Explicit and implicit emotional processing in peripheral vision: A saccadic choice paradigm

The prefrontal cortex is differentially involved in implicit and explicit facial emotion processing: An fNIRS study

Influence of attention mechanisms on cerebellar and basal ganglia activity during vocal emotion decoding.

Implicit and explicit processing of emotional facial expressions in Parkinson’s disease

Memory can be assessed with either explicit or implicit tasks. Implicit memory tasks, in contrast with explicit tasks, do not refer to conscious recollection of a previous learning experience. Implicit memory is revealed by a change in task performance that can be attributed to previous learning. Amnesic patients perform poorly on explicit memory tasks, but exhibit normal performance on implicit tasks. Recently, researchers have studied the implicit memory performance of patients with Alzheimer's disease. This article aims to give an overview of the performance of Alzheimer patients on four tasks of implicit memory. Compared with normal elderly controls, patients with Alzheimer's disease seem to demonstrate impaired performance on conceptual, but not on perceptual, implicit memory tasks. This dissociation could yield important information about the neurologic systems subserving implicit memory processes. Some suggestions for future research into the implicit memory of Alzheimer patients are given.

Interpreting emotional expressions appropriately poses a challenge for individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In particular, difficulties with emotional processing in ASD are more pronounced in contexts where emotional expressions are subtle, automatic, and reflexive-that is, implicit. In contrast, explicit emotional processing, which requires the cognitive evaluation of an emotional experience, appears to be relatively intact in individuals with ASD. In the present study, we examined the brain activation and functional connectivity differences underlying explicit and implicit emotional processing in age- and IQ-matched adults with (n = 17) and without (n = 15) ASD. Results indicated: (1) significantly reduced levels of brain activation in participants with ASD in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and superior temporal gyrus (STG) during implicit emotion processing; (2) significantly weaker functional connectivity in the ASD group in connections of the MPFC with the amygdala, temporal lobe, parietal lobe, and fusiform gyrus; (3) No group difference in performance accuracy or reaction time; and (4) Significant positive relationship between empathizing ability and STG activity in ASD but not in typically developing participants. These findings suggest that the neural mechanisms underlying implicit, but not explicit, emotion processing may be altered at multiple levels in individuals with ASD.

On the assumption that linguistic faculties reflect both lexical storage in the temporal cortex and combinatorial rules in the striatal circuits, several authors have shown that striatal-damaged patients are impaired with conjugation rules while retaining lexical knowledge of irregular verbs [Teichmann, M., Dupoux, E., Kouider, S., Brugières, P., Boissé, M. F., Baudic, S., Cesaro, P., Peschanski, M., & Bachoud-Lévi, A. C. (2005). The role of the striatum in rule application. The model of Huntington's disease at early stage. Brain, 128, 1155-1167; Ullman, M. T., Corkin, S., Coppola, M., Hickok, G., Growdon, J. H., Koroshetz, W. J., & Pinker, S. (1997). A neural dissociation within language: Evidence that the mental dictionary is part of declarative memory, and that grammatical rules are processed by the procedural system. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 266-276]. Yet, such impairment was documented only with explicit conjugation tasks in the production domain. Little is known about whether it generalizes to other language modalities such as perception and whether it refers to implicit language processing or rather to intentional rule operations through executive functions. We investigated these issues by assessing perceptive processing of conjugated verb forms in a model of striatal dysfunction, namely, in Huntington's Disease (HD) at early stages. Rule application and lexical processes were evaluated in an explicit task (acceptability judgments on verb and nonword forms) and in an implicit task (lexical decision on frequency-manipulated verb forms). HD patients were also assessed in executive functions, and striatal atrophy was evaluated with magnetic resonance imaging (bicaudate ratio). Results from both tasks showed that HD patients were selectively impaired for rule application but lexical abilities were spared. Bicaudate ratios correlated with rule scores on both tasks, whereas executive parameters only correlated with scores on the explicit task. We argue that the striatum has a core function in linguistic rule application generalizing to perceptive aspects of morphological operations and pertaining to implicit language processes. In addition, we suggest that the striatum may enclose computational circuits that underpin explicit manipulation of regularities.

Mood congruence effect in explicit and implicit memory tasks: a comparison between depressed patients, schizophrenic patients and controls

Neuroimaging studies have identified a number of cortical areas involved in the executive control of conscious actions. The areas most frequently implicated are prefrontal and cingulate cortices. Evidence suggests that both of these areas may be essential for executive control of willed action. Prefrontal cortex, however, may be responsible for the initial processing. Executive control is usually discussed with reference to willed actions and is assumed to regulate complex cognitive responses. Although many implicit processes involve complex responses, it is not known whether these actions are also controlled by executive processes. Significantly, some implicit tasks like those involving motor sequence learning and cross-modality priming activate the same areas of prefrontal cortex that are implicated in the executive control of willed actions. It is, however, not clear whether a single executive process controls both implicit and explicit processes, or the implicit processes are regulated by a separate set of executive control having distinct neuroanatomical location and processing properties.

Although we agree that a constructivist approach to emotional experience makes sense, we propose that implicit (visceromotor and somatomotor) emotional processes are dissociable from explicit (attention and reflection) emotional processes, and that the conscious experience of emotion requires an integration of the two. Assessments of implicit emotion and emotional awareness can be helpful in the neuroscientific investigation of emotion.

Who is speaking? Implicit and explicit self and other voice recognition

Attentional capture by incongruent object/background scenes in patients with Alzheimer disease

Response inhibition, a crucial component of executive function, is closely related to personal impulse control, social adaption, and mental health. Previous studies have found response inhibition deficit in patients with major depressive disorder, but whether it also exists in individuals with subclinical depression (SD) remains unclear. This study aimed to identify the ability of response inhibition to emotional face stimuli both under explicit and implicit conditions in individuals with SD. Thirty-six subclinical depressed college students and 39 healthy individuals were recruited and administered the non-emotional, explicit, and implicit emotional stop-signal tasks (SSTs). Mixed-model analyses of variance were used to analyze the differences between and within groups. In implicit emotional SST, the results showed a significant longer stop-signal response time, a shorter stop-signal delay time, a shorter go reaction time, and a similar proportion of stop success in the SD group compared to healthy controls. However, the above indices showed no significant difference between the two groups in the non-emotional SST and explicit emotional SST. These findings suggest a possible defect of response inhibition in implicit emotional processing in individuals with SD, which may potentially serve as a marker of susceptibility to depression and thus be applied to early screening and intervention for major depressive disorder.

Functional contributions of the basal ganglia to emotional prosody: Evidence from ERPs

This article proposes a unified framework for understanding creative problem solving, namely, the explicit-implicit interaction theory. This new theory of creative problem solving constitutes an attempt at providing a more unified explanation of relevant phenomena (in part by reinterpreting/integrating various fragmentary existing theories of incubation and insight). The explicit-implicit interaction theory relies mainly on 5 basic principles, namely, (a) the coexistence of and the difference between explicit and implicit knowledge, (b) the simultaneous involvement of implicit and explicit processes in most tasks, (c) the redundant representation of explicit and implicit knowledge, (d) the integration of the results of explicit and implicit processing, and (e) the iterative (and possibly bidirectional) processing. A computational implementation of the theory is developed based on the CLARION cognitive architecture and applied to the simulation of relevant human data. This work represents an initial step in the development of process-based theories of creativity encompassing incubation, insight, and various other related phenomena.

Solving the Credit Assignment Problem: The interaction of Explicit and Implicit learning with Internal and External State Information Wai-Tat Fu (wfu@cmu.edu) Human Factors Division and Beckman Institute University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 Airport Road, Savoy, IL 61874, USA John R. Anderson (ja+@cmu.edu) Department of Psychology Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA recognition of external state information (signs on the walls). Indeed, many have argued that real-world skills often involve the interplay between cognition (internal), perception, and action (external) that the understanding of these interactive skills requires careful study of how internal (memory) and external information (cues in the environment) are processed in the learning processes (Ballard, 1997; Fu & Gray, 2000; 2004; Gray & Fu, 2004; Larkin, 1989; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, in press). The navigation problem above is an example of one of the most difficult situations in skill learning: when the learner has to perform a sequence of actions but only gets feedback on their success at the end of the sequence (e.g., when the destination is reached). This creates a credit-assignment problem, in which the learner has to assign credits to earlier actions that are responsible for eventual success. When actions are interdependent, either memory of previous actions or recognition of the correct problem state in the external environment is required to properly assign credits to the appropriate actions. In this article, we present results from an experiment in which we study how people learn to solve the credit-assignment problem in a simple but challenging example of such a situation. Our focus is on the recent proposal that humans exhibit two distinct learning processes and we apply it to learning of action sequences with delayed feedback: an explicit process (with awareness) that requires memory for actions and outcomes, and an implicit process (without awareness) that does not require such memory. We will first review research in some related areas that informed the design of our experiment. Abstract In most problem-solving activities, feedback is received at the end of an action sequence. This creates a credit-assignment problem where the learner must associate the feedback with earlier actions, and the interdependencies of actions require the learner to either remember past choices of actions (internal state information) or rely on external cues in the environment (external state information) to select the right actions. We investigated the nature of explicit and implicit learning processes in the credit-assignment problem using a probabilistic sequential choice task with and without external state information. We found that when explicit memory encoding was dominant, subjects were faster to select the better option in their first choices than in the last choices; when implicit reinforcement learning was dominant subjects were faster to select the better option in their last choices than in their first choices. However, implicit reinforcement learning was only successful when distinct external state information was available. The results suggest the nature of learning in credit assignment: an explicit memory encoding process that keeps track of internal state information and a reinforcement-learning process that uses state information to propagate reinforcement backwards to previous choices. However, the implicit reinforcement learning process is effective only when the valences can be attributed to the appropriate states in the system – either internally generated states in the cognitive system or externally presented stimuli in the environment. Introduction Consider a person navigating in a large office building. The person has to decide when to turn left or right at various hallway intersections. The sequence of decisions is interdependent – e.g., turning left at a particular hallway intersection will affect the decisions at the next intersections. The person may therefore need to keep track of previous actions to inform what actions to take in the future. In reality, memory of previous actions (internal state information) may not be necessary as people can explicitly seek information in the environment (external state information) to know where one is located or which direction to go to reach a destination (Fu & Gray, 2006). Learning to navigate is therefore likely to involve both the retention of internal state information (memory) and the Explicit and Implicit Learning Probability Learning and Classification There have been numerous studies on the learning of the probabilistic relationship between choices and their consequences. The simplest situation is the probability- learning experiment in which subjects guess which of the alternatives occurs and then receives feedback on their guesses (e.g., Estes, 1964). One robust finding is that subjects often “probability match”; that is, they will choose a particular alternative with the same probability that it is reinforced (e.g., Friedman et al., 1964). This leads many to propose that probability matching is the result of an implicit