In The Politics of Islam, Birol Baskan sets out on the ambitious task of explaining the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the governments of five Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He traces what began as a symbiotic relationship between these states and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s before chronicling a divergence of attitudes among the Gulf’s ruling elites toward the Muslim Brotherhood today, marking key events like the Iranian Revolution, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the 9/11 attacks, and the Arab Spring uprisings in the 2010s as critical junctures in this change. This comparative and chronological approach is useful, although Saudi Arabia, as Baskan highlights, emerges as an outlier. Baskan explains the unique continued relevance of Saudi religious actors by the fact that their influence predated the construction of institutions of the modern nation-state.Baskan also finds that “the level of state religiosity seems to have little impact on whether Islamism generates opposition in a country or not” (2–3, emphasis original). To this end, he investigates literature about Islamism’s oppositionality―an understudied topic and one that certainly deserves attention, particularly when writing and thinking about state-Muslim Brotherhood relations. In his view, Islamism “seeks to expand the scope of Islam beyond the specific areas explicitly covered by the Islamic law” and as a result sets out to compel the state that all rules and norms should be derived from Islamic sources (11). Meanwhile, modern states have sought to harness the political and social capital of religion, and thus, even if they try to put in place religious rules, as in many Gulf states, they often run into Islamist opposition. And yet the Muslim Brotherhood has not become oppositional in all cases; Baskan notes Bahrain and Qatar as examples.After an introduction in which he discusses Islamism as an oppositional movement and state-religion relations in the Gulf, Baskan’s book has five substantive chapters. The first of these (chapter 2) describes how the Gulf states were founded and highlights the role of religious scholars in the formation of educational and judicial systems. It is interesting that Baskan begins his analysis in the pre-independence period. In my own book tracing state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, I began after independence and indeed after the realization of oil wealth. Baskan’s longer historical lens, however, gives a sense of the extent to which Ottoman and British legacies affected state-religion relations in the Gulf, since religious figures held political capital in Saudi Arabia long before the advent of the modern Saudi state.The second substantive chapter (chapter 3) covers the period 1950–70 and shows how the regional political context in which Arab nationalism was ascendant as the oppositional political ideology and the choice of all five of the states covered to welcome members of the Muslim Brotherhood who escaped repression elsewhere in the region―namely from Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Indeed, it was during this period that all five of the states under study in the volume were aligned in their policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood, welcoming many of its members from abroad to staff nascent educational and judicial sectors.Chapter 4 examines the period between 1980 and the late 2000s, tracing how domestic reforms in education and justice, sectors in which members of the Muslim Brotherhood had once been active, changed how these four states interacted with Islamists, particularly as Islamists accrued power in both sectors. In this discussion, however, Baskan appears to conflate modernity with secularism. The Gulf states, not to mention the United States, prove that religiosity can be interwoven into modern, purportedly secular, institutions. In his words, “all the Gulf states issued man-made laws to regulate increasingly complex modern life. This does not suggest, however, that they intentionally pursued state secularization. It rather suggests that the Islamic law is insufficiently developed to regulate all, new or old, fields of human life and in fact grants rulers extensive discretion to regulate a range of them” (69–70). I find it difficult to accept the notion that religion necessarily is at odds with modernity or modernizing reforms, especially considering that Islamic law exists as a living and adaptable body rather than a strictly codified legislative text. Baskan later states that “the modern state inescapably confronts religious actors” (215)―a claim that I believe can be contested, since modernity does not always imply secularism or Westernization, as it has in many countries of the Gulf. Further, because much of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is made by humans rather than coming directly from God, it is perhaps uniquely open to reform.The fifth chapter focuses on geopolitics during the same period (1980s to the late 2000s), particularly the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the 9/11 attacks. In so doing, Baskan discusses ways in which regional events fundamentally shaped how Gulf regimes viewed Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Increasingly, Islamists came to be seen as part of a viable political opposition (except in Bahrain and Qatar) in the aftermath of the fall of Arab nationalism. It was during this period that the Gulf states developed different attitudes toward the Brotherhood, ranging from suspicion in those states in which the Brotherhood became oppositional (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE), and co-optation in states in which the Brotherhood was a potential partner (Bahrain and Qatar).The sixth chapter focuses on the Arab Spring, when state-Muslim Brotherhood relations shifted sharply in the five states under study, from a loyalist Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain and Qatar, to a tolerated Brotherhood in Kuwait, to the Muslim Brotherhood’s being designated as a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He uses statements of specific Islamist figures to tell the story of how relations change, yet not all of the figures he uses are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This approach also overlooks existing scholarship on Islamism in the Gulf as well as primary source material from the local organizations themselves. In Saudi Arabia, Baskan uses the figure of Salman al-ʿAwdah, in the UAE―Muhammad al-Siddiqi, in Kuwait―Tareq al-Suwaidan, and in Qatar―Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In my view, it would have been more effective to analyze what Muslim Brotherhood movements did and the statements which they produced in the wake of the events of the Arab Spring. Also, the use of Egyptian-born Shaykh Qaradawi to give a sense of the position of Qatari Islamists points to a larger issue about the importance of indigenous religious scholarship in the Gulf.While Baskan makes an important point about a lack of indigenous religious scholars at independence in the Gulf states, I would argue that the field has changed significantly in intervening decades, with many Bahraini, Kuwaiti, and Qatari religious figures having emerged in their own right in the past decades. Throughout the volume, Baskan, in my view, underestimates the role of Gulf-based Islamists in the field of Islamism writ large. For instance, he states “The Arab Gulf region did not produce any Islamists who made a contribution to the development of Islamism” (47). This statement dismisses the substantial scholarship produced by Gulf-based Islamists ranging from the extreme (Osama bin Laden), to the quietist Salafi strand, which has found a home in Kuwait since the 1980s, to ideologues of the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. Baskan further claims that a “home-grown” Muslim Brotherhood organization emerged only in Bahrain and Kuwait (88), denying the agency of local Islamists in other countries he studies. While the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements in the Gulf were certainly influenced by outsiders initially, the Gulf has produced its own types of Islamists and strand of Islamist ideology.All in all, Baskan’s book provides a helpful reference and overview of state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in five Gulf states, a huge undertaking to be applauded. He claims that modern states inevitably face opposition from religious actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as they try to expand control over new state institutions (especially in education and the judiciary), which once were controlled by religious actors. Nonetheless, variation exists among the Gulf states, as the Brotherhood did not become oppositional in all five states―an important finding of the book. Still, Baskan leaves some important issues unaddressed. For instance, is authoritarianism rather than modernity to blame for the attempted state takeover of arms of the state once ceded to religious figures? And while Saudi Arabia maintains a cohesive native religious class, how much independent political capital does it still retain as the state seeks to take over more areas previously under their control? At what point does coherence no longer imply political capital?Further, Baskan recognizes throughout the book that the states under study have massive financial resources, which they used to help finance state modernization, to try to buy off political discontent during the Arab Spring, and to fund the Morsi and later the Sisi governments in Egypt after the Arab Spring. However, he does not explicitly engage the academic literature linked to rentierism, which I believe may have helped to show how state-Muslim Brotherhood relations in the Gulf are qualitatively different from those elsewhere in the region. He mentions these issues tangentially in a brief conclusion, but the book would benefit from a broader assessment and recognition of how the Muslim Brotherhood operates as an oppositional movement in rentier states of the Gulf. This kind of assessment could then be tied to a more general discussion of opposition in such states. The result, in my judgment, would have been a very useful contribution to Gulf studies.To be fair, Baskan never sets out to make a contribution Gulf studies specifically, seeking instead to question the oppositional nature of Islamist movements and the degree to which opposition might be predicted in certain contexts in the region. This he largely succeeds in doing.
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