In your face: transcendence in embodied interaction.

Theory of Mind and the Psychoanalytic Model

The development of thinking with all its different aspects is not alone a theme of cognitive psychology, but more and more of developmental psychology, in particular with psychoanalytic background. At the latest since the important work by Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2004) we are aware of the possible impact of an impaired mentalisation capacity for psychic development. In this article we discuss three aspects of thinking: narrative competence, representations and mentalisation and theory of mind; we will limit ourselves to children in first and second year of Kindergarten who are between 5 and 6 years old. The narrative competence is a really rich and interesting construct as well as a psychic ability connecting cognitive and affective aspects in a most interesting way. Representations of relationships are the main issue of several theories in developmental psychology. The concept of theory of mind has become very significant in cognitive psychology. After a detailed introduction of the central concepts, in the empiric part we will show how aspects of narrative competence are associated with advanced theory of mind skills. Children having passed a theory of mind test respond more to the conflict of the story and show less avoidant strategies in their narratives. Further analyses revealed that only girls showed the expected differences. Therefore an advanced theory of mind capacity gives girls a scope for development to get involved with more difficult conflicts in stories, which enables them to work through more contentious situations.

Theory of mind and facial emotion recognition in euthymic bipolar I and bipolar II disorders

Present of a causal model for social function based on theory of mind with mediating of Machiavellian beliefs and hot empathy

We investigated cognitive and affective Theory of Mind (ToM) and empathy in patients with premanifest and manifest Huntington's disease (HD). The relationship between ToM performance and executive skills was also examined. Sixteen preclinical and 23 clinical HD patients, and 39 healthy subjects divided into 2 control groups were given a French adaptation of the Yoni test (Shamay-Tsoory, S.G., Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory of mind: a lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45(3), 3054-67) that examines first- and second-order cognitive and affective ToM processing in separate conditions with a physical control condition. Participants were also given questionnaires of empathy and cognitive tests which mainly assessed executive functions (inhibition and mental flexibility). Clinical HD patients made significantly more errors than their controls in the first- and second-order cognitive and affective ToM conditions of the Yoni task, but exhibited no empathy deficits. However, there was no evidence that ToM impairment was related to cognitive deficits in these patients. Preclinical HD patients were unimpaired in ToM tasks and empathy measures compared with their controls. Our results are consistent with the idea that impaired affective and cognitive mentalizing emerges with the clinical manifestation of HD, but is not necessarily part of the preclinical stage. Furthermore, these impairments appear independent of executive dysfunction and empathy.

Emotion recognition and theory of mind are related to gray matter volume of the prefrontal cortex in schizophrenia

Previous studies that have assessed social cognition in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have produced inconsistent findings. To summarize these data and shed light upon moderators that may explain observed inconsistencies, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis exploring social cognition (Theory of Mind (ToM), Empathy, Facial and Non-Facial Emotion Recognition) and Everyday Social Skills in children and adolescents with ADHD. The current meta-analysis involved 142 studies including 652 effect sizes. These studies compared children and adolescents with ADHD (n = 8,300) and with typical development (n = 7,983). Participants with ADHD exhibited moderate to very large deficits in ToM (SMD = 0.84, 95% CI = 0.68-0.99), Facial Emotion Recognition (SMD = 0.63, 95% CI = 0.46-0.81), and Everyday Social Skills (SMD = 1.23, 95% CI = 1.08-1.37). The magnitude of these impairments was similar when considering effect sizes adjusted for some covariates and the methodological quality of the studies. Few studies have investigated Empathy and Non-Facial Emotion Recognition, which precludes definitive conclusions. Children and adolescents with ADHD experience robust impairments in ToM, Facial Emotion Recognition and Everyday Social Skills. Future studies should explore whether these deficits are a consequence of difficulties in other areas of cognition (e.g., executive functioning). We have made all our raw data open access to facilitate the use of the present work by the community (e.g., clinicians looking for tools, assessing social impairments, or researchers designing new studies).

Meta-analysis of social cognition in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

Social cognition in first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder: A meta-analysis

Social communication in autism spectrum disorder not improved by Theory of Mind interventions.

Neural correlates of theory of mind and empathy in schizophrenia: An activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis

Social cognition refers broadly to the cognitive processes used to encode and decode social information and consists of four key domains: theory of mind, social perception, affective empathy, and social behaviour. Social cognitive deficits are a key predictor of important functional outcomes as they fundamentally disrupt the ability to form and sustain strong interpersonal relationships thereby potentially leading to social isolation, a critical risk factor for morbidity and mortality. Although people who have suffered a stroke are one of the many clinical groups at increased risk of social cognitive impairment, important questions remain about the nature and magnitude of these difficulties. The overarching aim of the present thesis was therefore to enhance current understanding of social cognitive deficits following stroke. This was achieved in two parts. Firstly, via a comprehensive meta-analysis (Chapter 2) of 58 datasets involving 2567 participants (937 with stroke, 1630 non-clinical controls). Results from this meta-analysis revealed significant stroke related deficits for three of the four social cognitive domains (theory of mind, social perception, and social behaviour), with these deficits robust across both left and right lateralized lesions, as well as social cognitive assessments that differed in their broader cognitive demands and their modality of presentation. The second core part of the thesis involved an extensive empirical study (Chapter 3) addressing limitations of the broader literature identified by the meta-analysis. Seventy participants (35 people who had suffered a first-time stroke and 35 demographically-matched controls) completed a comprehensive social cognitive test battery, background neuropsychological tests and measures related to quality of life. Key results indicated that while affective empathy remained intact following stroke, again there was evidence of significant stroke-related impairment for all three other social cognitive domains. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Introduction Few studies have focused on social cognition in dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB), even though some brain structures being well known as underlying social cognitive processes are directly impacted in this disease. Furthermore, social cognition processes have been mostly studied independently using evaluations with poor ecological validity. We aimed at studying the ability of a new naturalistic and multidimensional social cognition task to reveal impairments in DLB patients. We chose to compare the profile of these patients with that of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients, for which social cognition is better preserved. Method Fifteen patients (DLB: n = 7; AD: n = 8) and 28 healthy controls underwent the REALSoCog task. They encountered several social situations (e.g. control versus transgressions) in a non-immersive virtual city environment allowing the assessment of moral cognition, cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM), emotional empathy and behavioral intentions. Results The main results showed (i) a lower ability to detect transgressions in DLB patients, particularly conventional ones, whereas moral cognition seemed better preserved in AD patients; (ii) a cognitive ToM impairment in both DLB and AD patients, while affective ToM is impaired only in DLB patients; (iii) a decreased emotional empathy specifically observed in DLB patients; (iv) more inappropriate behavioral intentions, mainly in DLB patients, but also in some AD patients. Conclusions This study suggests the feasibility and potential interest of the REALSoCog task in revealing social cognition deficits, particularly for DLB patients by showing different social patterns as compared to AD patients. These results offer interesting clinical perspectives to develop more naturalistic tasks in such populations and for clinical differential diagnosis. Limitations and future perspectives are discussed.

Emotion recognition, ‘theory of mind,’ and social behavior in schizophrenia

Understanding, as Descartes, Locke and Kant all insisted, is the primary 'faculty' of the mind; yet our modern sciences have been slow to advance a clear and testable account of what it means to understand, of children's acquisition of this concept and, in particular, how children come to ascribe understanding to themselves and others. By drawing together developmental and philosophical theories, this book provides a systematic account of children's concept of understanding and places understanding at the heart of children's 'theory of mind'. Children's subjective awareness of their own minds, of what they think, depends on learning a language for ascribing mental states to themselves and others. This book will appeal to researchers in developmental psychology, cognitive science, education and philosophy who are interested in the cognitive and emotional development of children and in the more basic question of what it means to have a mind.