Improvements in pandemic preparedness in 8 Central American countries, 2008 - 2012

The Global Fund: replenishment and future-proofing

The threat of a human pandemic of influenza has prompted the development of national influenza pandemic preparedness plans over the last 4 years. Analyses have been carried out to assess preparedness in Europe, Asia and Africa. We assessed plans to evaluate the national strategic pandemic influenza preparedness in the countries of Latin America.Published national pandemic influenza preparedness plans from Latin American countries were evaluated against criteria drawn from the World Health Organization checklist. Plans were eligible for inclusion if formally published before 16 November 2007.Fifteen national plans were identified and retrieved from the 17 Latin American countries surveyed. Latin American countries demonstrated different degrees of preparedness, and that a high level of completeness of plans was correlated to a country's wealth to a certain extent. Plans were judged strong in addressing surveillance requirements, and provided appropriate communication strategies directed to the general public and health care personnel. However, gaps remained, including the organization of health care services’ response; planning and maintenance of essential services; and the provision of containment measures such as the stockpiling of necessary medical supplies including vaccines and antiviral medications. In addition, some inconsistencies and variations which may be important, such as in border control measures and the capacity to contain outbreaks, exist between country plans—issues that could result in confusion in the event of a pandemic. A number of plans remain developmental in nature and, as elsewhere, more emphasis should be placed on strengthening the operability of plans, and in testing them. Whilst taking account of resources constraints, plans should be further developed in a coherent manner with both regional and international imperatives.

Influenza pandemic preparedness has focused on influenza virus H5 and H7 subtypes. However, it is not possible to predict with certainty which subtype of avian influenza virus will cause the next pandemic, and it is prudent to include other avian influenza virus subtypes in pandemic preparedness efforts. An H6 influenza virus was identified as a potential progenitor of the H5N1 viruses that emerged in Hong Kong in 1997. This virus continues to circulate in the bird population in Asia, and other H6 viruses are prevalent in birds in North America and Asia. The high rate of reassortment observed in influenza viruses and the prevalence of H6 viruses in birds suggest that this subtype may pose a pandemic risk. Very little is known about the replicative capacity, immunogenicity, and correlates of protective immunity for low-pathogenicity H6 influenza viruses in mammals. We evaluated the antigenic and genetic relatedness of 14 H6 influenza viruses and their abilities to replicate and induce a cross-reactive immune response in two animal models: mice and ferrets. The different H6 viruses replicated to different levels in the respiratory tracts of mice and ferrets, causing varied degrees of morbidity and mortality in these two models. H6 virus infection induced similar patterns of neutralizing antibody responses in mice and ferrets; however, species-specific differences in the cross-reactivity of the antibody responses were observed. Overall, cross-reactivity of neutralizing antibodies in H6 virus-infected mice did not correlate well with protection against heterologous wild-type H6 viruses. However, we have identified an H6 virus that induces protective immunity against viruses in the North American and Eurasian lineages.

Improved capacity for influenza surveillance in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region: Progress in a challenging setting

Influenza A virus infection is a zoonosis. The natural reservoirs of the viruses are migratory water birds, particularly ducks. Through a process of reassortment of the genomes of avian and human influenza viruses, novel virus strains may arise to which humans are not immune. Such a virus can spread rapidly throughout populations as a pandemic, usually with serious consequences. Effective preparedness for future influenza pandemics depends on robust global surveillance of avian, swine, mammalian, and human influenza and continuous updating of our Library of Influenza Viruses from these hosts to aid diagnosis and vaccine production. Enhancing and refining strategies for controlling seasonal influenza, including the development of more potent vaccines and therapeutic medicines, that can be seamlessly implemented when a new influenza virus emerges is crucial. This review, which draws on more than half a century of our research on the ecology of influenza viruses, describes how pandemic influenza viruses arise and outlines strategies for preparedness against future pandemics.

In Italy, the arrival of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus triggered an integrated response that was mainly based on the 2006 National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan. In this article we analyse the main activities implemented for epidemiological surveillance, containment and mitigation of the pandemic influenza and the lesson learned from this experience. Overall, from week 31 (27 July – 2 August) of 2009 to week 17 (26 April – 2 May) of 2010, we estimate that there were approximately 5,600,000 cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) who received medical attention (with almost 2,000 laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic influenza from May to October 2009). A total of 1,106 confirmed cases were admitted to hospital for serious conditions, of whom 532 were admitted to intensive care units. There were 260 reported deaths due to pandemic influenza. Approximately 870,000 first doses of the pandemic vaccine were administered, representing a vaccine coverage of 4% of the target population. One of the possible reasons for the low uptake of the pandemic vaccine in the target population could be the communication strategy adopted, for both the general population and healthcare workers, which turned out to be a major challenge. Active involvement of all health professionals (at local, regional and national level) in influenza pandemic preparedness and response should be encouraged in the future.

Avian influenza A H5N1 continues to be a major threat to global public health as it is a likely candidate for the next influenza pandemic. To protect public health and avert potential disruption to the economy, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has committed substantial effort in preparedness for avian and pandemic influenza. Public health infrastructures for emerging infectious diseases have been developed to enhance command, control and coordination of emergency response. Strategies against avian and pandemic influenza are formulated to reduce opportunities for human infection, detect pandemic influenza timely, and enhance emergency preparedness and response capacity. Key components of the pandemic response include strengthening disease surveillance systems, updating legislation on infectious disease prevention and control, enhancing traveller health measures, building surge capacity, maintaining adequate pharmaceutical stockpiles, and ensuring business continuity during crisis. Challenges from avian and pandemic influenza are not to be underestimated. Implementing quarantine and social distancing measures to contain or mitigate the spread of pandemic influenza is problematic in a highly urbanised city like Hong Kong as they involved complex operational and ethical issues. Sustaining effective risk communication campaigns during interpandemic times is another challenge. Being a member of the global village, Hong Kong is committed to contributing its share of efforts and collaborating with health authorities internationally in combating our common public health enemy.

Preparing to respond: Irish nurses' perceptions of preparedness for an influenza pandemic

Pandemic Preparedness and Responses to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza: Crisis Management and Public Policy Insights

Understanding the characteristics of available influenza or influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance systems is important for seasonal influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness. We compared five influenza or ILI data sources in Victoria: notifications of laboratory-confirmed influenza to the Victorian Department of Human Services; hospital emergency presentations and hospital admissions; sentinel general practitioner surveillance; and medical locum service surveillance. Seasonal trends for influenza and ILI activity were similar for all data sources. Community ILI surveillance, operating as sentinel GP, locum service or hospital emergency department surveillance, in conjunction with notification of laboratory-confirmed influenza, would provide adequate inter-pandemic surveillance for influenza in Victoria and, by extension, in any Australian jurisdiction. Other surveillance systems would be needed for early pandemic case or cluster detection, while pandemic monitoring would be better achieved by a more automated system.

Children in child care centers represent an important population to consider in attempts to mitigate the spread of an influenza pandemic. This national survey, conducted in 2008 and 2016, assessed directors' reports of their child care centers' pandemic influenza preparation before and after the 2009 H1N1 novel influenza pandemic. This was a telephone-based survey of child care center directors randomly selected from a national database of licensed US child care centers who were queried about their preparedness for pandemic influenza. We grouped conceptually related items in 6 domains into indexes: general infection control, communication, seasonal influenza control, use of health consultants, quality of child care, and perceived barriers. These indexes, along with other center and director characteristics, were used to predict pandemic influenza preparedness. Among 1500 and 518 child care center directors surveyed in 2008 and 2016, respectively, preparation for pandemic influenza was low and did not improve. Only 7% of directors had taken concrete actions to prepare their centers. Having served as a center director during the 2009 influenza pandemic did not influence preparedness. After adjusting for covariates, child care health consultation and years of director's experience were positively associated with pandemic influenza preparation, whereas experiencing perceived barriers such as lack of knowing what to do in the event of pandemic influenza, was negatively associated with pandemic influenza preparedness. Pandemic influenza preparedness of child care center's directors needs to improve. Child care health consultants are likely to be important collaborators in addressing this problem.

Influenza A virus (IAV) has its natural reservoir in wild waterfowl, and new human IAVs often contain gene segments originating from avian IAVs. Treatment options for severe human influenza are principally restricted to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs), among which oseltamivir is stockpiled in preparedness for influenza pandemics. There is evolutionary pressure in the environment for resistance development to oseltamivir in avian IAVs, as the active metabolite oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) passes largely undegraded through sewage treatment to river water where waterfowl reside. In an in vivo mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) model, we tested if low-pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus might become resistant if the host was exposed to low levels of OC. Ducks were experimentally infected, and OC was added to their water, after which infection and transmission were maintained by successive introductions of uninfected birds. Daily fecal samples were tested for IAV excretion, genotype, and phenotype. Following mallard exposure to 2.5 μg/liter OC, the resistance-related neuraminidase (NA) I222T substitution, was detected within 2 days during the first passage and was found in all viruses sequenced from subsequently introduced ducks. The substitution generated 8-fold and 2.4-fold increases in the 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) for OC (P < 0.001) and zanamivir (P = 0.016), respectively. We conclude that OC exposure of IAV hosts, in the same concentration magnitude as found in the environment, may result in amino acid substitutions, leading to changed antiviral sensitivity in an IAV subtype that can be highly pathogenic to humans. Prudent use of oseltamivir and resistance surveillance of IAVs in wild birds are warranted.

How does microbial emergence become a local area of medical, political, and technological intervention in cities such as London or Frankfurt? Through a multi-sited ethnography of urban health authorities, hospitals, blue light services, and epidemiologists, this article examines the achievement of pandemic order in times of crisis. Its specific focus is on pandemic influenza preparedness. By tracing the complex spatiotemporal, technological, and administrative dimensions required for the articulation of a local pandemic threat, this paper will look at how public health experts know about the arrival of an influenza pandemic, how sociotechnical networks are assembled in the decision-making process, and how single cases of illness are drawn into spaces of pandemic potential. Integrating concepts from science and technology studies and critical global health, the article highlights how disease emergence entails hard work and administrative, technological, political, and biomedical skills in order to be made present and tangible. In consequence, it will be argued that local pandemic preparedness does not result from a linear adaption of internationally circulating standards, but from rather precarious modes and modalities of ordering.

Stockpile of personal protective equipment in hospital settings: Preparedness for influenza pandemics

Editorial introductions.