India as the balancer

In the last decade, the European Union (EU), a bulwark of the liberal international order, has been subject to a high degree of turmoil resulting from various processes and crises and has witnessed the rise of national populism, of which Brexit was the main exponent. The leadership of the order was also impacted by the changes in the foreign policy of the United States of America (USA) effected by the Trump Administration. The USA, the United Kingdom (UK), and the EU are the leaders of the liberal zone of peace and if national populism structurally affects them the liberal international order could be seriously challenged. Among the various instances of national populism, Brexit remains a significant challenge to the EU and might greatly impact the liberal international order. By adopting an interpretivist methodology anchored in hermeneutics and in the methodological approach of emergent causation, this article seeks to understand how Brexit, as an internal challenge to the order, and the rise of China and other revisionist powers, as an external one, might influence the future of the liberal international order and great power competition. I argue that the news of the order’s death is greatly exaggerated, and that depending on British, German, and US variables, Brexit and the rise of China can either challenge or reinforce the liberal international order. Nevertheless, liberalism has a resilience no other political perspective has due to its innate ability for criticism and adaptation to change. Considering that the current liberal international order is a USA-led order, I argue that these are the two main variables concerning how Brexit might influence the liberal international order and how the order’s leading powers will adapt their strategies and foreign policies towards China and other revisionist powers.

A Marriage Estranged:The Strategic Disconnect between Pakistan and the United States Moeed Yusuf (bio) Like a bad marriage that holds together only because the couple deems divorce to be cost-prohibitive, the United States and Pakistan remain locked in a deeply distrustful relationship. Both sides regularly accuse the other of being an insincere partner and complain of being cheated. Yet Pakistan remains a major non-NATO ally, and the two states continue to seek ways to overcome their differences to fight terrorism. U.S.-Pakistan relations frayed considerably in the last eighteen months of the Obama administration. With President Donald Trump's entry into the mix, Pakistanis sensed an opportunity to work with an administration that seems to have no preconceived South Asia policy. But progress will not be easy. The roots of U.S.-Pakistan tensions in recent years lie in the most canonical principle of interstate relations: a fundamental divergence of priorities and self-perceived interests. Each country's policies in pursuit of its interests, perfectly rational in its own mind, have been antithetical to the other's vision for South Asia. But both sides have been reluctant to acknowledge this situation—perhaps concerned that doing so would unleash the dangers associated with a total rupture in ties. This essay will examine the divergence in U.S. and Pakistani interests and consider the prospect for improved relations during the Trump administration. Real Divergences, Real Consequences Since September 11, the United States' most urgent priority in Pakistan's neighborhood has been to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Its principal long-term strategic interest lies in cementing its burgeoning alliance with India as a means of checking China's rise. Pakistan's foreign and security policy, on the other hand, is shaped by the perennially hostile relationship with India. Throughout the country's 70-year history, the Pakistani military has tried to ensure a semblance of parity with its eastern neighbor. This has been Pakistan's insurance policy against any Indian aggression that could threaten the state's collapse. [End Page 46] During the Cold War, Pakistan used the United States to bolster its economy and military capability against Soviet-leaning India. Pakistan's India calculus has not moved since this time, but the United States' strategy has flipped. And herein lies the problem. The United States and India are now engaged in a multifaceted strategic partnership that is reinforcing India's rise. In Afghanistan, the United States has invested trillions of dollars to transform the country from a safe haven for anti-U.S. terrorist groups responsible for the September 11 attacks to a peaceful, democratic state. To achieve this goal, it created the NATO-trained and -backed 350,000-strong Afghan National Security Force, partnered with political forces opposed to the Taliban, and leveraged international economic support for Afghanistan. India has emerged as a key partner. It has pledged over $2 billion in assistance, making it Afghanistan's fifth-largest donor, and was the first country to sign a security pact with Afghanistan.1 Pakistan was pivotal for this U.S. vision in Afghanistan—without Pakistan, no victory was possible there. Pakistan provided the United States with subsidized transit facilities, deployment of over 100,000 troops to its western frontier to fight anti-U.S. terrorists who had crossed into Pakistan's border regions after the September 11 attacks, and significant intelligence cooperation on groups like al Qaeda. But this cooperation did not extend to the Afghan Taliban. U.S. policymakers offered several incentives to gain Pakistan's full support in Afghanistan while simultaneously trying to ensure Pakistan's internal stability. These included over $30 billion in monetary assistance, support to Pakistan's internal counterterrorism operations, direct use of aerial power through drone strikes against militants in the border regions, and signals of a long-term commitment to Pakistan that entailed broadening the conversation beyond Afghanistan and terrorism to economic and development issues through a "strategic dialogue" process. Such U.S. assistance helped Pakistan immensely—from critical budget support in times of economic crisis to much-needed resources to fight domestic terrorists. But behind the veil of the two countries' crucial tactical cooperation remained...

(Still) Supporting the Indispensable Power:Singapore's Relations with the United States from Trump to Biden See Seng Tan (bio) Singapore regards the United States as an indispensable power whose global might, purpose, and reach Singaporeans have long viewed as invaluable to the stability, security, and prosperity of Asia. The United States has evolved from an unlikely collaborator and patron of Singapore following the 1971 British withdrawal east of the Suez Canal to being the city-state's invaluable partner today. As with other U.S. allies and partners, Singapore's relations with the United States were tested during the presidency of Donald Trump, who effectively recused his nation from the traditional role of global leadership it had played since the end of World War II. Yet Singapore chose to stay the course of its pragmatic encouragement and facilitation of the U.S. forward presence in Asia. The transition to the Biden administration, which presumably aims to walk back Trump's "America first" policy without easing up on China, has not changed Singapore's perspective on and policy toward the United States. It remains in Singapore's interest to continue welcoming, facilitating, and—in the face of growing Chinese objection to U.S. strategic dominance in the region—justifying the United States' place and role in Asia. That said, Singapore's view of U.S. indispensability does not mean it will take Washington's side on every international issue and dispute, especially where Singapore's interests and the general well-being of the Asian region are thought to be at risk. Singapore is a consummate hedger that has long sought "to be a friend to all, but an enemy of none."1 Its contemporary support of the United States has risked souring relations with China, [End Page 77] Singapore's top trading partner in 2021.2 Thus understood, Singapore's qualified belief in U.S. leadership presupposes a United States that accepts not only its long-standing role as a world leader but equally the obligation to be a force for Asia's peace, prosperity, and security—a responsibility that, in Singapore's view, is better shared than hogged at a time when Beijing's strategic ambitions have risen concomitantly with China's growing military power and global influence. How the United States and its partners can work with China while balancing Chinese power and influence without causing regional discord is the key challenge. It is on that basis that Singapore will do what it can to help the United States restore its post-Trump credibility in Asia while seeking to ensure that U.S.-China tensions do not irreparably damage the region. This essay contends that Singapore will continue to support the United States' forward presence in Asia while encouraging Washington and Beijing to accommodate one another and seek ways to cooperate amid their competitive relationship. Beginning with a short reflection on the city-state's propensity to hedge against the great powers, the essay then explores Singapore's ties with the United States from the Trump to the Biden administration. Incorrigible Hedger Historically, Southeast Asian states have relied on hedging and shifting limited alignments, and Singapore is no exception.3 Hedging is the inclination to adopt the via media between aligning with great powers and balancing them. States hedge to minimize risks and deny larger powers their ability to dominate without having to balance directly against them.4 Neither passive neutralists nor fence-sitters, hedgers seek to engage multiple powers without becoming reliant on any single power. Short of the U.S.-China rivalry intensifying to Thucydidean proportions, it is not unreasonable to assume that Singapore will persist in hedging to create [End Page 78] strategic space and flexibility for itself as long as there is no undue pressure to take sides.5 Singapore has been described as having pursued a "balanced" foreign policy that assiduously avoids the impression that it is seeking to balance others—a difficult act made more necessary at a time when the city-state is caught in the middle of the U.S.-China competition.6 Like the proverbial bird on a wire, Singapore's perceived vulnerability as a small state in a...

Three Scenarios for Asia's Changing Regional Order Renato Cruz De Castro (bio) Prior to Donald Trump's presidential inauguration on January 20, 2017, several East Asian leaders were concerned about the fate of the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific in particular and U.S. foreign policy in the region more generally. They suspected already that President Trump would ignore the region, given that one of his first official decisions was to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Neither was their apprehension assuaged by a subgroup of White House national security officials who tried to soften or rectify the president's statements on a range of issues from the South China Sea to the notorious activities of extremist groups in Southeast Asia.1 The public airing of discord within the administration also generated confusion and doubt about the credibility of U.S. foreign policy commitments in Asia. Trump's decision to withdraw from the TPP, his quirky temperament, his lack of strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and his personal concern regarding Islamic militancy in the Middle East made analysts and Asian statesmen doubt whether he would heed former president Barack Obama's advice that "engaging in the Asia-Pacific is critical to America's future prosperity and security."2 Along with China's growing economic and strategic clout and increasing tensions in several regional flashpoints, all these factors made many pessimistic about the future of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and the durability of the regional security order. Andrew Yeo's recent work Asia's Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century offers a fresh and reassuring outlook on the future of Asia's security order and U.S. foreign policy in the region. In the book, Yeo argues that Asia's regional institutions are more powerful and resilient than the whims of the United States' current, eccentric president. He observes that political leaders' choices and actions [End Page 139] are framed within a larger temporal and historical context, making it difficult for new and inexperienced decision-makers to reverse existing ideas and institutions that were created to articulate states' core interests and values. He maintains that Asia's security architecture reflects greater stability and continuity; thus, it can withstand and even outlive the Trump administration's inconsistent signals regarding long-term U.S. intentions and policy toward the region. Using historical institutionalism as a theoretical framework, the book examines the evolution of Asia's regional security order. Yeo explores the beginnings and development of U.S. bilateral security alliances as well as the modes of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward fostering multilateralism in Asia. He observes that while this system of bilateral alliances remains an important means of ensuring national security and regional stability, regional institutional structures are also being used by several states to organize and address emerging security and economic challenges. He assumes that bilateralism and multilateralism are complementary rather than contradictory. This raises two questions: how do bilateral and multilateral institutions interact, and how are old and new institutions layered and integrated? Yeo traces how the emergence of the postwar bilateral alliance system in the 1950s and the formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s led to the creation of the complex patchwork of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions that currently constitute Asia's security architecture. However, despite the region's new multilateralism and the proliferation of several patchworks of regional institutions, Cold War relics such as the U.S. system of bilateral alliances and ASEAN remain at the core of this architecture. The book then examines how the Trump administration's actions and China's foreign policy goals can affect the regional order. Yeo notes that despite Trump's erratic statements on U.S. policy toward Asia, the actions of the United States appear to encourage some degree of stability and continuity in the regional architecture. Interestingly, he maintains that China does not actually want to overhaul this regional security architecture. Instead, it wants greater influence in the region and simply seeks to fill the void that the United States and its allies have left. Yeo is skeptical...

U.S.-India Relations under President Trump:Promise and Peril Rajesh Rajagopalan (bio) The structural conditions in Asia are ripe for closer U.S.-India strategic relations. China's rise and aggressive behavior, coupled with the massive imbalance of power between China and India, leaves India with little choice but to attempt to balance China. Moreover, its choice of partners is limited. India could attempt to create a regional balance by banding together with the many other Asian states that share its concerns about China, but this promises to be difficult and may not work. The United States' dominance over Asia, an essential component of its global role, is also under threat from China. Though the United States can probably still counter China by itself, it would be a lot easier to do this in concert with other Asian powers such as India. This strategic picture suggests significant promise for U.S.-India relations in the longer term. But whether this will lead to a closer relationship during the presidency of Donald Trump is less clear. The Trump administration's transactional approach to its strategic partners, the nonstrategic focus on Pakistan by both India and the United States, economic nationalism in both countries, and the potential for deepening domestic political chaos in the United States all complicate the outlook for U.S.-India relations over the next four years. The following essay will first examine the strategic rationale for closer ties and then assess the challenges confronting the partnership under the Trump administration. The Strategic Rationale China's rise is the central strategic challenge facing India. India's economy was larger than China's in 1962, the year that India suffered a devastating military defeat at China's hands. By the late 1970s, however, China had overtaken India. The Chinese economy had become twice as large as India's by 1995 and is now four times the size.1 This gross imbalance itself should be worrisome for India, but what makes the situation even more [End Page 39] troubling is that it is married to many active disagreements between the two sides. India and China have a significant unresolved territorial dispute that simmers and occasionally boils, which more than a dozen rounds of negotiations over two decades have not brought any closer to resolution. China's relationship with Pakistan is seen in New Delhi as not just political balancing but as a military threat so grave that Indian defense planners are now seriously considering a two-front war contingency.2 China's relations with India's other South Asian neighbors are likewise interpreted as an effort to undermine India. New Delhi refused to send a delegation to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May because it regards the initiative as a Chinese design for Asian dominance. China's scuttling of India's bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and its refusal to support India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council are also seen in New Delhi as part of China's efforts to undermine India.3 India's options to balance China are limited. China's defense budget is at least four times as large as India's and its infrastructure in Tibet is far superior, allowing China much greater ease in military operations along the disputed border. To balance China, India has improved defense relations with other countries in Asia. It is developing a trilateral partnership with Japan and Australia, which seeks to enhance defense ties between the three and is clearly focused on China. India is also stepping up defense cooperation with Vietnam and Singapore. But though these efforts can supplement India's other balancing efforts, they cannot by themselves provide sufficient ballast to right the Asian balance of power. For one, even when these countries' capabilities are combined, China still significantly outmatches them in defense spending. For another, the geography of the region is an obstacle to mutual support because of the great distance of these secondary powers from each other. Finally, there is no history of mutual security cooperation between India and these countries, and it will take a while for cooperation to reach a level that can provide domestic...

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

Due to the rapid growth of China's national power, the so- called ＂China Threat＂ has become an important issue since the late 20^(th) century. It involves academic debates not only over power issues, but also over issues on American diplomatic policy, especially toward the Taiwan Strait. Employing the theory of security dilemma, this paper first analyzes and evaluates the rise of China and addresses two questions: ＂How fast are China's economic and military capabilities increasing?＂ and ＂How should the world, especially the United States and Taiwan, respond to this emerging great power?＂ Secondly, it is believed that the security dilemma should be measured more broadly and some factors, such as nationalism, need to be taken into account as well. It is clear that the dynamics of the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait are uniquely complex. The interests rivalry that has reemerged in the Taiwan Strait since the 1990s seems to be a classic example of the security dilemma, illustrating why some are worried that the growth of Chinese military power and the reactions to it would result in dangerous balancing behavior and would increase the chances of military conflict. Finally, this paper offers some suggestions to the further relaxation of the security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait.

Reviewed by: China's Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order by Dawn C. Murphy Jiarui Wu Murphy, Dawn C. China's Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022. [End Page 237] China's rise as an economic powerhouse competing with the United States for power and influence globally is a development that has received mixed reactions from different players on the global scene. While to African nations, China's interest and support of developmental projects have been received as a blessing by these nations, the Western world and especially the United States remain wary and critical of China's growing influence in these developing nations. Fears of neocolonialism and the support of nations of interest that might lead to the resurgence of terrorist groups are some of the areas of concern raised by the United States. China's interest in the Middle East also concerns the United States. The Middle East is a central national interest area for the United States, which is concerned with fighting ISIS, preventing Iran from gaining nuclear power, and providing support to Israel. Competition for resources is also a critical factor in the emerging competition between China and the United States. Africa and the Middle East are rich in valuable resources, and China's interest in them raises concerns about the United States' future access to the resources. Additionally, it is still unclear whether China will be a cooperative or competitive player in the global market. Dawn Murphy's book provides an in-depth analysis of China's increased involvement in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and the implications from a global perspective. Although China's relations with Africa are not a new development, the increase in its involvement in Africa and its increased influence on Africa's politics, economy, and provision of foreign aid and military engagements have raised Western nations' interest as they try to figure out how China's increased involvement will shift the global power dynamics. Similarly, China's increased sway in the Middle East threatens to shift the power dynamics in an area where the United States previously held much sway. The book looks at China's approach in relating to African and Middle Eastern nations. It also provides an in-depth look at the tools China employs in its foreign policy, including China's cooperation forums, United Nations (UN) Security Council voting, foreign aid, and free trade agreements. By providing a detailed look at China's approach, the book objectively compares China's and the United States' approaches and notes areas of similarity and divergences between the two. This comparison provides an excellent basis for predicting future China–US relations. Studies by various authors have reached vastly different conclusions on the impact of China–Africa relations, while the impact of its relations with Middle [End Page 238] Eastern nations has largely been understudied. The book argues that despite China not aggressively attempting to interfere in US–Africa relations, its rapid growth puts it in a competitive place with Western nations and makes it challenge the "rules of the liberal international system as it increasingly builds spheres of influence in these areas" (8). In essence, although not in outright competition, China–Africa/Middle East interactions are creating an alternative international order that might eventually lead to the collapse of the existing system and the emergence of a new order primarily influenced by China's model. The possibility of such development provides ample basis for the global interest in studying China's activities in African and Middle Eastern nations. In a departure from previous studies that have focused on the arising China–US tensions in their look at China's increasing influence in Africa, Murphy adopts a new approach. The author proposes a more wholesome approach to understanding China's growing influence in these regions. Rather than just focusing on the competitive relationship between the two nations, the book also analyzes the areas of cooperation. For example, some areas where China–US cooperation can be observed are participation in UN peacekeeping operations, limiting arms sales...

The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance under the KoizumiAbe governments has prompted a neorealist argument that Japan is aligning even more closely with the United States in order to balance China. (1) In practice, Japan's strategy for dealing with Chinese power is more complex than simply bandwagoning with the United States, which has been the foundation of its security policy for more than five decades. (2) The shift in Japanese strategy became evident under the Abe administration. Key differences can be discerned in the responses of the governments of Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe to China's rise. Although Prime Minister Abe sought to go even further than Prime Minister Koizumi in strengthening security ties with the United States, (3) the Koizumi administration gave sole priority to the United States, while the Abe administration adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. A stronger US-Japan alliance was complemented by the buildup of much broader and deeper security ties with other countries in the Asia Pacific, with the aim of constructing a containment coalition against the growth of Chinese power. (4) The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Japan's more complex balancing strategy. It should not be viewed in isolation but in concert with other similar initiatives taking place at the same time: parallel overtures to India and the promotion of concepts of security trilateralism (Japan-India-US/Japan-Australia-US) and quadrilateralism (Japan-US-Australia-India), backed by the overt rhetoric of shared values and references to partnerships based on common security interests. These manifestations of Prime Minister Abe's assertive diplomacy and his desire for closer security relations with like-minded states are quite distinct from the multilateral initiatives that have been an enduring feature of Japan's regional policy in the finance, trade and diplomatic spheres. In dealing with China, the Abe government did not just turn to multilateral initiatives as a means of shaping Japan's security environment in Asia. (5) In fact, the burgeoning security ties with countries outside the US-Japan alliance exemplified a minilateral rather than a multilateralist approach, which sought to formalize and regularize security relations among a small number of regional partners and establish a new grouping with a closed rather than open membership. (6) In this respect, the revamping of security ties with other Asia-Pacific states by the Abe government marked a subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. (7) The new approach also had divergent implications for Japan's security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, it reinforced the US alliance where the United States was also an invited player in minilateral frameworks. The Australia-Japan Security Declaration, for example, foreshadowed stronger Japan-Australia-US trilateral security cooperation in the future. On the other hand, the Abe administration's willingness to sign a security declaration with Australia and overt security approaches to India appeared to reflect a desire to take independent steps to shore up Japan's security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation In March 2007, Japan took the unprecedented step of signing a security declaration with a third country outside the framework of its bilateral alliance with the United States. It was the first security agreement Japan had signed since the 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and signalled a clear departure from Japan's exclusive security bilateralism centring on the United States. The declaration affirmed the existence of a Japan-Australia strategic partnership and committed each nation to close security consultation, enhanced cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disarmament and peace keeping operations, and the provision of international public goods such as maritime security, and humanitarian and disaster relief. …

Vision of a Void: Shifting Global Power and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

This chapter analyzes the key drives underpinning continuity and change in Polish foreign and security policy from 1990 to 2019. This period has marked a significant shift in Poland’s position on the European continent. From a country under Russian tutelage during the Cold War, Poland has ‘returned to Europe’, joining the EU (2004) and NATO (1999). As this chapter will highlight, while the core of Poland’s foreign and security policy has remained focused on Poland’s territorial integrity as sacrosanct, how this has been operationalized by Poland’s policy-making elites has fluctuated. This not only relates to shifts in government, but also to external drivers, not least the behavior of Poland’s neighbor Russia. In particular, Poland’s pro-active approach to participating in international military operations, whether in the context of NATO, CSDP or US coalitions of the willing, marking it as a ‘go to player’ in European defense (Whitney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 24), has been replaced by a territorial defense focus. This has been accompanied by a fortified Atlanticism and a skeptical Europeanism. Overall, however, this chapter will demonstrate that Polish foreign and security policy has shown remarkable continuity and that changes can primarily be found in how policies are designed, actioned or prioritized.

The article presents the results of a study of the development of the UK's foreign policy in the context of the leading trends in world politics and bilateral interstate cooperation with Ukraine during the period of full-scale Russian aggression from February 24, 2022. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity and objectivity, general scientific methods of logic, comparative analysis, special historical methods of historiographic analysis, historical-systemic, chronological, historical-genetic, retrospective analysis, comparative historical methods of scientific knowledge. A historiographical overview of the problem under study is presented. The main reasons and interests of the UK government in reorienting the state's foreign policy in the post-Brexit period from the declared global positioning to the level of regional policy are noted. The author emphasizes that the main directions of the UK's foreign policy remain relations with the United States and European partners. These directions traditionally both contradict and complement each other, depending on national interests and the international situation. At the same time, the factor of the Russian-Ukrainian war and changes in US foreign policy after Donald Trump's return to power make Europe an indispensable and advanced area for the realization of the UK's international ambitions. However, it is noted that its international political positioning remains hostage to its significant military, political and economic dependence on the United States. Since Trump came to power, the UK government has been attempting to strengthen its international influence through traditional manoeuvring between the American and European poles of its foreign policy. The uncertainty of further support from Washington is forcing British elites to move closer to European partners, even partially reintegrating into the EU's cooperation system. It is noted that the UK has a geopolitical interest in helping Ukraine emerge from the war in the strongest possible condition, and restore its economic and political structure. For these reasons, the British government has stepped up its support for Ukraine. However, the parties still have to work hard to implement joint plans, especially to preserve existing ones and form new multilateral formats of cooperation at the regional level.

Research Highlights and Abstract Through an analysis of recent foreign policy discourse, in particular the UK approach to stabilisation, the article identifies distinctive similarities and continuities in the patterns of ethically-minded foreign policy, employed by the 1997–2010 Labour government and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. The article makes a fresh engagement with the concept of Good International Citizenship, arguing for a much more overt engagement, by policymakers, with the concept, to help address some of the shortcomings associated with both Labour and the Coalition's attempts to incorporate ethical obligations into British foreign policy. This article examines the interaction between the idea of Good International Citizenship and the recent evolution of UK foreign and security policy. Good International Citizenship centres on the mediation of ethical commitments to national interest, to the promotion international order, and to the wellbeing of vulnerable non-citizen populations. Whilst ethical commitments to non-citizens have become overt components of British foreign policy, recent UK governments have struggled to reconcile these with commitments to the national interest and a stable international order. The article argues that the more direct affirmation of Good International Citizenship as a narrative and ethos of practice for UK foreign policy might help further the increasingly open discussion on the ethics and UK foreign policy. As a framework for dialogue and public debate, the concept provides a means by which ethical commitments in the traditionally closed world of foreign policy might be opened up to wider critical scrutiny.