Grading by Committees: An Axiomatic Approach

Judgment aggregation is a field in which individuals are required to vote for or against a certain decision (the conclusion) while providing reasons for their choice. The reasons and the conclusion are logically connected propositions. The problem is how a collective judgment on logically interconnected propositions can be defined from individual judgments on the same propositions. It turns out that, despite the fact that the individuals are logically consistent, the aggregation of their judgments may lead to an inconsistent group outcome, where the reasons do not support the conclusion. However, in this paper we claim that collective irrationality should not be the only worry of judgment aggregation. For example, judgment aggregation would not reject a consistent combination of reasons and conclusion that no member voted for. In our view this may not be a desirable solution. This motivates our research about when a social outcome is `compatible' with the individuals' judgments. The key notion that we want to capture is that any individual member has to be able to defend the collective decision. This is guaranteed when the group outcome is compatible with its members views. Judgment aggregation problems are usually studied using classical propositional logic. However, for our analysis we use an argumentation approach to judgment aggregation problems. Indeed the question of how individual evaluations can be combined into a collective one can also be addressed in abstract argumentation. We introduce three aggregation operators that satisfy the condition above, and we offer two definitions of compatibility. Not only does our proposal satisfy a good number of standard judgment aggregation postulates, but it also avoids the problem of individual members of a group having to become committed to a group judgment that is in conflict with their own individual positions.

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using “systematicity” and “independence” conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

Preference aggregation and judgment aggregation are two basic research models of group decision making. And preference aggregation has been deeply studied in social choice theory. However, researches of social choice theory gradually focus on judgment aggregation which appears recently. Judgment aggregation focuses on how to aggregate many consistent logical formulas into one, from the perspective of logic. We try to start with judgment aggregation model based on logic and then explore different solutions to problem of judgment aggregation.

In recent years, judgement aggregation has emerged as an important area of social choice theory. Judgement aggregation is concerned with aggregating sets of individual judgements over logically connected propositions into a set of collective judgements. It has been shown that even seemingly weak conditions on the aggregation function make it impossible to find functions that produce rational collective judgements from all possible rational individual judgements. This implies that the step from individual judgements to collective judgements requires trade-offs between different desiderata, such as universal domain, rationality, epistemological quality, and unbiasedness. The typical application for judgement aggregation is the problem of group decision making. Juries and expert committees are the stock examples. However, the relevance of judgement aggregation goes beyond these cases. In this survey, I review some core results in the field of judgement aggregation and social epistemology and discuss their implications for the analysis of distributed thinking.

Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it.

Computational social choice is a new interdisciplinary research area at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science that studies computational aspects of social choice mechanisms as well as applications of social choice ideas in the design and analysis of computing systems. Research on computational social choice now encompasses a variety of topics, including the algorithmic aspects of voting rules, computational barriers to strategic behaviour, collective decision-making in multi-agent systems, preference elicitation and communication issues in voting, fair division, computational aspects of weighted voting games, collective decision-making in combinatorial domains, logic-based formalisms for social choice problems, belief and judgement aggregation, and social software. The aim of this special issue is to build on the spectacular success of two workshops on computational social choice (COMSOC’06, Amsterdam and COMSOC’08, Liverpool), and provide a forum for reseachers in the area to present their ideas on a variety of topics. This special issue is composed of nine research articles and a short note that span a fairly wide range of issues, including voting, mechanism design, judgment aggregation, and fairness, and a similarly wide range of techniques, such as logic, experiments, and computational complexity. The paper by Agotnes, van der Hoek and Wooldridge defines a new modal logic for representing and reasoning about preference and judgment aggregation. The authors show that their logic can be used to express a variety of concepts and results from the social choice domain, including majority voting, the discursive paradox, Arrow’s theorem and Condorcet’s paradox. Baharad, Goldberger, Koppel and Nitzan propose a maximum likelihood estimation-based approach for aggregating voters’ opinions over several issues. They argue that their method is vastly superior to simple majority voting, and use both analytical and empirical evaluation to support their argument. Balan, Richards and Luke deal with the problem of selecting a sequence of actions when the actions have multiple beneficiaries. Their goal is to select the actions according to a lexicographic fairness criterion. The explore the complexity of this problem for both finite and infinite sequences of actions and present both algorithms and intractability results for this problem. The paper by Caminada and Pigozzi applies argumentation theory to judgment aggregation, and proposes aggregation operators satisfying not only the usual property of collective rationality, but another highly desirable property,

This paper aims to support decision-makers improve their ability to accurately capture and represent their judgment in a wide range of situations. To do this, we propose a new type of fuzzy set called a p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-cubic quasi-rung orthopair fuzzy set (p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFS). The p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFS allows for a more flexible and detailed expression of incomplete information through the use of an additional parameter. The paper describes the concept of p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFS and its relationship to other types of fuzzy sets, introduces score and accuracy functions for p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFS and analyzes some of its mathematical properties, defines the Hamming distance measure between two p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFSs and examines some of its important properties, investigates the basic operations of p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-CQOFSs and extends these laws to aggregation operators, and introduces weighted averaging and geometric aggregation operators for combining p,q\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$p,q$$\\end{document}-cubic quasi-rung orthopair fuzzy data.

Some decision aiding methods are based on constructing and exploiting outranking relations. An alternative a outranks another b if a is at least as good as b (aSb). One well known method in this field is ELECTRE. The outranking relation is usually built by means of a weighted average (WA) of the votes given by a set of criterion with respect to the fulfilment of aSb. The value obtained represent the strength of the majority opinion. The WA operator can be observed to have sometimes an undesired compensative effect. In this paper we propose the use of other aggregation operators with different mathematical properties. In particular, we substitute the WA by three operators from the Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) family of operators because it permits to decide the degree of andness/orness that is used during the aggregation. The OWAWA (Ordered Weighted Average Weighted Average), WOWA (Weighted Ordered Weighted Average) and IOWA (Induced Ordered Weighted Average) operators are studied. They are capable to combine the importance given to each criterion with the conjunctive/disjunctive requirement applied in the definition of the outranking relation.

Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens the theoretical boundaries of judgment aggregation by proving that, even if these nonmonotonic logics are employed, certain typical impossibility results still hold.

There are two different fundamental conceptions of the task of social aggregation: interest aggregation and judgment aggregation. While the former aims at the fair and efficient trade-off of personal interests, the latter aims the best resolution of disagreement. Both are possible interpretations of the standard preference aggregation and preference-based voting problems. This note makes two broad points. First, the judgment aggregation conception is not yet well understood and remains undertheorized. Second, the difference between the two conceptions matters; it is a difference that makes a difference. To substantiate the first point, we argue that judgment aggregation as resolution of disagreement cannot be subsumed under statistical aggregation in the manner of Condorcet’s jury theorem, and sketch a more specific articulation as “reflexive consensus under arguable disagreement”. To substantiate the second point, we illustrate the difference in the context of two important voting rules, the Kemeny rule and Majority Judgment.

Information stored in a database is often subject to uncertainty and imprecision. Probability theory provides a well-known and well understood way of representing uncertainty and may thus be used to provide a mechanism for storing uncertain information in a database. We consider the problem of aggregation using an imprecise probability data model that allows us to represent imprecision by partial probabilities and uncertainty using probability distributions. Most work to date has concentrated on providing functionality for extending the relational algebra with a view to executing traditional queries on uncertain or imprecise data. However, for imprecise and uncertain data, we often require aggregation operators that provide information on patterns in the data. Thus, while traditional query processing is tuple-driven, processing of uncertain data is often attribute-driven where we use aggregation operators to discover attribute properties. The aggregation operator that we define uses the Kullback-Leibler information divergence between the aggregated probability distribution and the individual tuple values to provide a probability distribution for the domain values of an attribute or group of attributes. The provision of such aggregation operators is a central requirement in furnishing a database with the capability to perform the operations necessary for knowledge discovery in databases.

Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step aggregation of individual decisions is arguably most studied. Another way to reach collective decisions is by iterative consensus building – allowing each decision-maker to change their individual decision in response to the choices of the other agents until a consensus is reached. Iterative consensus building has so far only been studied for voting problems. Here we propose an iterative judgment aggregation algorithm, based on movements in an undirected graph, and we study for which instances it terminates with a consensus. We also compare the computational complexity of our itterative procedure with that of related judgment aggregation operators.

An intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) is a valuable tool to execute uncertain and indeterminate information. IFSs are more suitable to identify decision-maker’s evaluation data in decision-making problems. Intuitionistic fuzzy aggregation operators (AOs) are of enormous consequences in multiple attribute group decision-making (MAGDM) problems with an intuitionistic fuzzy environment. Consequently, the main impacts of this article are: firstly, to instigate various new novel generalized power AOs based on Schweizer-Sklar operational rules for IFS. Secondly, the study aims to discuss characteristics and particular cases of AOs. The core edge of proposed AOs is that they can eradicate the influence of uncomfortable data which could be too high or too low, making them more admirable for efficiently solving more and more complex MAGDM problems. Thirdly, we instigate two new algorithms to deal with MAGDM established on the generalized Schweizer-Sklar power AOs. Lastly, we appertain the anticipated method and algorithms to health care waste treatment technology selection (HCW-TT) to show the competence of the anticipated method and algorithms. The prevailing novelties of these items are duplex. Firstly, new generalized AOs established on Schweizer-Sklar operational rules are initiated for IFNs. Secondly, two new approaches for IF MAGDM are initiated, one for known decision-makers (DMs) and attributes weights, while the other for unknown DMs and attributes weights.

The neutrosophic cubic set (NCS) is a hybrid structure, which consists of interval neutrosophic sets (INS) (associated with the undetermined part of information associated with entropy) and single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS) (associated with the determined part of information). NCS is a better tool to handle complex decision-making (DM) problems with INS and SVNS. The main purpose of this article is to develop some new aggregation operators for cubic neutrosophic numbers (NCNs), which is a basic member of NCS. Taking the advantages of Muirhead mean (MM) operator and power average (PA) operator, the power Muirhead mean (PMM) operator is developed and is scrutinized under NC information. To manage the problems upstretched, some new NC aggregation operators, such as the NC power Muirhead mean (NCPMM) operator, weighted NC power Muirhead mean (WNCPMM) operator, NC power dual Muirhead mean (NCPMM) operator and weighted NC power dual Muirhead mean (WNCPDMM) operator are proposed and related properties of these proposed aggregation operators are conferred. The important advantage of the developed aggregation operator is that it can remove the effect of awkward data and it considers the interrelationship among aggregated values at the same time. Furthermore, a novel multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) method is established over the proposed new aggregation operators to confer the usefulness of these operators. Finally, a numerical example is given to show the effectiveness of the developed approach.

Judgment aggregation is a recent theory that combines aggregation problems previously studied by social choice theory with logic. Social choice theory is a vast subject, including not only the study of preference aggregation and voting theory but also topics like social welfare and justice. Given the tight links between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation, in this first chapter we give a concise survey on some historical aspects of preference aggregation and then introduce and motivate the more recent field of judgment aggregation. The chapter builds on [Sen99, Sen86, Bla58] for the historical overview on social choice theory, and on [KS93, Kor92] for the informal introduction to judgment aggregation.