How to Safely Locate Residential Developments Near Process Plants

Safety in Offshore Platforms—Use of QRA in the Norwegian Offshore Industry

The North Sea offshore industry is now over 50 years old with the installation of the first platform in the North Sea in 1966. The majority of platforms have now exceeded their design lives and are considered to be ageing structures in the life-extension phase. Safe operation requires the implementation of structural integrity management systems that recognise the potential issues associated with damage, deterioration and obsolescence. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Energy Division and Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority(PSA)have been very active in the development and promotion of good practice in the integrity management of ageing offshore installations from the outset. In the UK, with the transfer of responsibilities from the UK Department of Energy to the HSE following the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988, the HSE has funded a substantial research programme on ageing and life extension (ALE) issues. This has supported the development of codes, standards and guidance on structural integrity management and ageing / life extension. The HSE has under taken major industry-wide inspection programmes and led significant stakeholder engagement activities to promote awareness of ALE within the offshore industry. A particularly successful initiative was the creation of the Energy Institute Ageing and Life Extension Work Group which supports the development of guidance on ALE issues and continues to be very active. Most recently, the HSE has extended its activity to the assessment of extreme weather loading, characterised by the 10,000-year event, which was not a design requirement for ageing installations and now presents a challenge to these. Similarly, PSA in Norway has placed an increasing focus on ageing facilities since the late 1990s. By then, a few fixed offshore platforms had exceeded their original design life but, more significantly, a number of drilling rigs showed signs of ageing and had exceeded their design life. A joint letter to the industry about managing ageing drilling rigs was issued by the HSE in the UK and PSA in Norway in 2003. From 2005 to 2010, PSA undertook a key programme on ageing and life extension of oil and gas facilities. This key programme initiated several technology-development projects with the aim of increasing knowledge in the industry on life extension assessment. This paper outlines the work of the offshore regulatory authorities on the issue of ageing and life extension and concludes that, with the focus on energy transition, ALE will present further challenges to the safe operation of offshore structures for the foreseeable future. The management of ALE in the evolving offshore environment also highlights the importance of suitable integrity management practices and the role of regulation in ensuring workforce safety.

_ This article, written by JPT Technology Editor Chris Carpenter, contains highlights of paper SPE 220333, “Quantitative Risk Assessments: Why They Fall Short and How To Use Them Better,” by Peter A.R. Hudson, SPE, and Timothy G.L. Hudson, SPE, Hudson Global Consulting. The paper has not been peer reviewed. _ This paper discusses the limitations of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) with respect to the usefulness of the concept in managing day‑to‑day and emerging risks and the effect of change. The current use of QRA creates a mismatch between the management of risks on paper and real‑world situations. This paper proposes updating QRA by transforming it into an active management tool linked to proactive management of risks through bowtie and similar models. Challenges of QRA The purpose of QRA is to establish a number that represents the likelihood of incidents and to undertake measures that mitigate risk to within an acceptable level. In a range of industries, it can be observed that what are presumed to be very unlikely events, based on QRA reports, nevertheless appear to occur with regularity. Major events, such as refinery explosions and rail fires, in theory, should occur so rarely that a single instance should not be expected. In oil and gas, the expected rate of fires and explosions is approximately one incident per 10 years per refinery. This is orders of magnitude away from the intended level. Hyperbolically, it should be closer to once in the lifetime of the universe. One real‑world example is the Texas City refinery explosion on 23 March 2005 that resulted in the deaths of 15 people and 170 injuries. Shortcomings in that incident included overreliance within QRA on historical data that did not reflect the unique conditions and actual operations at the refinery. The QRA underestimated the likelihood of organizational and human‑error deficiencies, which were significant contributors to the incident. The QRA used simplified assumptions that failed to capture the complexity of the refinery’s operations and the scale of catastrophic failure modes. An example from the nuclear industry is the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on 11 March 2011. Following a massive earthquake and tsunami, the cooling systems at the nuclear plant failed, leading to a core meltdown in three reactors, extensive radioactive contamination, and significant evacuation zones. The QRA underestimated the risks because of several factors, including the natural hazard, the effectiveness of redundancy systems, and the effect of organizational and regulatory failures. The QRA assumed that redundancy systems would function correctly without considering how a single event might cause simultaneous failures. These examples demonstrate that discrepancies between predicted failure rates or rates of negative outcomes from QRA and actual failure rates can be attributed to several factors. These factors include limitations in data, modeling assumptions, human factors, unforeseen events, and the complexity of real‑world operations. An appendix is included in the complete paper to ensure that unfamiliar readers understand the basic concepts of QRA and understand forms of data and sources for such data.

Application of in vitro skin penetration measurements to confirm and refine the quantitative skin sensitization risk assessment of methylisothiazolinone

The use of quantitative risk assessment in HACCP

Using quantitative risk assessment in the chemical process industry

A recent report by the UK's Health and Safety Executive postulated that severe explosions can propagate at subsonic speeds but generate overpressures of several bar in open areas and this “new” type of explosion is episodic in nature. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) paper based their findings on a specific interpretation of historical data and “empirical evidence” from previous incidents and selected experimental data. They indicate that their results should guide plant design and risk assessment. The report fails to take account of key evidence from recent large‐scale experimental studies and incident investigations in proposing a hypothetical explosion mechanism over those that are known to occur and are well understood. This has the potential to misdirect efforts to manage such events.The first part of the article will review a number of incidents and demonstrate that each of these incidents can indeed be explained by fast deflagrations or transition to detonations, in complete contradiction to the HSE findings. The results found at the incident sites will be directly compared against results from recent DDT work and damage. The second part of the paper will present a novel technique for determining the DDT transition velocity from high‐speed video footage of experiments performed at large scales. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 38: e11998, 2019

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published three reports on 18February 2000 in relation to operations at British Nuclear Fuels(BNFL), Sellafield. The firstreport, by HSE's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), gave thefindings of an investigation into falsification of fuel pellet data atBNFL, Sellafield, and its effect on the safety of MOX fuel in use. Itanalysed in detail the issues surrounding the falsification of qualityassurance data at the MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) and explained whyNII believes the fuel supplied to Japan will be safe in use. The report concluded that: A systematic management failure allowed various individuals to falsifyquality assurance (QA) records for fuel pellet diametermeasurements. It was not possible to establish a motive for the falsification, butpoor ergonomic design of the plant, the tedium of the job and the easewith which the computer data logging system could be manipulated wereseen to be contributory factors. Although QA data were falsified, this would have no effect on thesafety of the fuel in a nuclear reactor, since the diameter of all fuelpellets is checked and recorded at an earlier stage in the process by afully-automated system. The second report on control and supervision of operations at BNFL,Sellafield concluded that the site lacks a high-quality safetymanagement system. It also found that the site lacks: sufficient resources to implement the existing safety managementsystem, and an effective, independent inspection, auditing the reviewsystem within the company.The report is the result of an inspection by HSE's NII, set up after a series of events in 1999 whichpointed to weaknesses in control and supervision. The inspection focusedon: incidents, control and supervision of operations, and staffing andresources, plus central issues associated with the management of thesite. The report makes 28 recommendations.The third report comprised an updated safety review of high-level liquidwaste storage and covers progress since HSE's last report on this issuewas published in 1995. The report is divided into four main parts: Part 1 discusses the highly active liquor (HAL) storage facility (B215)in the context of current and past operations at Sellafield, and thelegislative framework under which the site is regulated. Part 2 explains why NII believes that the B215 operations remainacceptably safe. It summarises and discusses BNFL's safety case. The keysafety issues are addressed, especially those associated withmaintaining the cooling of the HAL and those affecting its containmentand isolation from the environment. Improvements introduced by BNFL,following its own review, are also discussed. Part 3 covers the wider safety requirement to reduce risk by continuingto vitrify the liquid waste. It discussed throughput issues forincorporating the HAL inventory into glass, the requirement to definethe residual buffer stock and sets out BNFL's ongoing approach tomonitoring and regulating BNFL's strategy for emptying the tanks. Part 4 presents the general conclusions on the safety of HAL storage inthe tanks, arising from the discussion of issues in parts 2 and 3. Italso summarises the more important areas where further information isrequired from BNFL. Annexes cover: regulation of operations atSellafield, historical development of B215, a description of the tanksand a summary of NII's recommendations.As a result of NII's recommendations in the report on storage ofhigh-level liquid waste, BNFL is updating its strategies for reprocessing, and its forecasts ofvitrification plant performance, so that its predictions for thereduction of liquid waste stocks will be more reliable, has agreed to carry out an options study for reducing the stocks to abuffer quantity by around 2015, in line with previouscommitments, and has strengthened the safety case to include additional engineeringinformation and fault analysis.The report sets out HSE's regulatory strategy to achieve reductions instocks to a buffer quantity, which should be the minimum required forsafe and efficient operation. The report states that HSE intends usingits regulatory powers to ensure that BNFL reduces HAL stocks to thebuffer quantity by around 2015. As part of the options study, NII requires BNFL to propose a stockreduction programme, with milestones for monitoring progress. HSEintends to publish an addendum to this report when suitable progress hasbeen made.

Risk assessment is an effective and commonly practiced process in industry, including oil and gas sector, as a basis for designing new pipeline terminals and stations and managing integrity of existing facilities. A holistic risk assessment method, which could be qualitative or quantitative, includes both the likelihood and consequence assessments of an undesired event. Prior to 2015, Enbridge Pipelines employed a qualitative risk assessment algorithm to assess the likelihood and consequence of a failure of liquids pipeline facilities. Over the past decade Enbridge has identified a number of shortcomings with the qualitative approach, necessitating the development and use of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to support consistency and defensibility in risk-informed decision making. A QRA requires rigorous quantitative algorithms to measure public and environmental safety, and potential business consequences of an undesired event at a facility. While significant literature has been produced, and considerable effort has been expended to quantify the potential impacts of a flammable product release on public safety, very limited work has been done on the quantitative measurement of environment related impacts. In particular, limited research has been successful in aggregating environmental consequences, public safety and business consequences to estimate the total consequence of a liquid hydrocarbon release within a pipeline facility. The consequence assessment of an unwanted event conducted through QRA can be combined with the associated likelihood to provide a quantitative measure of risk. This risk level may be used to support organizations in making risk informed decisions and in analyzing and treating facility risks, specifically in the: • Identification of top risk facilities and high consequence functional areas; • Identification of assets posing the most risk and worst case consequences; • Understanding of system reliability risk and opportunities to optimize facility operation; • Prioritization of facility maintenance projects in the capital and operating budget processes; • Supporting regulatory requirements and expectations; • Presentation of risk down to the equipment or component level; and • Understanding of residual risk and achieved risk reduction. This paper describes the development of a consequence model that monetizes the quantitative measure of public and environment safety, and potential business losses for a liquid product release at pipeline facilities. The proposed model characterizes the severity of impact of released product, expressed in dollars per event, as a function of system volume, proximity and category of receptors, asset location, and available controls.

A central question in health and safety is the relationship between good practice and the financial performance of capitalist enterprises. Two alternative views have been presented on this issue: in one, good health and safety management is seen as contributing to sound enterprise finan cial performance; in the other, an inherent contradiction is seen to exist between expenditure on health and safety and the desire on the part of the employers to secure satisfactory financial performance. This article seeks to re-examine the validity of these two views through a discussion of a research report, The Costs of Accidents at Work from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the main body responsible for enforcing occupational health and safety law in Britain. The paper is divided into three parts: the first discusses arguments that the pursuit of safety and profit involve incompatible goals and analyses the differences between this literature and the HSE document; the second critically examines the methodology of the HSE study; and the final section uses a case study approach to illustrate the difficulties in the approach to organisational decision making which underlies the HSE study.

Safety investigation of hydrogen energy storage systems using quantitative risk assessment

In the United Kingdom it is a legal requirement that the radiation doses received by classified persons are measured using dosemeters that have been provided by an approved dosimetry service. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the regulatory body responsible for approving these dosimetry services. Until recently, statutory dose measurements in the UK have been made with well established dosimetry techniques involving the use of film or TLDs. In January 2000 HSE granted approval to a dosimetry service, operated by a UK nuclear utility, to provide a service to nuclear sites for making measurements of individual dose using electronic dosemeters. HSE has published the requirements that prospective dosimetry services must satisfy in order to gain regulatory approval. These requirements are applicable to those services wishing to use established techniques with film and TLDs and also to services that wish to use novel systems of dose measurement such as electronic dosemeters. This paper briefly describes the regulatory framework for the approval of dosimetry services in the UK, the criteria used by HSE for the approval of these services with particular reference to electronic dosemeters, and the regulatory issues associated with the use of electronic dosemeters for statutory individual dose measurements in the UK.

In 1993, a case-control study by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) assessed the risk ofleukaemia and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (LNHL) among children of fathers employed at theSellafield nuclear installation in relation to paternal preconceptional irradiation (PPI). Itconcluded that the statistical association between risk of LNHL and PPI was confined tochildren born in the village of Seascale, where the dose-response was extremely high andvery significant. In contrast, in 2002, a Cumbrian birth cohort study, investigating largelythe same cases, concluded that this statistical association was not significantly differentamong children born inside and outside Seascale and estimated the dose-response insideSeascale to be much lower. This review makes a detailed comparison of the twostudies, considering their design, data and analyses. The differences between theirfindings are due to: (i) differences in the distribution of offspring-years which aredifferential with respect to dose category and Seascale birth status, (ii) a non-Seascalehigh-dose case included in the Cumbrian but not the HSE study, (iii) differencesbetween analyses using categorical and continuous PPI dose and (iv) the presenceof Seascale controls with PPI over 200 mSv in the Cumbrian but not the HSEstudy.

The offshore industry in the North Sea and other parts of the world is a mature industry and a significant and ever-increasing proportion of the infrastructure is being operated beyond the original design life. This requires the implementation of a suitable integrity management system based on the use of codes, standards and guidance, which have been developed from a considerable body of research over many years, to enable the safe operation of ageing structures. During this time, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has led the commissioning of relevant research aimed at developing suitable guidance in support of its enforcement activities. This has covered a very wide range of relevant topics and the substantial body of results has been incorporated subsequently into offshore industry standards and guidance. Despite the considerable technical advances that have been made over the years in areas such as fatigue performance, static strength, inspection techniques / strategies and repair methods, significant technical challenges to the maintenance of the integrity of ageing structures remain. This is due to the uncertainties associated with complex analytical predictions and the condition of the structure, the full extent of which is not always known due to limitations in current inspection methods and practices. Furthermore, the economic aspects of continued operation present another important challenge. In addition to the detailed review of the extensive research programme funded by the UK Department of Energy and the Health and Safety Executive, the paper addresses the several uncertainties that are relevant to the safe management of ageing and life extension of offshore structures and the consequent challenges that characterise integrity management strategies.

The focal point of the empirical work undertaken was the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the largest regulatory body in Great Britain (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 1983) and thus especially attractive to students of ‘social regulation’. This Chapter describes the origins, structure, and aims of HSE during the research period 1983-6, and explains how this study was organized. In particular, it details how and why the inspectorates, which form the basis of this research, were selected and how fieldwork with them was structured.