Information Assurance: A National Policy Struggling With Implementation

The article analyzes the existing legal mechanisms for managing critical information infrastructure in Ukraine. The instruments for their improvement are proposing in this article. An important component of critical infrastructure is its information component – a critical information infrastructure. The sphere of protection of critical information infrastructure in Ukraine is at the initial stage of formation. The current legislation defines only certain objects of socio-economic sphere, in which extraordinary events can lead to socially dangerous consequences. In view of the fact, that the term “critical information infrastructure” does not having a consistent interpretation in different countries, we propose our opinion. “Critical information infrastructure is a system of information management of critical facilities and information and communication networks that provide defense capabilities and security of public and private institutions, whose operation may flow to the national security of Ukraine” (KII). In the KII we can identified information and network components. Information environment of KII is a system for information management of critical objects, including computing and information resources that form automated control systems (ACS). The network component of KII consists of a set of telecommunication devices, communication lines and network equipment, systems of open protocols for the exchange of information between elecommunication devices, global system of digital addresses and digital identifiers, software. The Internet network can be considered as a technological add-on over a telecommunication network that provides the provision of data transmission and processing services (e-mail, teleconferencing, file transfer, access to computing and information systems in local area networks). The main threat to the safety of ACS of critical information infrastructure objects is targeted actions on information systems, information and telecommunication networks by software and hardware. KII legal security include two main components – national and international. The national component may be forming by a set of principles, legal institutions and norms, which are enshrined in the national legislation regulating public relations in Ukraine in the area of counteracting the security threats of the ACS of critical objects. In order to protect the most important objects of KII, it is necessary to identify these objects. The current legislation defines such categories of objects, for which special conditions for ensuring their protection and functioning are established. Some of them, in whole or in part, may be classifying as objects of critical infrastructure. The specificity of providing information security was reflecting in such Ukraine laws like “On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, “On the Concept of the National Program of Informatization”, “On the National Program of Informatization”. As well as the Concept of Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Strategy of Cybersecurity Of Ukraine. The National Security Strategy identifies actual threats to national security and sets priorities for information security, cyber security and security of information resources and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the implementation of the state policy in the field of security of KII requires the further development of legal principles and norms governing the relevant social relations, that is, the national component of the legal security of KII. Ukraine should ensure the establishment of a nationwide system for assessing risks and threats to critical infrastructure, and after the legislative definition of the main terms, the implementation of the Identification of Critical Information Infrastructure objects. Identification of objects of critical information infrastructure can be accomplishing by introducing the certification of objects of critical information infrastructure. Such passports must contain general data about the facility, data on the main sources of danger, data on hazardous natural conditions, technological processes and response to threats. The international component of the legal security of KII provides for the regulation of a set of principles and norms defined by international treaties and recognized by the state, regulating issues of international cooperation in this area. Ukraine has signed the Convention on Cybercrime together with the member states of the Council of Europe and other States. It is aiming at stopping actions against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data, as well as abusing such systems, networks and data by installing the criminal responsibility for such behavior, the provision of powers sufficient to combat criminal offenses, and the conclusion of agreements on rapid and reliable international cooperation. In addition, the plan of measures for 2017 on implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine provides for the implementation of Directive 2008/114/EC on the protection of critical infrastructure, in particular on cybersecurity and cyber defense of critical infrastructure objects. Development of the system of international information security, the following main groups of international relations that requirenormative legal regulation within the framework of the legal security of KII: definition of the boundaries of the national KII in the global information and communication infrastructure and fixing signs of computer incidents in the control system of critical objects information infrastructure. The absence of generally recognized borders of state sovereignty of States in this space is a significant obstacle to the application of international law to the actions of other states. In particular, this impedes the establishment of limits of responsibility of states for violating the security of the KII and organizing international cooperation in the field of countering computer crime. The urgency of the legislative consolidation of signs of computer incidents in the automated control system of critical information infrastructure objects suggests the widespread use of the concept of “incident” in international law. An incident in cyberspace usually associated with a violation of the functioning of the components of cyberspace – an electronic collection environment and automated processing of information that determines the processes of the implementation of these operations, as well as information systems and automated control systems. The essence of the general definition of the “international incident” in the field of KII will be determining, firstly, by the nature of international relations between states that are violating by the “incident”. This event may be the result of unforeseen actions of the state, including actions that harm the interests of public bodies of one or more states, or, conversely, be one of many intentional but minor provocations carried out by agents of one state against another state. Given that international relations in the field of incidents in the field of KII are not regulating by international treaties, the main and, in fact, the only source of international law in this case serves as an international custom, however, its application to the sphere of KII is accompanying by considerable difficulties. For Ukraine, it is possible to introduce the positive experience of other states in the security of the KII. In particular, the problem of security of information technologies has been enshrined in the international standard ISO / IEC 15408 “General criteria for assessing the safety of information technology”.

BackgroundAn estimated 214 million women have unmet need for family planning in developing regions. Improved utilization of the private sector is key to achieving universal access to a range of safe and effective modern contraceptive methods stipulated by FP2020 and SDG commitments. Until now, a lack of market data has limited understanding of the private sector’s role in increasing contraceptive coverage and choice.MethodsIn 2015, the FPwatch Project conducted representative outlet surveys in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and DRC using a full census approach in selected administrative areas. Every public and private sector outlet with the potential to sell or distribute modern contraceptives was approached. In outlets with modern contraceptives, product audits and provider interviews assessed contraceptive market composition, availability, and price.FindingsExcluding general retailers, 96% of potential outlets in Ethiopia, 55% in Nigeria, and 41% in DRC had modern contraceptive methods available. In Ethiopia, 41% of modern contraceptive stocking outlets were in the private sector compared with approximately 80% in Nigeria and DRC where drug shops were dominant. Ninety-five percent of private sector outlets in Ethiopia had modern contraceptive methods available; 37% had three or more methods. In Nigeria and DRC, only 54% and 42% of private sector outlets stocked modern contraceptives with 5% and 4% stocking three or more methods, respectively. High prices in Nigeria and DRC create barriers to consumer access and choice.DiscussionThere is a missed opportunity to provide modern contraception through the private sector, particularly drug shops. Subsidies and interventions, like social marketing and social franchising, could leverage the private sector’s role in increasing access to a range of contraceptives. Achieving global FP2020 commitments depends on the expansion of national contraceptive policies that promote greater partnership and cooperation with the private sector and improvement of decisions around funding streams of countries with large populations and high unmet need like Ethiopia, Nigeria, and DRC.

As new technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) are integrated into Critical National Infrastructures (CNI), new cybersecurity threats emerge that require specific security solutions. Approaches used for analysis include the modelling and simulation of critical infrastructure systems using attributes, functionalities, operations, and behaviours to support various security analysis viewpoints, recognising and appropriately managing associated security risks. With several critical infrastructure protection approaches available, the question of how to effectively model the complex behaviour of interconnected CNI elements and to configure their protection as a system-of-systems remains a challenge. Using a systematic review approach, existing critical infrastructure protection approaches (tools and techniques) are examined to determine their suitability given trends like IoT, and effective security modelling and analysis issues. It is found that empirical-based, agent-based, system dynamics-based, and network-based modelling are more commonly applied than economic-based and equation-based techniques, and empirical-based modelling is the most widely used. The energy and transportation critical infrastructure sectors reflect the most responsive sectors, and no one Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) approach – tool, technique, methodology or framework – provides a ‘fit-for-all’ capacity for all-round attribute modelling and simulation of security risks. Typically, deciding factors for CIP choices to adopt are often dominated by trade-offs between ‘complexity of use’ and ‘popularity of approach’, as well as between ‘specificity’ and ‘generality’ of application in sectors. Improved security modelling is feasible via; appropriate tweaking of CIP approaches to include a wider scope of security risk management, functional responsiveness to interdependency, resilience and policy formulation requirements, and collaborative information sharing between public and private sectors.

Not a panacea: private-sector engagement in adaptation and adaptation finance in developing countries

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

Any national defense is dependent on the efficacy of the available physical infrastructure. Whatever degrades infrastructure, structurally, physically, architecturally, or aesthetically, is of interest to the nation. Climate change is now a major significant factor of interest impinging on national critical infrastructure. The devastating effects of climate change have increasing pervasiveness throughout the world. The impact on critical infrastructure is of particular interest to researchers. In consonance with ASCE-ASME's special issue on critical infrastructure protection and resilience, this paper presents a systems-modeling approach for critical infrastructure and predictions in relation to climate change agreements in COP26. The paper addresses high-level critical systems-based assessment of the social, legal, economic, and technical nuances impinging on the viability of COP26 agreements. The paper was written using a multi-national collaboration approach. The specific focus of national defense is used as the backdrop for the methodology of the paper.

The objective of this paper is to provide a strategic framework for a secure cyberspace in developing countries, taking cognisance of the realities and constraints within a developing milieu; and to discuss if the risk of cyber warfare and related techniques against developing countries should be addressed within ‘The Framework'. Cybersecurity policies and related strategies are required for developing countries in order to effectively safeguard against cyber related threats (the same as for developed countries). These policies and strategies for developing countries will differ from those of developed countries due to the unique realities within a developing world. Africa in specific is presently seen as a hotbed for cybercrime, and one of the reasons is that many African countries do not have a proper framework, policies and procedures to properly protect cyberspace. Experience has also shown that a pure adoption by developing countries of the cyber frameworks of developed nations will not always be effective, especially due to the unique requirements and realities within developing worlds, such as limited resources, infrastructure, technologies, skills and experience. It is also necessary when talking about a strategic framework to secure cyberspace, to discuss cyber warfare, its general application and its possible utilisation as part of the strategy to protect national critical information infrastructure. This, as part of a developing country's national security strategy in addition to traditional cybersecurity defence measures. The approach taken for the research program, and discussed in this paper, is based on a comprehensive literature study on several existing cybersecurity policies and strategies from both developed and developing countries. From this the drivers / elements for national cybersecurity policies and strategies were identified. These drivers were than adapted to specifically relate to the requirements of developing countries, and then, utilising the identified and adapted drivers, our strategic framework for developing countries to secure their cyberspace was developed. This document will be very useful for those African countries venturing into defining relevant policies and procedures.

The article analyzes modern features of state policy in the field of critical infrastructure protection. Attention is focused on the need for institutional transformations in the direction of improving efficiency, transparency, responsibility and responding to new security challenges in the conditions of a hybrid war with the Russian Federation. The practice of protecting critical infrastructure facilities in developed countries has been studied. It was determined that its priority is the actualization of the predicate of stability of critical infrastructure objects. The content of normative and legal acts of Ukraine in this area was analyzed. A number of provisions have been identified that allow the adjustment of the domestic security doctrine to the European vector of stability. Within the perspective of the development of the concept of sustainability, the intention of «critical infrastructure stakeholders» is substantiated. This opens up the prospects of creating transparent conditions for ensuring the annihilation of state institutions of power, state protection systems, the private sector, educational and scientific institutions and other stakeholders of critical infrastructure to the National System of Critical Infrastructure Protection at the next levels of management. The possible levels of such cooperation are determined. Modern scientific works were analyzed, which studied the prospects of changing the paradigm of protection and stability to the paradigm of resilience. The complex of institutional transformations is proposed to be expanded due to the application within the framework of the functioning of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection System of the process of determining and analyzing the range of risks that the country faces in the spheres of critical infrastructure functioning. The transformation of institutional protection systems is considered through the prism of systemic determinants, among which physical protection and defense, cyber protection and defense, preventive measures of protection and defense, and an educational and scientific approach are highlighted. The system of organization at the state level of conducting regular interdisciplinary trainings on the operational response to emergency situations at facilities has been studied. It is proposed to increase clarity in the delineation of responsibility for project threats and to strengthen control over compliance with the systematicity of interdisciplinary training. On the basis of the extrapolations of scientists' hypotheses and the results of the author's research, a proposal was made to systematize the main proposals for institutional transformations in the direction of increasing the effectiveness of the state policy for the protection of critical infrastructure in the form of a Preventive concept of resilience of critical infrastructure objects.

The link between national security and the protection of critical infrastructure is vital to the progress of any society and its proper social functioning. The term critical infrastructure was developed by the United States in the 1990s and it has evolved in time; nowadays, most of the current definitions include the security dimension in their content. Along with its many benefits, the technological advancement has brought with it the diversification of threats that could lead to the malfunctioning of critical infrastructures. The new weapons of the 21st century and the new asymmetric threats constitute real dangers to the good functioning of every critical infrastructure. Once they may be interrupted, the normal functioning of the whole society would be endangered because of the domino effects it causes. In this article we will look at how the link between critical infrastructure and national security is reflected in national regulations and crisis scenarios, highlighting the main strengths and the existing legislative gaps along with discussing their applicability.

: Among the leading concerns surrounding Homeland Security in the United States is Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Identifying, prioritizing, and providing for the protection of infrastructure so vital to the United States that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters is one of the most compelling issues facing the Department of Homeland Security, its interagency partners, state and local governments, and the private sector. On 25 May 2004, the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a senior symposium dedicated to examining the United States' evolving strategies for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in our country. The forum brought together a distinguished panel of seven retired generals and senior civilian officials, from both the public and private sectors, all actively involved in homeland security issues. The immediate intent of the symposium was to gather insights on the directions taken by these strategies for use in future studies, wargames and syllabus development addressing the changing face of homeland security. At the same time, the Center hoped to use the insights as a springboard for an expanded symposium on CIP, In Support of the Common Defense, which took place at Collins Hall on from 25-26 August. By extension, the War College hoped to contribute in the search for the surest path to the inherently complex end of critical infrastructure protection.

This paper focuses on CIP (Critical infrastructure Protection) and posits an approach to implementing it following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11). While the phrase ‘Critical infrastructure Protection’ is used frequently in government, academia, the private sector, and within the NATO alliance, there are many different approaches and constructs to the topic. What is clear is that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed how organizations defined Critical infrastructure and what strategies were used to protect it.

While the Private sector's role has been prominent in climate change mitigation, it is considered as an emerging stakeholder in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Furthermore, climate change adaptation opportunities including innovations of products and services have also been opening up a new door to the Private sector in recent years. In order to fill the global adaptation gap, there is an urgent need to accelerate these innovations of Private sector. In this chapter, after summarizing the trend of climate change adaptation with actual examples, and clarifying the role of the private sector in climate change adaptation, solutions to narrow the global adaptation gap are discussed within the private sector context. Further, innovation and technology management theory are described from the corporate management perspective. To accelerate innovation in the private sector, a new framework linking to the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) is offered

Best practices, policy and innovations in the administration of healthcare in developing communities and countries. For administrators, academics, researchers and policy leaders. Includes peer reviewed research papers. Edited by Dr. Judith Shamian, President Emeritus, International Council of Nurses, Professor and Co-investigator with the Nursing Health Services Research Unit, Lawrence S. Bloomberg Faculty of Nursing, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON

The increasing sophistication of cyber threats targeting U.S. national security, critical infrastructure, and financial systems necessitates a proactive, AI-driven cybersecurity strategy. Traditional security models relying on perimeter-based defenses are insufficient against state-sponsored attacks, ransomware, and advanced persistent threats (APTs). This paper explores the transformative potential of cloud-based artificial intelligence (AI) and Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in fortifying U.S. cybersecurity and mitigating foreign threats. Cloud-based AI enhances threat detection, real-time anomaly identification, and automated incident response by leveraging machine learning (ML), deep neural networks, and behavioral analytics. These models analyze vast amounts of network telemetry data, endpoint activities, and encrypted communications to detect evolving attack vectors with unprecedented accuracy. By incorporating federated learning and AI-driven deception techniques, cybersecurity frameworks can proactively predict and neutralize cyber threats before they materialize. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) further strengthens national security by enforcing continuous authentication, micro-segmentation, and least-privilege access controls. Unlike traditional models, ZTA operates under the assumption that no entity—internal or external—should be inherently trusted. By integrating cloud-native security solutions with identity-centric AI models, organizations can mitigate insider threats, secure critical infrastructure, and ensure compliance with federal cybersecurity directives. This paper examines real-world applications of AI and ZTA in national defense, critical infrastructure protection, and supply chain security, addressing implementation challenges, ethical concerns, and future research directions. The findings highlight how cloud-driven AI and Zero Trust policies are essential in safeguarding the U.S. against cyber warfare, foreign espionage, and next-generation cyber threats.

The private sector's role in public sector genetically engineered crop projects