Imagination and the Psychotherapeutic Process

Oxytocin Improves “Mind-Reading” in Humans

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer the mental states of others, is integral to facilitating healthy social interactions. People can reason about the mental states of others even with limited or (sometimes) inconsistent information. However, little is known about how people make inferences about the mental states of others under uncertainty, and what features of information are important in aiding mental state reasoning. In the current study, we conducted three unique experiments that alter participant's uncertainty when engaging in ToM tests. In Experiment 1, we simultaneously manipulated both the amount and consistency of information available in social stimuli presented to 59 participants. In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed to decipher which feature of social stimuli is more conducive to mental state reasoning. Experiment 2 manipulated only the amount of information available to 47 participants, while Experiment 3 manipulated only the consistency of information available to 46 participants. Using both frequentist and Bayesian statistics, results confirmed that manipulating the amount and consistency of information alters ToM performance. Exploratory analysis comparing the effects of the amount and consistency of information suggests that the effects of the consistency of information seem to be stronger than those of the amount of information. Taken together, all three experiments suggest that while both the amount and consistency of information are important features of social stimuli-the consistency of information available is more salient when inferring mental states of others. These findings are discussed in relation to information theory and have important implications for creating enriched social stimuli, which may enhance mental state reasoning in individuals with social deficits.

Structural and functional brain correlates of theory of mind impairment post-stroke

Humans live not only in a physical world but also in a mental world. Theory of mind reflects the understanding that the mind is comprised of different mental states, such as intentions, desires, and beliefs. This conception of the mind is a critical achievement in human development because it directly impacts effective communication and social interaction. It allows for the understanding of others’ behaviors by inferring their mental states. The formation of a theory of mind has been a central topic in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. It impacts related processes, such as communication skills, perspective-taking ability, and social cognition. Across the life span, the understanding of the mind becomes increasingly complex. Early in development, infants and toddlers can discern the intentions of others. Later, more sophisticated reasoning about the mental states of others becomes possible. For instance, the ability to follow and understand the recursive thought that “Sam believes, that Mary said, that Jose wanted . . .” develops. Additionally, within distinctive developmental time periods, people differ in their ability to take into account mental states. Once people’s beliefs, including their misconceptions, are identified, it is possible to generate effective communication strategies designed to teach, learn, and even reduce risk-taking behaviors.

Do Non-Human Primates Really Represent Others' Beliefs?

The purpose of this study was to examine the usefulness of near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) for identifying abnormalities in prefrontal brain activity in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) as they inferred the mental states of others. The subjects were 16 children with ASD aged between 8 and 14 years and 16 age-matched healthy control children. Oxygenated hemoglobin concentration was measured in the subject's prefrontal brain region on NIRS during tasks expressing a person's mental state (MS task) and expressing an object's characteristics (OC task). There was a significant main effect of group (ASD vs control), with the control group having more activity than the ASD group. But there was no significant main effect of task (MS task vs OC task) or hemisphere (right vs left). Significant interactions of task and group were found, with the control group showing more activity than the ASD group during the MS task relative to the OC task. NIRS showed that there was lower activity in the prefrontal brain area when children with ASD performed MS tasks. Therefore, clinicians might be able to use NIRS and these tasks for conveniently detecting brain dysfunction in children with ASD related to inferring mental states, in the clinical setting.

The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test was developed by Baron-Cohen and his co-workers. This test provides them the unique opportunity to evaluate social cognition assessing the ability to recognize the mental state of others using only the expressions around the eyes. In healthy populations, however, it has produced conflicting results, particularly regarding sex differences and number of items to use. In this study we performed two studies: The first one investigated the presence of gender effects and the sensitivity of test stimuli; the second one considered other individual factors (i.e., artistic attitude, social empathy and personality traits) that could influence the ability to understand emotions from gaze. Our results demonstrated a sex effect, which can be more or less attenuated by the nature of the stimuli. This could be as aforementioned the result of the following, empathy or artistic attitude in being proficient in understanding the mental states of others.

Perception of other people’s mental states affects humor in social anxiety

Spitefulness and deficits in the social–perceptual and social–cognitive components of Theory of Mind

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has been implicated in seemingly disparate cognitive functions, such as understanding the minds of other people and processing information about the self. This functional overlap would be expected if humans use their own experiences to infer the mental states of others, a basic postulate of simulation theory. Neural activity was measured while participants attended to either the mental or physical aspects of a series of other people. To permit a test of simulation theory's prediction that inferences based on self-reflection should only be made for similar others, targets were subsequently rated for their degree of similarity to self. Parametric analyses revealed a region of the ventral mPFC--previously implicated in self-referencing tasks--in which activity correlated with perceived self/other similarity, but only for mentalizing trials. These results suggest that self-reflection may be used to infer the mental states of others when they are sufficiently similar to self.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.

Humans live in complex social environments. By the time they reach adulthood, most people have developed highly sophisticated social skills, including the ability to infer the 'invisible' mental states in others, and to act upon those inferences; they have become experts at 'social chess'. This paper draws upon research from developmental and evolutionary psychology, primatology, as well as studies of autistic children, to explore the processes by which children acquire the complex skills underpinning social interaction. It also examines obstacles to social skill acquisition. In light of ethological studies of social play in humans and other primates, it is argued that play is a fundamental medium for acquiring social skills.

Background. The formation of values in adolescence is one of the priority tasks of school education and upbringing, since it is values that determine a person's relationship with society. In the course of communication and interaction with the surrounding world, adolescents form personal characteristics, including emotional intelligence, adolescents' perception of values and meanings. Purpose. To study the features of value orientations in adolescents with different levels of emotional intelligence. Materials and methods. In the course of studying the value orientations of adolescents with different levels of emotional intelligence, an empirical study was conducted with the participation of 50 adolescents aged 14-15 years of Naberezhnye Chelny city schools. Diagnostic tools of the study included the use of the following methods: ‘Diagnostics of value orientations of adolescents’ (V.F. Sopov L.V. Karpushina), “Value orientations” (M. Rokich), questionnaire “Emotional intelligence” (D.V. Lyusin). Mathematical processing of the results was carried out by Student's t-criterion method. Results. Adolescent children learn to understand their own emotions, but still have difficulty recognising the emotional states of other people, more often by external expression, while showing little sensitivity to the mental state of others. They have poor control over their emotions and are unable to manage the emotions of their peers and are unable to manage external expressive manifestations of their emotions and restrain facial expressions and gestures. Teenagers display the values ‘cognition’, ‘I-value’, ‘other-value’, socially useful activity is not so significant for teenagers, and they do not consider responsibility a valuable quality. In the ‘terminal values’ category, it is more important for adolescents to have loyal friends, health, freedom and material well-being. Adolescents are least interested in happiness in family life, happiness of others and social recognition. In the ‘instrumental values’ category, it is more important for adolescents to enjoy life, to be useful in a common cause, and to be well-mannered and educated. Adolescents pay the least attention to responsibility, high demands, and broad-mindedness.

SummaryEmpathy allows us to internally simulate the affective and cognitive mental states of others. Neurobiological studies suggest that empathy is a complex phenomenon, which can be described using a model that includes 2 modes of processing: bottom-up and top-down. Bottom-up neural processing is achieved via the mirroring representation systems that play a key role in the direct sharing of the emotional states of others. Top-down processing, known as cognitive perspective-taking or theory of mind, where the feelings of others are fully imagined and understood, is based on control and inhibition mechanisms. Available evidence indicates that empathic brain responses are likely to be influenced by several different modulating factors.

ObjectivesCognitive deficits are common in patients with chronic heart failure (CHF), but no study has investigated whether these deficits extend to social cognition. The present study provided the first empirical assessment of emotion recognition and theory of mind (ToM) in patients with CHF. In addition, it assessed whether each of these social cognitive constructs was associated with more general cognitive impairment.MethodsA group comparison design was used, with 31 CHF patients compared to 38 demographically matched controls. The Ekman Faces test was used to assess emotion recognition, and the Mind in the Eyes test to measure ToM. Measures assessing global cognition, executive functions, and verbal memory were also administered.ResultsThere were no differences between groups on emotion recognition or ToM. The CHF group’s performance was poorer on some executive measures, but memory was relatively preserved. In the CHF group, both emotion recognition performance and ToM ability correlated moderately with global cognition (r = .38, p = .034; r = .49, p = .005, respectively), but not with executive function or verbal memory.ConclusionCHF patients with lower cognitive ability were more likely to have difficulty recognizing emotions and inferring the mental states of others. Clinical implications of these findings are discussed.