Eric Schliesser. Adam Smith: Systematic Philosopher and Public Thinker.

Reviewed by: Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment Fred D. Miller Jr. Charles L. Griswold . Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 412. Cloth, $59.95. For over a century, scholars have been vexed by the so-called "Adam Smith problem," which concerns the relationship between the two works which Smith published during his lifetime: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) in 1759, and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) in 1776 (citations are to the Liberty Classics reprints of the Oxford University Press editions). Many have regarded them as discordant: while TMS is apparently concerned with classical ethics, WN seems to assume that humans are basically egoistic, although they can be directed toward the public good by means of the "invisible hand." It is tempting to view Smith as a transitional author: TMS is the swan song of virtue ethics, whereas WN is a pioneering work in a new tradition of political economy. Griswold challenges this temptation in this brilliant study, arguing that Smith had a coherent and integrated philosophical viewpoint encompassing TMS, WN, and other surviving writings. Griswold views Smith as offering a virtue ethics and "throwing in his lot with the ancient moralists" (65). He argues, "We cannot grasp Smith's diagnosis of and therapy for the modern age without devoting considerable attention to his analysis of the virtues (especially the virtue of justice) as well as to the theory of the emotions, of the impartial spectator, and of sympathy" (20). Smith tried to reconcile a traditional ethics with modern skepticism and the new values associated with commercial society and religious secularism. Griswold's book illuminates a wide range of themes in Smith's moral philosophy: his view of rhetoric, method, and system underlying TMS (chapter 1); sympathy and self-interest (chapter 2); moral psychology and the theory of the impartial spectator (chapter 3); Smith's skepticism and reservations about philosophy (chapter 4); virtue theory (chapter 5); justice (chapter 6); the relationship between TMS and WN (chapter 7); and nature versus artifice in ethics (chapter 8). The epilogue critically discusses whether Smith's moral theory falls into subjectivism, and whether [End Page 439] Smith goes too far in excluding philosophers such as Socrates from ordinary moral discourse. A brief review cannot do justice to Griswold's compelling interpretation, and I shall focus on his solution to "the old problem of how the moral theory and the political economy mesh" (21). Griswold argues, "Smith sees himself as synthesizing an ancient view about the nature of virtue with a modern approach to the problem of the source of moral value. Consequently the moral psychology (especially the notions of sympathy and the impartial spectator) and the virtue theory must be understood in light of each other" (181). Further, "The virtue theory is the moral foundation of Smith's political economy, political theory, and 'natural jurisprudence.' Hence the virtue theory is closely tied to his doctrine of liberty as well as to his views about the pursuit of wealth. However 'ancient' the virtue theory may in some respects be, Smith combines it with a modern view of the social and political institutions appropriate to virtue" (ibid.). With impressive erudition Griswold argues that "taken together . . . TMS and WN form complementary parts of a larger whole" (265), and that Smith thinks "the virtues of a free and commercial society" may be defended on the basis of views espoused in WN: skepticism of state interference in economic and social matters, anti-utopianism, and the doctrine of the invisible hand (21). Yet WN does not place blind faith in laissez faire but advocates social justice, compulsory public education and greater taxes on the rich (254, 264, 359). Has Griswold, then, finally solved the Adam Smith Problem? There remains the problem that WN apparently neglects central themes of TMS: sympathy, the impartial spectator, and benevolence. In TMS virtue has distinctive components: "Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence" (TMS 262). These constitute perfect virtue: "The man who acts according to the rules of perfect...

Adam Smith was probably one of the first philosophers to introduce the concept of impartiality into the realm of moral philosophy. In his book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), published in 1759, Smith develops the idea of an impartial spectator, one of his most compelling concepts. Like the ancient parrhesiast, the impartial spectator stands for an authority that we need greatly in order to 'pull off the mysterious veil of self-delusion'. The impartial spectator possesses a particular type of objectivity, since the stranger holds a viewpoint which is within and beyond society at the same time. The author's argument starts with a short discussion of Adam Smith's theory of sympathy, and then proceeds with a general account of his idea of the impartial spectator, followed by showing how Smith's impartial spectator could be understood as a revenant of the ancient figure of the parrhesiast. Keywords: Adam Smith; impartial spectator; impartiality; parrhesiast; sympathy; The Theory of Moral Sentiments

As social economics is a value‐directed enquiry into economic theory as it pertains to the formulation of economic policy it is incumbent upon the social economist not merely to state a value position but to provide reasons for holding this position. In this manner values enter the realm of rational discourse and are no, longer treated as mere preferences. Since this is precisely what Adam Smith did in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), the social economist interested in learning from Smith's social economics must confront the issue of the relationship between TMS and the Wealth of Nations. The precise relationship between TMS and WN is at once the most interesting and the most controversial aspect of Adam Smith's social and economic thought. The failure of Smith explicitly to connect the works remains a mystery. Particularly striking is the complete absence of the impartial spectator in WN although there are passages, cited below, which contain reference to ethical judgements implying the spectator thesis of TMS. This article will not attempt to “solve” the Adam Smith problem, nor will it attempt to offer a new proof for or against the consistency of the two great works. Rather, the purpose of this article is to offer an interpretation which makes sense of the TMS‐WN connection which Smith might have used to relate them. The article suggests that Smith could have explicitly introduced the spectator into his chapters on value and distribution in a way which would have consistently linked the social theory of TMS with the economic theory of WN. There is, of course, no strong evidence that Smith actually thought of the connection in the proposed way. However, some textual evidence can be cited to suggest that he may have thought along these lines and that if he did not he might nevertheless assent to this as a legitimate extension of his concepts.

El presente trabajo se propone mostrar los puntos de contacto existentes entre el desarrollo de la noción de simpatía en La Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales y el desarrollo de la noción de valor en La Riqueza de las Naciones. En cada una de sus dos obras (La Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales y La Riqueza de las Naciones), Smith elige a la noción de simpatía y a la noción de valor como principios fundamentales para la armonía de la conducta social y del sistema de intercambio mercantil, respectivamente. Pero, en ambos casos, esos principios rigen solamente en sociedades pequeñas y no en la sociedad de carácter universal que asomaba ya en la época smithiana, donde el individuo moderno ya no tiene lazos de afecto con todos los miembros de la sociedad y, asimismo, desconoce los esfuerzos necesarios para producir todas las mercancías necesarias para su vida cotidiana.

The Hidden Adam Smith in His Alleged Theology

Adam Smith's Prudence (Self Interest-Self Love) Was the Bedrock Foundation and Necessary Condition for the Attainment of All Other Virtues in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations

Many scholars have noted the ways in which Jane Austen's narratives bring to life elements of Adam Smith's moral philosophy as articulated in Theory of Moral Sentiments. His economic treatise Wealth of Nations is also worth considering. Looking at the representations of sailors in Mansfield Park and Persuasion, this essay traces connections to Wealth of Nations to argue that Austen is cautiously but increasingly accepting the role of commerce in her society. Through her portrayal of naval officers, she conceptualises commercial ambition and domestic affection as intertwined rather than in tension. This connection provides a check to acquisitiveness and mercantile urges. She also appears to reject specialisation as a desirable human occupation. As a result, she unites the sympathies of The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the entrepreneurial energy of The Wealth of Nations. While Fanny Price and Anne Elliot are each, in their own ways, exemplary women, it is noteworthy that Austen gives us William Price and Captain Wentworth as exemplary, naval, commercial, men.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a book praising commerce. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith claims that viewing oneself from a distance decreases the natural tendency toward self-deception and increases the propriety of one's behavior. In front of strangers and distant acquaintances, an individual would generally restrain the more self-indulgent and excessive passions and be more composed than in front of family and close friends. Frequent exposure to strangers fosters the habit of propriety—the basis of moral behavior. Commerce increases one's opportunities to interact with strangers and introduces distance in interpersonal relationships. Commercial societies are therefore the environments that most facilitate and are amenable to proper and moral behavior. According to this reading of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, for Smith, commerce facilitates not just material prosperity but also moral development.

I build on Adam Smith’s account of the impartial spectator in The Theory of Moral Sentiments in order to offer a modest ideal observer theory of moral judgment that is adequate in the following sense: the account specifies the hypothetical conditions that guarantee the authoritativeness of an agent’s (or agents’) responses in constituting the standard in question, and, if an actual agent or an actual community of agents are not under those conditions, their responses are not authoritative in setting this standard. However, in the account that I provide, the hypothetical conditions can themselves be constructed from the psychology and interactions of actual human beings. In other words, facts about the morally appropriate and inappropriate are determined from hypothetical conditions that––while agents in a given society might have yet to attain them––can be constructed from those agents’ shared experiences. Thus, the account offers both an attainable standard of moral judgment and a standard that can transcend the biases of the society which gave rise to it. I also defend the account against three challenges: (a) ideal observer theories do not offer the right kind of motivation to act on the verdicts of the ideal observer; (b) ideal observer theories cannot explain why the idealization in question is well-motivated and not objectionably ad hoc; (c) the standard used in ideal observer theories cannot be defended upon further reflection, because we would need a non-arbitrary, second-order standard to govern our reflection on the first-order standard of moral judgment.

The moral sentiments Ever since Adam Smith (1759) proposed his Theory of Moral Sentiments it has been known that people are not strictly self-regarding, but also other-regarding. This other-regarding aspect of humans is important in creating a sustainable, livable, and sociable society. According to Smith, moral sentiments play a pivotal role in this. He also made it explicit that in his view moral sentiments are a universal aspect of humans; in us is rooted the ability to feel emotions about the fortune and misfortune of others, and our behavioral choices reflect this. Put differently, our other-regarding preferences stem from moral sentiments. The opening paragraph of Smith’s book (1759: 9) reads:How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

Reading Adam Smith after Darwin: On the evolution of propensities, institutions, and sentiments

Dear readers, I would like to devote the preface to this year's first issue of the European Financial and Accounting Journal to a short thought about one wall calendar. The American Economic Association sent its members a calendar covering the period from January 2010 until June 2011 on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of its founding. Each of these eighteen months is dedicated to the one famous name of economic science. There is a picture of Adam Smith, who teaches his Theory of Moral Sentiments (recognized by the text on the blackboard) and the seventeen students carefully listening to his lecture, on the first page. John Stuart Mill, George Stigler, Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes sit in first row, Irving Fisher, Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Friedrich von Hayek, David Ricardo, Leon Walras and Thomas Robert Malthus are in the next row, Francis Edgeworth, Thorstein Veblen, Marshall, John von Neumann and Richard Theodore Ely occupied the rear seats and then Joan Robinson and Milton Friedman sit a little away. The position of Adam Smith (5th June, 1723 - 17th July, 1790), the Scottish native, in the role of the teacher seems to be indisputable. He sets the fundamentals of modern economic science in his major works; The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, from which researchers in the whole world benefit from it even nowadays. His followers developed his theory in a number of often very different fields. For most days in the year there are names of representatives of economic science, who were born or baptized on this day. The representative sample is made of a total of 392 economists living in different times, from different countries and often engaged in various scientific topics. In this manner there are names well known, less known and some rather forgotten. However, you can find some surprises. In the case of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, I only vaguely remember from my earlier studies, that in his collected writings there are some signs of scientific work, but his inclusion among reputable scientists do not fit me much. But the biggest surprise seems to be Rosa Luxembourg, who was for me by the former communist regime profaned representative. Only this calendar forced me to look into her biography, and there can also be found her book about the Accumulation of Capital written in spirit of Marxist economics. The largest number of names appears in the month of July (44), on the contrary the lowest number appears in September (28). In terms of individual days the 26th July wins, in this day the famous five economic scientists were born. However, it seems that a good day for the birth of a new future genius is also 5th June, when both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes could celebrate birthday (or the day of baptism). Representation of women in science is unfortunately rather symbolic. Only eleven of them can be found in the list. They are Glicman Irma Adelman, Susan Carleton Atlee, Mary Joan Bowman, Katharine Coman, Anne Osborn Krueger, Margaret Gilpin Reid, Alice Mitchell Rivlin, Anna Jacobson Schwartz, and Martha Beatrice Webb in addition to Joan Robinson and Rosa Luxembourg. Eight economic scientists were born in the seventeenth century, 31 in the eighteenth century, 148 in the nineteenth century and 205 in the twentieth century. The oldest representative is English economist William Petty (27th May, 1623 - 16th December, 1687), the author of the labor theory of value, while the younger generation is represented by the French scholar Emmanuel Saez (26th November, 1972) dealing with optimal taxation. The calendar of the American Economic Association recalls the names of those who have contributed to the development of economic science, those persons, without whose research, ideas, analysis, models, but also mistakes, would our world look a little different. Maybe the world would be better without some of them, it certainly cannot be excluded, but in that case we would now probably face the same problems that our ancestors have already solved.

Adam Smith's Model of Man and Some of its Consequences

This study aims to Islamize Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand, which has long been regarded as a central pillar of capitalist economic theory. The invisible hand describes a free market mechanism in which individuals pursuing self-interest unintentionally contribute to collective welfare. While this theory emphasizes efficiency, it has been criticized for neglecting morality, justice, and equity. From an Islamic economic perspective, these dimensions are essential, as economic activity must be aligned with values of tawḥīd (monotheism), justice, and social responsibility. The research employs a qualitative approach through literature review and conceptual analysis. The literature review examines Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments, alongside classical and contemporary Islamic economic writings. Conceptual analysis is then used to assess the compatibility between the invisible hand and Islamic principles, particularly the role of zakat, ḥisbah, and maqāṣid al-Syarīʿah in shaping economic justice and social welfare. The results show that Smith’s invisible hand can be reconstructed by integrating Islamic values, thereby producing a more equitable economic model. While self-interest remains a driving force for efficiency, Islamic principles such as distributive justice through zakat, ethical oversight through ḥisbah, and alignment with maqāṣid al-Syarīʿah ensure that markets also serve moral and social objectives. The implication of this study is twofold: theoretically, it contributes to the enrichment of Islamic economic thought; practically, it offers policymakers an alternative framework for designing economic systems that are not only efficient but also just and welfare-oriented.

Despite the fact that the discussion on the economic man flourishes in John Stuart Mill’s work, this does not mean that this issue has not been previously discussed, at least, not in clear terms. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that even if Adam Smith never specifically characterized the person who deals with economic affairs, he pointed out some of his characteristics in his writings. We can find some clues to his thoughts on that issue in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762) and The Wealth of Nations (1776). In this article, Smith’s homo oeconomicus is approached in three aspects: rational, moral and emotional. In addition, we also argue that the philosopher had advanced some studies of psychology and behavioral economics that would be developed from the twentieth century, which is discussed when we approach the emotional side of Smith’s economic man.