Elementary epimorphisms between models of set theory

In this paper we show that using implicative algebras one can produce models of set theory generalizing Heyting/Boolean-valued models and realizability models of (I)ZF, both in intuitionistic and classical logic. This has as consequence that any topos which is obtained from a Set-based tripos as the result of the tripos-to-topos construction hosts a model of intuitionistic or classical set theory, provided a large enough strongly inaccessible cardinal exists.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2301.11740

Probably the two most famous examples of elementary embeddings between inner models of set theory are the embeddings of the universe into an inner model given by a measurable cardinal and the embeddings of the constructible universeLinto itself given by 0#. In both of these examples, the “target model” is a subclass of the “ground model” (and in the latter case they are equal). It is not hard to find examples of embeddings in which the target model is not a subclass of the ground model: ifis a generic ultrafilter arising from forcing with a precipitous ideal on a successor cardinalκ, then the ultraproduct of the ground model viacollapsesκ. Such considerations suggest a classification of how close the target model comes to “fitting inside” the ground model.Definition 1.1. LetMandNbe inner models (transitive, proper class models) of ZFC, and letj:M→Nbe an elementary embedding. Theco-critical pointofjis the least ordinalλ, if any exist, such that there isX⊆λ, X∈NbutX∉M. Such anXis called anew subsetofλ.It is easy to see that the co-critical point ofj:M→Nis a cardinal inN.

We prove that the satisfaction relation $\mathcal {N}\models \varphi [\vec a]$ of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure $\mathcal {N}$ and the formulas $\varphi $ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic $\left \langle {\mathbb N},{+},{\cdot },0,1, <\right \rangle $ , yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same $\left \langle {H}_{\omega _2},{\in }\right \rangle $ or the same rank-initial segment $\left \langle {V}_\delta ,{\in }\right \rangle $ , yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures. On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure ${\mathbb N}=\{\,{0,1,2,\ldots }\,\}$ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.

Ehrenfeucht’s lemma asserts that whenever one element of a model of Peano arithmetic is definable from another, they satisfy different types. We consider here the analogue of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma for models of set theory. The original argument applies directly to the ordinal-definable elements of any model of set theory, and, in particular, Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds fully for models of set theory satisfying V=HOD. We show that the lemma fails in the forcing extension of the universe by adding a Cohen real. We go on to formulate a scheme of natural parametric generalizations of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma, namely, the principles of the form EL(A,P,Q), which asserts that P-definability from A implies Q-discernibility. We also consider various analogues of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma obtained by using algebraicity in place of definability, where a set b is algebraic in a if it is a member of a finite set definable from a. Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds for the ordinal-algebraic sets, we prove, if and only if the ordinal-algebraic and ordinal-definable sets coincide. Using a similar analysis, we answer two open questions posed earlier by the third author and C. Leahy, showing that (i) algebraicity and definability need not coincide in models of set theory and (ii) the internal and external notions of being ordinal algebraic need not coincide.

In this third and last paper on inner models we consider some of the inherent limitations of the method of using inner models of the type defined in 1.2 for the proof of consistency results for the particular system of set theory under consideration. Roughly speaking this limitation may be described by saying that practically no further consistency results can be obtained by the construction of models satisfying the conditions of theorem 1.5, i.e., conditions 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.51, viz.:This applies in particular to the ‘complete models’ defined in 1.4. Before going on to a precise statement of these limitations we shall consider now the theorem on which they depend. This is concerned with a particular type of complete model examples of which we call “proper complete models”; they are those complete models which are essentially interior to the universe, those whose classes are sets of the universe constituting a class thereof, i.e., those for which the following proposition is true:The main theorem of this paper is that the statement that there are no models of this kind can be expressed formally in the same way as the axioms A, B, C and furthermore it can be proved that if the axiom system A, B, C is consistent then so is the system consisting of axioms A, B, C, plus this new hypothesis that there exist no proper complete models. When combined with the axiom ‘V = L’ introduced by Gödel in (1) this new hypothesis yields a system in which any normal complete model which exists has for its universal class V, the universal class of the original system.

In the proof of the consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis and the Axiom of Choice with the other axioms of set theory, Godel [ l ] introduced the notion of a constructible set and showed that the constructible sets form a model for set theory. These sets are intuitively those which can be reached by means of a transfinite sequence of several simple operations. He then showed that the Axiom of Choice and Continuum Hypothesis held in the collection of constructible sets. If the original universe of sets is sufficiently rich in ordinal numbers, it will follow that every set is constructible, in which case we say that the Axiom of Constructibility is satisfied. This axiom implies the two axioms previously mentioned. However, from one point of view it may seem that this notion of constructibility does not intuitively correspond to what is meant by constructive since it may happen that all sets in the universe are constructive. In this paper we show that a more restricted notion of construction will yield a class of sets which form a minimal model for set theory. In this manner we prove the consistency of a stronger form of the Axiom of Constructibility. We observe that the idea of a minimal collection of objects satisfying certain axioms is well known in mathematics, for example, in group theory one often considers the subgroup generated by a collection of elements, and in measure theory we define the Borel sets as the smallest y) holds, then there exists a set B consisting of precisely those y. Since much of the proofs of the theorems we state follow quite closely the arguments of [ l ] , we shall be rather brief. Our main result is

James H. Schmerl. Peano models with many generic classes. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, vol. 43 (1973), pp. 523–536. - James H. Schmerl. Correction to: “Peano models with many generic classes”. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, vol. 92 (1981), no. 1, pp. 195–198. - James H. Schmerl. Recursively saturated, rather classless models of Peano arithmetic. Logic Year 1979–80. Recursively saturated, rather classless models of Peano arithmetic. Logic Year 1979–80 (Proceedings, Seminars, and Conferences in Mathematical Logic, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, 1979/80). edited by M. Lerman, J. H. Schmerl, and R. I. Soare, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 859. Springer, Berlin, pp. 268–282. - James H. Schmerl. Recursively saturatedmodels generated by indiscernibles. Notre Dane Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 26 (1985), no. 1, pp. 99–105. - James H. Schmerl. Large resplendent models generated by indiscernibles. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 54 (1989), no. 4, pp. 1382–1388. - James H. Schmerl. Automorphism groups of models of Peano arithmetic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 67 (2002), no. 4, pp. 1249–1264. - James H. Schmerl. Diversity in substructures. Nonstandard models of arithmetic and set theory. edited by A. Enayat and R. Kossak, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 361, American Mathematical Societey (2004), pp. 45–161. - James H. Schmerl. Generic automorphisms and graph coloring. Discrete Mathematics, vol. 291 (2005), no. 1–3, pp. 235–242. - James H. Schmerl. Nondiversity in substructures. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 73 (2008), no. 1, pp. 193–211. - Volume 15 Issue 2

In 1981, Takeuti introduced quantum set theory as the quantum counterpart of Boolean valued models of set theory by constructing a model of set theory based on quantum logic represented by the lattice of closed subspaces in a Hilbert space and showed that appropriate quantum counterparts of ZFC axioms hold in the model. Here, Takeuti's formulation is extended to construct a model of set theory based on the logic represented by the lattice of projections in an arbitrary von Neumann algebra. A transfer principle is established that enables us to transfer theorems of ZFC to their quantum counterparts holding in the model. The set of real numbers in the model is shown to be in one-to-one correspondence with the set of self-adjoint operators affiliated with the von Neumann algebra generated by the logic. Despite the difficulty pointed out by Takeuti that equality axioms do not generally hold in quantum set theory, it is shown that equality axioms hold for any real numbers in the model. It is also shown that any observational proposition in quantum mechanics can be represented by a corresponding statement for real numbers in the model with the truth value consistent with the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, and that the equality relation between two real numbers in the model is equivalent with the notion of perfect correlation between corresponding observables (self-adjoint operators) in quantum mechanics. The paper is concluded with some remarks on the relevance to quantum set theory of the choice of the implication connective in quantum logic.

Assuming the Axiom of Constructibility, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the vanishing of Ext\ for rings A of global dimension 1.Using Martin's Axiom, the necessity of these conditions is shown not to be a theorem of ZFC.Applications are given to abelian group theory, including a partial solution (assuming V = L) to a problem of Baer on the splitting of abelian groups.Some independence results in abelian group theory are also proved.Introduction.In a remarkable recent paper [22], S. Shelah proved that Whitehead's problem is unsolvable in ordinary set theory (Zermelo-Frankel set theory with the Axiom of Choice).More precisely, he proved that two different answers to the problem are obtained when set theory is extended by adding two different axioms: the Axiom of Constructibility and Martin's Axiom.(See Theorem 4.1.)Shelah's arguments were specific to Whitehead's problem and nonhomological in character.In this paper we extend Shelah's techniques in order to obtain some general results about the vanishing of ExtA (for modules over a ring A of global dimension 1) in different models of set theory, and we apply them to some specific problems in abelian group theory.Assuming the Axiom of Constructibility we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the vanishing of ExtA (Theorems 1.2 and 1.5).To state the result in.a special case: if C and A are abelian groups of cardinality N,, Ext(C, A) -0 if and only if C is the union of an increasing chain of countable subgroups [Cv\v < «,} such that the chain is smooth (i.e., C0 -U"<oC, for aii iimit ordinals a) and satisfies Ext(C0, A) = 0 and E\i(Cv+x/Cv,A) = 0 for all v < K,.Although the sufficiency of this condition is an easy consequence of classical homological algebra (see Theorem 1.2), the proof of necessity makes use of the Axiom of Constructibility (Theorem 1.5).The necessity of this condition is not provable in ordinary set theory; in particular the condition is not necessary when Martin's Axiom is assumed ( §3).

We use models of set theory described in [2] and [3] to prove the consistency of several combinatorial principles, for example:If ℱ is any filter on N containing all the cofinite sets, then there is a finite-to-one function f: N → N such that f(ℱ) is either the filter of cofinite sets or an ultrafilter.As a consequence of our combinatorial principles, we also obtain the consistency of:The partial ordering P of slenderness classes of abelian groups, denned and studied in [4], is a four-element chain.In the remainder of this Introduction, we shall define our terminology and state the combinatorial principles to be considered. In §2, we shall establish some implications between these principles. In §3, we shall prove our consistency results by showing that the strongest of our principles holds in models of set theory constructed in [2] and [3].A filter on N will always mean a proper filter containing all cofinite sets; in particular, an ultrafilter will necessarily be nonprincipal. We write N ↗ N for the set of nondecreasing functions from the set N of positive integers into itself. A subset ℐ of N ↗ N is called an ideal if it is closed downward (if f(n) ≤ g(n) for all n and if g ∈ ℐ, then f ∈ ℐ) and closed under binary maximum (if f(n) = max(g(n), h(n)) for all n and if g, h ∈ ℐ then f ∈ ℐ).

In this paper, we unify the study of classical and non-classical algebra-valued models of set theory, by studying variations of the interpretation functions for = and ∈. Although, these variations coincide with the standard interpretation in Boolean-valued constructions, nonetheless they extend the scope of validity of ZF to new algebra-valued models. This paper presents, for the first time, non-trivial paraconsistent models of full ZF. Moreover, due to the validity of Leibniz's law in these structures, we will show how to construct proper models of set theory by quotienting these algebra-valued models with respect to equality, modulo the filter of the designated truth-values.

The twentieth-century mathematician Thoralf Skolem is known principally for two achievements. The first is the statement and proof of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. The second is his construction of countable nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic and set theory when these theories are expressed in first-order (predicate) logic. The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, for which Skolem gave several proofs, showed that no first-order axiom system can characterise a unique infinite model. Skolem regarded this theorem as casting doubt on the belief that mathematics can be reliably founded on formal axiomatic systems alone. He discovered that first-order logics are necessarily incomplete descriptions of their intended models. There is a vivid contrast between the comprehensive syntactic expressive power of first-order theories and their very limited power to constrain their models to a priori desired models. The startling conclusion he derived from his theorem is known as ‘Skolem’s paradox’. It asserts that concepts such as cardinality must be interpreted relative to a given model and thus have no absolute meaning. Anticipating modern model theory, in a later paper he gave a direct construction of a nonstandard model of first-order arithmetic based on plus and times by a method which anticipated the ultraproduct construction of models of first-order theories. He realised that it might be possible to construct new models for set theory which demonstrate the consistency or the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. The first goal was realised in the early 1930s by Kurt Gödel’s introduction of the notion of constructability for consistency proofs. The second goal was realised in the early 1960s by Paul Cohen’s introduction of the notion of forcing for independence proofs, for which he was awarded the Field’s medal in 1966.

A novel evaluation method of renewable energy development based on improved rough set theory and grey cloud model

Appropriate hierarchies are essential for the study of minimal or con- structible inner models of set theory, in particular for proving strong combina- torial principles in those models. We define a finestructural hierarchy (Ffi) and compare it to Jensen's well-known Jfi-hierarchy for G¨ odel's constructible uni- verse L.

Using hitherto unpublished manuscripts from the Zermelo Nachlass, I describe the development of the notion of definiteness and the discussion about it, giving a conclusive picture of Zermelo's thoughts up to the late thirties. As it turns out, Zermelo's considerations about definiteness are intimately related to his concept of a Cantorian universe of categorically definable sets that may be considered an inner model of set theory in an ideationally given universe of classes.