Existence of Market Equilibria for Grid Computing

1 Mathematical Background.- Integration of Banach-Valued Correspondences.- Set-Valued Functions of Two Variables in Economic Theory.- 2 Equilibria, Core, and Pareto Optimality.- A Theorem on the Existence of Competitive Equilibria in a Market with a Finite Number of Agents and Whose Commodity Space is L?.- The Core of an Economy Without Ordered Preferences.- Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics in Infinite Dimensional Commodity Spaces.- 3 Core Equivalence.- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy with a Continuum of Commodities.- An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy with Commodity Space L? ? ?(L?, L1).- The Principle of Equivalence.- 4 The Existence of an Equilibrium in Economies with a Continuum of Agents.- A Very Weak Theorem on the Existence of Equilibria in Atomless Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities.- Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Agents and Commodities.- What is Perfect Competition?.- 5 Correlated Equilibria.- On the Existence of Correlated Equilibria.- Existence of Correlated Weak Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.- Communication Equilibria with Large State Spaces.- 6 Games with a Continuum of Players.- An Axiomatic Approach to the Efficiency of Non-Cooperative Equilibrium in Economies with a Continuum of Traders.- On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game.- Equilibria in Random and Bayesian Games with a Continuum of Players.- 7 Sequential Equilibria.- Recursive Utility Under Uncertainty.- Consistency and Continuity of Choice in a Sequence of Spot and Futures Markets.- 8 References.

On the Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Frictionless and Incomplete Stochastic Asset Markets

We are grateful to Jorg Laitenberger who allow us to take this chapter from his Ph.D. Thesis, Laitenberger [1999].

Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information

6 - Existence of competitive equilibria

Resource management and scheduling using economic-based principles and market-oriented models have been proven to be useful for scheduling tasks in Computing Grid. However, most studies only focus on the single objective of either cost or makespan. In this paper, we consider both cost and makespan, and focus on scheduling parallel tasks from Grid users considering a commodity market. A cost and time balancing algorithm, called MMCTB, which is based on Min-Min scheduling algorithm is proposed. The MMCTB minimizes and manages the execution cost and makespan of user tasks by a balancing formula and giving consideration to task urgency. The simulations reveal that the MMCTB has merits of needing less time and cost to complete the task, and high ratio of tasks executed within deadline by comparing with an enhanced Greedy heuristic.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OIL PRICES, EXCHANGE RATES AND MAIZE PRICES IN KENYA

The existence, determination, and effects of competitive market equilibrium for unit commitment power pool auctions are investigated in this paper. When an equilibrium does not exist, under specific situations conflictive multiple optimal primal solutions may exist. When an equilibrium exists, multiple primal solutions do not represent conflicts of interest. The existence or nonexistence of competitive equilibrium can be determined if the dual problem is solved to optimality. If equilibrium does not exist, there is excess supply at the optimal dual solution, which can be used to define priority orders and price-setting altematives to determine a final schedule, and avoid the conflicts of interest and revenue deficiency. Under disequilibrium, the optimal dual variables are not market clearing prices; a nonuniform pricing rule that avoids the flaws and complications of other pricing rules, such as maximum average cost and price minimization auctions, is proposed in the paper. The proposed scheduling and price-setting alternatives show that unit commitment models can be used in a market environment.

Existence of competitive equilibrium under financial constraints and increasing returns

The accelerated development in peer‐to‐peer and Grid computing has positioned them as promising next‐generation computing platforms. They enable the creation of virtual enterprises for sharing resources distributed across the world. However, resource management, application development and usage models in these environments is a complex undertaking. This is due to the geographic distribution of resources that are owned by different organizations or peers. The resource owners of each of these resources have different usage or access policies and cost models, and varying loads and availability. In order to address complex resource management issues, we have proposed a computational economy framework for resource allocation and for regulating supply and demand in Grid computing environments. This framework provides mechanisms for optimizing resource provider and consumer objective functions through trading and brokering services. In a real world market, there exist various economic models for setting the price of services based on supply‐and‐demand and their value to the user. They include commodity market, posted price, tender and auction models. In this paper, we discuss the use of these models for interaction between Grid components to decide resource service value, and the necessary infrastructure to realize each model. In addition to usual services offered by Grid computing systems, we need an infrastructure to support interaction protocols, allocation mechanisms, currency, secure banking and enforcement services. We briefly discuss existing technologies that provide some of these services and show their usage in developing the Nimrod‐G grid resource broker. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness of some of the economic models in resource trading and scheduling using the Nimrod/G resource broker, with deadline and cost constrained scheduling for two different optimization strategies, on the World‐Wide Grid testbed that has resources distributed across five continents. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Grid computing is the next generation platform that maximizes computing performance of system as using numerous computing resources on computer networks. Grid computing not only shares computing resources but also efficiently utilizes available computing resources. Therefore, grid computing needs resource management policies that handle and manage grid computing resources. This paper reviews existing resource management models based on economic principles such as auction model and commodity market model. This paper proposes an efficient resource management model, which is called the grid resource trade network model, and presents its bidding algorithms for grid users and grid providers. The proposed model reduces idle resources, improves resource utilization, and provides effective resource distribution. Empirical results show usefulness and efficiency of the grid resource trade network model.

A remark on the existence of equilibria in markets without ordered preferences and with a Riesz space of commodities

More on equilibria in competitive markets with externalities and a continuum of agents

Volunteer Computing (VC) is an approach under grid computing which prepares a platform for computer owners around the globe to donate their resources at internet based VC projects like as SETI@home, Folding@hom. Therefore, global desktop grid is a VC that includes hosts who present their resources to solve some kind of CPU, RAM or Disk space-intensive problems. At the moment, the common approach used in resource scheduling in VC is mostly based on CPU availability alone. However, we believe that RAM and disk space of the volunteering hosts also play a role in ensuring an optimized assignment of a job to a host, and hence, could lead to an improved resource scheduling performance of the VC. As an initial step to support the above proposal, a formula for normalizing the three different resource information, i.e., CPU, RAM, and disk space, into common representations is developed. In this paper, the normalization formula is presented as well as the formula for calculating the average availability of three resources. Besides, the results from applying the two formulas to a data set extracted from http://fta.inria.fr/res/ are also given. The results show a significant support to the potential of the proposed approach. Impact of this research to the organization will be execution of their tasks' project in suitable cluster of volunteers with specified weighted mean of resources.

This paper considers a network of agents who trade indivisible goods or services via bilateral contracts. Under a substitutability assumption on preferences, it is known that a competitive equilibrium exists. In “Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach,” Candogan, Epitropou, and Vohra show how to determine equilibrium outcomes as a generalized submodular flow problem. Existence of a competitive equilibrium and its equivalence to seemingly weaker notions of stability follow directly from the optimality conditions of the flow problem. The formulation enables the authors to perform comparative statics with respect to the number of buyers, sellers, and trades. In particular, they are able to shed light on the impact of new trading opportunities on the equilibrium trades, prices, and surpluses. In addition, they present algorithms for finding competitive equilibria in trading networks and testing stability.