How Residents Develop Virtues: A Qualitative Longitudinal Study.

Reviewed by: Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics by J. Budziszewski Raymond Hain Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics by J. Budziszewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), xxvii + 295 pp. J. Budziszewski's Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics follows his similarly structured 2014 Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law. But while the earlier commentary, over 500 pages long, works straight through all of questions 90–97 of the prima secundae and is supplemented by an additional 250-page online commentary, this commentary is shorter, highly selective, and lacks a supplemental online commentary. And since the first half considers selected articles on the virtues in general, while the second half considers selected articles on justice, the Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics itself feels like a supplement to the earlier law commentary. After describing its overall content and structure, I will comment on how useful it might be for its intended audience: "scholars," "students" and "even . . . serious general readers" (xxi). The Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics includes the text of, and commentary on, eighteen articles from the Summa theologiae. Ten articles focus on the virtues in general: I-II, q. 55, a. 4 (Whether virtue is suitably defined?) I-II, q. 58, a. 4 (Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?) I-II, q. 58, a. 5 (Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?) [End Page 583] I-II, q. 61, a. 2 (Whether there are four cardinal virtues?) I-II, q. 61, a. 3 (Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?) I-II, q. 62, a. 1 (Whether there are any theological virtues?) I-II, q. 63, a. 1 (Whether virtue is in us by nature?) I-II, q. 63, a. 2 (Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?) I-II, q. 65, a. 1 (Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another) I-II, q. 84, a. 4 (Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?) And the remaining eight articles focus on the virtue of justice: II-II, q. 30, a. 3 (Whether mercy is a virtue) II-II, q. 58, a. 1 (Whether justice is i described as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?) II-II, q. 60, a. 1 (Whether judgment is an act of justice?) II-II, q. 60, a. 2 (Whether it is lawful to judge?) II-II, q. 60, a. 5 (Whether we should always judge according to the written law?) II-II, q. 60, a. 6 (Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?) II-II, q. 80, a. 1 (Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?) II-II, q. 122, a. 1 (Whether the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of justice?) The text of each article is presented twice—once in the 1920 Blackfriars translation (now in the public domain and widely available) and once in a paraphrase by Budziszewski. Line-by-line commentary follows each portion of the text and is keyed to the sentences in the Blackfriars translation. Besides the text of the commentary itself, an eleven-page general introduction and an index are included as supporting material. Budziszewski is most interested in understanding the plain meaning of the text, and in working through Aquinas's sources, and there are almost no comments that engage contemporary scholars or critics of Aquinas. As he says, "Some may think I do not spend enough time quarreling with critics of St. Thomas. My conviction is that before we enter these quarrels, we had better make sure we understand him. If we do understand him, many of the criticisms fall away like dead leaves" (xxii). Serious general readers will find this commentary very helpful, especially [End Page 584] if they are coming to Aquinas for the first time. Consider this representative passage from ST I-II, q. 55, a. 4 that discusses the "matter" of virtues and Budziszewski's paraphrase (10–11): Text: [5] Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which...

Aristotle based his theory of virtue ethics on the idea that it is moral and intellectual virtues that lead people to behave well. Moral virtues are character traits that dispose people to behave ethically. The intellectual virtue of phronesis enables them to make good judgements as to how to give practical effect to their disposition. He thought it impossible to define with precision what the ethical course of action would be in any particular situation, so he had no interest in defining specific moral laws. He was concerned rather to set up a target which, if people aimed at it, would enable them to behave better than they otherwise would. Virtue ethics is highly applicable to management consulting. The intangible nature of the outputs of management consultancy work, and the reliance that clients and others, therefore, have to place on subjective impressions in evaluating the performance and behaviour of management consultants, means that the character of management consultants is a central issue in determining whether or not they can be trusted to behave in an ethical manner. Ideas from Aristotle’s theory could go far towards strengthening management consultancy firms’ typical approaches to ensuring that ethical standards are observed.

Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of intellectual virtue. The kind of she has in mind is on the model of Aristotle's account of moral virtue: A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual thoroughness and intellectual courage. Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a true theory, distinguishing it from reliabilist theories of Sosa and Goldman.' These latter authors use the terminology of intellectual and but in a way that, according to Zagzebski, misuses the language of virtue. In what follows below I will argue for two theses. First, there is an important way of dividing up the landscape so that the theories of Sosa and Goldman are indeed theories. On this understanding, all three of our authors are in the same broad camp; one which can appropriately be labeled virtue epistemology, and which can be distinguished from other broad alternatives concerning the nature of knowledge. The real disagreement between Zagzebski on the one hand, and Sosa and Goldman on the other, is over the nature of intellectual virtue, or that kind of which is required for knowledge. Once the question is put this way, it is possible to argue for my second thesis. Namely, reliabilists such as Sosa and Goldman are correct in rejecting Aristotle's account of the moral virtues as the model for understanding intellectual virtue. Contra Zagzebski, the cognitive character that grounds knowledge need not be acquired, need not include the strong motivational component of an Aristotlean moral virtue, and need not be an excellence in Aristotle's sense. Rather, the essential aspect of an intellectual is its success component, or in Sosa's and Goldman's terms, its reliability.

This article explores the distinct yet interconnected approaches to virtue ethics presented by Aristotle, David Hume, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Virtue ethics, broadly defined, is a moral theory emphasizing character and moral virtues over rules or consequences. While Aristotle grounds virtue in reason and defines the good life (eudaimonia) as living in accordance with rational activity and social excellence, Hume reinterprets virtue through the lens of emotion, arguing that moral judgment stems from feelings like sympathy and benevolence rather than rational deliberation. Nietzsche, diverging further, criticizes traditional moral frameworks altogether, presenting virtue as a dynamic and personal expression of strength and individuality, independent of universal reason or emotion. By employing these three perspectives, the study categorizes Aristotle’s model as eudaimonian virtue ethics, Hume’s as sentimentalist virtue ethics, and Nietzsche’s as a virtue ethics of becoming. These distinctions illuminate the evolving role of reason in moral philosophy and highlight contrasting views of human flourishing, moral development, and the nature of virtue itself.

Introduction: In Malaysia, medical specialisation training is mainly carried out by the public universities. Methods: A survey was carried out to explore the views of medical specialists in the country on issues such as structure of medical specialty training, availability of human resource, public/private sector competition, competency and apprenticeship, and its impact on assurance and quality of medical specialty training. Results: Altogether 238 medical specialists from 30 hospitals and medical institutions in the country participated in the survey. Conclusion: Among the findings, competition for human resource between public and private sector and lack of uniformity on medical specialty training across universities in the country are among the issues found to be of concern. There is also a need to address governance issue which necessitates to clearly delineating what constitutes medical specialty and what constitutes a subspecialty so that an agreed uniformed nomenclature is exercised across all stakeholders. The respondents also strongly agreed on the need to ensure competence in medical specialist training.

Актуальность. Эксперты ВОЗ отмечают, что сегодня в Европе не существует общепризнанного подхода к непрерывному медицинскому образованию, однако существует общее мнение, что качество медицинских услуг напрямую зависит от постоянного развития и оценки профессиональных компетенций врачей в процессе их повышения квалификации. Особое внимание всегда уделялось обеспечению (и постоянному совершенствованию) академического уровня поставщиков образовательных услуг или программ, на основе которых врачи согласовывают собственные планы по получению необходимых профессиональных знаний и навыков. Важнейшей предпосылкой обеспечения повышения квалификации является создание единой системы аккредитации поставщиков образовательных услуг или программ, а также "коллективная ответственность" всех участников медицинского образования. Цель: исследовать развитие системы последипломного и непрерывного образования в Украине на примере ведущего национального учреждения последипломного образования – Национальной медицинской академии последипломного образования имени П. Л. Шупика (НМАПО). Материалы и методы. Архивные материалы. В исследовании мы использовали общий (универсальный) метод, исторический и логический методы. Результаты. Согласно определению Всемирной федерации медицинского образования (WFME), последипломное медицинское образование – это фаза медицинского образования, на которой врачи развивают свои компетенции после завершения базовой медицинской квалификации. Этот этап обучения проводится в соответствии с определенными правилами и инструкциями. Последипломное медицинское образование включает подготовку к сертификации и/или лицензирования, производственную/профессиональную подготовку, специализацию и узкую специализацию, а также другие формализованные учебные программы для развития определенных экспертных функций. Будучи частью непрерывного медицинского образования, последипломное образование включается в непрерывное медицинское образование (НМО) или непрерывное профессиональное развитие (НПР). Согласно определению WFME, НПР касается подготовки врачей, которая начинается после окончания базового и последипломного медицинского образования и продолжается в дальнейшем в течение профессиональной жизни каждого врача. Сейчас развитие современной медицины происходит чрезвычайно быстрыми темпами, а навыки и знания врачей быстро устаревают. В статье прослеживается внедрение последипломной медицинской подготовки в Украине на примере НМАПО. Выводы. Внедрение последипломной подготовки врачей в Украине изучается на примере более 100-летней деятельности НМАПО, что позволяет утверждать, что сочетание исследований и инноваций, обучения и медицинской практики позволило учебному заведению стать примером для подражания в учебно-методической деятельности в условиях последипломного медицинского и фармацевтического образования.

The article examines the specifics of the virtue ethics as an anthropological turn in the moral philosophy of the 20th century based on Aristotle's ethics ideas. The article sets a goal to show the specificity of borrowing these ideas determined the virtue ethics thematic development direction in conceptualizing the moral assessment of human activity, but it also became the cause of the main conceptual difficulty (problematization of human nature), it has not been overcome. The article provides an analytical review of the main works of the most significant representatives of the virtue ethics, reconstructs the approaches developed in the works to the conceptualization of moral evaluation of human activity and establishes the role of Aristotle's ideas in the approaches. It is shown the appeal to Aristotle's philosophy primarily occurs when developing a method for determining the moral content of an action in a specific situation, where the application of a universal rule should be supplemented by many conditions of this situation, as well as when trying to return the motive and personal qualities to the description of the conditions. The latter also entails the conceptualization of personal qualities as a moral state of a person, correlated with his development (in possibility — by nature, in reality — in interaction with other people). It is concluded that the virtue ethics borrowed Aristotle's ideas in fragments and without a deep analysis of his philosophy. As a result, the problem of conceptualizing human nature was not solved, which would allow us to come to moral assessments of an act without appeal to a transcendental legislator or abstraction of duty. The achievements of ethics of virtue show: 1) it is impossible to selectively return individual concepts from the past to moral philosophy, but a comprehensive description of the phenomenon of morality in human activity is necessary, 2) the return of old concepts also brings back old problems of former moral theories (in the case of virtue, this is the problem of making a choice and forming a disposition).

Regulation is essential to health systems and is central to advancing equity-oriented policy objectives in health. Regulating new medical specialties is an emerging, yet underexplored, aspect of health sector governance in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), such as India. Limited research exists regarding how regulatory institutions in India decide what specialties should be formally recognized and how training programmes for these specialties should be organized. Understanding these regulatory functions provides a lens into how policymakers envision the role of these specialties in the broader health system and how they view the linkages between medical education, health system needs and equity. Drawing upon the recent development of emergency medicine in India, the goal of this study was to understand how recognition and training for new medical specialties are regulated in India. Building on previous frameworks, we examined the institutions, functions, enforcement, mechanisms and institutional relationships that make up the regulatory architecture, and situated our analysis in historical context. Two data sources were iteratively utilized: document review (n = 93) and in-depth interviews (n = 87). Our analysis reveals a plurality of institutions involved in regulating recognition and training for new medical specialties in India, characterized by a lack of coordination, limited collaboration and weak accountability. We also found an absence of clear responsibility for the systematic, planned development of specialties, particularly in terms of health system in strengthening and achieving health equity. As medical specialization continues to shape health systems in LMICs, further streamlining and coordination in the regulatory system will enable policymakers, researchers, practitioners and civil society to proactively plan for how these specialties can better integrate with health systems, and to advance their contribution to improving health outcomes.

ABSTRACTBetween 1997 and 2009 Derek Sellman published a series of articles that explore the question: what makes a good nurse. To answer this question, Sellman engaged at length with the virtue ethics of Alisdair MacIntyre. Sellman contends that modern nursing is a professional practice, in the sense of practice described by MacIntyre. Based on nursing's ends and moral tradition, therefore, certain professional virtues can be collectively discerned and then nurtured in developing nurses. Contemporary bioethics approaches, including consequentialism, which tend to dominate ethics in nursing, are largely dismissive of virtue ethics. Sellman offers a corrective, proposing MacIntyrean virtue ethics as a solution to the loss of attention to a nurse's character in current ethical theorising within nursing. He proposes the virtues of open‐mindedness and trustworthiness as required for nurses to respond to patients and their families or carers; patients, Sellman argues, who are more‐than‐ordinarily vulnerable. In revisiting Sellman's work, I consider its importance, reflect on the profession's engagement with it, and examine a few of the challenges it presents. Throughout the analysis, I explore MacIntyre's approach in the context of philosophical shifts in the mid‐20th century, specifically in relation to moral philosophy and the aretaic turn, and social sciences. The value of contextualising nursing scholars' work in philosophy, and specifically moral philosophy, is presented, with a call to more explicit integration of moral theorising and cognitive science.

Objetivo y tipologia textual. De la materia “Etica y liderazgo”, que forma parte del curriculo del Doctorado en Educacion, surge la inquietud de analizar la relacion del buen humor, virtud moral en particular tratada por Aristoteles, con la labor docente y debido a la asociacion que investigaciones han demostrado sobre el valor positivo del buen humor con la mejora del aprendizaje, el objetivo del presente articulo muestra una reflexion sobre la importancia que tiene considerar esta virtud en la practica educativa.Metodologia. Desde una vision hermeutica-dialectica se busca dar explicacion sobre el significado que tiene el buen humor dentro del aula y de la importancia que tiene la etica positiva del humor para promover, tanto las virtudes morales como las intelectuales. Diversos estudios expuestos por Jauregui y Fernandez (2009); Perandones, Lledo y Herrera (2013); Morreall (2010, 2014) y Siuruana (2014) han relacionado el sentido del humor con la disminucion de ansiedad, con el animo positivo y como promotor de otras virtudes, lo que ha dado pauta para asegurar que el humor debe formar parte integral de cualquier metodologia educativa.Una de las funciones basicas del buen humor es ser una forma de comunicacion social y estar conectado al codigo de cultura social. Profundizar en la investigacion de esta virtud en el salon de clase puede abrir puertas para fortalecer la motivacion y promover un clima de armonia y cooperacion.Resultados. El humor en la labor docente requiere de criterio, de muchas horas de trabajo y experiencia. Investigaciones han demostrado el valor positivo del buen humor asociandolo al fortalecimiento de las relaciones intrapersonales e interpersonales y como motor para el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de otras virtudes, lo cual deja ver que no pude haber educacion sin etica y que a traves de las virtudes el ser humano se humaniza.

In finance, unethical behavior is a regular occurrence. Across History, and most notably the 2008 financial crisis, the age of risk-taking and profit maximization has been at the forefront of financial firms' and institutions' minds beyond the prioritization of integrity. Through the literature review, I researched this conversation to reveal the leading unethical practices that have arisen in the investment advisory industry. The main ethical problems include but are not limited to compensation, corporate culture, and risk-taking. In the scholarly conversation, articles bypass coming to a standard narrative that helps present a solution to these problems. Establishing my research question, “How can Investment Advisers in the United States most effectively promote ethical behavior beyond having good intentions alone?” Semi-structured interviews with six investment advisers were used to accomplish this best. Then a thematic analysis was used, with the most common themes being acting voluntarily, establishing a moral framework, and fostering knowledge through mentorship and experience. After the conversation of these themes, I present a standard narrative. From establishing the themes such as ethical obligation and knowledge, virtue ethics, an ancient philosophy coined by Aristotle in his book “The Nicomachean Ethics,” which encompasses moral and intellectual virtues, will most effectively bridge the absence of ethics in the industry. It is an advanced moral perspective young advisers usually do not have; therefore, researchers must study the role of virtue ethics in the industry and its implications.

<span lang="EN-US">Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics</span>

This book addresses one of today’s most burning issues, namely the environmental crisis, by offering an insight into the problem from the perspective of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is an approach to ethics that centralizes the concept of moral virtue, which can be extended to environmental ethics via environmental virtue ethics (EVE). Beginning with a comprehensive overview, the book explores the renaissance of contemporary virtue ethics and the beginnings of EVE in the second half of the 20th century and presents the main characteristics, proponents, and criticisms of EVE. The book then goes on to analyze its development by distinguishing the three most influential concepts: the classical; the naturalistic, teleological, and pluralistic; and the narrative conception of environmental virtue ethics. The author also discusses the most influential works on EVE, including a revision of Louke van Wensveen’s postulate to use virtue language in environmental ethics. By synthesizing such works on EVE alongside an analysis of the three most important concepts, the book offers a new concept that is universalistic, positive, and pragmatic. The book will be useful for students, scholars, and researchers studying environmental ethics, sustainable development, environmental psychology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of education. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

While honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue‐ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter‐day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato's Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Iris Murdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self‐delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment.

Foundation trainees replaced the pre-registration house officers in August 2005 after Modernising Medical Careers was set up to 'drive up the quality of care for patients through reform and improvement in postgraduate medical education and training'. Doctors qualifying from UK medical schools entered into the foundation years, which consisted of two years of training designed to form a bridge between medical school and specialty training. All doctors wanting to apply for specialty training in the UK must complete their foundation programme or equivalent.