Global Governance as International Organization

In this article the frames of democratic global government, which determine the role of a global civil society as an alternative of market-driven globalization, are being analyzed. With this intention the main theories of international political economy – hegemonic stability theory, complex independence theory, new multilateralism, and also the comparison of the approaches to the potential possibilities of strengthening of the role of civil society in the system of global government are being examined.In order to create the necessary framework for democratic global governance in the twenty-first century, global and national civil societies must enter into more intensive synergies with individual national states and international organizations. Therefore, the article aims to define the role of global civil society in the project of global democratic governance as an alternative to market-driven globalization and to consider the main theories of international political economy by comparing their approaches to the potential opportunities of civil society in the global governance system.The article concludes that, based on the definition of opportunities for expanding the role of civil society in global governance, the theory of complex interdependence and the new multilateralism offer the most appropriate theoretical framework for examining the contribution of civil society in removing the tensions generated by globalization. One can talk about the expansion of the role of civil society in global governance, as the growing presence of social movements and non-governmental organizations on the global scene has become visible due to their activities in the areas of services, education, and protection of rights that contribute to the development of a global cooperative system.

Through collective action, global governance helps identify, understand, and address problems that spill over national boundaries. Those problems include maintaining peace and security; developing and implementing rules with regard to trade in commodities and services, capital flows, and migration; containing transboundary pests and diseases; slowing global warming; and providing aid for needy countries and peoples. Specific international organizations (five discussed in Chapter 6) address these issues). The difference between global and national governance is that there is no global government. Global governance, through various international bodies and institutions, complements regional, national, and local governance in an important way and is the sum total of the informal and formal ideas, values, rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies, and institutions that govern all actors—states, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, transnational corporations, and the general public. The number of actors on the global governance scene has proliferated, as has the sheer number of international initiatives that have been started to mobilize incremental international funding in support of food security and nutrition since the 2007 food crisis. Many of the initiatives are reviewed in this chapter, showing that the amount of incremental funding in support of food security and nutrition, beyond traditional sources raised, was insignificant compared to the number of international consultations held. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program was a notable exception, as well as the Agricultural Market Information System. This situation appears to have changed for the better since the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter examines the relationship between global, regional, national, and local governance.

Can goals change the world? In September 2015, the United Nations (UN) unanimously adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to "transform our world" by 2030. With these highly ambitious goals, world leaders pledged to "end hunger", "achieve gender equality", "protect life on land", and much more. Importantly, the SDGs emphasise the need for more collaboration, the breakdown of 'silos' in global governance, and to achieve the SDGs in a balanced and integrated manner. This call for both institutional and policy integration in global governance is long-standing, but remains highly challenging. The SDGs - as the most central and ambitious global agenda so far - have given a renewed impetus to this call. Yet, empirically, we know very little about the effects of global goals. Can non-binding, highly ambitious goals really steer global governance? In this thesis, I investigate the steering effects of the SDGs on international organisations. Specifically, I assess whether - since the advent of the SDGs - institutional integration among and policy integration within international organisations has increased. My methods are both quantitative and qualitative. I rely primarily on a large dataset of scraped websites of 276 international organisations, and assess the contents of and hyperlinks between websites. To complement this data, I also conduct a discourse analysis and analysis on Twitter data. My findings can be summarised in four key points. First, while many international organisations use the SDGs on their websites, the SDGs are not yet a fully global framework. Many international organisations use the SDGs on their websites, and this increases over time. However, the SDGs are mainly used by the larger organisations and by UN entities, while many of the smaller and more regional organisations do not or barely use the SDGs. Second, policy integration overall is increasing, but the integration of environmental topics with socio-economic topics is lagging behind. As mentioned, the call for more policy integration is long-standing, and indeed an increase in policy integration is observed in my study. However, mainly socio-economic topics (ending poverty, decent work, innovation and infrastructure) are integrated with one another, while the integration of environmental with socio-economic topics occurs much less frequent. Third, while policy integration is overall increasing, the SDGs appear not to be an influencing factor. The international organisations that use the SDGs more, do not subsequently show an increase in policy integration. It is rather the other way around: those international organisations that already showed higher levels of policy integration, also use the SDGs more. Thus, the SDGs are used to frame efforts towards policy integration, but do not spur it. Fourth, the SDGs facilitate institutional integration within policy domains. This also means, conversely, that institutional integration between policy domains has decreased. Thus, contrary to political expectations of the SDGS to "break down silos", silos around the 17 issue areas of the SDGs and around the economic, social and environmental dimension of sustainability have strengthened.

THE KEY INSIGHT EXPRESSED IN THE STRIKING WORDS OF THE BRUNDTLAND Commission--The Earth is one but the world is not (1)--remains as relevant a political statement about most global governance challenges today as it was about sustainable development twenty-seven years ago. Global governance entails multilevel and networked relations and interactions for managing and facilitating linkages across policy levels and domains. It consists of formal and informal arrangements that provide more order and stability for a world in constant and rapid flux than would occur naturally--the range of international cooperation without a world government. Intensifying global interdependence, growing recognition of problems that defy solutions by a single state or organization, and increasing numbers and importance of nonstate actors have all contributed to the growth of global governance as an analytical framework. As the numbers of international actors and the frequency and intensity of their interactions have grown, so has the requirement for institutionalized cooperation among them. International transactions are typically characterized by order, stability, and predictability. This immediately raises a puzzle: how is the world governed even in the absence of a world government in order to produce norms, codes of conduct, and regulatory, surveillance, and compliance instruments? How are values allocated quasi-authoritatively for the world and accepted as such, without a government to rule the world? The answer, we believe, lies in global governance--just like the outbreaks and pockets of disorder, instability, volatility, and conflict represent crises of governance whether domestic or global. The content of global governance embraces the totality of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations between citizens, societies, markets, and states in the international system--the wielders and objects of the exercise of international public power. The architecture of global governance is made up of formal international organizations with the UN system as the core of the organized multilateral order, formal regional and subregional organizations, and informal general-purpose groupings. The most visible example of the latter in recent times is the Group of 20 (G-20) heads of state or government, but these groupings also include the old Group of 7 (G7) and the new Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) groupings of the industrialized and emerging market economies, and even informal but functionally specific and single-problem-oriented institutions like the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Nuclear Security Summits as well as transnational networks of civil society and market actors. This journal should be the first port of call for all students, scholars, and practitioners engaged in the study and conduct of global governance. We are only too conscious of following in the footsteps of several distinguished teams of editors who have successfully established Global Governance. They did so in the relatively short period of time since it was launched as the flagship journal of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) to serve as a premier publication where key and insightful articles can be submitted by researchers and subsequently read by all who are interested in knowing about the latest research and thinking on global governance. This continues to be so whether the goal is to describe, explain, or evaluate the state of global governance and whether the primary interest is in the actors, processes, structures, or outcomes of global governance. It is certainly our intention to maintain Global Governance as the journal of choice for researchers, writers, and readers alike on the full breadth and range of issues, problems, and responses of interest to the academic and policy communities. To this end, the well-established practices of double-blind peer review to ensure rigorous quality control and standards of scholarship will be continued. …

This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance--shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy. Keywords: 3G, G-20, global governance, informal groups, small states. Informal Global Governance As new centers of power mobilize and old institutions fall behind the curve of change, the trend in world politics has been for countries to substitute, bypass, or marginalize established institutions of global governance in favor of engagement with new forms of cooperative institutional arrangements--in short, toward informality in global governance. International relations theory has traditionally been uneasy with forms of informal global governance. (1) Realists have dismissed them as irrelevant given that powerful members can go it alone, and neoliberal institutionalists are uncertain of what to make of these forums where formal institutional structures or binding agreements are not apparent. (2) Students of rational design see the advance of centralized rather than disaggregated models of international organizations. (3) Yet this trend toward informality is not only important for extending the debate about the manner by which cooperation can be secured in the global political economy after hegemony, (4) but the manner by which small states attempt to influence bigger ones. Marked by less hierarchy and greater flexibility, informal global governance of small states is an admittedly fuzzy concept, and explaining its theoretical relevance has therefore been a challenge for dominant international relations paradigms. Moreover, the relationship between conceptualization and issue-specific international practice beyond the domain of the UN Security Council in select crisis situations has not been extensively explored. Notwithstanding Jochen Prantl's call in his 2005 International Organization article for extended studies of the dynamics between internal arrangements and formal international organizations, there has been scant research that explores the use by smaller states of informal groups to increase their leverage in the global political economy and so increase our understanding of power, legitimacy and change. (5) Thus, in functional terms, there is some considerable space for specialized and more nuanced studies. Although greater attention is devoted to multilateralism light, the focus has been to some considerable extent on the mechanisms used by bigger and stronger countries, not as tools by coalitions of the weak. (6) A major strand of literature that traces forms of informal governance does so in a mode of analysis that privileges clubs of power where informality allows for easier backroom negotiations over contested issue areas as well as the implementation of tough regulations that are monitored in the privacy of informal groups, whether on a permanent or temporary ad hoc basis. (7) Well-known groupings such as the Group of 8 (G8), the World Trade Organization Green Rooms, and the Middle East Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reflections of these informal groups, which indeed can be effective at achieving their narrow objective of furthering global cooperation. Yet although we have become accustomed to the idea that these contracting parties should have the requisite resources to back up their influence at the table, this approach should not limit our inclination or ability to perceive of alternative arrangements. …

The article explores the concept of «world government» through the prism of its main goals. The works of philosophers, public figures and scientists from various fields of knowledge are analyzed. Four contexts of understanding «world government» are conditionally distinguished, important for modern research – historical and philosophical, economic, legal and political. The political goals of the «world government» are revealed: 1) World security and guarantee of peace: conflict prevention; management of world natural resources. 2. Global human equality: reduction of economic inequality; global control over calculation systems. 3. Unified global control over the development and use of technologies. 4. Ecological world security. To clarify the understanding of the concept of «world government», a teleological approach is applied. Based on the works of philosophers, economists, lawyers and politicians, it is shown that the term «world government» is mentioned in the context of world order, world governance, global governance. It is characterized as a supranational institution of power, a body of political power capable of governing all the peoples of the world. It is found that the concept of «world government» is used in relation to various forms of global governance, some international organizations and hypothetical models of a single power. The main goals of the "world government" are highlighted, which, according to supporters, indicate the need for its creation: reducing the number of conflicts; preventing crises in various areas; stable world order; lasting peace on the planet; preventing nuclear war; ensuring economic equality; economic stability; rational management of resources; fair distribution of resources; more effective response to unforeseen circumstances and uncontrolled development of technologies (artificial intelligence); effective functioning of international law; protection of human rights at the global level. Attention is focused on the need to study the arguments of critics of the need for the existence of a «world government».

Recent years have seen an unprecedented explosive growth of renewable energy. The demand for global governance in this sphere has also increased. Existing energy institutes proved to be unable to take lead in global governance not only in renewables, but also in the whole energy sector. Therefore, the last 10 to 15 years have been marked by attempts to solve renewable (as well as traditional) energy problems at the informal level, or within the framework of Group of Seven/Eight, the Group of 20 and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Moreover, authoritative organizations wholly devoted to renewable energy (such as the International Renewable Energy Agency) have emerged.This article studies the structure and trends of the modern global governance of renewable energy. The authors analyze the role and functions of traditional and new energy institutions and informal groupings, and draw parallels with global governance of the whole energy sector. They pay special attention to Russia’s participation in international renewable energy incentives.Both qualitative and quantitative research methods are applied. The article contains multiple examples of analytical research methods and a content analysis of international documents. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of Russia’s results in complying with the renewable energy commitments of informal groups.The authors conclude that traditional international energy organizations sustain a passive position toward renewable energy. The only exclusion is the International Energy Agency, which has transformed its agenda to include renewable energy. The role of informal groups has been limited (because they have broad agendas and because they were created for other tasks than promoting renewable energy). However, their efforts have a positive influence on the harmonization and development of governance in renewable energy. The article argues that on most sensitive energy-related issues (in renewables and climate change), soft governance or governance based on aims and commitments formulated by countries themselves and not by international organizations becomes most efficient; the best results are demonstrated by new agencies dedicated to renewable energy only.According to the authors, although Russia has taken part in all major relevant initiatives, the results of its efforts have been rather poor, except for the creation and implementation of the legal framework for renewable energy. Russia’s efforts have been mostly declarative in nature. The main reason for this poor performance is the low level of renewable energy development in Russia (except for large hydro), underpinned by the prevailing inertial development model of the energy sector and the whole economy. However, the rapid diffusion of renewable energy technologies in global markets may affect Russia’s oil and gas sectors negatively. Therefore, Russia should increase and improve its participation in global renewable energy governance in order to provide national energy and economic security in the long run.

1. Introduction: The European Union in International Organisations - Functional Necessity or General Aspiration? Christine Kaddous Part I: The European Union in the United Nations 2. The United Nations: A European Union Perspective Mariangela Zappia 3. The Position of the European Union in the United Nations: A United Nations Perspective Markus Schmidt 4. Improving the European Union's Status in the United Nations and the UN System: An Objective Without a Strategy? Jan Wouters, Anna-Luise Chane , Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos Part II: The European Union in the International Labour Organization 5. Coordination Between the European Union and its Member States Marco Ferri 6. European Union Participation and Cooperation in ILO Institutions and Activities: An ILO Perspective Part III: The European Union in the World Trade Organization 7. The European Union in the World Trade Organization Post-Lisbon: No Single Change to the Single Voice? Detlev Brauns and Tomas Baert 8. The European Union and its Member States' Participation in the World Trade Organization: A WTO Perspective Janos Volkai 9. The European Union in the World Trade Organization - A Model for the EU's Status in International Organisations? Frank Hoffmeister Part IV: The European Union in the World Health Organization 10. Coordination Between the European Union and the Member States: An EU Perspective Lourdes Chamorro 11. The European Union and the World Health Organization: Interactions and Collaboration from a Governance and Policy Perspective Gian Luca Burci 12. The European Union's Role and Potential in Research and Innovation for Global Health Ilona Kickbusch, Stephen A Matlin, Samantha Battams and Albrecht Jahn Part V: The European Union in the World Intellectual Property Organization 13. The European Union in the World Intellectual Property Organization: From a Cloudy Complexity towards an Ordered Pluralism: An External Appraisal Jean-Christophe Galloux Part VI: The European Union Participation in International Organisations and Its Normative Power 14. How to Evaluate the European Union as a Normative Power in Multilevel Governance of Public Goods? Methodological Pluralism and its Constitutional Limits in European Governance Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann

Civil Society and International Organizations: A Liberal Framework for Global Governance

Introduction: Global Governance or Global Governances? J.N.Rosenau Governance in the Twenty-First Century J.N.Rosenau Actors, Arenas, and Issues in Global Governance K.Dingwerth& P.Pattberg Global Governance as International Organization T.G.Weiss& A.Z.Kamran Global Governance as Configurations of State/Non-State Activity T.Porter Global Governance as Liberal Hegemony J.Friedrichs Global Governance as Public Policy Networks and Partnerships J.Steets Global Governance as Sector-Specific Management J.Whitman Global Governance as a Summative Phenomenon W.A.Knight Conclusion: The Global Governance Prospect J.Whitman

International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes that IOs, backed by their powerful member states, have at least temporary authority over the seemingly “weak” states in which they intervene. We argue, in contrast, that many post-conflict states shape IO statebuilding efforts through many statebuilding contracts, which we call incomplete arrangements, that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of these statebuilding contracts with IOs. These incomplete arrangements, as opposed to complete takeovers, which are the other type of statebuilding contracts, provide procedural “weapons of the weak state” that enable the post-conflict state to influence what the IO mandate contains, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using in-depth case studies of Burundi, Guatemala, and Timor-Leste, as well as analysis of 36 U.N. interventions in post-conflict states from 2000–2020, this article demonstrates the potential of incomplete arrangement statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states institutional power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.

Desde a virada do milênio, a participação das corporações transnacionais e entidades filantrópicas na agenda de desenvolvimento e direitos humanos das Nações Unidas (ONU) tem sido crescente. Além do Pacto Global, novos espaços de cooperação e diálogo entre empresas e agências da ONU foram criados ou estão sendo discutidos. Na governança global da agricultura e alimentação, essa interação, além de notável, apresenta perfil e dinâmicas próprias, resultado do caráter estratégico que tais parcerias assumiram na agenda tanto das corporações quanto das organizações internacionais (OIs). O artigo, portanto, discute como tem se dado a participação e a influência das corporações na governança agroalimentar das Nações Unidas. Nesta perspectiva, apresentam-se especificamente as interações políticas e institucionais entre as transnacionais ligadas ao agronegócio e três organizações/programas do sistema ONU – a Organização das Nações Unidas para Alimentação e Agricultura (FAO), o Fundo Internacional de Desenvolvimento Agrícola (FIDA) e o Programa Alimentar Mundial (PAM), expondo as razões e os mecanismos responsáveis pela aproximação entre esses atores, ao tempo que destaca algumas das contradições presentes nesta relação. Por fim, mapeia desafios analíticos que se interpõem à abordagem das contradições observadas na intersecção entre atores privados e a governança global agroalimentar.

The global governance of AMR has reached a new stage in recent years since recommendations issued by international organizations have been turned into numerous national action plans. The future of global governance thus depends on the ways national administrations and bureaucrats adapt the goals and tools of international policy against AMR to their own perspective. Based on the theoretical framework of the sociology of professions, this chapter highlights with a qualitative approach why professional state bureaucrats face difficulties in implementing the One Health approach, a cornerstone of global governance which implies the establishment of collaboration between professionals. The analysis focuses on animal health professionals whose views on AMR remain comparatively less studied than those of human health professionals. Building on Switzerland as a case study, it shows that in countries with a decentralized administrative structure, interactions between national and regional administrative units characterized the national governance of AMR. Negotiations between state actors and representatives of the professions concerned with the control of antibiotic use are an additional central element in understanding how global governance is adapted to the national scale. The chapter contributes to the analysis of AMR’s global governance by showing that successful global governance is not limited to countries’ formal compliance with the norms and injunctions promulgated by international organizations. Even in Northern countries where administrative resources are much more developed than in Southern countries, global governance must take into account the social and professional environment in which those who implement plans against antibiotic resistance work.

With formal international organizations (IOs) facing gridlock and informal IOs proliferating, cooperation in the twenty-first century looks different than it did in previous eras. Global governance institutions today also face additional challenges, including a fragmented information environment where publics are increasingly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. What do these trends portend for international politics? One way to answer this question is to return to a core ingredient of a well-functioning IO—information provision—and ask how such changes affect efficiency. Viewed through this lens, we see decline in some arenas and adaptation in others. Formal IOs are struggling to retain relevance as their weak policy responses and ambiguous rules create space for competing signals. The proliferation of informal institutions, on the other hand, may represent global governance evolution, as these technocratic bodies are often well-insulated from many political challenges. Yet even if global governance retains functionality, the legitimacy implications of such trends are troubling. IO legitimacy depends in part on process, and from this standpoint, the informational gains of informal governance must be weighed against losses of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, evaluating the normative implications of these trends requires making judgments about the preferred legitimizing principles for global governance.

PurposeThis paper aims to discuss the positioning of international organisations (IOs) in the realm of international law. It proposes a more robust approach, arguing IOs have legal obligations akin to states to the extent which could be fulfilled by them. This paper suggests making IOs parties to international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Geneva Convention 1949 to codify their international responsibilities. In addition, it proposes amending multilateral treaties to grant IOs membership and create binding legal obligations for them, thereby enhancing the overall legal framework for IOs.Design/methodology/approachThe paper opted for qualitative analytical approach of research by referring to international treaties and scholarly papers.FindingsThe authors have evaluated the bindingness of international law on IOs. The authors argue that jus cogens and customary international law are equally binding on IOs. However, treaties could only be binding on IOs to the extent of their consent. The authors have assessed prior violations of IOs. The authors argue that, to prevent such violations by IOs, creating obligations is the first step. Second, amendments are required in the existing international treaties that reflect the foundations of international humanitarian and international human rights law like the Geneva Convention 1949, ICCPR, and ICESCR, to permit IOs to join these treaties, resulting in binding international legal obligations.Research limitations/implicationsThe most prominent assertion of this paper is that IOs as subjects of international law are bound by the principles of international law, including treaty law with consent, customary international laws, general principles of law and peremptory norms. To fulfil these obligations, a regime needs to be introduced wherein amendment is made in treaties to make IOs parties to them and structuring the law on responsibility for IOs. Considering the multifaceted nature of IO, the role it performs in contemporary times requires them to be bound by rules of international law just like states. There is a need to settle their position in global governance and give them more teeth to understand and fulfil their duties to ensure smooth functioning in the long run.Originality/valueThe paper fulfils an identified gap in the positioning of IOs under the international law.