Ethnographic Philosophy: A Qualitative Method for Naturalised Philosophy

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Literally speaking, "Philosophy of biology" is a rather old expression. William Whewell coined it in 1840, at the very time he introduced the expression "philosophy of science". Whewell was fond of creating neologisms, like Auguste Comte, his French counterpart in the field of the philosophical reflection about science. Historians of science know that a few years earlier, in 1834, Whewell had generated a small scandal when he proposed the word "scientist" as a general term by which "the students of the knowledge of the material world" could describe themselves, and distinguish themselves from artists. The term "philosopher", Whewell argued, was too wide. A new generic term, more or less equivalent to the French term "savant", was needed in order to prevent the disintegration of science that seemed to flow from its specialization in modern times.1 When Whewell first introduced the terms "philosophy of science" and "philosophy of biology" in his 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences, the latter term was merely a special branch of "philosophy of science". The expression "philosophy of science" itself had two justifications: firstly, this phrase expressed the idea that "science" remained cognitively coherent enough to justify a critical enquiry into its methodological unity and its foundation; secondly, the phrase "philosophy of science" was required in order to distinguish a properly "philosophical" enquiry from a "historical" approach to science. Although Whewell's 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences 2 had approximately the same chapter structure as his 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences 3 (that is, a series of chapters successively devoted to the concept of science in general, and although there was considerable overlap between the contents of the two books, then to particular sciences), its theoretical purpose was different. Clearly, Whewell was not willing to confuse the genres of history and philosophy as Auguste Comte had done in his 1830 Cours de philosophie positive.4 Note also that the word "biology" was still extremely rare in English when Whewell used it in 1840. In fact, Whewell's 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences does not make use of the word "biology": Whewell successively examines "botany", "zoology", "physiology" and "comparative antomy" as special branches of "analytico-classificatory science", then discusses palaeontology as a special case of the "palaeo-etiological sciences". Three years later, in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell does use "biology" as a generic term for all the sciences dealing with life. The various sciences which were separately examined in the previous book are now collectively considered. Furthermore, the main philosophical problem raised by biology is its dual nature: biology is both nomological and a historical science. Modern philosophers of biology are generally unaware of the story of the origins of the expression "philosophy of biology", but Whewell's dual theoretical nature of biology is still a major concern for modern "philosophy of biology".

Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data, and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena, often in terms of forces or entities we do not perceive with our normal, unaided human senses. Empiricism has never been congenial to realism about such scientific posits. Bas van Fraassen’s “Constructive Empiricism” purports that realist interpretations of any “unobservables” mentioned by a scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that theory’s empirical adequacy, and that “explanations” are merely pragmatic, insofar as they are context‑specific to the presuppositions of whomever poses the question an explanation is to answer. Here I argue that “Constructive Empiricism” rests upon a series of flawed presumptions about natural science and about epistemology. I draw upon two main resources. One resource is the constraints upon specifically c ognitive reference to particulars, first identified by Kant (and later by Evans). The second is William Harper’s (2011) brilliant re‑analysis and defense of Newton’s Prin c ipia , which shows that, and how, Newton justified his realism about gravitational force. One surprise is that Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (examined in §3) directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of scientific method (§4), which strongly supports his realism about gravi‑ tational force (summarized in §2). A further surprise is that Hegel first recognized that this semantics of singular cognitive reference directly and strongly supports Newton’s meth odological Rule 4 of experimental philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force, and about distance forces generally. The textual and exegetical issues these attributions require I examine elsewhere. Here I make these important findings available to philosophers and historians of science. (*) Invited paper

Notes on Contributors

Aim. To identify the main trends in the development of experimental philosophy. Methodology. The current state of contradictory judgments in the development of experimental philosophy has been analyzed. The methodology of the research is a systematic analysis of the problem of the development of experimental philosophy in science, as well as general scientific methods of theoretical knowledge, methods of system analysis, comparison and generalization of foreign and Russian studies on the problem. Experimental philosophy involves the empirical study of methods and conceptual judgments confirming empirical research based on experiments and surveys to evaluate the philosophical epistemological activity. Results. Based on the study of concepts, positive and negative models, the question arises about the importance of experimental philosophy in science. Critical remarks about experimental philosophy are highlighted: experimental conditions lack structured theoretical validity, reliance on experimental data is carried out; reflexive and social directions of philosophical analysis are blurred; there is an inaccuracy in the interpretation of procedural and evaluative forms of philosophical expertise. Research implications. The results of the research contribute to the methodological basis of social philosophy. The relevance is determined by the practical significance of experimental philosophy, i. e. the application of experimental results to methodology in the aspect of philosophical theories. This will solve the dilemma of using intuition as a form of philosophical proof. The authors conclude that experimental philosophy has the right to use both intuition and rational and empirical ways to solve a scientific problem. Consequently, experimental philosophy assumes the presence of positive andnegative results as opposite structures in the theoretical and methodological set of studies to obtain a rationally justified model.

Notes on Contributors

Previous articleNext article FreeSynthetic Bibliography, with Special Reference to the History of ScienceGeorge SartonGeorge Sarton Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 3, Number 2Autumn, 1920 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/357911 Views: 103Total views on this site Citations: 4Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Marcel Martin George Sarton (1884-1956): the Founder of the History of Science Branch, Historica Olomucensia 53, no.vol. 53vol. 53 (Dec 2017): 273–320.https://doi.org/10.5507/ho.2017.036 Herman H. Henkle Content and the Curriculum in Education for Librarianship, The Library Quarterly 12, no.11 (Sep 2015): 29–48.https://doi.org/10.1086/615103 George Sarton Sixteenth Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization, Isis 7, no.22 (Oct 2015): 171–352.https://doi.org/10.1086/358324 George Sarton Ninth Critical Bibliography of the History, Philosophy and Organization of Science and of the History of Civilization, Isis 3, no.33 (Oct 2015): 451–497.https://doi.org/10.1086/357970

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview ArticlesHISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP OR MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?RONALD N. GIERERONALD N. GIEREDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 24, Number 3September 1973 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/24.3.282 Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref © 1973 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: By Alan Richardson Scientific Philosophy as a Topic for History of Science Alan Richardson, Isis 99, no.11 (Jul 2015): 88–96.https://doi.org/10.1086/587534 Ronald N. Giere Philosophy of Science Naturalized, Philosophy of Science 52, no.33 (Oct 2015): 331–356.https://doi.org/10.1086/289255 Stephen J. Wykstra Toward a Historical Meta-Method for Assessing Normative Methodologies: Rationability, Serendipity, and the Robinson Crusoe Fallacy, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980, no.11 (Oct 2015): 211–222.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.1.192566 James Robert Brown History and the Norms of Science, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980, no.11 (Oct 2015): 236–248.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.1.192568 Richard M. Burian More than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science 44, no.11 (Oct 2015): 1–42.https://doi.org/10.1086/288722 Nancy L. Maull Reconstructed Science as Philosophical Evidence, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976, no.11 (Oct 2015): 119–129.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1976.1.192355 Ernan McMullin History and Philosophy of Science: A Marriage of Convenience?, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974 (Sep 2015): 585–601.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1974.495828

I shall attempt to demonstrate here that the general categories of hermeneutics can be applied just as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities, and I shall explore the implications of this demonstration for both types of disciplines. In doing so, it will be necessary for me to raise some unfashionable issues about the objectivity and rationality of critical interpretations, and, as a result, I may appear to be cast in the role of advocatus diaboli. The value of lowering the critical barriers that have been set up between the human and natural sciences, however, will outweigh any incidental paradoxes that may crop up en route.

Previous article No AccessSeventy-Second Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization (To January 1948)George Sarton and Frances SiegelGeorge Sarton Search for more articles by this author and Frances Siegel Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 39, Number 4Nov., 1948 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/348984 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1948 History of Science SocietyPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: George Sarton , and Frances Siegel Seventy-Third Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization (To November 1948), Isis 40, no.22 (Oct 2015): 124–193.https://doi.org/10.1086/349039

The conceptual dichotomy of Erklaren and Verstehen (explaining vs. understanding) has a revealing dual status. On the one hand, it has something of an antiquated air to it, as we loosely associate its origins with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and other nineteenth-century German philosophers who are not widely read any more, at least not within contemporary Anglo-American history and philosophy of the human sciences. At the same time, however, remnants of the dichotomy still come up in various guises and in various areas of contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science. One example is the long-standing debate over the logical status of action explanations (“reasons vs. causes”) in philosophy of mind (Davidson 1980), and associated issues of “teleological explanations” and the explanatory status of laws of nature in the philosophy of the human sciences (Dray 1957; Hempel 1965; von Wright 1971). Another is the question of whether the subject matter of the social sciences requires a special type of interpretative, hermeneutic, or perhaps even empathetic, “access” (Collingwood 1946; Winch 1964; Taylor [1971] 1985). More recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of how to explicate our capacity to interpret another person’s actions (see the recent suggestion that the “theory-theory” vs. “simulation theory” distinction is similar to some aspects of the Erklaren/Verstehen distinction) (Kogler and Stueber 2000). And within mainstream analytical philosophy of the social sciences, one of the central topics has long been the question of whether social facts/events can be reduced to the explanations of the actions of individuals (e.g., Kincaid 1997), raising questions about the units at which explanatory and/or interpretive efforts ought to be directed. (“individualism” vs. “holism”). This question can be traced back to early twentieth-century debates in economics and other emerging social sciences (Udehn 2001).

December 01 2002 Comments on the Precarious Relationship between History and Philosophy of Science Richard M. Burian Richard M. Burian Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Richard M. Burian Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Online Issn: 1530-9274 Print Issn: 1063-6145 © 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2003 Perspectives on Science (2002) 10 (4): 398–407. https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402322288039 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Search Site Citation Richard M. Burian; Comments on the Precarious Relationship between History and Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science 2002; 10 (4): 398–407. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402322288039 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsPerspectives on Science Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2003 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The relationship between the history and philosophy of engineering is similar to that between the history and philosophy of science and that between the history and philosophy of technology. Lakatos’ thesis—that “philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind”—applies as well to the history and philosophy of engineering. To advance the history of engineering requires some attention to the nature of engineering and vice versa. The effort here is to draw some lines of demarcation among the histories of engineering, of technology, of science, and of economics from a philosophical point view. With regard to history, a theory of engineering evolution can bridge philosophy and history; an important part of such an evolution will also consider historical developments in the engineering community. There nevertheless remain important tensions and complementarities between the history and philosophy of engineering.

Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science is the second volume of a collection on Nietzsche and the Sciences, featuring essays addressing truth, epistemology, and the philosophy of science, with a substantial representation of analytically schooled Nietzsche scholars. This collection offers a dynamic articulation of the differing strengths of Anglo-American analytic and contemporary European approaches to philosophy, with translations from European specialists, notably Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Paul Valadier, and Walther Ch. Zimmerli.This broad collection also features a preface by Alasdair MacIntyre. Contributions explore Nietzsche's contributions to the philosophy of language and epistemology, and include essays on the social history of truth and the historical and cultural analyses of Serres and Baudrillard, as well as new contributions to the philosophy of science, including theological and hermeneutical approaches, history of science, the philosophy of medicine, cognitive science, and technology.