Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations for Matroid Rank Valuations

We study the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among a set of agents under the fairness notion of Any Price Share (APS). APS is known to dominate the widely studied Maximin share (MMS). Since an exact APS allocation may not exist, the focus has traditionally been on the computation of approximate APS allocations. [4] studied the problem under additive valuations, and asked (i) how large can the APS value be compared to the MMS value? and (ii) what guarantees can one achieve beyond additive functions. We partly answer these questions by considering valuations beyond additive, namely submodular and XOS functions, with binary marginals. For the submodular functions with binary marginals, also known as matroid rank functions (MRFs), we show that APS is exactly equal to MMS. Consequently, following [5] we show that an exact APS allocation exists and can be computed efficiently while maximizing the social welfare. Complementing this result, we show that it is NP-hard to compute the APS value within a factor of 5/6 for submodular valuations with three distinct marginals of {0, 1/2, 1.} We then consider binary XOS functions, which are immediate generalizations of binary submodular functions in the complement free hierarchy. In contrast to the MRFs setting, MMS and APS values are not equal under this case. Nevertheless, we can show that they are only a constant factor apart. In particular, we show that under binary XOS valuations, MMS ≤= APS ≤= 2 x MMS + 1. Further, we show that this is almost the tightest bound we can get using MMS, by giving an instance where APS ≥= 2 x MMS. The upper bound on APS, combined with [17], implies a 0.1222-approximation for APS under binary XOS valuations. And the lower bound implies the non-existence of better than 0.5-APS even when agents have identical valuations, which is in sharp contrast to the guaranteed existence of exact MMS allocation when agent valuations are identical.

Semi-matchings for bipartite graphs and load balancing

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under the criteria of the maximin share guarantee. Specifically, we study approximation of maximin share allocations under hereditary set system valuations, in which each valuation function is based on the independent sets of an underlying hereditary set system. Using a lone divider approach, we show the existence of 1/2-approximate MMS allocations, improving on the 11/30 guarantee of Li and Vetta [ 37 ]. Moreover, we prove that (2/3 + ε)-approximate MMS allocations do not always exist in this model for every ε > 0, an improvement from the recent 3/4 + ε result of Li and Deng [ 36 ]. Our existence proof is constructive but does not directly yield a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. However, we show that a 2/5-approximate MMS allocation can be found in polynomial time, given valuation oracles. Finally, we show that our existence and approximation results transfer to a variety of problems within constrained fair allocation, improving on existing results in some of these settings.

Background: Efficient utilization of agricultural inputs is fundamental to improving farm productivity and economic performance in crop production systems. In input-intensive crops such as cabbage, the profitability of cultivation depends not only on the level of input use but also on their optimal allocation. Imbalances in the use of key inputs, particularly fertilizers and plant protection chemicals, can lead to diminishing returns and increased production costs, thereby reducing overall efficiency. Such inefficiencies are of particular concern in off-season vegetable production, where higher input intensity and market-driven incentives amplify the economic consequences of suboptimal resource use. Aims: The study was undertaken to analyse allocative and technical efficiency and their implications for resource use in off-season cabbage farming. Study Design: A farm-level study based on primary data collected through simple random sampling with proportional allocation. Methodology: The study was conducted using data from 80 off-season cabbage farmers. Cobb–Douglas production function was employed to estimate allocative efficiency, while stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was used to estimate technical efficiency. A Tobit regression model was applied to identify the influence of socio-economic factors on technical efficiency. Results: The results revealed significant allocative inefficiency across farm categories. Seed was underutilized (2.63), while labor was overutilized (-2.79) while fertilizer was underutilized in marginal farms (4.51). In small farms, seed (-3.84) and labor (-4.07) were overutilized, whereas fertilizer (2.65) was underutilized. In the stochastic frontier model, γ = 0.9988 indicated that the composite error variance was largely attributable to the inefficiency component relative to random noise, while σ² = 0.00123 reflected low overall dispersion in deviations from the frontier. The mean technical efficiency was 97.5 per cent, indicating that farms operated close to the production frontier with limited variation. Tobit results showed that age, farm size, and labor availability were statistically insignificant, implying a homogeneous efficiency structure across farms. Conclusion: The results suggest that the primary scope for improving performance in off-season cabbage production lies in enhancing allocative efficiency through rationalization of fertilizer and plant protection chemical use, given the relatively high and homogeneous levels of technical efficiency across farms.

The VCG mechanism is the standard method to incentivize bidders in combinatorial auctions to bid truthfully. Under the VCG mechanism, the auctioneer can sometimes increase revenue by “burning” items. We study this phenomenon in a setting where items are described by a number of attributes. The value of an attribute corresponds to a quality level, and bidders’ valuations are non-decreasing in the quality levels. In addition to burning items, we allow the auctioneer to present some of the attributes as lower quality than they actually are. We consider the following two revenue maximization problems under VCG: finding an optimal way to mark down items by reducing their quality levels, and finding an optimal set of items to burn. We study the effect of the following parameters on the computational complexity of these two problems: the number of attributes, the number of quality levels per attribute, and the complexity of the bidders’ valuation functions. Bidders have unit demand, so VCG’s outcome can be computed in polynomial time, and the valuation functions we consider are step functions that are non-decreasing with the quality levels. We prove that both problems are NP-hard even in the following three simple settings: a) four attributes, arbitrarily many quality levels per attribute, and single-step valuation functions, b) arbitrarily many attributes, two quality levels per attribute, and single-step valuation functions, and c) one attribute, arbitrarily many quality levels, and multi-step valuation functions. For the case where items have only one attribute, and every bidder has a single-step valuation (zero below some quality threshold), we show that both problems can be solved in polynomial-time using a dynamic programming approach. For this case, we also quantify how much better marking down is than item burning, and we compare the revenue of both approaches with computational experiments.

Maximum bipartite matching (MBM) is a fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization with a long and rich history. A classic result of Hopcroft and Karp (1973) provides an O(m √n)-time algorithm for the problem, where n and m are the number of vertices and edges in the input graph, respectively. For dense graphs, an approach based on fast matrix multiplication achieves a running time of O(n2.371). For several decades, these results represented state-of-the-art algorithms, until, in 2013, Madry introduced a powerful new approach for solving MBM using continuous optimization techniques. This line of research, that builds on continuous techniques based on interior-point methods, led to several spectacular results, culminating in a breakthrough m1+o(1)-time algorithm for min-cost flow, that implies an m1+o(1)-time algorithm for MBM as well. These striking advances naturally raise the question of whether combinatorial algorithms can match the performance of the algorithms that are based on continuous techniques for MBM. One reason to explore combinatorial algorithms is that they are often more transparent than their continuous counterparts, and that the tools and techniques developed for such algorithms may be useful in other settings, including, for example, developing faster algorithms for maximum matching in general graphs. A recent work of Chuzhoy and Khanna (2024) made progress on this question by giving a combinatorial Õ(m1/3n5/3)-time algorithm for MBM, thus outperforming both the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm and matrix multiplication based approaches, on sufficiently dense graphs. Still, a large gap remains between the running time of their algorithm and the almost linear-time achievable by algorithms based on continuous techniques. In this work, we take another step towards narrowing this gap, and present a randomized n2+o(1)-time combinatorial algorithm for MBM. Thus in dense graphs, our algorithm essentially matches the performance of algorithms that are based on continuous methods. Similar to the classical algorithms for MBM and the approach used in the work of Chuzhoy and Khanna (2024), our algorithm is based on iterative augmentation of a current matching using augmenting paths in the corresponding (directed) residual flow network. Our main contribution is a recursive algorithm that exploits the special structure of the resulting flow problem to recover an Ω(1/log2 n)-fraction of the remaining augmentations in n2+o(1) time. Finally, we obtain a randomized n2+o(1)-time algorithm for maximum vertex-capacitated s-t flow in directed graphs when all vertex capacities are identical, using a standard reduction from this problem to MBM.

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible, and O(1)-approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). The fact that in our mechanism the agents are not ordered according to their marginal value per cost allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present, for example, at most k agents can be selected. We obtain O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a p-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about nontrivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are, asymptotically, the best possible.

The arctic rank of a Boolean matrix

In the Cellular Long-Term Evolution (LTE) downlink, the smallest radio resource unit a Scheduler can assign to a user is a Resource Block (RB). Each RB consists of twelve (12) adjacent Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) sub-carriers with inter-subcarrier spacing of 15 kHz. Over the years, researchers have investigated the problem of radio resource allocation in cellular LTE downlink and have made useful contributions. In an earlier paper for example, we proposed a deterministic dynamic programming based technique for optimal allocation of RBs in the downlink of multiuser Cellular LTE System. We found that this proposed methodology optimally allocates RBs to users at every transmission instant, but the computational time associated with the allocation policy was high. In the current work, we propose a truncated dynamic programming based technique for efficient and optimal allocation of radio resource. This paper also addresses uncertainty emanating from users’ mobility within a Cell coverage area. The objective is to significantly reduce the computational time and dynamically select applicable modulation scheme (i.e., QPSK, 16QAM, or 64QAM) in response to users’ mobility. We compare the proposed scheme with the Fair allocation and the earlier proposed dynamic programming based techniques. It is shown that the proposed methodology is more efficient in allocating radio resource and has better performance than both the Fair Allocation and the deterministic dynamic programming based techniques.

Efficient and fair allocation of multiple types of resources is a crucial objective in a cloud/distributed computing cluster. Users may have diverse resource needs. Furthermore, diversity in server properties/capabilities may mean that only a subset of servers may be usable by a given user. In platforms with such heterogeneity, we identify important limitations in existing multi-resource fair allocation mechanisms, notably Dominant Resource Fairness and its follow-up work. To overcome such limitations, we propose a new server-based approach ; each server allocates resources by maximizing a per-server utility function . We propose a specific class of utility functions which, when appropriately parameterized, adjusts the trade-off between efficiency and fairness, and captures a variety of fairness measures (such as our recently proposed Per-Server Dominant Share Fairness ). We establish conditions for the proposed mechanism to satisfy certain properties that are generally deemed desirable, e.g., envy-freeness, sharing incentive, bottleneck fairness, and Pareto optimality. To implement our resource allocation mechanism, we develop an iterative algorithm which is shown to be globally convergent. Subsequently, we show how the proposed mechanism could be implemented in a distributed fashion. Finally, we carry out extensive trace-driven simulations to show the enhanced performance of our proposed mechanism over the existing ones.

The optimal coalition structure determination problem is in general computationally hard. In this article, we identify some problem instances for which the space of possible coalition structures has a certain form and constructively prove that the problem is polynomial time solvable. Specifically, we consider games with an ordering over the players and introduce a distance metric for measuring the distance between any two structures. In terms of this metric, we define the property of monotonicity, meaning that coalition structures closer to the optimal, as measured by the metric, have higher value than those further away. Similarly, quasi-monotonicity means that part of the space of coalition structures is monotonic, while part of it is non-monotonic. (Quasi)-monotonicity is a property that can be satisfied by coalition games in characteristic function form and also those in partition function form. For a setting with a monotonic value function and a known player ordering, we prove that the optimal coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm using a greedy approach. We extend this algorithm to quasi-monotonic value functions and demonstrate how its time complexity improves from exponential to polynomial as the degree of monotonicity of the value function increases. We go further and consider a setting in which the value function is monotonic and an ordering over the players is known to exist but ordering itself is unknown. For this setting too, we prove that the coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to report new original evidence on optimal holding periods and optimal asset allocations (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ a number of different value functions, a recent dataset, different markets, and varying investment horizons. Findings – The authors report original evidence across markets and over-time, employing different value functions and varying investment horizons. The results results indicate that, during the past decades, the optimal holding period (seven months during the whole period and four/five months during crises) is not affected by the value function employed, is in accordance with the Myopic Loss Aversion hypothesis, is consistent across markets, but is sensitive to economic crises and shorter to that reported in Benartzi and Thaler (12 months). The optimal asset allocation is also different to that of Benartzi and Thaler during crises periods and/or assuming value functions with probability distortion. Originality/value – The paper employs a number of different value functions, with and without probability distortion; it compares investor behavior in three important international markets (USA, UK, Germany); as a further robustness test the authors use various investment horizons.

Debate: Implications for the Continuous Allocation System for Organ Distribution in the United States: Challenges and Controversies - CON.

This paper proposes an algorithm to minimize weighted service latency for different classes of tenants (or service classes) in a data center network where erasure-coded files are stored on distributed disks/racks and access requests are scattered across the network. Due to limited bandwidth available at both top-of-the-rack and aggregation switches and tenants in different service classes need differentiated services, network bandwidth must be apportioned among different intra- and inter-rack data flows for different service classes in line with their traffic statistics. We formulate this problem as weighted queuing and employ a class of probabilistic request scheduling policies to derive a closed-form upper-bound of service latency for erasure-coded storage with arbitrary file access patterns and service time distributions. The result enables us to propose a joint weighted latency (over different service classes) optimization over three entangled "control knobs": the bandwidth allocation at top-of-the-rack and aggregation switches for different service classes, dynamic scheduling of file requests, and the placement of encoded file chunks (i.e., data locality). The joint optimization is shown to be a mixed-integer problem. We develop an iterative algorithm which decouples and solves the joint optimization as 3 sub-problems, which are either convex or solvable via bipartite matching in polynomial time. The proposed algorithm is prototyped in an open-source, distributed file system, {\em Tahoe}, and evaluated on a cloud testbed with 16 separate physical hosts in an Openstack cluster using 48-port Cisco Catalyst switches. Experiments validate our theoretical latency analysis and show significant latency reduction for diverse file access patterns. The results provide valuable insights on designing low-latency data center networks with erasure coded storage.

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility