Hydrologic Resources Management Program and Underground Test Area Project FY 2000 Progress Report

This report presents the results from fiscal year (FY) 1999 technical studies conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) as part of the Hydrology and Radionuclide Migration Program (HRMP) and Underground Test Area (UGTA) work-for-others project. This report is the latest in a series of annual reports published by LLNL to document the migration of radionuclides and controls of radionuclide movement at the Nevada Test Site. The FY 1999 studies highlighted in this report are: (1) Chapter 1 provides the results from flow-through leaching of nuclear melt glasses at 25 C and near-neutral pH using dilute bicarbonate groundwaters. (2) Chapter 2 reports on a summary of the size and concentration of colloidal material in NTS groundwaters. (3) Chapter 3 discusses the collaboration between LLNL/ANCD (Analytical and Nuclear Chemistry Division) and the Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (CAMS) to develop a technique for analyzing NTS groundwater for 99-Technicium ({sup 99}Tc) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Since {sup 99}Tc is conservative like tritium in groundwater systems, and is not sorbed to geologic material, it has the potential for being an important tool for radionuclide migration studies. (4) Chapter 4 presents the results of secondary ion mass spectrometry measurements of the in-situ distribution of radionuclides in zeolitized tuffs from cores taken adjacent to nuclear test cavities and chimneys. In-situ measurements provide insight to the distribution of specific radionuclides on a micro-scale, mineralogical controls of radionuclide sorption, and identification of migration pathways (i.e., matrix diffusion, fractures). (5) Chapter 5 outlines new analytical techniques developed in LLNL/ANCD to study hydrologic problems at the NTS using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). With costs for thermal-ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) increasing relative to sample preparation time and facility support, ICP-MS technology provides a means for rapidly measuring dilute concentrations of radionuclides with precision and abundance sensitivity comparable to TIMS. (6) Chapter 6 provides results of a characterization study of alluvium collected from the U-1a complex approximately 300 meters below ground surface in Yucca Flat. The purpose of this investigation was to provide information on particle size, mineralogical context, the proportion of primary and secondary minerals, and the texture of the reactive surface area that could be used to accurately model radionuclide interactions within Nevada Test Site alluvial basins (i.e., Frenchman Flat and Yucca Flat).

This document is the collaborative effort of the members of an ad hoc subcommittee of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Technical Working Group (TWG). The UGTA Project relies on data from a variety of sources; therefore, a process is needed to identify relevant factors for determining whether material-property data collected from other areas can be used to support groundwater flow, radionuclide transport, and other models within a Corrective Action Unit (CAU), and for documenting the data transfer decision and process. This document describes the overall data transfer process. Separate Parameter Descriptions will be prepared that provide information for selected specific parameters as determined by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) UGTA Project Manager. This document and its accompanying appendices do not provide the specific criteria to be used for transfer of data for specific uses. Rather, the criteria will be established by separate parameter-specific and model-specific Data Transfer Protocols. The CAU Data Documentation Packages and data analysis reports will apply the protocols and provide or reference a document with the data transfer evaluations and decisions.

One of the original drivers behind the development of pulsed power was the need for short-pulse (flash) x-ray sources for hydrodynamic tests. These systems continue to be an important diagnostic for the evaluation of hydrodynamic phenomena. In the United States, three primary facilities provide this function: Flash X-Ray (FXR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); and Cygnus at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). FXR and DARHT provide highly penetrating radiographic capabilities but are limited in the types of hydrodynamic experiments that can be performed, while Cygnus can support a larger range of experiments, but does not provide the same penetrating capability. To fill this gap in hydrodynamic experimental capability, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) has recently issued a set of high-level requirements describing a radiographic capability similar to that of DARHT, but located in a facility similar to Cygnus. In response to these requirements, a project called Scorpius has been developed as a joint partnership between LANL, LLNL, Sandia National Laboratory (SnL), and the NNSS. A key requirement is the delivery of multiple (2 or more) radiographic images along a single axis in a short time scale. This requirement effectively limits the possible system choices to a linear induction accelerator (LIA). However, there are several families of multi-pulse LIA architectures from which to choose. This paper describes the high-level system requirements for Scorpius as well as the evaluation of technologies and systems that might meet those requirements. In addition, the current preferred option and the initial conceptual designs are discussed.

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at their Nevada Site Office are addressing groundwater contamination resulting from historical underground nuclear testing through the Environmental Management program and, in particular, the Underground Test Area project. One issue of concern is the nature of the somewhat poorly constrained pre Tertiary geology and its effects on ground-water flow in the area adjacent to a nuclear test. Ground water modelers would like to know more about the hydrostratigraphy and geologic structure to support a hydrostratigraphic framework model that is under development for the Yucca Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU). During 2003, the U.S. Geological Survey, supported by the DOE and NNSA-NSO, collected and processed data from 51 magnetotelluric (MT) and audio-magnetotelluric (AMT) stations at the Nevada Test Site in and near Yucca Flat to assist in characterizing the pre-Tertiary geology in that area. The primary purpose was to refine the character, thickness, and lateral extent of pre Tertiary confining units. In particular, a major goal has been to define the upper clastic confining unit (late Devonian - Mississippian-age siliciclastic rocks assigned to the Eleana Formation and Chainman Shale) in the Yucca Flat area. The MT and AMT data have been released in separate USGS Open File Reports. The Nevada Test Site magnetotelluric data interpretation presented in this report includes the results of detailed two-dimensional (2 D) resistivity modeling for each profile (including alternative interpretations) and gross inferences on the three dimensional (3 D) character of the geology beneath each station. The character, thickness, and lateral extent of the Chainman Shale and Eleana Formation that comprise the Upper Clastic Confining Unit are generally well determined in the upper 5 km. Inferences can be made regarding the presence of the Lower Clastic Confining Unit at depths below 5 km. Large fault structures such as the CP Thrust fault, the Carpetbag fault, and the Yucca fault that cross Yucca Flat are also discernable as are other smaller faults. The subsurface electrical resistivity distribution and inferred geologic structures determined by this investigation should help constrain the hydrostratigraphic framework model that is under development.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

Characterizing and managing groundwater contamination associated with the 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site are among the most challenging environmental remediation issues faced by the U.S. Department of Energy. Although significant long-term stewardship and risk management issues are associated with underground nuclear tests on the Nevada Test Site, of possible equal concern are a smaller number of underground nuclear tests conducted by the United States, 12 total, at eight sites located off the Nevada Test Site. In comparison to the Nevada Test Site, the U.S. Department of Energy has minimal institutional controls at these “offsite test areas” (Offsites) to serve as risk barriers. The corrective action and closure strategy under development for the Central Nevada Test Area and proposed recommendations [1] concerning long-term stewardship for this and the other Offsites illustrate long-term stewardship and risk management strategies applicable to underground nuclear test areas in the United States. The groundwater flow and transport model for the Central Nevada Test Area, site of the 1968 Faultless underground nuclear test, is the first model accepted by a U.S. state regulator (the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection) for an underground nuclear test area. Recommendations for the Central Nevada Test Area and other Offsites include developing decision support models to evaluate the impacts of future changes of land and water uses on previous decisions involving groundwater-use restrictions. Particularly for the Offsites in arid states such as Nevada, New Mexico, and Colorado, it is difficult to envision all future demands on subsurface resources. Rather than trying to maintain complex flow and transport models to evaluate future resource-use scenarios, decision support models coupled with original contaminant flow and transport models could be used as scoping tools to evaluate the sensitivity of previously established resource-use boundaries. This evaluation will determine if the previously established boundaries are still adequate for proposed new land and resource uses or if additional data collection or modeling will be necessary to make technically sound decisions. In addition, previously developed Data Decision Analyses, used to quantitatively evaluate the costs and benefits of different data collection activities conducted during the site characterization phase, could be maintained as a long-term stewardship tool to identify new data collection efforts, if necessary as indicated by a decision support model.

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U16a Tunnel on the Nevada National Security Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The U16a Tunnel was used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests in Shoshone Mountain in Area 16 of the Nevada National Security Site. Six nuclear tests were conducted in the U16a Tunnel from 1962 to 1971. These tests are Marshmallow, Gum Drop, Double Play, Ming Vase, Diamond Dust, and Diamond Mine. The U.S. Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with participation from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Las Alamos National Laboratory, sponsored the tests. Fifteen high explosives tests were also conducted at the tunnel. Two were calibration tests during nuclear testing and the remaining were U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency tunnel defeat tests. The U16a Tunnel complex is on the top and slopes of Shoshone Mountain, encompassing an area of approximately 16.7 hectares (41.1 acres). Major modifications to the landscape are a result of three principal activities, road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, and site preparation for activities related to testing. Forty-seven cultural features were recorded at the portal and on the slopes of Shoshone Mountain. At the portal area, features relate to the mining, construction, testing, and general every day operational support activities within the tunnel. These include concrete foundations for buildings, equipment pads, and rail lines. Features on the slopes above the tunnel relate to tunnel ventilation, borehole drilling, and data recording. Feature types include soil-covered bunkers, concrete foundations, instrument cable holes, drill holes, and ventilation shafts. The U16a Tunnel complex is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under criteria a and c, consideration g of 36 CFR Part 60.4 as a historic landscape. Scientific research conducted at the tunnel has made significant contributions to the broad patterns of our history, particularly in regard to the Cold War era that was characterized by competing social, economic, and political ideologies between the former Soviet Union and the United States. The tunnel also possesses distinctive construction and engineering methods for conducting underground nuclear tests. The Desert Research Institute recommends that the U16a Tunnel area be left in place in its current condition and that the U16a Tunnel historic landscape be included in the Nevada National Security Site monitoring program and monitored on a regular basis.

This report details the work of Chemistry Division personnel from Los Alamos National Laboratory in FY 2001 for the U. S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV) under its Defense Programs and Environmental Restoration divisions. Los Alamos is one of a number of agencies collaborating in an effort to describe the present and future movement of radionuclides in the underground environment of the Nevada Test Site. This fiscal year we collected and analyzed water samples from a number of expended test locations at the Nevada Test Site. We give the results of these analyses and summarize the information gained over the quarter century that we have been studying several of these sites. We find that by far most of the radioactive residues from a nuclear test are contained in the melt glass in the cavity. Those radionuclides that are mobile in water can be transported if the groundwater is moving due to hydraulic or thermal gradients. The extent to which they move is a function of their chemical speciation, with neutral or anionic materials traveling freely relative to cationic materials that tend to sorb on rock surfaces. However, radionuclides sorbed on colloids may be transported if the colloids are moving. Local conditions strongly influence the distribution and movement of radionuclides, and we continue to study sites such as Almendro, which is thermally quite hot, and Nash and Bourbon, where radionuclides had not been measured for 8 years. We collected samples from three characterization wells in Frenchman Flat to obtain baseline radiochemistry data for each well, and we analyzed eight wells containing radioactivity for {sup 237}Np, using our highly sensitive ICP/MS. We have again used our field probe that allows us to measure important groundwater properties in situ. We conclude our report by noting document reviews and publications produced in support of this program.

A radionuclide tracer test was conducted in 1963 by the U.S. Geological Survey at the Project Gnome underground nuclear test site, approximately 40 km southeast of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The tracer study was carried out under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to study the transport behavior of radionuclides in fractured rock aquifers. The Culebra Dolomite was chosen for the test because it was considered to be a reasonable analogue of the fractured carbonate aquifer at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the principal location of U.S. underground nuclear tests. Project Gnome was one of a small number of underground nuclear tests conducted by the AEC at sites distant from the NTS. The Gnome device was detonated on December 10, 1961 in an evaporate unit at a depth of 360 m below ground surface. Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) implemented an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close these offsite nuclear test areas. An early step in this process is performance of a preliminary risk analysis of the hazard posed by each site. The Desert Research Institute has performed preliminary hydrologic risk evaluations for the groundwater transport pathway at Gnome. That evaluation included the radioactive tracer test as a possible source because the test introduced radionuclides directly into the Culebra Dolomite, which is the only aquifer at the site. This report presents a preliminary evaluation of the radionuclide tracer test as a source for radionuclide migration in the Culebra Dolomite. The results of this study will assist in planning site characterization activities and refining estimates of the radionuclide source for comprehensive models of groundwater transport st the Gnome site.

The Nevada Test Site (NTS), located in southern Nevada, was the site of 928 underground nuclear tests conducted between 1951 and 1992. The tests were performed as part of the Atomic Energy Commission and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons testing program. The NTS is managed by the DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV). Of the 928 tests conducted below ground surface at the NTS, approximately 200 were detonated below the water table. As an unavoidable consequence of these testing activities, radionuclides have been introduced into the subsurface environment, impacting groundwater. In the few instances of groundwater sampling, radionuclides have been detected in the groundwater; however, only a very limited investigation of the underground test sites and associated shot cavities has been conducted to date. The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Subproject was established to fill this void and to characterize the risk posed to human health and the environment as a result of underground nuclear testing activities at the NTS. One of its primary objectives is to gather data to characterize the deep aquifer underlying the NTS.

26 - Modeling and strategy approaches for assessing radionuclide contamination from underground testing of nuclear weapons in Nevada, USA

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12n Tunnel on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12n Tunnel was one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests in Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. A total of 22 nuclear tests were conducted in the U12n Tunnel from 1967 to 1992. These tests include Midi Mist, Hudson Seal, Diana Mist, Misty North, Husky Ace, Ming Blade, Hybla Fair, Mighty Epic, Diablo Hawk, Miners Iron, Huron Landing, Diamond Ace, Mini Jade, Tomme/Midnight Zephyr, Misty Rain, Mill Yard, Diamond Beech, Middle Note, Misty Echo, Mineral Quarry, Randsburg, and Hunters Trophy. DTRA sponsored all tests except Tomme and Randsburg which were sponsored by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Midnight Zephyr, sponsored by DTRA, was an add on experiment to the Tomme test. Eleven high explosive tests were also conducted in the tunnel and included a Stemming Plan Test, the Pre-Mill Yard test, the two seismic Non-Proliferation Experiment tests, and seven Dipole Hail tests. The U12n Tunnel complex is composed of the portal and mesa areas, encompassing a total area of approximately 600 acres (240 hectares). Major modifications to the landscape have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to testing, and construction of retention ponds. A total of 202 cultural features were recorded for the portal and mesa areas. At the portal area, features relate to the mining, construction, testing, and general everyday operational support activities within the tunnel. These include concrete foundations for buildings, ventilation equipment, air compressors, communications equipment, mining equipment, rail lines, retention ponds to impound tunnel effluent, and storage containers. Features on the mesa above the tunnel generally relate to tunnel ventilation and cooling, borehole drilling, and data recording facilities. Feature types include concrete foundations, instrument cable holes, drill holes, equipment pads, ventilation shafts, and ventilation equipment. The U12n Tunnel complex is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under criteria a and c, consideration g of 36 CFR Part 60.4 as a historic landscape. Scientific research conducted at the tunnel has made significant contributions to the broad patterns of our history, particularly in regard to the Cold War era that was characterized by competing social, economic, and political ideologies between the former Soviet Union and the United States. The tunnel also possesses distinctive construction and engineering methods for conducting underground nuclear tests. The Desert Research Institute recommends that the U12n Tunnel area be left in place in its current condition and that the U12n Tunnel historic landscape be included in the NNSS monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations on a regular basis.

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.

Previous studies Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) found elevated ratios of chlorine-36 to total chloride (36Cl/Cl) in samples of rock collected from the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) at Yucca Mountain (YM). The data were interpreted as an indication that fluids containing “bomb-pulse” 36Cl reached the repository horizon in the ~50 years since the peak period of above-ground nuclear testing. Due to the significance of 36Cl data to conceptual models of unsaturated zone flow, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) implemented a study to validate the LANL findings. The USGS drilled new boreholes at select locations across zones where bomb-pulse ratios had previously been identified. The drill cores were analyzed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Because consensus was not reached between the USGS/LLNL and LANL on several fundamental points including the presence or absence of bomb-pulse 36Cl, an evaluation by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), was initiated. The overall objectives of the UNLV study were to investigate the source of the validation study’s conflicting results, and to obtain additional data on bomb-pulse isotopes at the repository horizon. UNLV engaged in discussions with previous investigators, reviewed reports, and analyzed archived samples. UNLV also collected new samples of rock from the ESF, soil profiles from the surface of YM, and samples of seep water from inside the ESF. Samples were analyzed for 36Cl/Cl ratios, and 99Tc and 129I in select samples. A column experiment was conducted mimicking the passage of bomb-pulse 36Cl through YM tuff. The work faced several obstacles including an extended shutdown of the tunnel. Only one sample yielded a background corrected 36Cl/Cl ratio that was higher than the accepted bomb-pulse threshold (1250 x 10-15). Specimen 01034214 obtained from the Drill Hole Wash fault (19+33) had a ratio of 1590 ± 80 (1σ) x10-15, whereas the other separate sample from this fault zone yielded 1160 ± 50 (1σ) x 10-15. Three samples collected from Alcove 6 averaged 490 ± 100 (1σ) x10-15; a sample from Sundance Fault resulted in a ratio of 920 ± 60 (1σ) x10-15, and a sample from the Bow Ridge Fault produced 530 ± 20 (1σ) x10-15. The results are significant because: 1) they tend to be lower than LANL data for comparable samples, albeit in agreement with the range of data produced in the area, and 2) they show that a bomb-pulse 36Cl/Cl ratio was measured in rock collected at the repository horizon level by a second and independent group of investigators (UNLV). Because of time UNLV was not able to replicate the results, and these few data points are insufficient to draw major and definitive conclusions. Leachates of soil samples collected from the surface above the ESF yielded several ratios with bomb-pulse 36Cl, particularly for samples encompassing the wetting front. Soil samples collected above the south ramp, where there was limited soil coverage due to a large amount of rock outcrop, had relatively large ratios ranging from 2170 ± 110 (1σ) x10-15 to 5670 ± 350 (1σ) x10-15. Soil samples from profiles from above the north ramp ranged from 820 ± 70 (1σ) x10-15 to 2390 ± 160 (1σ) x10-15, which compare favorably with previous measurements near the site. Water seepage into the ESF south ramp and 36Cl standards made from NIST material were also analyzed. The standards were produced to have nominal 36Cl/Cl ratios (10-15) of 500, 2,500 and 10,000 and the results showed good agreement with the calculated ratios. The seepage samples ranged between 680 ± 40 (1σ) x10-15 to 1110 ± 40 (1σ) x10-15, consistent with that found for modern meteoric water, with a small bomb-pulse component. Bomb-pulse 36Cl may not have been incorporated in this fast-path water because the surface above the infiltration zone consists mostly of outcrop and the flow pathways have probably mostly been leached. 99Tc was measured in five of nine leaches of ESF rock but poor analytical recoveries and lack of data overlap with 36Cl limit interpretations of these data. The detection capability of the ICP-MS was insufficient for measuring 129I without preconcentration, and detection by AMS may be preferable. Experiments were conducted using bromide instead of chloride as a carrier, which is advantageous because it may eliminate the need for blank subtraction. ESF samples prepared using bromide had 36Cl/Cl ratios (x10-15) with acceptable levels of uncertainty (1σ): 720 ± 30 and 1250 ± 90 for Bow Ridge and Drill Hole Wash Faults, respectively. The result for the latter is noteworthy because it constitutes a second detection of a 36Cl/Cl bomb-pulse ratio at the site, albeit from a non-Q measurement. The source of the conflicting results between USGS/LLNL and LANL could not be determined. There was no evidence that the different AMS facilities were a source of the discrepancy between the results.

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s), and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal sites, or release sites. Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP will be used in conjunction with the Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (DOE/NV, 1998c), hereafter referred to as the Leachfield Work Plan. Under the FFACO, a work plan is an optional planning document that provides information for a CAU or group of CAUs where significant commonality exists. This CAIP contains CAU-specific information including a facility description, environmental sample collection objectives, and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU 500. This CAIP addresses one of three leachfield systems associated with Test Cell A, which is located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (see Leachfield Work Plan Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 500 is comprised of the Test Cell A Septic System (CAS 25-04-05) and the associated leachfield system presented in Figure 1-1 (FFACO, 1996).