation at the regional level. Indeed, it turns out that the additional functions of the vote cast in a single-member district in Baden-Württemberg's Landtag elections cause voters to treat it similarly to how they treat the vote for party lists in the Bundestag election. This conclusion was reached by comparing voting results in the elections to the Landtag and the Bundestag in Baden-Württemberg and four other Länder, where the rules governing elections to state parliaments and the lower house of the federal parliament are similar. The analysis results are a significant contrast to conventional perceptions of electoral system consequences, thus confirming that easy associations do not correspond to the real effects of certain institutional arrangements.