India

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 3.d focuses on measuring a country’s strengthening of self-contained early warning, risk assessment and management, and health risk reduction through core International Health Regulations (IHR). IHR is an instrument of international law, adopted pursuant to Article 21 of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Constitution, and is legally binding on 196 States Parties, including all 194 Member States of WHO. This paper examines how Nepal endeavours to achieve this target in the context of the country’s transition to a federal governance system. A performance audit was conducted, utilising data from secondary sources (2016 onwards), including government publications, reports from international agencies, and peer-reviewed academic articles. A specific case study on the response to COVID-19 was included. Analysis was conducted in accordance with the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) guidelines for self-contained report evaluations, focusing on possible divergence and convergence, the Leave No One Behind (LNOB) principles, cross-domain considerations, and structural finance. Progress is undermined by a controlled information vacuum. Since the last IHR was issued in 2015, the country has been in a state of stagnation, albeit self-sustaining. Although the country has a constitutional basis for health, policy and implementation levels are characterised by widespread vertical and horizontal misunderstandings among federal, provincial, and local governments. The COVID-19 response relegated the issue of ‘proliferated temporary control mechanisms’ or missing rational command systems. Financial analysis showed what appeared to be “firefighting” models, which allocated declining investments to the core preparedness functions like epidemic control, which fell to 2% of the federal health budget in 2021/22, and spending for COVID-19 emergencies, which constituted 36% of the federal health budget in 2021/22. The overarching Target 3.d monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were weak and lacked specified operations for subnational units. The systemic governance and financing issues inherent to transition federalism, which are inescapable for Nepal, pose acute challenges to achieving SDG Target 3.d by 2030. Scaling the governance system while strengthening IHR financing and core systems, and monitoring discretion through proactive mechanisms, is imperative for the resilience of the National Public Health System.

People belonging to the Scheduled Castes have had a long history of being discriminated against, exploited and placed at the bottom of caste society. After the enactment of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, measures such as quota within ordinary seats in the Panchayats as well as among the office-bearers have been introduced to overcome indignities endured through history by members of the Scheduled Castes. Notwithstanding these reservations, there is still strong resistance among those of higher castes (just above that of the Scheduled Castes in many cases), who have not been enthusiastic about reservations of the post of Panchayat president for Scheduled Caste people. What needs to be seen is whether the people of Scheduled Castes are able to participate, or whether they have been prevented from doing so, by the castes that are higher to them, as well as those that are dominant in the area of the Grama Panchayats. This article discusses certain issues that are related to the participation of Scheduled Castes in the Panchayats of Karnataka.

METHODS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES Wherever there is a problem regarded as common to two or more areas governed by different legislatures, a question inevitably arises as to how the law of the areas may be made uniform whenever it is desirable to do so. There appear to be three methods of obtaining the uniformity assumed to be desirable: (i) by voluntary action of the two law-making bodies adopting identical laws; (2) by agreement negotiated by a representative of the two governments and adopted by the appropriate legislative bodies; (3) by direction of a superior law-making body capable of compelling other law-making bodies to desist from having separate, distinct, and different laws. The first, or voluntary method, is always available without regard to the structure of the governments. The only requisite for this method is that both governments have a power to legislate on the subject involved. Thus, within a nation, or a state of a federal system having many local self-governing bodies, such as cities and villages, it is possible for two or more municipal governments voluntarily to adopt an identical law on any subject over which they have legislative power; it is equally possible for two or more states within a federal system voluntarily to adopt an identical law; and it is possible for two or more national states voluntarily to adopt an identical law. The method of obtaining uniformity by direction depends on the structure of government of the two areas involved. Thus, in most parts of the world it is possible for a central government having power over the municipal governments to obtain the desired uniformity by enacting a law of its own which is supreme over the laws of these lesser units of government. Within a federal system this method of obtaining uniformity is also available wherever the constituent states have, with respect to a subject, concurrent power with the national government. Thus, in the United States it is possible to obtain uniformity in many matters simply by Congress enacting a law which under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution supersedes state law. If there is no government having supreme or superior power over the other legislative bodies involved, this method, uniformity by direction, is not an available choice. Thus, in the international world where

Iraq is currently building a political system on new bases, and its political leaders are re-building the state based on new visions and foundations. These new visions were reflected first in the administrative system. administrative system, which has never been seen before, federal system of federalism), which is a very advanced picture of federal systems and broad administrative administrative decentralization. foundations of this new administrative system have been laid down in the country's permanent constitution (Constitution of 2005), article 1 of which states: The Republic of Iraq is a federal state. ..)) , And as far as the administrative function, the competencies exercised are the competencies granted to the federal authorities and regions and governorates not organized in a region. It is known that in the Federative Union, each state or region has its own reconciliation, which may be compatible or contrary to the interests of another state or territory. To dissolve these differences and differences, each unit of the Federation waives part of its rights and privileges for the continuation of the Union State . These are rules applicable to the distribution of jurisdiction in the federal system in general. To take account of these considerations, the federal constitution usually includes a distribution of competencies between the federal government and local governments and common terms of reference.

Gender inequalities and social exclusions in community-based forest management have garnered attention, particularly in South Asia. Yet, framings that homogenize women and marginalized groups fail to capture the nuanced processes by which such exclusions occur. Despite provisions for women in local community management institutions, numerous constraints hinder their active participation in forest governance. Understanding participation in JFM requires attention not only to gender, but also to the diversified interests and experiences women hold and the unequal power relations in which they are enmeshed. Based on 85 semi- structured interviews with women and men farmers, JFM committee members, local authorities, NGO staff and Forest Department officials, we explore emic perspectives of how social differentiation shapes participation in JFM. We compare the situation in Karnataka, a wealthier Indian state that is considered exemplary for JFM, with that in Madhya Pradesh, a poorer Indian state inhabited by tribal populations, where JFM is poorly functional. We show that exclusions in Uttara Kannada occur along gender and caste lines, whereas among tribal groups in Mandla, women of certain ethnicities are particularly disadvantaged in JFM despite their extensive forest use. Grouping marginalized groups into homogeneous categories (e.g. as Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes), as do Indian laws addressing tribal issues, deters focus from the inequalities that occur among groups, and from their relevance in shaping local experiences. Place-based environmental and political economic histories further shape local interests and participation in JFM. We argue that a focus on gender is necessary but not sufficient to understand social exclusions in JFM, and that gender must be understood in relation to other factors of social differentiation.

Decentralisation is commonly defended on the grounds that it will bring government closer to people, thereby creating political structures that are more transparent and accountable to poor and marginal groups in society. However, a problem that is well recognised in the decentralisation literature is that the devolution of power will not necessarily improve the performance and accountability of local government. Indeed, in many cases, decentralisation simply empowers local elites to capture a larger share of public resources, often at the expense of the poor. Reflecting on these relatively long-standing problems, an important strand of scholarship has argued that central government can play a central role in counterbalancing the forces that tend to disfavour the poor. In this article, we aim to inform this scholarship by reflecting on the interface between local government and local people in two Indian States: Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Madhya Pradesh (MP). Drawing upon 12 months of primary research, we argue that although the government of AP did not devolve power to the extent that proponents of decentralisation would have liked, its populist approach to certain forms of poverty reduction empowered the poor in ways that the more ambitious decentralisation agenda in MP did not. This, we argue, was due in part to the fact that MP's decentralisation process failed to challenge the well-entrenched power of the village chiefs, the sarpanches. But the discrepancy can also be explained in terms of the historical evolution of ‘development populism’ in AP. In particular, we argue that the strong performance of programmes aimed at subsidising rice for low income households and providing credit to women's ‘self-help groups’ (SHGs) was part of the State government's wider political strategy of enhancing and maintaining electoral support among women, scheduled castes and the poor.

Structural and social inequalities are determinants of poor human development outcomes in low- and middle-income countries. In a quasi-experimental, regression discontinuity design study, we examined associations of affirmative action in local governments for a historically marginalized group in India with health and education outcomes, using administrative health data, primary data in schools, and interviews. Exposure was 60 village clusters with, and nonexposure was 60 village clusters without, local leadership reserved for scheduled caste (SC) in 2021 local elections. Primary outcomes were infant mortality rate (IMR) and student test scores. Secondary outcomes were prenatal visits, mother tetanus vaccinations, prenatal supplement, infant vaccination, and teacher engagement in schools. Groups did not differ on socioeconomic, geographic, and service delivery indicators in 2020 (baseline). In 2023, 2.5 y after elections, exposure village clusters had lower IMR (0.46 IRR; [0.30 to 0.69]; P < 0.001), and exposure village clusters had significantly higher odds of two prenatal visits, two tetanus vaccinations, and prenatal supplement received by the second trimester. Exposure was not associated with maternal care in the first trimester or infant vaccination. Exposure was not associated with test scores, but teacher engagement was lower in exposure village clusters. Exposure group leaders reported higher discrimination than nonexposure group, and in follow-up interviews, they described more difficulty in working with teachers. Affirmative action in local governments in India predicted greater infant survival and improved prenatal health services, indicating benefits of addressing structural inequities. Lack of benefits for education outcomes might reflect social inequity of discrimination experienced by SC leaders.

States and localities play a critical role in bringing the United States into compliance with its international human rights commitments. The human rights framework embraces the importance of local decision making and implementation, as well as a significant role for subnational incorporation of human rights obligations. Realization of human rights in affected communities requires strong cooperation and collaboration among local, state, and federal governments, and between government and civil society (Melish 2009). Moreover, state and local implementation of human rights may eventually help influence national policy and broader acceptance of international human rights norms (Burroughs 2006, 420–24; Davis 2008a, 436; Powell 2001, 249; Resnik 2006, 1581; Soohoo and Stoltz 2008, 475). Indeed, human rights treaties are intended to be implemented at the local level with a great deal of democratic input. They provide mechanisms and opportunities for reporting on conditions within communities (both positive and negative), training government officials and agencies as well as the community to promote equality and nondiscrimination, conducting hearings to explore and examine the relevance of findings by international treaty bodies, and issuing recommendations for future action. They also provide a set of standards that local governments should adhere to in administering their own laws and policies. Subnational implementation of human rights, particularly in areas traditionally reserved for state and local regulation, is also consistent with the U.S. federalist system.

For formerly excluded and marginalised people at the grassroots level of politics, the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act has opened up previously unimaginable doors of opportunity. Because of the 73rd Amendment, scheduled castes have gained representation in panchayats; nonetheless, they were unable to participate in decision-making, which is reserved for upper and middle castes. The numerical or percentage representation of dalits at the grassroots level is the most frequently used criterion for assessing their political participation in India. This does not foster proper comprehension since representation, in and of itself, does not provide evidence of participation in a meaningful way. It is pointless for them to participate at the panchayat level unless the institutions in which they participate accept them openly and give them the authority to exercise influence over the outcome of the decision, thereby promoting their integration into mainstream society. Against this backdrop, the primary objective of this research is to identify the impact of political participation on the processes of changing the trajectories of social interaction among dalits at the grassroots level.

This paper examines the local government practice under the federal system of government in Nigeria. It highlights the performance of local government system in Nigeria as a federal entity. It accounts for the circumstances which underline the performance of the local government system in Nigeria and the impact on its efficiency and effectiveness. The secondary method of collecting data has been adopted in this paper and data collected were subjected to further documentary analysis. David Easton’s systems theory is employed as the theoretical framework. The findings reveal that because the practice of federalism in Nigeria has failed to take into account the heterogeneous composition of its peoples, it adopted a uniform system of local government which has failed to make impact on the people within their localities. The paper recommends enthronement of genuine and practical democratic federal cultures across the country and a fundamental review of the laws that created the Nigerian local government system with a view to evolving fewer but stronger local governments that are relatively independent, functional and adapted to meet peculiar local needs.

With state and federal governments undergoing a continual reduction of funds, Congress and legislators, administrators, and citizen groups are searching for ways to stretch the public dollar without harmful results. Programs based on categorical eligibility rather than individual need, such as Social Security and Medicare, are under scrutiny to determine if assistance should be available primarily to those who could not otherwise afford them. Such discussions not only involve the issue of targeting but quickly evolve to the question of which group or groups to target and how they should be defined and identified. Under the system of federalism, grants provided by the federal government to the states have frequently required a targeting mechanism, sometimes for social reasons, often for financial ones. An examination of the actions and reactions in the targeting process can offer insight into the legislative and administrative difficulties in designing and implementing targeting procedures. Following the evolution of one program from a completely categorically based program to a more target-based program can further show the political implications of changing an existing system serving a primarily middle-class client population to one which offers preference to a low-income, minority group. Federal Grant Programs Formula grants, revenue sharing, and block grants are terms for the granting of money with the stipulations that the applicant formulates a plan, agrees to have the program reviewed in light of the plan, and agrees to have the funds audited. Writers of legislation employ grant programs to solicit cooperation rather than using straight appropriations with penalties for nonperformance. Ingram (1977) reports that legislation containing grants is also likely to contain vague objectives, which, coupled with the grant dollars, are designed to entice compliance; the inclusion of guidelines for the denial or recall of a grant in the legislation would be incompatible with the intent. Therefore, large federal grants are distributed to local governments without specific priorities being mandated. Although each program has a different method of distributing local control and allowing for wide discretion, the federal government retains some measure of power in all of them. However, Browne (1980) states that the granting agency's usual participation after the grant has been issued is that of a consultant upon request. Anagnoson (1980) proposes that targeting by formula grants, which are usually more reflective of the general population than the target population, is a difficult task. He blames this on the compromises at the congressional level that create a distributional pattern designed to please everyone, even those without a significant portion of the target group in their constituencies. Williams (1980) asserts that the implementation and administration of the distribution of benefits create an environment of conflict in compliance. He discusses formula grants going beyond a mathematical process to hinge on interpretation of target groups and geographic areas. Often these formulas are created or influenced in congressional legislation, or under administrative rule, because of pressure from interest groups. What is seen at the local level as heavy-handed mandates from the federal level may in fact be a reaction to demands from these groups. The compliance problem is compounded by the reluctance (Benton and Morgan, 1986) of state and local governments to commit themselves to redistributive programs. Because locally based governments are more interested in generating a tax base, which depends on the wealthy staying that way, the authors cite several studies that support the tendency of state and local governments to be more reluctant than the national government to target benefits to low-income persons. A comparison of programs by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1981) based on the targeting of services to minorities with strong, moderate, and weak federal guidelines also concluded that the capacity of federal grants to effect local change is dependent on the extent to which goals are shared, and political and economic resources exist. …

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) offers a transformative approach to social research by prioritizing community participation, local knowledge, and collective problem-solving. Unlike conventional top-down methods, PRA empowers marginalized groups to identify issues and co-create solutions. This chapter examines PRA as a methodology for advancing social justice research, with reference to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in India. It discusses how PRA tools—such as social mapping, resource mapping, and seasonal calendars—can illuminate exclusion, governance, and development challenges among Scheduled Castes, women, and the rural poor. Drawing on case studies and secondary literature, the chapter highlights methodological innovations, ethical challenges, and strategies to ensure genuine participation. By linking PRA to participatory action and decolonial research paradigms, it argues that PRA strengthens both democratic engagement and accountable local governance in the Global South.

The West German health and social services: A comparison with their British equivalents

Much of the research on the distribution of federal assistance focuses on the activities of members of Congress. Yet it has been long understood that seeking and receiving federal aid programs by state and local governments is a costly activity. What is not understood nor carefully studied is how local jurisdictions attempt to "work" the federal aid system to obtain increased federal funding. To investigate this question, we draw upon theories of collective action among governmental jurisdictions within metropolitan areas to explain both the quantity and quality of participation in the federal aid system. We focus on four questions: (1) To what extent is governmental fragmentation and interjurisdictional collaboration among governmental jurisdictions within metropolitan areas positively related to the ability of local actors to secure new federal grant awards? (2) To what extent do congressional delegations that represent voters within metropolitan areas influence the flow of grant awards to those areas? (3) To what extent are the efforts of congressional delegations to secure new grants conditional on partisan factors, both nationally and at the local level? (4) Do the effects of cooperative grant seeking endeavors vary across different types of grant programs? The single most important finding is that interlocal cooperation and governmental structure within metropolitan areas matter significantly in the distribution of federal assistance.

In 1999, Switzerland made good its pledge by writing sustainable development into its Constitution. Different strategies and programs are going on to promote Agenda 21-like processes. In July 2005, just 4% of municipalities were involved in the process, though this does represent 29% of the population. In Switzerland, under the country’s federal system, local authorities have for a long time enjoyed considerable autonomy and, under the Swiss system of direct democracy, citizens are able to participate more fully in all political decision-making than in other countries. In the longer term, the aim of the National Sustainable development Strategy is to include sustainable development in all the policies and activities of public authorities.