Germany and EU Foreign Policy

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from nontraditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a classical sense entails focusing on agents (individuals or groups of individuals). In the case of the European Union (EU), FPA becomes more problematic. Firstly, the question arises of what a foreign policy of the EU really means. This article defines EU foreign policy in a wider sense, namely along the lines of what is known as EU's external action. It focuses however on the security aspect of the EU's external action – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, a problem of identifying agents arises in the EU setting in large part because of the complex institutional setup of the CFSP/CSDP. Although final decisions are made at the level of the Council, the policy itself is drafted and prepared at lower levels of policy-making (working parties, committees and agencies) based in Brussels. This article proposes a discursive institutionalist model of analysis, applicable to any organization of the policy process. After presenting the model's ontological and epistemological positions, as well as theoretical underpinnings, the article elaborates on the different levels of information processing and meaning construction by actors and their role in setting the overall foreign policy discourse by shaping the coordinative discourses1 during this early phase of the policy-making process.

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) has presented innumerable challenges for both the leaving state and the EU. In these unchartered waters, the future of UK involvement in EU policies is very much in doubt. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has not been at the forefront of the debates about Brexit, despite the increasing focus on the EU’s global role, and the UK’s own vision of a ‘Global Britain’. The purpose of this article is to consider the past, present, and future role played by the UK in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union. This necessitates consideration of how the CFSP might develop in the future and fulfil the goals of the recent Global Strategy. The article explores the UK’s constant opposition to greater integration in EU foreign policy and how it has purported to distance itself from the CFSP machinery. This can be contrasted with the UK’s apparent post-referendum enthusiasm for pursuing shared foreign policy goals. The future direction of the CFSP may not be affected to a significant degree by the UK’s departure. However, the CFSP will not necessarily become more integrated after Brexit. To achieve this, greater commitment will need to be shown by the EU27 to the aims of the CFSP, and other Member States will no longer be able to count on the UK as the lead voice of opposition or ‘brake’ on integration. If there is a continued desire for the UK to be involved in the CFSP, finding an acceptable model for cooperation is likely to prove a substantial, long-term challenge.

The expansion of European foreign and security policy co-operation since the 1970s imposes unique requirements on European Union (EU) member states, and the co- ordination of these various obligations presents a major challenge to the EU's pursuit of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). However, the past decade has also seen significant progress toward the multi-level governance of EU foreign policy, particularly when compared to the limited policy co-ordination of the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines the relationship between institutional development and the multi-level governance of EU foreign policy, as represented by the CFSP. In particular, it explores: (1) the extent to which the CFSP policy space can be described in terms of multi-level governance; (2) the processes by which governance mechanisms influence the domestic foreign policy cultures of EU member states; and (3) how the interaction of domestic politics and governance mechanisms produces specific policy outcomes.

The European Union (EU) is a multilevel governance whose dynamics of change cannot be understood outside the perspective of each member state. France has contributed to the politics and policies of the EU, but the EU has also had an impact on French domestic politics and policies. As a founding member state of the European Communities (EC), France has played since the 1950s a major role in the development of European institutions, policies, and reforms leading to the EU. France has also, however, always had a paradoxical position regarding the institutional design of the EU. On one side, France has supported the principle of supranationality in the economic areas of EU integration (market and monetary policy). On the other side, it has preferred the intergovernmental method for foreign policy and defense. France’s influence in the EU was for a long time exercised in co-leadership with Germany. The return of Germany to full sovereignty after its reunification, the enlargements of the EU toward the East, and a growing asymmetry between French and German economies made the Franco-German partnership less central in the 1990s. France’s influence on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has diminished to the benefit of Germany, while it has remained central for the definition of a EU foreign and security policy. Like most of the EU member states, France has also to cope domestically with a growing politicization of the EU issue in the domestic context since the middle of the 1990s. Opposition to the EU has arisen among French public opinion and has restrained the autonomy of the French executive (president of the republic and government) in the EU negotiations. The dominant narrative in France about EU membership has four main components: being a founding member state, being a big member state, co-leading the EU with Germany, and making sure that the EU maximizes the French national interest. The relationships of the main French institutional actors with the EU focus on the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Parliament, as well as major national courts and interest groups. The political debates on the EU in the French public sphere involve the mainstream political parties, the rise of Euroskepticism, the referendum campaigns on EU issues, and general trends in the public opinion. France’s contributions to the main EU policies include membership in the EMU, the commitment to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the attitudes toward the enlargement processes, and the future of the EU institutional reforms.

This study focuses on the comparative analysis of EU foreign policy and AU foreign policy. The main objectives of the study encompass: to identify the objectives of EU foreign policy and AU foreign policy, to identify the similarities and differences between the objectives of EU and AU foreign policy, to analyse the factors that shape the objectives of EU and AU foreign policy, to evaluate the effectiveness of EU and AU foreign policy in achieving their respective objectives and to analyse the challenges facing EU and AU in implementing their foreign policy. The study utilized a qualitative research methodology, utilizing secondary sources such as official documents, policy statements, academic literature, and case studies through the use of documentary review tool. The key findings of the study on the objectives of EU foreign policy and AU foreign policy which they entail: The TEU states that the EU aims to promote its values, democracy, and the rule of law, human rights, and international law in its relations with other countries (Article 21.1 TEU) and the objectives of AU foreign policy as outlined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union include: promotion of peace, security, and stability as central objectives of the AU (Article 3.h); the similarities and differences between EU and AU, the Similarities entail: promotion of peace and security and promotion of democracy and human rights; and the differences include: regional integration versus global governance, economic development and poverty eradication and neighborhood versus continental and global; the factors that shape the objectives of the European Union include: treaty framework, member state interests, external challenges and global issues; and the factors that shape the objectives of and African Union foreign policy entail: African unity and solidarity, historical context and colonial legacy and peace and security challenges; the effectiveness of European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) foreign policy in achieving their respective objectives include: Institutional Framework, emphasis on diplomacy, multilateralism and international cooperation and peace and security; lastly, the finding on the challenges face by EU and AU in implementing their foreign policies include: EU, consensus-building among member states, coherence and coordination, external perceptions and influence, global power shifts and geopolitical dynamics, AU, include: limited resources and funding, peace and security challenge and Limited enforcement mechanisms.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

There is a growing interest in the European Union (EU) in defending its energy interests through the use of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instruments. This derives from the fact that the EU already relies on external sources for 50 per cent of its energy needs while most estimates suggest this will rise to 90 per cent for oil and 70 per cent for gas by 2030. Energy security in the European context is a particularly interesting case study given the number of issues at play. It involves the security of supply, the security of demand, the reliability of contractual arrangements on energy, the physical security of critical installations and their personnel, the interplay between national and supranational energy policies, and the quality of overall relations with Russia. With regard to the wider Black Sea area, it has to take into account the recent developments such as greater EU involvement in that part of the world. In other words, it involves a number of variables and possible outcomes including the linkage between EU foreign policy and energy policy. Ultimately, whether CFSP can successfully be used in terns of energy security remains to be seen.

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.

In 2022, the European Union (EU) took the unprecedented step of providing financial assistance for military purposes to a warring state, Ukraine, while also establishing mechanisms to incentivize member states to supply arms and military equipment to Kyiv. These measures, characterized as "hard instruments" of EU foreign policy, were developed in response to the "return of high-intensity warfare to Europe." This marked a significant departure from the EU’s traditional emphasis, particularly in the 2000s and 2010s, on non-military foreign policy tools. During that period, the EU took pride in achieving its objectives without recourse to force and deliberately avoided military pressure in international relations.This article explores the concept of foreign policy instruments, categorizing them into hard, soft, and hybrid tools. It examines the EU’s repertoire of foreign policy instruments, distinguishing between its long-standing approaches and those recently developed. Through an analysis of EU policy documents, the article identifies the Union’s evolving interests in the Eastern Partnership countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—and evaluates the practical application of its tools in the region since the launch of the "Eastern Policy" (comprising the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiative).The study concludes by analyzing the use of soft, hard, and hybrid instruments in the Eastern Partnership, outlining the nature of the transformations in EU foreign policy and hypothesizing their underlying causes. These changes in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit reveal broader trends in its strategic development and shed light on the specific dynamics of its engagement with six post-Soviet countries, which remain strategically significant for the EU while occupying a critical space within Russia’s sphere of interests.

How can we better understand weaknesses in the democratic legitimacy underpinning European Union (EU) foreign, security and defence policy? The argument presented here is that this weakness can in part be seen as a function of poor narrative construction in Europe. The nascent European public space does not yet provide a solid foundation from which such narratives might be established, contested and developed and from which they might aspire to some hegemony. Instead, the Union remains reliant upon an unstable intersection of national foreign policy narratives and the weak instantiation of an élite European narrative based on exceptionalism. This fails to create a sense of ownership and legitimacy over the international actions of the Union, adversely impacting its effectiveness and credibility. The élite narrative has solid roots in policy, academic and specialist constituencies but is weakly disseminated and vigorously contested.

The current relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey is dragged outside the standard EU accession framework and is increasingly shaped by Turkey’s positions and actions regarding a set of regional and global foreign policy issues. For the EU to carry forward Turkey’s long-stalled accession negotiations, Turkey is expected to show progress on multiple fronts, including a satisfactory level of policy alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s poor alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions since 2014. It looks into regional as well as international issues that occupied the agenda of EU foreign policy and explores the utility-based and normative explanations behind Turkey’s (dis)engagement in policy cooperation.

There are many factors driving the development of European Union (EU) foreign policy. While much of the literature focuses on how particular interests, norms or internal processes within Brussels institutions, this article sheds light on the role of external factors in shaping EU foreign policy through an in-depth examination of the recent development of EU Arctic policies. We find that increased Russian aggression, not least in Ukraine, is key to understanding why the EU recently has taken a strong interest in the Arctic. In a more insecure environment, Member States are more prone to develop common policies to counter other powers and gain more influence over future developments, especially as it relates to regime-formation in the Global Commons. In effect, the EU demonstrates a kind of reactive power when it comes to dealing with new geopolitical threats.

The European Union (EU) imposes on itself its own constraints in which it performs as an external actor, and yet, there is little acknowledgment of this imposed constraint. It is the migration crisis, an unexpected occurrence, which happens to have brought the fields of EU external relation law and migration law together. The EU ' s external border, on both land and sea, has brought vivid images of tightened borders through legal acts of non-traditional nature, namely, the resort to securitisation and militarisation. Challenges, such as mass irregular migration, require more than just the individual responses of a few selected Member States that are directly affected by the issue. With thousands of persons attempting to reach the shores of EU Member States, and the perils such persons face on their journey, which has seen mass drownings in the Mediterranean Sea, the EU and its Member States have not stood idly by. Instead, decisive action on a number of fronts has been imperative.

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.