- Book Chapter
1
- 10.1007/978-3-642-55116-1_10
Assessment of Risk Studies and Severe Nuclear Accidents
- Jan 01, 2014
- Günter Kessler + 1 more +1
In Chaps. 7 and 9 the results of the risk studies for LWRs and the facts and consequences of the severe nuclear accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima were assessed. The severe nuclear accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima resulted in contamination of large areas and in the evacuation of the population of large areas.It is concluded that LWRs in Europe are built and operated in densely populated areas with cities of several 100,000 inhabitants. It is impossible to evacuate cities of that size in due time and their contamination is beyond anybody’s imagination. Therefore, the KHE safety concept was proposed around 1990 to build future LWRs such that the main accident path of the risk studies leading to the high number of deaths and to the large contamination of land should be eliminated by the safety design concept of the plant. The probabilistic safety studies leading to low frequencies of core melt in the range of 10−6 per year should be retained. However, the present risk concept should not be applicable any more to LWR plants built in future in Europe. It was concluded that the consequences of the most severe accidents in risk studies should be managed by the inner and outer containment of the reactor plant. A severe accident research program of the Research Center Karlsruhe, Germany, lasting for about two decades showed that it is possible to fulfill the requirements of the KHE concept. The KHE concept was essentially accepted by the German and French Safety Commissions and also incorporated in the German Atomic Law in 1994.The main findings of the Karlsruhe research program for severe accidents were as follows: A large scale steam explosion in the reactor pressure vessel of a PWR would not jeopardize the mechanical integrity of the reactor pressure vessel. Consequently a steam explosion followed by failure of the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel and of the containment as assumed in WASH-1400 and the German Risk study can be considered impossible. A large scale hydrogen detonation after core melt in the spherical containment of a KWU PWR-1300 reactor plant cannot jeopardize the integrity of the steel containment. Nevertheless hydrogen recombiners in the containment are useful for preventing or mitigating some accident sequences. Core melt down after a break of a pipe of the residual heat removal system in the annulus of the containment system or core melt down after an uncontrolled large scale steam generator tube break can be avoided by proper design. Containment failure after core melt down under high primary coolant pressure, as assumed in WASH-1400 and the German risk study, can be avoided by manual or automatic opening of pressure relief valves (ADS systems of Chap. 3) or—as a limiting case—reinforced anchorage of the pressure vessel cover. Core melting through the bottom part of the reactor pressure vessel can be counteracted by flooding the reactor pressure vessel on the outside with water (severe accident measure). Similar results can be obtained by installing a molten core spreading and cooling device (core catcher). Appropriate core catcher designs were developed after research. A rising steam pressure in the inner containment after a core melt can be avoided by water spray systems. A mechanically intact double containment, where the inner containment is either a steel containment or a concrete containment with an inner steel liner, having a leak rate of 0.3–1 % per day after a core melt accident and where the leaking radioactive gases and aerosols are passed from the annulus through aerosol filters to a stack can fulfill the requirements of the KHE safety concept. In this case the contamination by radioactive fission products is essentially limited to the site of the reactor plant. No evacuation of the population is necessary. In summary all most severe accident consequences found in the WASH-1400 or the German risk study can be either controlled or eliminated or managed in future LWRs by appropriate design measures. Examples for such designs are EPR and KERENA (SWR-1000). Concluding remarks compare the KHE safety concept with the safety concept of presently operating reactors and more recent designs for LWRs.
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