Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory

In recent years, more and more philosophical work has come to be done under the rubric of ‘feminist philosophy.’ In particular, more and more work in philosophical ethics has come to be identified by both those who produce it and those who read it as within the domain of ‘feminist ethics.’ As a philosophical ethicist and a feminist, the question naturally arises as to whether I do feminist ethics. The question seems particularly natural in my case, because a great deal of my research has focussed on the nature of intimate relationships, the types of reasons to which such relationships give rise, and how moral theory ought to accommodate such relationships and their attendant reasons. Intimacy, after all, has been one of the areas to which feminist ethicists have paid a great deal of attention in their attempts to carve out a peculiarly’ feminist’ ethics, arguing that traditional or canonical theories need, at the very least, a great deal of revision if they are to respond appropriately to the ‘data’ acquired as the result of the inclusion and responsiveness to the experience of women.

The main aim of the study was to examine the advertisement practices of Oromia Television and audience reaction with the theoretical foundation of encoding and decoding and situational ethical theory. The study of the research employed descriptive design involving both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Data were qualitatively collected through in-depth interview and questionnaire with open and close ended questions. Besides, purposive sampling method was employed to select the respondents of the study. The data obtained from conducted interview were analyzed qualitatively. In the study, the data which were gathered through document review basically ethical guideline and sample of broadcast ads, were presented in the forms of descriptive and the responses of the audience were presented in the form of the tables and chart with frequency and percentage. Finally, this data were analyzed quantitatively. Through the help of above methods the research answered four basic research questions. The findings of the study revealed that Oromoia Television advertisement manual which has produced by Oromoia Television and which were not given more attention to the problem (Marketing concept and professionalism) of advertisement ethics. The procedures more of followed by conducting advertisement focused on revenue generation. And the findings of the study also revealed that most of ads have the problem of imitation from local and foreign language, this leads the advertisement practices of Oromoia Television to standardization, similarly the practices are not understandable, the advertisement message is not adequate and some advertisement messages have no logical link with the product or products being communicated and advertisements transmitted on Oromoia Television are unreliable, exaggerated and deceptive information. Based on these indications the study concludes that there are problems of ethics in Oromoia Television advertisement which have been resulted from many factors. Oromoia Television advertisement practices have negative influence on purchasing decisions of the audiences. Finally, great attention should be given for improvement of the advertisement practices of Oromoia Television.

Rapid progress of artificial intelligence in digital advertising will have a major impact on the consumer. The aim of this article is to explicate this effect by defining the problem as a gap between the rationality of artificial intelligence and the vulnerability of the consumer in decision-making in the context of new researches in the field of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics. To prevent the increasing possibilities of unethical and hidden manipulations of the consumer in online advertising, some ethical theories and the possibility of their implementation in algorithms and legislation are examined. Theoretical research shows enormous lack of interdisciplinary cooperation for development of an appropriate ethical theory for the purpose of its implementation into artificial intelligence in business processes. Traditional moral theories are unable to solve new complex issues because of their too narrow focus on moral principles. An alternative ethical theory based on sustainability principles is proposed. It adheres to the principles of economics, latest findings of cognitive psychology, and uses artificial intelligence for its implementation. Sustainable evolutionary ethics opens up new research questions that can be solved only interdisciplinary.

A universal ethical principle is the respect of the individual, and this implies universal rules: informed consent, confidentiality, scientific rigor and the limiting of risks. Applying them involves difficulties which are not limited just to the developing countries and which sometimes pose real problems. To assess the quality of means implemented for making sure that these rules are respected, indicators exist which are either direct (evaluation of good practice, recourse to ethical committees) or indirect (quality of patient management, choice of subjects to be studied). Doubts concerning the application of these rules and the value of these indicators in some developing countries have led to an over-simplification of the issue on the part of those countries which consider themselves as paragons of ethical virtue. This has resulted in the concept of "contextual ethics". This concept is dangerous because: (1) it creates the impression that any doubts expressed or questions unresolved can only be encountered in poor countries, whereas they underpin all thinking about ethics; (2) it precludes the need for rich countries to call into question the research they perform intra muros without making any reference to the universal right to health care.

A case from 1996 in Oregon in which citizens' legally public motor vehicle information was disseminated on a World Wide Web site is considered. The case evoked widespread moral outrage among Oregonians and led to changes in the Oregon records laws. The application of either consequentialist or non-consequentialist moral theories to this and other informational privacy cases is found to be inadequate. Adjudication of conflicting desires is offered as the appropriate analytical model for moral disputes. The notion of adjudication offered here diverges from traditional moral theories in its indeterminate nature.

Universal Principles, Global Cooperation, and Moral Disagreement:A Natural Law Account Joseph Boyle (bio) I. Introduction Since ancient times a number of Western moral views have been described or self-described as "natural law" ethics. These views claim that there are universal moral principles and norms. Moral principles, according to natural law views, are somehow "natural," and, thus, are the common property of those who share human nature. That implies that the principles of the natural law are in principle accessible to all humans. Those who accept this ethical approach are not in full agreement about the precise sense and reference of the expression "natural law" or about the specific moral norms justified by the principles of the natural law. I do not here propose to address these differences among natural law theorists. Instead, I will sketch the approach to universal moral principles that I, as a philosopher working within the natural law tradition, think correct. My approach is within the broad tradition of natural law theorizing inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas; it is the version of Thomistic natural law called the "new natural law theory."1 Natural law theories include a conception of the nature and purpose of morality. Two closely related theses comprise the key elements of this conception. The first is that moral principles, and their implications in moral norms and judgments, are propositional realities having logical relationships and normative content that can be formulated, debated and judged either correct or incorrect. Thus, natural law theory is a form of ethical rationalism; moral judgments are a form of knowledge. The second thesis holds that moral principles are universal in two senses: they are applicable to all human actions, and they are accessible to all human beings capable of the reasoning needed for choice and action. Some immediate implications of these theses are obviously important for thinking about moral diversity, difference and consensus. First, the universal applicability of moral principles implies that there are no human actions, however complex their circumstances and obscure their significance, that are in principle immune from moral assessment. Second, the universal accessibility of the principles of the natural law implies that moral norms, customs, and practices are not finally a matter of local custom or particular circumstance. Criticism in the light of accessible moral principle is always possible. Third, the conjunction of the universal accessibility of natural law and its ethical rationalism makes the possibility of recognizing mistaken moral judgment and practice more than an abstract possibility, but, instead, an ordinary, intelligible aspect of moral life and thought. Any person capable of practical reasoning and choice can access enough of moral principle to criticize his or her own moral beliefs and those of his or her society. That capability is obviously ethically significant. Its availability in reflection to people generally implies that they are not simply stuck with the moral limitations and corruption of their culture, upbringing, and life experience; they have the resources for critical judgment and autonomous action based on that reflection. These claims about the nature of morality may now seem quaint given some defining features of post-modernity. The conjunction of two features of our post-modern world poses a special problem for natural law theory: (1) the rapidly emerging globalization of economic, social and political life; and (2) the pervasiveness of post-modern relativism, and "local-only" conceptions of morality. These conceptions reject the universalist theses I listed above. But they do so in a globalized context calling for moral guidance for the world-wide interactions that transcend the moralities of local communities and their members. Together these features challenge the core convictions of natural law theory. In this contribution, I will briefly articulate and defend these strong natural law claims about the nature of morality, and will bring natural law theory to bear on the challenge posed to them by the realities of our post-modern and globalized situation. I will develop this account as follows: In part II, I will summarize the account of the human good that underlies morality according to natural law theories that follow Aquinas's classic treatment. In Part III, I will sketch an account of how universal moral principles are justified...

Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy is concerned with economics and ethics, but it is not about how to behave ethically when doing business or undertaking economic research. We prescribe no code of conduct and preach no sermons. Rather, in this book we try to show how understanding moral philosophy can help economists to do economics better and how greater knowledge of economics and ethics can help policy analysts to improve their evaluations of alternative policies. We also hope to show how philosophers can make progress in ethics by drawing on insights and analytical tools from economics. While we are writing mainly for those who are interested in economics and aim at helping them to think more deeply about this field, we think that economics has some important concepts and methods to offer to those interested in ethics, too. This focus may seem a big letdown. Surely it is critically important to grapple with the moral problems that arise inside corporations and businesses, as well as in the global economy. You will get no argument from us about that. We are not proposing that people stop asking moral questions about the justification of employee and CEO compensation, the use of “sweatshop” labor, the rationale for protectionist policies, and the legitimacy of using economic boycotts to make policy change. On the contrary, we hope this book will show how important morality is in economic life. But our primary concern is with economic theory rather than directly with economic life. Our job will be to show clearly the role that ethics has in economics and policy analysis and to demonstrate how knowing moral philosophy helps one do economics and policy evaluation better. In our view, the main value of moral theories does not lie in prescribing what to do in particular situations. Moral theories are not cookbooks for good behavior. Their main purpose is to help people to understand what morality is, where it fits into human life, and why people assign it the importance they do. Moral theories have a practical role in guiding people's reflection on the moral principles they accept and in thereby helping people decide what to do when their moral principles conflict with each other.

Ethical theory and epidemiology

These notes consist of reflections on the course to be pursued to attain the best possible interaction between theoretical research on morality and our present economic and social tasks and on the practice of communist moral training. Much has been done in this regard in the recent past. On the occasion of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU scholars prepared successful treatments of timely problems in ethics, the theory of morality, and moral training. However, the level of the studies already conducted inevitably poses new and more complex questions calling for research by specialists in the field. Most of these questions are a natural consequence of the very process of more rapid rates of increase in ethical knowledge. But today, as we compare an evaluation of what has already been accomplished with, particularly, the prospects envisaged by the historical purview of the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, we are compelled to give thought also to factors that continue to hamper theoretical study, along a broad front, of morality and current questions in the moral practices of our society.

By normative I mean the age-old question Why should I be moral? To ask this question is to ask for justification of morality's claims on us, or for justification of the obligations of morality. The first systematic attempt to answer this question was made nearly 2500 years ago by Plato when it was put to him by Glaucon. The fact, if it is fact, that there is still no satisfactory answer to this question after 2500 years, that moral skepticism, even nihilism, is still serious threat, is, to paraphrase Kant, scandal of moral philosophy. As if out of fear of an outbreak of the scandal, or perhaps in an attempt to contain it, many philosophers have recently revisited the normative question and tried to answer it. Notable recent efforts include Michael Smith's The Moral Problem and Christine Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity.1 The history of philosophy shows clearly enough that the posed by the normative question is vexing. It is also true that failure to address the is scandalous. To avoid the scandal, or to counter moral skepticism, we need to tackle the from many different fronts. Philosophers such as Smith and Korsgaard belong to the camp, and their answers to the normative question form parts of the analytical front in the battle against skepticism. The question is whether some advance can be made on moral problem from the front. At first sight, it would appear that, if anything, Continental philosophy is facet of the rather than something that might hold an answer to it. One element of Continental philosophy in particular, namely postmodernism, is often characterized as philosophy that advocates all kinds of nihilism, including moral nihilism insofar as it has anything to say at all about moral questions.2 This is not the place to defend postmodernism, or more accurately philosophy, against such characterization.3 It is sufficient to point out that there is in the writings of Jean-Francois Lyotard, someone most often associated with postmodernism, line of ethical thought coherent and robust enough to be called an ethics. I have defended this claim elsewhere.4 The aim of this essay is to show that Lyotard's ethics is capable of answering the normative question. A summary of the key features of Lyotard's ethics is given in Section I. In Section III discuss how we can extract from it an answer that might satisfy the moral skeptic who wants to know why he or she should be moral, why he or she should stand under some moral obligations. I Three themes stand out in the writings of Lyotard: the death of metanarratives, the differend, and the sublime. A metanarrative is metadiscourse containing universal rules and principles to which we can appeal to resolve dispute that may arise between the or (petits recits) in which different people are engaged. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard defines postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.5 Thus, in the condition, metanarratives, or metadiscourses, have lost their authority and it is no longer possible to appeal to rules and principles that apply across discourses as source of legitimation. In the condition, there are no universally valid rules and principles. There are only language games, or small discourses, each defined by its own set of rules. In the absence of universally valid metadiscourses, conflict between language games cannot be resolved by appealing to universal rules. Thus, either conflict remains unresolved, or it is dissolved into totality dominated by one of the discourses in conflict. Lyotard calls this kind of conflict the differend, defining it as a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of rule of judgment applicable to both arguments.6 If the condition means the death of metanarratives then the differend is its effect. …

Computer ethics (or what is now often called the ethics of information and communication technology) is concerned with ethical issues that arise around the use of computers; more specifically, around activities that are enabled by computers. Whether or not it is a distinct field of applied ethics has been debated, but what is more important is that there is a cluster of issues centered on computer technology that demand ethical examination. (For a history of computer ethics, see Bynum 1999.) Problems in computer ethics are not different or new in the sense that they are different in kind from other ethical problems. Moral philosophy has been studied systematically at least from the time of the ancient Greeks and the ethical issues in computing are part of this tradition. For the most part they also arise in other applied ethics ( see Applied Ethics) contexts and overlaps exist between computer ethics and other applied fields, for example bioethics ( see Bioethics) and business ethics ( see Business Ethics) (Weckert and Henschke 2010). Many of the problems, however, become more urgent because of computer technology or occur in new and perhaps even novel ways (Johnson 2001). Intellectual property is a good example. The ease of copying, together with the fact that in most cases the copy is as good as the original, has made the ethical problems (as well as the legal ones) more urgent. Some of the problems are also novel. Computer programs are a bit like text that is normally subject to copyright and a bit like machines, where intellectual property is usually protected by patents.

Jung believed that the discovery of the unconscious processes would bring about a major transformation in the way people think about the ethical problem. After a brief look at the improtance of this problem in Jung's writings, the author examines Jung's subjectivist stance in ethics.

Studying and Advocating

This commentary on Robert Arnstein's exposition of several major value and ethical problems in therapy focuses on the problem area of current developmental theory which measures the maturation of college students against the phallocentric standars of separation, independence, autonomy and competitive success. Recent theoretical and clinical works indicate that these values do not fit with women's experience. For example, studies show that women students define themselves not in terms of indivdual achievements, but in terms of relational connection and caring. When the masculine model is used in therapy, therapists may misinterpret or devalue the healthy reational needs of women students. A new sef-inrelation model is briefly described that takes into account the centrality of relationships in a college woman's growth process.

Reviewed by: Rediscovering Women Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy Karen Green (bio) Rediscovering Women Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy. By Catherine Villanueva Gardner. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000. Catherine Gardner's book contains five studies, each discussing a different feminist philosopher. They are linked by the theme that the moral philosophy of these women has been neglected because its articulation fails to conform to [End Page 221] the dominant model of philosophical theorizing. Thus the question of genre becomes significant. Gardner's book partly develops a plea for extending the domain of philosophy to include letters, novels, and works of other genres. Is genre to blame for the neglect of women's moral theorizing? Women's treatises and discourses are equally neglected. Christine de Pizan wrote The Book of the Body Politic (1994) in 1407 and the Livre de la Paix (1958) between 1412 and 1414; Gabriel Suchon published a Traité de la Morale et de la Politique (1693); Damaris Masham published A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696); and Anne Conway published The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1996) in 1690. Evidence of published works in standard philosophical genres can also be found in Mary Astell (1996); and Margaret Cavendish (1994) also published works in standard philosophical genres. All are largely unstudied. Male authors are remembered because male scholars have chosen to edit, comment on, and explicate the works of their male predecessors. Women's philosophy has been deemed unworthy of study. Women's philosophy, not having had a comparable army of female exegetes, has languished unread, unedited, and unrecognized. It is gender, not genre, that explains the neglect of women's moral theorizing. Gardner's discussion is, furthermore, in danger of falling into anachronism. It seriously underestimates the range of genres that have historically constituted philosophy, implying that the academic journal article has been the historical norm. Despite my disagreement with Gardner's overarching argument, I found these essays to be valuable introductions to the ethical thought of the women thinkers studied. The first concentrates on Catherine Macaulay's Letters on Education, and calls for serious study of Macaulay's unjustifiably neglected philosophy. Here Gardner argues that this neglect came about because the epistolary form is not "the 'standard' form of a work of philosophy" and because "the expectations raised by the epistolary form—especially when it is written by a woman—link it firmly to the private sphere and, more particularly, to 'feminine' discourse, i.e. non-philosophical discourse" (24). Given current assumptions, this may be true. From an eighteenth-century perspective, however, things look different; at that time, the letter was a common philosophical genre, with antecedents stretching back to the letters of Epicurus and Cicero. There is no reason to see this genre as marginal to philosophy. The "epistle" is a genre occasionally adopted by Christine de Pizan, the subject of Gardner's next essay. She used it in her "Letter to the Queen of France" (1984), and, much modified, in the "Letter of Othea to Hector" (1990). However, Gardner does not discuss Pizan's "letters" but concentrates on her allegorical Book of the City of Ladies (1983) and argues that modern readers have difficulty in recognizing the allegorical form as part of the content of de Pizan's work. This is as may be. The difficulty flows from the fact that de Pizan used a now [End Page 222] unfamiliar genre, but it has little to do with her being a woman. The form had great prestige and popularity in her time, and anyone wanting to study the philosophy of this period needs to take this into account. Discussing Mary Wollstonecraft, Gardner similarly overestimates the extent to which novels constitute a genre excluded from philosophy. At one level she develops an argument with which I heartily agree: that Wollstonecraft should not be read as simply an "Enlightenment rationalist" (82). Gardner links this argument with the need to read Wollstonecraft's novels as part of her philosophical oeuvre, which is surely true. However, a number of philosophers, for example, Jean Jacques Rousseau, William Godwin, Jean-Paul Sartre, and most notably Simone de Beauvoir have chosen to...