Financial Dollarization and European Union Membership

IntroductionThe results of the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on European Union (EU) membership have highlighted deep societal divides. In six studies, we examined the role of personality traits, cognition and cognitive biases in relation to referendum voters’ choices.MethodsA total of 11,225 participants completed questionnaires and controlled experiments, which assessed differences in personality traits, levels of authoritarianism, numeracy, thinking styles, and susceptibility to cognitive biases including ideologically motivated numeracy and reasoning, framing, and the Dunning-Kruger effect.ResultsParticipants expressing an intent to vote to leave the EU reported significantly higher levels of authoritarianism and conscientiousness, and lower levels of openness and neuroticism than voters expressing an intent to vote to remain in the EU. When compared with Remain voters, Leave voters displayed significantly lower levels of numeracy and appeared more reliant on impulsive System 1 thinking. In the experimental studies, voters on both sides were found to be susceptible to the cognitive biases tested, with a general trend for Leave voters to show more bias than Remain voters.DiscussionThese results raise important questions regarding the use and framing of numerical and non-numerical data for public consumption.

It is often said that Finland's European Union (EU) membership in 1995 finally made it a ‘purely Western’ nation. This article theorises upon the membership debate by studying the geopolitical rhetoric used for and against EU membership from 1990 to 1994. It is argued that political studies of this kind should address arguments used in situations where competing actors try to persuade the public to support their own political goals and to increase their political power. In this context, national identity (i.e., competing interpretations of national history, geographical affiliation, the national future and national interests) becomes a rhetorical resource for political elites. The EU membership debate that took place in Finland reveals how important geography was in the context of this identity-political dispute and emphasises the importance of political recognition in legitimising crucial political decisions—in this case, joining the Western European integration process.

Is the decline of Turkish public support for the European Union (EU) membership better explained by a disappointment about the EU approach to Turkey or by the new self-confidence of the country? This question is relevant because frustration about the accession process could be overcome with more positive signals from the EU. However, if the second factor plays a significant role, this would be an indicator for an enduring alienation between Turks and the EU. This article presents the results of an exploratory study based on an online survey and personal interviews. For one-third of the 618 respondents to the survey, the most important reason for waning EU support is the new strength of Turkey as a rising regional power. In contrast, the interviewed parliamentarians and local party officials consider Turkey's proactive foreign policy approach in its Eastern neighborhood as a complementary and not alternative strategy to Turkey's EU accession.

The present state of the European monetary integration process can be characterised as a period of intensive preparations for the creation of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and for the transition to a single currency. European Union (EU) member countries and EU institutions seem firm in their decision to proceed with the EMU according to the timetable agreed upon in Maastricht. EMU is almost certainly starting in 1999, at least for a group of best performing EU member countries. Presently, the efforts of the EU member countries are concentrated on achieving requested macroeconomic stability, as defined in the Maastricht convergence criteria.

While international value chains have been present in planned economies for several decades, their integration into global value chains (GVCs) began in the 1990s. In this study, we investigated the evolution of downstream value chains in Eastern Europe (including the Balkan countries, Moldova, and Ukraine) from 1995, by applying Wang's UIBE methodology and the Eora database. The results of this study suggest that European Union (EU) membership indisputably has a positive impact on GVC embeddedness, whereas non-EU economies are still integrated in their own local downstream value chains. We further investigated the automotive sector in the Central and Eastern European countries and demonstrate how deeper integration into GVCs prompted the emergence of assembly activities.

The United Kingdom’s 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum vote to leave the European Union (EU) raised concerns that other countries would follow suit. This article examines how arguments about EU membership related to economic, cultural, political, and security and peace issues could influence how citizens would vote in EU membership referendums. Our two-wave survey experiment on a random sample of the German population and difference-in-differences analysis revealed that only fears of being outvoted in EU decision-making swayed German voters’ attitudes about EU membership, particularly voters with weaker EU support, little EU knowledge and low levels of political engagement. We therefore conclude that concerns about sovereignty loss can be drivers of Euroscepticism even in a country that has vast influence over EU decisions.

Prospects for much-needed partnership between the 15 old European Union (EU) member states and the 10 new member states in the area of media policy and regulation may be hampered by potential conflicts between national interests and EU regulations; preoccupation in the new member states with domestic issues of media policy and politics; and differences of media policy goals between new countries and other EU members; and indeed different understandings and definitions of the media in EU policy (treated mostly as "money-making machines") and the new members (in which the media are mostly perceived as "meaning-making machines"). If integration is to be successful and partnership is to be effective, both sides need to change. The new members can go through the motions of involvement in the EU audiovisual policy, or they can introduce new ideas and join forcefully and without inhibitions in the already ongoing debate about what sort of an organization it should be. For that, they need an EU with a heart, a social conscience, and courage-the courage of its convictions and principles.

The Western Balkan countries are in agreement about one thing: they all
\nwant to become members of the European Union (EU). Accession to the
\nEU has become a national priority for Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
\nMacedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). The first
\ndecade of the EU accession of some EU countries meant progress. Years of
\neconomic growth and prosperity are behind us. In 2013, EU is overindebted,
\nwith millions unemployed and unable to address the present
\neconomic crisis. It is losing its share of global market for goods and services
\nand aging population threatens to collapse the "welfare state." The
\ninability of the EU to resolve the accumulated economic problems
\nundermined the credibility of the European integration, opening the
\nhazardous speculations on the nature and necessity of the union. Certain
\nstates, such as Great Britain, are openly announcing a referendum to
\nremain in the EU. Some countries are partially affected by the economic
\ncrisis and achieved outstanding economic results. Along with some Asian
\ncountries, Turkey is an example of how, even without EU membership, a
\ncountry can efficiently solve present economic problems. Small and
\nunderdeveloped countries, such as B&H, can learn a lot from Turkey. The
\nessence of success is the open competition, simplified registration
\nprocedures and operations, the attraction of investors, innovations and
\nmanagement of innovations. The introduction of innovations is important
\nin all aspects of the B&H society, but it is particularly interesting in health
\ncare. B&H annually allocates 11.0% of its GDP to health care. The study,
\nwhich we had conducted, showed that there are different views regarding
\nthe quality of health care services, between service recipients (citizens and
\npatients - clients) and service providers (nurses and doctors). Nurses and
\ndoctors believe that the current quality of health care is good, while
\npatients and citizens argue the opposite. If we put the patients at the
\ncenter of our attention, then we have to respect their opinions and all our
\nmeasures and actions must be subordinated to their satisfaction.
\nInnovative approaches and innovation management do not need additional funding. The use of the best techniques and practices, which
\nalready exist at our hospitals and clinics raise quality of health care while
\nreducing costs. It should be kept in mind that the process of quality
\nimprovement must be continuous. A survey that we carried out on 313
\npatients in the Federation of B&H shows that the managers of health
\ninstitutions are not satisfied with the quality of health care and believe
\nthat this situation needs to be improved. For innovation in health care it is
\nnecessary to create a critical mass of qualified managers - innovators who
\nwill be supported by the key decision makers. To this end it is necessary for
\nhealth care institutions, as in all other areas of B&H society, to create a
\nclimate conducive to innovation as the part of national policy.
\nKeywords: Management, Innovation, Economic Crisis, Health Care, Quality,
\nInnovation Management, EU Accession.

This article evaluates public perceptions of the European Union (EU) in Montenegro and Serbia as the front running EU membership candidates. It uses a multidisciplinary approach, which comprises a comparative survey data analysis method, the Image Theory and a mind-mapping approach of EU perceptions analysis to study the EU-Western Balkans relations. Public perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans are (re)created and juxtaposed against perceptions of other external actors, notably Russia and China. This has led to the EU’s ‘power of attraction’ being diminished in the Western Balkans. Rival perceptions of China and Russia as ‘less demanding’ partners than the EU, and the slowing down of EU’s enlargement agenda have also contributed to this trend. In order to maximize its own security and counter the growing geopolitical influence by China and Russia in the Western Balkans, the EU would benefit from a more comprehensive study of its own representation and public perceptions in candidate states. By doing so, the EU could improve the knowledge about its soft power, which can in turn increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy programmes globally and democracy promotion in the neighbourhood. European integration, EU public diplomacy, accession, Image Theory, EU-Western Balkans relations, Montenegro, Serbia, EU membership, EU accession, EU foreign policy, soft power

This paper aims at investigating some of the critical issues highlighted by the sovereign debt crisis in European Union (EU) Member States (MS). The goal is twofold: 1) Quantify the increase in the risks of the EU banking systems due to haircuts of sovereign debts of some EU Member States, which have been particularly touched by the sovereign crisis; 2) evaluate and compare the policy options which have been adopted to address the issue. The first goal is achieved by estimating the increase in the banks Probability to Default (PD), due to the haircuts in sovereingn debts, through a further development of the SYMBOL model to estimate the PDs by numerical inversion of the Basel FIRB formula for minimum capital requirements. For the second objective the measures within the Basel III Accord, which among the others increases the quality and quantity of capital that banks should set aside to cover from unexpected losses, are compared with the agreement on bank recapitalisation and funding reached by the European Council in October 2011, which responded to the urgent consequences of the sovereign bonds crisis in the EU. The analysis is performed on the 65 large EU banking groups identified by the European Banking Authority (EBA) for the capitalisation exercise.. Results show that the haircuts on sovereign debts of EU MS in crisis would heavily worsen the stability of their banking systems but could also sometimes affect financial stability of other EU countries. We also show that the creation of a temporary capital buffer in the form of a capital target, necessitated by the exceptional circumstances prevailing in some EU MS, represent a step forward to Basel III rules

The European Union (EU) is a multilevel governance whose dynamics of change cannot be understood outside the perspective of each member state. France has contributed to the politics and policies of the EU, but the EU has also had an impact on French domestic politics and policies. As a founding member state of the European Communities (EC), France has played since the 1950s a major role in the development of European institutions, policies, and reforms leading to the EU. France has also, however, always had a paradoxical position regarding the institutional design of the EU. On one side, France has supported the principle of supranationality in the economic areas of EU integration (market and monetary policy). On the other side, it has preferred the intergovernmental method for foreign policy and defense. France’s influence in the EU was for a long time exercised in co-leadership with Germany. The return of Germany to full sovereignty after its reunification, the enlargements of the EU toward the East, and a growing asymmetry between French and German economies made the Franco-German partnership less central in the 1990s. France’s influence on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has diminished to the benefit of Germany, while it has remained central for the definition of a EU foreign and security policy. Like most of the EU member states, France has also to cope domestically with a growing politicization of the EU issue in the domestic context since the middle of the 1990s. Opposition to the EU has arisen among French public opinion and has restrained the autonomy of the French executive (president of the republic and government) in the EU negotiations. The dominant narrative in France about EU membership has four main components: being a founding member state, being a big member state, co-leading the EU with Germany, and making sure that the EU maximizes the French national interest. The relationships of the main French institutional actors with the EU focus on the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Parliament, as well as major national courts and interest groups. The political debates on the EU in the French public sphere involve the mainstream political parties, the rise of Euroskepticism, the referendum campaigns on EU issues, and general trends in the public opinion. France’s contributions to the main EU policies include membership in the EMU, the commitment to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the attitudes toward the enlargement processes, and the future of the EU institutional reforms.

Among the many important steps to European integration over the course of the past two decades, the two waves of accession of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) to the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2006 were undoubtedly among the most intensely debated. It was anticipated that these enlargements, which involved a total of 12 countries with a population of over 100 million inhabitants and a GDP of over €1,300 billion, would present major challenges both to the 12 new Member States (NMS12) and to those countries that were already members (the EU15). In particular, on the side of the NMS12 the implementation of the acquis communautaire (Burda, 1998), eligibility for EU Structural Funds (Boldrin and Canova, 2001), potential membership in the European monetary union (Gros, 2000) and the benefits from the liberties guaranteed in the European Economic Area (Belke and Hebler, 2001) were discussed. On the side of the EU15, by contrast, the hopes for increased levels of growth caused by further integration existed alongside fears related to potential migration and increased competitive pressures (Boeri and Brücker, 2000).KeywordsLabour MarketEuropean UnionUnemployment RateEmployment RateEuropean Monetary UnionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Overcoming resistance.

The legal adoption and implementation of minority protection rules in both EU member and candidate countries is a highly contested issue that varies across countries. As the status of European Union (EU) candidate country most debated, Turkey represents relatively a success story in minority rights due to the intensive minority-related legal adoption and increasing implementation in the accession process. The acceleration of the process is puzzling due to the fast transition to the implementation phase in a candidate country, of which the membership prospect has still been debated. Therefore, Turkey represents an interesting case, providing an empirical arena to explore factors that influence the implementation process. Suggesting a revised version of comprehensive ‘worlds of compliance’ that could be applied to the candidate states as a filter of explanatory factors for implementation, this article argues, that two worlds of compliance matter in Turkey's compliance with minority rights: world of domestic politics for implementation process, influenced by the domestic choice of the Turkish government; and world of law observance for legal adoption driven by the EU's credible conditionality.

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of European Union (EU) membership on Hungarian agricultural trade with the EU-27 in the period 2003-2013, based on our own calculations using the latest statistical data. We concluded that the agricultural orientation of Hungarian foreign trade and the export orientation of the agricultural sector have strengthened during these ten years. Hungarian agricultural trade with the EU-27 grew dynamically, with expansion of exports being accompanied by increasing import penetration. As a result of the three-fold export and import value growth, the EU-27 became the leading market for Hungarian export products (with an 80 per cent share) and the main source of imports (with a 91 per cent share). While, owing to low competitiveness, the Hungarian export commodity structure is dominated by raw materials and semi-processed goods, the import structure is rather diversified, though processed goods oriented. The share of the Member States that joined the EU from 2004 onwards has increased to almost 40 per cent in Hungary’s intra-EU agricultural trade, at the expense of the EU-15. Following a post EU accession deterioration, the balance of Hungary’s agricultural trade with the EU had improved to a record of EUR 2.7 billion by 2012.