Enforcing Sticky Policies with TPM and Virtualization

Virtualization and cloud computing can help an organization achieve significant datacenter savings in hardware costs, operational expenditures, and energy demands while achieving improvements in quality of service and business agility. The combination of a hardware based root of trust such as trust platform module (TPM) on virtual machine (VM) based system have being widely adopted. In this paper, combined with the trusted computing and cloud computing security, we establish a trust system with a certificate authority (CA) and trusted platform module (TPM). It takes the CA as the root of trust cloud computing platform. The servers use the TPM through the operations of acquisition, registration, certification for the certification and the operations of new construction, launch, running, transfer and maintenance for the virtual machine (VM). To implement the trusted ensure of the security, it designs the trusted module which take the TPM as the core, and develops the VM as a complete trust system with a measurement algorithm. It can be used into the VM authentication mechanism and the access user authentication mechanism of the VM.

As the platform mobility increases, it becomes increasingly susceptible to theft. Stolen data is often regarded as being more valuable than the notebook hardware itself. Thus, the need to protect user data and secrets is underscored in a mobile computing environment. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is defined as a hardware instantiation which has been proposed by the TCG (Trusted Computing Group) for trust computing. TPM offers facilities for the secure generation of cryptographic keys, and limitations on their use, in addition to a hardware pseudo-random number generator. It also includes capabilities such as remote attestation and sealed storage. A TPM can be used to authenticate hardware devices. Since each TPM chip has a unique and secret RSA key burned in during production, it is capable of performing platform authentication. The TPB (Trusted Platform Board) is an expansion of the TPM for enhancing the efficiency and usability of the TPM chip. In addition to the TPB functions supporting high-standard trust environments within the hardware standard of the system in this paper, we develop the v-TMS (Visual Trustworthy Monitoring System) that provides visualization of real-time monitoring for the behavior of system resources (process, memory, network, users, etc.) with TPB and system software for hardening of OS and applications. Moreover, v-TMS is not only a web-based computing environment for system resources but also a real-time monitoring system for a trust computing environment.

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a scheme that enables the remote authentication of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) while preserving the user's privacy. A TPM can prove to a remote party that it is a valid TPM without revealing its identity and without linkability. In the DAA scheme, a TPM can be revoked only if the DAA private key in the hardware has been extracted and published widely so that verifiers obtain the corrupted private key. If the unlinkability requirement is relaxed, a TPM suspected of being compromised can be revoked even if the private key is not known. However, with the full unlinkability requirement intact, if a TPM has been compromised but its private key has not been distributed to verifiers, the TPM cannot be revoked. Furthermore, a TPM cannot be revoked from the issuer, if the TPM is found to be compromised after the DAA issuing has occurred. In this paper, we present a new DAA scheme called Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme that addresses the above limitations. While still providing unlinkability, our scheme provides a method to revoke a TPM even if the TPM private key is unknown. This expanded revocation property makes the scheme useful for other applications such as for driver's license. Our EPID scheme is efficient and secure in the same security model as DAA, i.e. in the random oracle model under the strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

In the specification of Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Object-Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP) is the protocol which guarantees the security of the communication between TPM and its users. Nowadays, there are many TPM manufacturers having made their own TPM. However, some of the TPM manufacturers don't implement the TPM completely according to the specification of TPM. In this paper, BAN logic is used to construct an ideal model of OIAP. The security of the OIAP implemented by some TPM manufacturers is analyzed with the initial hypothesis and the logic postulate. From the result of analyzing, the inappropriate implementation of OIAP by the TPM manufacturers would lead to a replay attack, and the data in the data integrity register (DIR) and non-volatile (NV) storage would be contaminated by this attack.

13 - Establishing a TPM Owner

Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are small, inexpensive chips which provide a limited set of security functions. They are most commonly found as a motherboard component on laptops and desktops aimed at the corporate or government markets, but can also be found on many consumer-grade machines and servers, or purchased as independent components. Their role is to serve as a Root of Trust - a highly trusted component from which we can bootstrap trust in other parts of a system. TPMs are most useful for three kinds of tasks: remotely identifying a machine, or machine authentication; providing hardware protection of secrets, or data protection; and providing verifiable evidence about a machine's state, or attestation. This book describes the primary uses for TPMs, and practical considerations such as when TPMs can and should be used, when they shouldn't be, what advantages they provide, and how to actually make use of them, with use cases and worked examples of how to implement these use cases on a real system. Topics covered include when to use a TPM; TPM concepts and functionality; programming introduction; provisioning: getting the TPM ready to use; first steps: TPM keys; machine authentication; data protection; attestation; other TPM features; software and specifications; and troubleshooting. Appendices contain basic cryptographic concepts; command equivalence and requirements charts; and complete code samples.

Cloud computing platforms constructed on Trusted Computing Technology are commonly referred to as trusted cloud computing. The core component of this technology is known as Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Its specifications are given by the consortium known as Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Though TPM is an immovable module and is fixed inside any computer, yet its credentials can be shared with other devices. This paper presents the accessibility model for Virtual Machine (VM) of a distributed trust protocol which is based on TPM, through which consumer's credentials are shared to other trusted devices. These credentials essentially describe the integrity of VM.

Cloud security has gained increasingly emphasis in the research community, with much focus primary concentrated on how to secure the operation system and virtual machine on which cloud system runs on. We take an alternative perspective to consider the problem of building a secure cloud storage service on top of a public cloud infrastructure where the service provider is not completely trusted by the customer. So, it is necessary to put cipher text into the public cloud. We describe an architecture based on Trusted Platform Module and the client of cloud storage system to help manage the symmetric keys used for encrypting data in the public cloud and the asymmetric keys used for encrypting symmetric keys. The key management mechanism includes how to store keys, how to backup keys, and how to share keys. Based on the HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System), we put a way of key management into practice, and survey the benefits that such an infrastructure will provide to cloud users and providers, and we also survey the time cost it will bring to us.

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a key component designed to enable computers achieve greater security. Several vulnerabilities discovered in the TPM highlight the necessity of formal analysis. The procedure invoking an API may be regarded as several interactive processes between the TPM and a user. As a result, the current study formalized the API specifications proposed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) using applied pi calculus. Meanwhile, two authentication properties between them were also described in a formalized way. With the help of the tool ProVerif, the flaw of the command TPM_CertifyKey was discovered. It was also confirmed on the TPM emulator. Subsequently, the modified API was presented and its authentication properties could be satisfied after verifying again. Results show the model is valid. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/telkomnika.v11i2.2034

3 - Overview of the TPM Architecture

Trusted computing (TC) is considered to be one of the newly developed technologies on improving computer security and creating a trustworthy environment. Although the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has defined specifications/or TC, including that of trusted platform module (TPM), criteria on compliance testing is still not available. It is important that the design and implementation of TPM and other components follow the specifications, as incompliance may lead to crucial security impacts. In this paper, a test mechanism checking TPM commands is instrumented into TPM application, so that conformance to standards can be examined before TPM's functional execution to validate its compliance with the specifications. Furthermore, this paper also initially puts forward the concept of "chain of compliance", which enhances the trustworthiness of computing platforms by verifying the conformance of their components.

Users have become used to accepting two unfortunate consequences of complying with requests to supply personal data to service providers. Firstly, the personal data that a user supplies becomes the property of the service provider, which means that the data subject loses control over what is subsequently done with their data. Secondly, provision of services is made on an “all or nothing” basis, being dependent upon the user supplying all the personal data requested by a service or forgoing use of that service entirely. We present an approach to personal data management which avoids these two unnecessary disadvantages. Personal Data Stores enable individuals to retain ownership and control of their personal data, granting service providers access to specific items of that data upon request whilst remaining the owners of their data. Trusted third parties will be required to curate the data in order to ensure that it is non-repudiatable. Privacy Policy Negotiation will enable data subjects to negotiate with service providers about how much of their personal data they disclose and how detailed that data is. Different levels of service can be provided depending on what personal data a user is prepared to disclose. In this paper we describe systems and algorithms for Personal Data Stores and Privacy Policy Negotiation which have been implemented and tested separately and show how they can be combined to the benefit of data subjects.

Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a widespread cloud computing provisioning model where ICT infrastructure, including servers, storage and networking, is supplied on-demand, in a pay-as-you-go fashion. IaaS cloud providers give their clients virtual machines (VMs) that are controlled by cloud administrators who can run, stop, restore and migrate the VMs. A typical threat to IaaS is unauthorized access of untrustworthy administrators to cloud users' sensitive information residing in VMs' memory. In this paper we focus on the threat of users' cryptographic keys being stolen from the RAM of the VM they provision. We propose a decrypt-scatter/gather-decrypt technique that allows users to carry our encryption/decryption while protecting keys from unauthorized peeks on the part of cloud administrators. Our technique does not require modification to the current cloud architecture, but only the availability of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) capable of creating and holding a TPM-protected public/private key pair. It lends itself to security-as-a-service scenarios where third parties perform encryption/decryption on behalf of data owners.

Federated Identity Management (FIM) based on standards allows and facilitates participating federated organizations to share users identity attributes, facilitate authentication and grant or deny service access requests. Using single sign-on facility users authenticates only once to home identity provider and logged into access successive service providing service providers within federation. User's identity theft, misused of user identity information via single sign-on facility in identity providers and service providers, and trustworthiness of subject, identity providers and service providers are active concerns in federated identity management systems. In addition, we had explored trusted computing technology, which covers Trusted Platform Module security features such as Trusted Platform Module Identity, Integrity Measurement and Key certification as well as Trusted Network Connect. In this paper, we presented conceptual threat model for inter-domain web single sign-on in federate identity management system. For this, we set identity theft, misused of identity information, and trust relationship scenarios and in the end, we discussed how trusted computing technology use can effectively resolve identity theft, misused of identity information, and trust relationship concerns in federated identity management system.

Hong Kong is one of the first jurisdictions outside Europe to pass a data protection law [the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (PDPO)]. The PDPO protects identifiable personal data about a living individual, for example, a person’s name, address, age, or other more sensitive data like medical and health records. The advancement of technology and the prevalence of online activities have undoubtedly raised a number of issues concerning data protection. Behavioural tracking or the use of ‘cookies’ is so commonplace and very often data is being collected without the consent or knowledge of the relevant individual. However, such collection of data may not necessarily fall within the ambit of the PDPO if the data in question is not personal data. Even if such data is regarded as personal data, the PDPO may not be providing adequate safeguards for the collection and use of such data This article looks into the scope of the meaning of personal data, the legality of such activities under the direct marketing provisions in the PDPO as well as the role of processors and other third parties in the context of online behavioural tracking.