Enhancing Corporate Performance in Nigeria: The Role of Audit Committee Characteristics and Corporate Governance Mechanisms

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms including board size, independence, and meeting frequency, audit committee size and meeting frequency, CEO duality and ownership concentration on the operational, financial and market performance of Saudi listed firms using a contingent theoretical-based framework drawing on agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. This study examines 210 listed Saudi Stock Exchange firms over the timeframe 2017 to 2019. The paper applies both a manual content and regression analysis approach. The results show that firm performance deteriorates with board size and independence, audit committee and meeting frequency, and the presence of CEO role duality, while performance improves with board meeting frequency and ownership concentration. Thus, Saudi firms should respond by maintaining smaller boards and more frequent meetings, keeping the Chair and CEO roles separate, and maintaining smaller audit committees with more focused meetings. Further, the appointment of independent directors only makes a meaningful contribution to firm performance where they are truly independent. Finally, more concentrated ownership tends to encourage better firm performance due to the regime of monitoring and discipline concomitant with more powerful shareholders. The implications of this paper are threefold. First, the implementation by Saudi Arabia of the latest corporate governance regulations and IFRS adoption almost certainly impact firm performance markedly. Second, corporate governance regulations should recognize the role of more frequent board meetings and more concentrated ownership in enhancing corporate performance. Third, stakeholders should apply pressure on investee firms to maintain smaller boards, engage genuinely independent directors, separate the role of Chairman and CEO, and maintain smaller audit committees with fewer and more effective meetings. The results should help corporate boards when deciding on the best corporate governance mechanisms to enhance firm performance. Further, the study should provide policy makers with a better understanding of the corporate governance structures required to promote better performance by drawing on existing theories and the empirical modelling, in an emerging economy setting such as Saudi Arabia, a new and broader data set, thereby informing better future policy and protecting shareholders’ interests.

Orientation: There is little evidence on how corporate governance mechanism influences financial performance in Nigeria and Ghana.Research purpose: The study investigated the effect of corporate governance mechanism on financial performance of listed deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria and Ghana.Motivation for the study: The dwindling performance of listed DMBs has been attributed to poor corporate governance mechanism which has resulted in intense pressure on the board of directors to approve decisions that adversely affect the company’s financial performance.Research design, approach and method: The study employed a quantitative research approach and used panel regression analysis techniques. The study sample consisted of 19 DMBs from the Nigerian Exchange Group and Ghana Stock Exchange for the period from 2014 and 2023.Main findings: This study revealed that managerial ownership has a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of listed DMBs in Ghana.Practical/managerial implications: The findings offer the Board more clarity regarding how to maintain a balanced level of board independence that enables effective decision making aimed at improving the overall performance of banks. The study has practical implications for investors to ensure that boards maintain their size for improving effectiveness and achieve optimal financial performance.Contribution/value-add: The study provides new evidence on how corporate governance mechanism influences the financial performance of listed DMBs in Nigeria and Ghana. The study’s findings show that present and potential shareholders might evaluate board qualities to make better investment decisions.

Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper - a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries.

This research entitled is Analyze the Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanism to Earning Quality and Value of the Firm (An Empirical Study on Manufacturing Companies at Jakarta Stock Exchange). The purpose of the research was to disclose first whether corporate governance mechanism (managerial ownership, board of commissioner composition and audit committee) influence earning quality. Second, whether corporate governance mechanism (managerial ownership, board of commissioner composition and audit committee) and earning quality influences value of the firm. Data used in this research was obtained from 78 manufacturing companies that enlisted in Jakarta Stock Exchange. Data was analyzed using structural equation model (SEM) with AMOS 5 software. Research Result that ( 1) corporate governance mechanism (managerial ownership, board of commissioner composition and audit committee) have significant effect toward earning quality, (2) corporate governance mechanism (managerial ownership, board of commissioner composition, audit committee) and earning quality have no significant effect toward value of the firm. Keyword: Corporate Governance Mechanism, Earning Quality and Value of the Firm

This paper seeks to examine the effect of capital structure and board structure on firm performance in Nigeria using secondary data consisting of forty listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) within the period of 2008 to 2016. Data were merged and pooled for analysis, the unit root test; co -integration, granger causality test, and regression were done accordingly. The paper established that there exists a significant negative relationship between capital structures (DER), a significant relationship between board size and a negative but not significant relationship between board duality and performance (ROA & ROE) in Nigeria respectively.

This study is novel research aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on stock price volatility in the Egyptian stock exchange through the role of the dividend policy as a mediating variable. The study examines certain corporate governance mechanisms such as: board independence, board size, number of board meetings, CEO duality, and audit committee. The study used quarterly data on EGX 30 for the period 2012-2021. It was based on a sample of 25 stocks traded in the Egyptian stock exchange, not including the stocks of the financial sector. Leverage and size used as a controllable variables. Results revealed that corporate governance has an impact on stock price volatility and dividend policy. Board independence, board size, board meetings and audit committee have a significant negative impact on stock price volatility of listed Egyptian companies. A good corporate governance practices is a good sign to reduce the fluctuations in stock prices. However, CEO duality and size has no impact on stock price volatility. Leverage has a positive significant impact on stock price volatility. Accordingly, CEO duality and leverage is a sign of poor corporate governance. Egyptian investors need to consider the issue of corporate governance practices alongside with the risk associated with expected return when taking investment decisions. A new dimension which added to investigate the interrelationship between corporate governance mechanisms and stock price volatility is dividend policy as mediator factor. Dividend policy is the outcome of good corporate governance practices and has an impact on stock price volatility. Corporate governance is important for stimulating the dividend payments which in turn affect stock price volatility.

The study examines whether audit committee (AC) characteristics influence firm performance, and whether this relationship is moderated by board of director’s (BOD) ownership. The sample is listed manufacturing firms in Jordan. AC characteristics, as an indicator of corporate governance mechanism, include its size, meeting frequency, independence, and experience. Firm performance is proxied by return on assets (ROA). Thirty firms are included in the sample. Data are collected from 2015 to 2021 for a total of 210 observations. The first model indicates that AC meetings and independence positively and significantly influence firm performance. On the other hand, AC size is not a significant predictor of firm performance. The second model shows that the interaction effects (AC size, AC independence, and AC experience) are significant and positive on firm performance. The results provide insights on how to improve AC effectiveness so as to improve the performance of listed manufacturing firms in Jordan. They also suggest the significance of BOD ownership in enhancing internal corporate governance mechanisms, particularly the AC. Jordanian policy makers must therefore ensure the effectiveness of these mechanisms, especially AC, through relevant regulations and recommendations.

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on real (REM), accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and REM/AEM interaction in Jordan following the 2009 Jordanian CG Code (JCGC).Design/methodology/approachThe study used a sample of 108 Jordanian public firms covering 2010-2014. Hypotheses are tested using pooled OLS-regression models.FindingsThe authors find that both institutional and managerial ownership constrain the use of REM and AEM. In contrast, both independent directors and large shareholders are found to exaggerate such practices, and CEO-duality is found to exaggerate REM only. However, foreign ownership does not appear to have a significant impact. They further find that managers use REM and AEM jointly to obtain the greatest earnings impact.Practical implicationsThe findings have important implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain earnings management (EM) practices and improve financial reporting quality in Jordan.Originality/valueThe authors believe this to be the first Jordanian study examining the relationship between CG mechanisms and both REM and AEM following the introduction of the 2009 JCGC, as well as the first in Jordan and the Middle East to examine board characteristics and REM. Moreover, it is the first to test for the potential substitution of REM and AEM since the 2009 JCGC enactment. As such, the findings draw attention to EM practices and the role of monitoring mechanisms in Jordan.

Corporate governance mechanism is a form of supervision of the company to run effectively and efficiently to improve firm performance and value. The supervision that corporate governance mechanism provide is to lesser the agency conflicts due the different interest between manager and owner such earnings management that is detrimental to shareholders. This study examines corporate governance as a supervisory mechanism that aims to improve firm performance, value and minimize earnings management. Then, we analyze the possibility that corporate governance mechanisms can improve firm’s performance and value by controlling earnings management. Using data of banking companies from 2018-2019 then tested using partial least squares with the WarpPLS application, we found evidence that corporate governance mechanisms positively influence the company's financial performance. Corporate governance mechanism has a negative effect on firm value. Corporate governance mechanisms have a negative effect on earnings management. Then earnings management does not provide a mediating effect in the relationship of corporate governance with the company's financial performance and firm value.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate financial decisions in one of the emerging economies, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, the paper examines the degree to which internal corporate governance mechanisms and an external corporate governance mechanism affect UAE firms’ capital structure.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a multiple regression analysis to examine the association between corporate governance and capital structure for a sample of 71 UAE firms listed either in the Dubai financial market or the Abu Dhabi securities market during 2006.FindingsThe paper finds that institutional investors have a negative impact on debt‐to‐equity ratio. This result does not support the “active monitoring hypotheses” where institutional investors are expected to exercise their voting rights effectively in order to prevent managers from reducing their “employment risk” at the expense of the interests of shareholders. It also finds that dividend policy is negatively associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio, while firms’ size is positively associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio.Research limitations/implicationsEmpirical analysis suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have important implications for UAE firms’ financial policies. UAE managers should be aware of the benefits of the implementation of effective internal and external corporate governance mechanisms while embracing international corporate governance standards. An effective implementation of the codes of corporate governance should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of UAE firms and the UAE stock markets.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no study that has yet empirically examined the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure in UAE or Middle Eastern countries. This study offers the first evidence of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure in UAE.

Corporate governance covers with its scope a set of internal and external mechanisms forming the system of supervision and control in a company. In an economy based on market mechanisms private companies dominate over companies in which the State Treasury has shares. Companies with Treasury shareholding still play a significant role in the economy in Poland. Thus, the paper points to the principles of operation of mechanisms of corporate governance in companies with Treasury shareholding. The purpose of the paper is to analyze mechanisms of corporate governance applied in Energy companies with Treasury shareholding, as well as to establish whether the supervision and control instruments used were convergent. The research was carried out on the basis of companies within the energy sector, which in terms of the number of companies as well as market value was dominated by companies with Treasury shareholding. On the basis of statutes of companies with Treasury shareholding the applied mechanisms of corporate governance are compiled in a table set-up. The conducted research shows that in companies with Treasury shareholding the role of external mechanisms in the company supervision and control system was significantly limited, whereas corporate governance was implemented mainly be means of internal mechanisms. Moreover, the scope of corporate control in companies with Treasury shareholding was much greater than that resulting from the ownership structure.

This study aims to determine and analyze 1) the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend policy and value of the firm; 2) the effects of dividend policy mediated in order of causality between corporate governance mechanisms and value of the firm. The sample used was the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange with the observation period starting in 2000 to 2007. The results showed that: 1) corporate governance mechanisms in istitutional ownership represented by institutional ownership have a positive and significant impact on dividend policy represented by dividend payout ratio; 2) corporate governance mechanisms are represented by institutional ownership, independent boards, and board’s size have a positive effect and significant impact on dividend policy, represented by Tobin's q; and 3) the dividend policy does not mediate the relationship of causality between corporate governance mechanisms (which are represented by boards institutional ownership and board’s size) with Tobin's q. Key Word : corporate governance mechanism, value of the firm, boards independent, dividend payout ra

Reduction of Asymmetric Information Through Corporate Governance Mechanisms - The Importance of Ownership Dispersion and International Orientation

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm value of the listed companies in China. Does the better corporate governance lead to the higher firm value? Or does the higher firm value make it easy to choose a better governance mechanism? Or they affect each other? In other words, this paper tries to answer whether the corporate governance mechanism is only decided by institutional arrangement, or by market choice according to firm value or performance or by the interaction of institutional arrangement and market choice? It tries to answer whether institutional arrangement maximizes the firm value, or an invisible hand pushes them to arrive at its maximum. Design/methodology/approach – This paper establishes an analytic framework of simultaneous equations based on causality, which includes five endogenous variables: ownership of larger shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation, debt financing and firm value. It adopts 1,644 data samples from 274 Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007- 2012 after the non-tradable shares reform. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of single equation, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation of simultaneous equations are respectively done to show the differences of these three kinds of estimations. Findings – The empirical results show that differences exist among OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation. Finally, 3SLS estimation should be adopted because the OLS and 2SLS estimation are biased. There are endogenous relationships between corporate governance mechanism and firm value. Through the 3SLS estimation, it is found that first, ownership concentration and firm value affect each other positively. Second, managerial ownership and firm value affect each other positively; third, director compensation and firm value affect each other negatively, while director compensation and firm performance affect each other positively. Finally, debt financing level and firm value are negatively related to each other. Practical implications – It means that ownership of large shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation and debt financing in the Chinese listed companies are found to have a root in the interaction between institutional arrangement and market choice. It is also found that adverse selection occurs when creditors loan to the listed companies. Managerial compensation is positively related to accounting profit, but it is negatively related to firm value because managers increase profit due by earning management. This could only increase the accounting profits and obtain huge cash compensation, but not increase firm value and even harm the interests of shareholders. Originality/value – This paper not only shows the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation but also compares the estimation of 2SLS and 3SLS in terms of empirical methods. It gives answers to the following questions: whether the relationship is one-way causality or bilateral causality between ownership concentration, managerial ownership, director compensation and firm value; whether governance mechanism affects firm value by institutional arrangement, or market drives both of them to strike a balance by an invisible hand. In other words, does it make them arrive at equilibrium through the competitive selection process when shareholders, directors, managers and creditors attempt to maximize themselves of their interests?

The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting quality (FRQ) remains a central concern for policymakers and scholars, particularly within emerging economies where institutional frameworks may be weak. This study examines how internal controls, audit committee characteristics, executive accountability, ownership concentration, and regulatory quality influence FRQ, using firm-level data drawn from 210 companies in an emerging market over the period 2015–2022. Employing a combination of linear regression and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), the results indicate that while internal controls exhibit a positive yet statistically weak association with FRQ, other mechanisms such as audit committee effectiveness, executive accountability, and ownership concentration do not show significant independent effects. The QCA highlights that specific combinations of governance mechanisms, rather than individual components, are associated with higher FRQ, aligning with recent configurational perspectives on corporate governance. These findings suggest that isolated reforms targeting single governance elements may be insufficient without broader institutional strengthening. The study recommends an integrated policy approach that enhances internal governance while simultaneously improving external enforcement, legal protections for minority shareholders, and regulatory capacity. Such measures can foster greater transparency, investor confidence, and sustainable economic development in emerging markets.