First-Order Modal Logic: Frame Definability and a Lindström Theorem

A well established technique toward developing the proof theory of a Hilbert-style modal logic is to introduce a Gentzen-style equivalent (a Gentzenisation), then develop the proof theory of the latter, and finally transfer the metatheoretical results to the original logic (e.g., [1, 6, 8, 18, 10, 12]). In the first-order modal case, on one hand we know that the Gentzenisation of the straightforward first-order extension of GL, the logic QGL, admits no cut elimination (if the rule is included as primitive; or, if not included, then the rule is not admissible [1]). On the other hand the (cut-free) Gentzenisations of the first-order modal logics M3 and ML3 of [10, 12] do have cut as an admissible rule. The syntactic cut admissibility proof given in [18] for the Gentzenisation of the propositional provability logic GL is extremely complex, and it was the basis of the proofs of cut admissibility of the Gentzenisations of M3 and ML3, where the presence of quantifiers and quantifier rules added to the complexity and length of the proof. A recent proof of cut admissibility in a cut-free Gentzenisation of GL is given in [5] and is quite short and easy to read. We adapt it here to revisit the proofs for the cases of M3 and ML3, resulting to similarly short and easy to read proofs, only slightly complicated by the presence of quantification and its relevant rules.

Kripke transformed both the model theory of modal logic and the understanding of metaphysical modality. In particular, he analysed the model-theoretic conditions for the Barcan formula and its converse to hold. However, the relation between the model theory of modal logic and the correctness of formulas on their metaphysical readings is not straightforward. To mediate between them, a notion of metaphysical universality is defined such that an intended model structure (on the metaphysical reading) should validate all and only metaphysically universal formulas. Technical problems for defining intended model structures arise in both propositional and first-order modal logic; there may be ‘too many’ worlds and ‘too many’ individuals. Given that these problems can be overcome, a special reason is explained why contingentism but not necessitism forbids an intended model structure for quantified modal logic. But even granted necessitism, it is controversial which first-order modal formulas are metaphysically universal.

Many authors have noted that a number of English modal sentences cannot be formalized into standard first-order modal logic. Some widely discussed examples include “There could have been things other than there actually are” and “Everyone who’s actually rich could have been poor.” In response, many authors have introduced an “actually” operator @ into the language of first-order modal logic. It is occasionally noted that some of the example sentences still cannot be formalized with @ if one allows only actualist quantifiers, and embedded versions of these example sentences cannot be formalized even with possibilist quantifiers and @. The typical justification for these claims is to observe that none of the most plausible candidate formalizations succeed. In this paper, we prove these inexpressibility results by using a modular notion of bisimulation for first-order modal logic with “actually” and other operators. In doing so, we will explain in what ways these results do or do not generalize to more expressive modal languages.

As an extension of the traditional modal logic, the fuzzy first-order modal logic is discussed in this paper. A description of fuzzy first-order modal logic based on constant domain semantics is given, and a formal system of fuzzy reasoning based on the semantic information of models of first-order modal logic is established. It is also introduced in this paper the notion of the satisfiability of the reasoning system and some properties associated with the satisfiability are proved.

First-order modal logic, in the usual formulations, is not sufficiently expressive, and as a consequence problems like Frege's morning star/evening star puzzle arise. The introduction of predicate abstraction machinery provides a natural extension in which such difficulties can be addressed. But this machinery can also be thought of as part of a move to a full higher-order modal logic. In this paper we present a sketch of just such a higher-order modal logic: its formal semantics, and a proof procedure using tableaus. Naturally the tableau rules are not complete, but they are with respect to a Henkinization of the true semantics. We demonstrate the use of the tableau rules by proving one of the theorems involved in Godel's ontological argument, one of the rare instances in the literature where higher-order modal constructs have appeared. A fuller treatment of the material presented here is in preparation

"This book describes the aspects of mathematical logic related to computer sciences. The materials adopted in this book are intended to attend to both the peculiarities of logical systems and the requirements of computer science."

The Local Computation Framework has been used to improve the efficiency of computation in various uncertainty formalisms. This paper shows how it can be applied to logical deduction in first-order logic, modal and conditional logics, circumscription and possibilistic logic.

Automatic reasoning tools play an important role when developing provably correct software. Both main approaches, program verification and program synthesis employ automated reasoning tools, more specifically, automated theorem provers. Besides classical logic, non-classical logics are particularly relevant in this field. This chapter presents calculi to automate theorem proving in classical and some important non-classical logics, namely first-order intuitionistic and first-order modal logics. These calculi are based on the connection method, which permits a goal-oriented and, hence, a more efficient proof search. The connection calculi for these non-classical logics extend the calculus for classical logic in an elegant and uniform way by adding so-called prefixes to atomic formulae. The leanCoP theorem prover is a very compact PROLOG implementation of the connection calculus for classical logics. We present details of the implementation and describe some basic techniques to improve its efficiency. leanCoP is adapted to non-classical logics by integrating a prefix unification algorithm, which depends on the specific logic. This results in leading theorem provers for the aforementioned non-classical logics.

The present paper studies two approaches to the expressiveness of propositional modal logics based on first-degree entailment logic, FDE. We first consider the basic FDE-based modal logic BK and certain systems in its vicinity, and then turn to some FDE-based modal logics in a richer vocabulary, including modal bilattice logic, MBL. On the one hand, model-theoretic proofs of the definability of connectives along the lines of [McCullough, “Logical connectives for intuitionistic propositional logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 36, 1 (1971): 15–20. DOI: 10.2307/2271511] and [[17] Wansing, “Logical connectives for constructive modal logic”, Synthese 150, 3 (2006): 459–482. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-5518-5] are given for various FDE-based modal logics. On the other hand, building on [Odintsov and Wansing, “Disentangling FDE-based paraconsistent modal logics, Studia Logica 105, 6 (2017): 1221–1254. DOI: 10.1007/s11225-017-9753-9], expressibility is considered in terms of mutual faithful embeddability of one logic into another logic. A distinction is drawn between definitional equivalence, which is defined with respect to a pair of structural translations between two languages, and weak definitional equivalence, which is defined with respect to a weaker notion of translations. Moreover, the definitional equivalence of some FDE-based modal logics is proven, especially the definitional equivalence of MBL and a conservative extension of the logic BK□×BK□, which underlines the central role played by BK among FDE-based modal logics.

Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) protects confidential information, stored in an information system. It prevents harmful inferences due to a user's knowledge and reasoning. In this article we extend CQE to incomplete first-order databases, a data model which suits a broader range of applications than a previously studied propositional incomplete data model. Because of the complexity of the underlying implication problem, which describes the user's reasoning, the representation of the user's knowledge is the main obstacle to effective inference control. For knowledge representation, we introduce first-order modal logic to CQE. Especially, we deal with knowledge about a restricted data model in first-order logic. The restricted data model considered gives rise to a new problem: if the user is aware of the data model, his reasoning must be modeled appropriately. In the analysis of this “reasoning” model we consider both confidentiality and availability. Finally we show, how the considered data model can be reduced to the propositional case and analyze confidentiality properties of the resulting implementation.

The propositional modal logic is obtained by adding the necessity operator □ to the propositional logic. Each formula in the propositional logic is equivalent to a formula in the disjunctive normal form. In order to obtain the correspondence between the propositional modal logic and the propositional logic, we add the axiom \(\Box\varphi \leftrightarrow\Diamond\varphi \) to K and get a new system K + . Each formula in such a logic is equivalent to a formula in the disjunctive normal form, where □ k (k ≥ 0) only occurs before an atomic formula p, and \(\lnot\) only occurs before a pseudo-atomic formula of form □ k p. Maximally consistent sets of K + have a property holding in the propositional logic: a set of pseudo-atom-complete formulas uniquely determines a maximally consistent set. When a pseudo-atomic formula □ k p i (k,i ≥ 0) is corresponding to a propositional variable q ki , each formula in K + then can be corresponding to a formula in the propositional logic P + . We can also get the correspondence of models between K + and P + . Then we get correspondences of theorems and valid formulas between them. So, the soundness theorem and the completeness theorem of K + follow directly from those of P + .

In this paper a technique is presented which provides us with a means to develop resolution-based calculi for (first-order) modal and temporal logics. The approach is based on three parts: A special translation technique from modal and temporal logic formulae into classical predicate logic, a certain kind of saturation technique which is to be applied to given background theories, and an extraction of either suitable “simpler” background theories or logic-specific inference rules. The former is interesting in case existing classical logic theorem provers are to be utilized; the latter gains importance if one is prepared to extend theorem provers that are already at hand.

Bisimulation is a central concept in the model theory of modal logic with extensive computational applications. It is a relation between two models in which related states have identical atomic properties and matching transition possibilities. Bisimulation captures the expressive power of propositional modal logic in the sense that bisimilar states are not distinguishable by any propositional modal formula. In recent years, fuzzy modal logic has received much attention because of the connection between uncertainty measures and fuzzy modalities. In this paper, we define the notion of fuzzy bisimulation and prove that, in a fuzzified version, it bears the same relationship to fuzzy modal logic that bisimulation bears to propositional modal logic.

1 Modal logic: a semantic perspective

We consider the relationship between the algorithmic properties of the validity problem for a modal or superintuitionistic propositional logic and the size of the smallest Kripke countermodels for non-theorems of the logic. We establish the existence, for every degree of unsolvability, of a propositional logic whose validity problem belongs to the degree and whose every non-theorem is refuted on a Kripke frame that validates the logic and has the size linear in the length of the non-theorem. Such logics are obtained among the normal extensions of the propositional modal logics $\textbf {KTB}$, $\textbf {GL}$ and $\textbf {Grz}$ as well as in the lattice of superintuitionistic propositional logics. This shows that the computational complexity of a modal or superintuitionistic propositional logic is, in general, not related to the size of the countermodels for its non-theorems.