HiDS Data clustering algorithm based on differential privacy

Differential privacy in probabilistic systems

Differential privacy is a precise mathematical constraint meant to ensure privacy of individual pieces of information in a database even while queries are being answered about the aggregate. Intuitively, one must come to terms with what differential privacy does and does not guarantee. For example, the definition prevents a strong adversary who knows all but one entry in the database from further inferring about the last one. This strong adversary assumption can be overlooked, resulting in misinterpretation of the privacy guarantee of differential privacy. Herein we give an equivalent definition of privacy using mutual information that makes plain some of the subtleties of differential privacy. The mutual-information differential privacy is in fact sandwiched between $\epsilon$-differential privacy and $(\epsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy in terms of its strength. In contrast to previous works using unconditional mutual information, differential privacy is fundamentally related to conditional mutual information, accompanied by a maximization over the database distribution. The conceptual advantage of using mutual information, aside from yielding a simpler and more intuitive definition of differential privacy, is that its properties are well understood. Several properties of differential privacy are easily verified for the mutual information alternative, such as composition theorems.

Recent emerging mobile and wearable technologies make it easy to collect personal spatiotemporal data such as activity trajectories in daily life. Releasing real-time statistics over trajectory streams produced by crowds of people is expected to be valuable for both academia and business, answering questions such as How many people are in Central Station now? However, analyzing these raw data will entail risks of compromising individual privacy. ?-Differential Privacy has emerged as a de facto standard for private statistics publishing because of its guarantee of being rigorous and mathematically provable. Since user trajectories will be generated infinitely, it is difficult to protect every trajectory under ?-differential privacy. To this end, we propose a flexible privacy model of l-trajectory privacy to ensure every length of l trajectories under protection of ?-differential privacy. Then we hierarchically design algorithms to satisfy l-trajectory privacy. Experiments using four real-life datasets show that our proposed algorithms are effective and efficient.

Differential privacy is a statistical definition of privacy that has attracted the interest of both academia and industry. Its formulations are easy to understand, but the differential privacy of databases is complicated to determine. One of the reasons for this is that small changes in database programs can break their differential privacy. Therefore, formal verification of differential privacy has been studied for over a decade. In this paper, we propose an Isabelle/HOL library for formalizing differential privacy in a general setting. To our knowledge, it is the first formalization of differential privacy that supports continuous probability distributions. First, we formalize the standard definition of differential privacy and its basic properties. Second, we formalize the Laplace mechanism and its differential privacy. Finally, we formalize the differential privacy of the report noisy max mechanism.

The primary motivation is to address difficulties in data interpretation or a reduction in model accuracy. Although differential privacy can provide data privacy guarantees, it also creates problems. Thus, we need to consider the noise setting for differential privacy is currently inconclusive. This paper’s main contribution is finding a balance between privacy and accuracy. The training data of deep learning models may contain private or sensitive corporate information. These may be dangerous to attacks, leading to privacy data leakage for data sharing. Many strategies are for privacy protection, and differential privacy is the most widely applied one. Google proposed a federated learning technology to solve the problem of data silos in 2016. The technology can share information without exchanging original data and has made significant progress in the medical field. However, there is still the risk of data leakage in federated learning; thus, many models are now used with differential privacy mechanisms to minimize the risk. The data in the financial field are similar to medical data, which contains a substantial amount of personal data. The leakage may cause uncontrollable consequences, making data exchange and sharing difficult. Let us suppose that differential privacy applies to the financial field. Financial institutions can provide customers with higher value and personalized services and automate credit scoring and risk management. Unfortunately, the economic area rarely applies differential privacy and attains no consensus on parameter settings. This study compares data security with non-private and differential privacy financial visual models. The paper finds a balance between privacy protection with model accuracy. The results show that when the privacy loss parameter ϵ is between 12.62 and 5.41, the privacy models can protect training data, and the accuracy does not decrease too much.

This letter proposes an algorithmic method to verify differential privacy for estimation mechanisms with performance guarantees. Differential privacy makes it hard to distinguish outputs of a mechanism produced by adjacent inputs. While obtaining theoretical conditions that guarantee differential privacy may be possible, evaluating these conditions in practice can be hard. This is especially true for estimation mechanisms that take values in continuous spaces, as this requires checking for an infinite set of inequalities. Instead, our verification approach consists of testing the differential privacy condition for a suitably chosen finite collection of events at the expense of some information loss. More precisely, our data-driven, test framework for continuous range mechanisms first finds a highly-likely, compact event set, as well as a partition of this event, and then evaluates differential privacy wrt this partition. This results into a type of differential privacy with high confidence, which we are able to quantify precisely. This approach is then used to evaluate the differential-privacy properties of the recently proposed <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$W_{2}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> Moving Horizon Estimator. We confirm its properties, while comparing its performance with alternative approaches in simulation.

Personal data privacy is a great concern by governments across the world as citizens generate huge amount of data continuously and industries using this for betterment of user centric services. There must be a reasonable balance between data privacy and utility of data. Differential privacy is a promise by data collector to the customer’s personal privacy. Centralised Differential Privacy (CDP) is performing output perturbation of user’s data by applying required privacy budget. This promises the inclusion or exclusion of individual’s data in data set not going to create significant change for a statistical query output and it offers -Differential privacy guarantee. CDP is holding a strong belief on trusted data collector and applying global sensitivity of the data. Local Differential Privacy (LDP) helps user to locally perturb his data and there by guaranteeing privacy even with untrusted data collector. Many differential privacy algorithms handles parameters like privacy budget, sensitivity and data utility in different ways and mostly trying to keep trade-off between privacy and utility of data. This paper evaluates differential privacy algorithms in regard to the privacy support it offers according to the sensitivity of the data. Generalized application of privacy budget is found ineffective in comparison to the sensitivity based usage of privacy budget.

With the advent of the volume, velocity and variety of data in today’s day and age, big data has become the norm in many places. Data at rest, the same data that is fed to the analyst of a company is at most times, not encrypted and depends on the fact that a person can be trusted by the company. Our contribution is implementing differential privacy in a NoSQL database while combating the few drawbacks in differential privacy with techniques such as cluffering (clustering and shuffling) and k-Anonymization. We implement an end to end implementation in a NoSQL database, MongoDB to promote privacy by perturbation using differential privacy which has been shown to be one of the best ways to do so. A generic system gets formed where local differential privacy is enforced before sending the sensitive database for analysis and enforcing differential privacy concepts on aggregate queries ensuring that no particular individual gets exposed in the process. We further provide the basis for implementing other aggregates apart from the ones we implemented and for complex queries that are not yet supported while the core concepts remain the same.

Differential privacy is a notion that has emerged in the community of statistical databases, as a response to the problem of protecting the privacy of the database's participants when performing statistical queries. The idea is that a randomized query satisfies differential privacy if the likelihood of obtaining a certain answer for a database $x$ is not too different from the likelihood of obtaining the same answer on adjacent databases, i.e. databases which differ from $x$ for only one individual. Information flow is an area of Security concerned with the problem of controlling the leakage of confidential information in programs and protocols. Nowadays, one of the most established approaches to quantify and to reason about leakage is based on the R\'enyi min entropy version of information theory. In this paper, we analyze critically the notion of differential privacy in light of the conceptual framework provided by the R\'enyi min information theory. We show that there is a close relation between differential privacy and leakage, due to the graph symmetries induced by the adjacency relation. Furthermore, we consider the utility of the randomized answer, which measures its expected degree of accuracy. We focus on certain kinds of utility functions called "binary", which have a close correspondence with the R\'enyi min mutual information. Again, it turns out that there can be a tight correspondence between differential privacy and utility, depending on the symmetries induced by the adjacency relation and by the query. Depending on these symmetries we can also build an optimal-utility randomization mechanism while preserving the required level of differential privacy. Our main contribution is a study of the kind of structures that can be induced by the adjacency relation and the query, and how to use them to derive bounds on the leakage and achieve the optimal utility.

Differential privacy is a rigorous, worst-case notion of privacy-preserving computation. Informally, a probabilistic program is differentially private if the participation of a single individual in the input database has a limited effect on the program's distribution on outputs. More technically, differential privacy is a quantitative 2-safety property that bounds the distance between the output distributions of a probabilistic program on adjacent inputs. Like many 2-safety properties, differential privacy lies outside the scope of traditional verification techniques. Existing approaches to enforce privacy are based on intricate, non-conventional type systems, or customized relational logics. These approaches are difficult to implement and often cumbersome to use. We present an alternative approach that verifies differential privacy by standard, non-relational reasoning on non-probabilistic programs. Our approach transforms a probabilistic program into a non-probabilistic program which simulates two executions of the original program. We prove that if the target program is correct with respect to a Hoare specification, then the original probabilistic program is differentially private. We provide a variety of examples from the differential privacy literature to demonstrate the utility of our approach. Finally, we compare our approach with existing verification techniques for privacy.

Federated learning is a distributed machine learning technique that allows multiple devices to collaborate on learning a shared model without exchanging data. It can be used to improve model accuracy while protecting user privacy. However, traditional federated learning is vulnerable to attacks from generative adversarial networks (GANs). As a new privacy protection method, differential privacy enhances privacy protection capabilities by sacrificing some data accuracy. To optimize the privacy budget allocation scheme in traditional differential privacy, we propose a differential privacy method called ADP-FL, which dynamically adjusts the privacy budget based on Newton’s Law of Cooling. While maintaining the overall privacy budget, it dynamically tunes adaptive parameters to improve training accuracy. Additionally, we propose an asynchronous federated learning aggregation scheme that combines privacy budget with data freshness, thereby reducing the impact of differential privacy on accuracy. We conducted extensive experiments on differential privacy algorithms based on Gaussian mechanisms and Laplace mechanisms. The experimental results show that, under the same privacy budget, our algorithm achieves higher accuracy and lower communication overhead compared to the baseline algorithm.

A verifiable scheme for differential privacy based on zero-knowledge proofs

Differential privacy is a de facto standard in data privacy with applications in the private and public sectors. Most of the techniques that achieve differential privacy are based on a judicious use of randomness. However, reasoning about randomized programs is difficult and error prone. For this reason, several techniques have been recently proposed to support designer in proving programs differentially private or in finding violations to it. In this work we propose a technique based on symbolic execution for reasoning about differential privacy. Symbolic execution is a classic technique used for testing, counterexample generation and to prove absence of bugs. Here we use symbolic execution to support these tasks specifically for differential privacy. To achieve this goal, we leverage two ideas that have been already proven useful in formal reasoning about differential privacy: relational reasoning and probabilistic coupling. Our technique integrates these two ideas and shows how such a combination can be used to both verify and find violations to differential privacy.

Differential privacy is often used in location privacy protection because of its strict reasoning and proof privacy guarantee. When users make continuous location query, it will cause noise superposition, which leads to the decline of query accuracy. At present, although differential privacy based on rule tree structure can reduce the query error, it will generate a lot of invalid zero nodes. The data structure is too large, and more improvement in the query accuracy can be further investigated. In this paper, we proposed a differential privacy location privacy protection method based on generative adversary network. Firstly, the definition of location data privacy protection under differential privacy mechanism is given, and then resume density aware network under differential privacy mechanism. Based on density aware network, the privacy protection problem of location data can be transformed into the distribution of fitting trajectory length. Finally, we use Markov chain to generate a new trajectory, and introduce the generative adversarial network to construct a set differential privacy protection method. Compared with other methods to improve the accuracy of differential privacy query, this method can effectively reduce the problem of query accuracy decline caused by noise superposition in continuous query, and can adapt to lbs location query service in different density environments.KeywordsGenerative adversarial networkLocation differencePrivacy protectionMarkov chainDensity aware network

Through the lens of the system of differential privacy specifications developed in Part I of a trio of articles, this second paper examines two statistical disclosure control (SDC) methods for the United States Decennial Census: the Permutation Swapping Algorithm (PSA), which is similar to the 2010 Census’s disclosure avoidance system (DAS), and the TopDown Algorithm (TDA), which was used in the 2020 DAS. To varying degrees, both methods leave unaltered some statistics of the confidential data—which are called the method’s invariants—and hence neither can be readily reconciled with differential privacy (DP), at least as it was originally conceived. Nevertheless, we establish that the PSA satisfies -DP subject to the invariants it necessarily induces, thereby showing that this traditional SDC method can in fact still be understood within our more-general system of DP specifications. By a similar modification to -zero concentrated DP, we also provide a DP specification for the TDA. Finally, as a point of comparison, we consider the counterfactual scenario in which the PSA was adopted for the 2020 Census, resulting in a reduction in the nominal privacy loss, but at the cost of releasing many more invariants. Therefore, while our results explicate the mathematical guarantees of SDC provided by the PSA, the TDA and the 2020 DAS in general, care must be taken in their translation to actual privacy protection—just as is the case for any DP deployment.